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CLE 
The University of Kentucky College of Law. Office of Continuing Legal Education (UK/CLE) was organized 
in 1973 as the first pennanently staffed. full time continuing legal education program in the Commonwealth of 
Kentucky. It endures with the threefold purpose: 1) to assist lawyers in keeping abreast of changes in the law; 
2) to develop and sustain practical lawyering skills; and 3) to maintain a high degree of professionalism in the 
'practice of law. Revenues from seminar registrations and publication sales allow the Office to operate as a 
separately budgeted. self-supporting program of the College. No tax dollars or public funds are used in the 
operation of UK/CLE. 
Seminars 
UK/CLE provides a variety of convenient. practical seminars to satisfY' the continuing legal education 
needs oflawyers. Seminars range from half-day programs in selected areas to in-depth programs extending over 
several days. While most seminars are conducted at the College of Law in Lexington. UK/CLE has a longstanding 
statewide commitment. Since its first year of operation. beginning with a crirninallaw seminar in Madisonville. 
Kentucky. the Office has continued to bring high-quality continuing legal education to attorneys in every region 
of Kentucky. 
Publications 
Each seminar is accompanied by extensive speaker-prepared course materials. These bound course 
materials are offered for sale following seminars and are conSistently regarded as valuable. affordable references 
for lawyers. 
Since 1987. UK/CLE has produced a series of Practice Handbooks and Monographs. Each Practice 
Handbook is an extensively referenced. ftilly'indexed practice guide conSisting of separately authored chapters. 
allowing for the comprehensive coverage of a distinct body of law. Their fonnat permits updating through 
supplements and revised indexes. Each Monograph is a concisely written practice gUide. often prepared by a single 
author. designed to cover a topic of narrower scope than the Handbooks. They are convenient references on topics 
often not treated elsewhere. 
Professional Management 
UK/CLE serves the needs of the bar from its offices on the University of Kentucky campus in 
Lexington. Its staff manages course registrations. publication planning and editing. publication sales. seminar and 
publication marketing. publication composition and printing. and seminar content planning. as well as budgeting. 
accounting and financial reporting. As an "income based" program. UK/CLE's seminar tuitions and publication 
sales are budgeted to generate sufficient revenues for self support. 
Commitment to Quality and Creativity 
UK/CLE is a member of the Association of Continuing Legal Education Administrators (ACLEA). As 
such. UK/ CLE subscribes to the ACLEA Standards in Continuing Legal Education; and the Standards of Fair 
Conduct and Voluntary Cooperation administered under the auspices oftheAmerican Law Institute-American Bar 
Association Committee on Continuing Professional Education. Throughout its existence UK/CLE has been 
actively involved in the activities and services proVided by ACLEA. UK/CLE's association with national and 
international CLE professionals has afforded it the opportunity to continually reassess instructional methods. 
quality in publications. arid effective means of delivering CLE services at conSistently high levels of creativity and 
qUality. ' 
An Integral Part of the Legal Profession's Tradition Of Service 
An enonnous debt is owed to the judges. law professors. and practitioners who generously donate 
their time and talent to continuing legal education. Their knowledge and experience are the fundamental 
ingredients for our seminars and publications. Without their motivation and freely given assistance in dedication 
to a distinguished profession. high quality continuing legal education would not exist. 
As a non-profit organization. UK/CLE relies upon the traditional spirit of service to the profession that 
attorneys have so long demonstrated. We are constantly striving to increase attorney involvement in the continuing 
education process. If you would like to partiCipate as a volunteer speaker or Writer, please contact us and indicate 
your areas of interest and experience. ' 
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SECTION A 
A. OVERVIEW. 
As of March 3, 1994, 942 House Bills and 340 Senate Bills had been introduced in the 
1994 Session of the Kentucky General Assembly. No more House Bills may be introduced since 
the last day for introducing House Bills was March 2, 1994; the last day for Senate Bill 
introductions was March 4, 1994. Compared to the 1992 Session, 948 House and 431 Senate 
Bills were introduced. 
This outline contains summaries of 16 Senate Bills and 44 House Bills which had the 
following status as of March 3, 1994: 
Passed by General Assembly 
Directly Affect FI 
Of Interest to FI 
Passed by Either Senate or House 
Directly Affect FI 
Of Interest to FI 
Pending in Either Senate or House 
Directly Affect FI 
Of Interest to FI 
TOTAL: 
Senate Bills 
o 
o 
2 
1 
1 
13 
17 
House Bills 
2 
4 
1 
4 
7 
25 
43 
Bills passed during the 1994 General Assembly and not vetoed by the Governor will take 
effect ninety days after adjournment (approximately July 13, 1994) unless provided differently 
in the bill. 
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B. BILLS DIRECTLY AFFECTING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONSo 
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS REORGANIZATION 
Senate Bill 78 
Introduced by Senator Joseph U. Meyer 
This bill amends KRS 287.011 relating to organization of the Department of Financial 
Institutions and approves reorganization of the Department into three divisions: Law and 
Regulatory Compliance, Planning and Management and Supervision. 
This bill confirms a reorganization plan previously implemented by the Commissioner; 
it passed the House on January 25, 1994 and was posted in the Senate State Government 
Committee on March 1, 1994. 
ABANDONED PROPERTY/ESCHEAT * 
House Bill 79 
Introduced by Representative Marshall Long 
This bill, among other things, reduces the escheat period for bank demand deposits and 
the contents removed from safe deposit boxes from 10 to 7 years and non-demand deposits from 
25 to 7 years. 
The bill passed the House on February 13, 1994. A Senate Committee Substitute passed 
on February 28, 1994 and the bill was returned to the House which concurred in the Senate 
Substitute on March 3, 1994. 
BANK SHARES TAX 
House Bill 82 
Introduced by Representative Marshall Long 
This bill amends KRS 136.270 to provide that the fair cash value of bank shares may be 
determined in any manner by the Revenue Cabinet and repeals the present statutory formula for 
determining fair cash value method. 
This bill is currently in the House Appropriations and Revenue Committee 
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DEEDS OF TRUST 
House Bill 114 
futroduced by Representative Michael Bowling 
This bill amends KRS 381.190 to pennit sale of real estate covered by a deed of trust to 
be "pursuant to a power of sale clause" instead of pursuant to a court judgment and prescribes 
. the form which a deed of trust covering single or multi-family property must take. 
This bill passed the House on February 23, 1994, and is currently in the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. 
REAL ESTATE TRANSFER TAX * 
House Bill 157 
futroduced by Representative William Lear 
This bill amends KRS 142.050 to exempt from the real property transfer tax certain 
transfers by or to a trust so long as the transfer, if made by the grantor of the trust to the trust's 
beneficiaries, would have been exempt. 
This bill has passed the House and Senate and was delivered to the Governor on March 
1, 1994 for signing. 
LIEN INFORMATION SYSTEM 
House Bill 464 
futroduced by Representatives Ramsey Morris and James Bruce 
This bill adds new sections to KRS Ch. 14 and creates a lien information system in the 
Secretary of State's office who is responsible for developing and implementing and coordinating, 
on a statewide level, the strategic planning and regulations relating to the creation, operation and 
maintenance of the system and a master index listing all UCC filings as' well as motor vehicle, 
mobile home, boat and certain tax liens. 
In implementing the lien information system, the Secretary of State is authorized to, 
among other things, adopt administrative rules and regulations and require standardized 
information for entry into the system's master index. In short, the Secretary of State is charged 
with developing the procedures, acquiring the necessary computer hardware and software and 
otherwise implementing the system. 
Once the system is in place, filing of financing statements and perfection of security 
interests will remain unchanged. Secured parties will continue to file financing statements and 
other UCC documents with the local county clerks or in the Secretary of State's office depending 
upon the residency of the debtor and the type of collateral. The same is true with respect to 
notation of security interests relating to motor vehicles, mobile homes and boats required to be 
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titled in Kentucky. Perfection will continue to be done locally through the county clerk of the 
debtor's residence or where the motor vehicle is principally operated if the debtor is a non-
resident. The sole means of perfecting and discharging a security interest in such property will 
continue to be by notation on the title certificate. 
At the time a financing statement, other VCC document or title lien statement is filed, 
the local county clerk or Secretary of State is required to transmit the information contained in 
the documents, together with the date and time of filing, to the Secretary of State's office for 
inclusion in the master index. 
Following receipt in the Secretary of State's office, a written notice confirming the 
receipt of the information and reflecting all information received will, if requested by the secured 
party, be sent to the secured party of record or other lienholder. This will enable the secured 
party to determine if the information has been correctly recorded in the master index. 
At the time the system first becomes operable, searches of the master index for effective 
financing statements, lien notations and other VCC filings will be conducted by, and at the 
offices of, the local county clerks. Non-residents of Kentucky may request the Secretary of 
State's office to conduct the search. 
A report of the search (as of a specified date and hour) will be issued in the form of a 
certificate listing the file number, date, hour and filing location of each filing and the names and 
addresses of each secured party, lessor or consignor. Neither the county clerks nor the 
Secretary of State's office is, however, personally liable for any damage which may arise due 
to information furnished pursuant to the search which is subsequently shown to be inaccurate or 
incomplete, and House Bill 464 provides that any person obtaining information from the system 
should examine the individual filings referred to in the certificate for any legal reliance. 
It is contemplated that the system will be self supporting and funded by increases in the 
filing fees for most VCC documents, one· dollar of which will be credited to a trust fund and 
used to pay for the necessary start-up costs, software, hardware, maintenance and other costs 
of developing and operating the network. The fee for searching the master index will be fixed 
by administrative regulation. 
The system will come into existence as well as the increase in the VCC and other filing 
fees will take effect on the effective date of House Bill 464 in July, 1994. However, in order 
to provide sufficient time to implement the necessary computer programs and related matters, 
the system is not required to be operational until April 15, 1996. 
This bill was reported favorably by the House State Government Committee on February 
24, 1994, but was recommitted to the House Appropriations and Revenue Committee on March 
3, 1994. 
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RECORDING INSTRUMENTS IN COUNTY CLERK'S OFFICES 
House Bill 553 (See Senate Bill 176) 
Introduced by Representatives Thomas ~err and Arnold Simpson 
This bill amends KRS 382.335 to prohibit county clerks from recording "any instrument" 
unless it "complies with the official indexing system of the county, " which has been in existence 
for at least 24 months prior to the effective date of the Bill or which is implemented for the 
purpose of allowing computerized instrument searches. 
This bill was posted in the House Judiciary Committee on February 24, 1994. 
INSURANCE 
House Bill 599 
Introduced by Representative Steven Riggs 
This bill adds new sections to Subtitle 11 of KRS Ch. 304 authorizing the Commissioner 
of Insurance to issue cease and desist orders against persons violating provisions of Subtitle 11 
~. g., transacting unauthorized insurance) and providing for a hearing. 
GOVERNMENT INVESTMENTS 
House Bill 754 
Introduced by Representative Mark Farrow 
This bill amends KRS 66.480 to require local governments, including school districts, 
to obtain bids from at least three banks or savings and loan associations prior to investing monies 
in repurchase agreements or interest-Qearing deposits, i.~., opening bank accounts. 
This bill is currently in the House Counties and Special Districts Committee. 
MORTGAGE LOAN COMPANIES AND BROKERS 
House Bill 855 
Introduced by Representative Billy Ray Smith 
This bill amends KRS Ch. 294, relating to mortgage loan companies, by adding certain 
consumer protection provisions and, among other things, providing that anyone conducting a 
mortgage loan business without a license is guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine of not 
less than $500 nor more than $1,000. 
This bill was posted in the House Banking and Insurance Committee on March 3, 1994. 
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CREDIT CARD APPLICATIONS 
House Bill 892 
Introduced by Representative Ruth Ann Palumbo 
This bill creates a new section of KRS Ch. 367 to make it unlawful for a credit card 
issuer, or anyone acting under the insurer's direction, to knowingly send or distribute a credit 
card application to a minor. 
This bill is currently in the House Banking and Insurance Committee. 
, 
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C. BILLS IMPACTING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. 
PARTNERSHIPS 
Senate Bill 38 
Introduced by Senator Michael Moloney 
This bill authorizes a partnership to sue and be sued in the partnership name; it is 
currently in the Senate Judiciary Committee. 
FORFEITURE OF CORPORATE CHARTER 
Senate Bill 47 
Introduced by Senators Mike Moloney and Kelsey Friend 
This bill amends KRS Chs. 271B, 272, 273 and 274 to provide, among other things, for 
possible corporate charter forfeiture if a corporation or any officer or agent is convicted of 
bribery of a public servant. 
The bill passed the Senate on January 24, 1994 and is currently posted in the House 
Judiciary Committee. 
LINKED DEPOSIT LOAN PROGRAM 
Senate Bill 100 
Introduced by Senator Larry Saunders 
This bill establishes a linked deposit loan program. Lending institutions are" not required 
to participate in the program but may elect to do so. 
This bill has been recommitted to the Senate Appropriations and Revenue Committee. 
SECURITY SERVICES AND SECURITY OFFICERS 
Senate Bill 145 
Introduced by Senator Fred Bradley 
This bill creates new sections of KRS Ch. 15B to establish a licensing program for 
private security officers. 
This bill is currently in the Senate Judiciary Committee. 
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ELIMINATION OF MARGINAL NOTATIONS 
Senate Bill 163 
Introduced by Senator Nick Kafoglis 
This bill amends KRS 382.290 to eliminate marginal notation of assignments or releases 
of retained liens or mortgages in the county clerk's records and requires that such assignments 
or releases be by separate instrument. 
This bill in currently in the Senate Local Government Committee. 
RECORDING INSTRUMENTS IN COUNTY CLERKS' OFFICES 
Senate Bill 176 (See House Bill 553) 
Introduced by Senate Joseph U. Meyer 
This bill amends KRS 382.335 to prohibit county clerks from recording "any instrument" 
unless it "complies with the official indexing system of the county. " 
This bill is currently in the Senate Judiciary Committee. 
STATE DEPOSITORIES * 
House Bill 85 
Introduced by Representative Marshall Long 
I 
This bill amends KRS 41.070 to provide that the Revenue Cabinet may deposit tax 
receipts directly with a depository designated by the State Treasurer and transfers the abandoned 
property function currently in the Revenue Cabinet to the State Treasurer. 
This bill has passed the House and Senate and was delivered to the Governor on March 
1, 1994. 
INTEREST ON JUDGMENTS 
House Bill 160 
Introduced by William Lear 
This bill adds new sections to KRS Ch. 360 authorizing the court - not the jury - to 
award pre-judgment interest and amends KRS 360.040 to fix post judgment interest (now 12%) 
at a rate equal to the "prime" rate set by Federal Reserve Board in effect on December 5 of the 
year prior to the year the judgment is entered plus 2 % . The bill also permits recovery of 
attorney fees "in a contract action". 
This bill was posted in the House Judiciary Committee on January 11, 1994. 
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CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE TAX AND LIEN 
House Bill 171 
Introduced by Representatives Charles Geveden and Stan Cave 
This bill imposes tax upon dealers in marijuana and controlled substances and creates a 
lien upon the real and personal property of the dealer for payment of the tax and penalties. 
This bill was reported favorably by the House Appropriations and Revenue Committee 
on March 1, 1994. Posted for passage on March 4, 1994. 
DEEDS OF RELEASE 
House Bill 451 
Introduced by Representative Mark Farrow 
This bill amends KRS 382.020 to provide that no deed of release may be recorded unless 
it contains the names of both the mortgagor and mortgagee. 
This bill was posted in the House Judiciary Committee and reported favorably on March 
3, 1994. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT/RESTRICTING RECOVERY OF DAMAGES 
House Bill 454 
Introduced by Representative Billy Ray Smith 
This bill amends Section 54 of the Kentucky Constitution and authorizes the General 
Assembly to limit non-economic loss, punitive damages and non-pecuniary damages arising from 
injuries resulting in death or to a person or property. 
This bill in currently in the House Elections and Constitutional Amendments Committee. 
CREDIT CARDS 
House Bill 611 
Introduced by Louis Johnson 
This bill adds new sections to KRS Ch. 365 prohibiting a credit card application from 
being sent into the state unless it is expressly requested by the receiving consumer. 
This bill was posted in the House Banking and Insurance Committee on February 25, 
1994. 
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TESTAMENTARY ADDITIONS TO TRUSTS 
House Bill 623 
Introduced by Representative Richard Lewis 
This bill adds the "Unifonu Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act" to KRS Ch. 394 and 
penuits property to be transferred by will to a life insurance or other trust so long as the trust 
was established by a separate instrument executed before, concurrently with or after execution 
of the will. Moreover, the transfer is effective even though the trust is amendable or revocable 
or was amended after the execution of the will or the testator's death. 
This bill is currently posted in the House Judiciary Committee. 
COUNTY CLERK FEES 
House Bill 647 
Introduced by Representatives Marshall Long, Don Gedling, Ron Cyrus and June Lyne 
This bill amends KRS Chs. 64, 186 and 186A relating to fees payable to county clerks 
by establishing new fees or increasing present recording and other fees. 
This bill was posted in the House Appropriations and Revenue Committee on February 
28, 1994. 
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE 
House Bill 779 
Introduced by Representative Michael Dean Bowling 
This bill amends KRS 382.135 to delete requirements that a commissioner's foreclosure 
deed contain a statement of consideration; amends KRS 426.006 to prohibit the Commonwealth 
or any local government having an ad valorem tax lien from being named as defendants in 
foreclosure actions; and amends KRS 426.705 to clarify the bond requirements of purchasers 
at foreclosure sales. 
This bill was posted in the House Judiciary Committee on March 3, 1994. 
AUTHORIZATION OF TRUST AMENDMENTS 
House Bill 833 
Introduced by Representatives Jim LeMaster and Louis Johnson 
This bill creates a new section of KRS Ch. 386, relating to trusts, to establish methods 
of amending all types of trusts (other than charitable trusts) in order to enable the trust to qualify 
as a marital deduction trust or to take advantage of "any other federal or state income, estate, 
excise, or inheritance tax benefit." 
This bill was posted in the House Judiciary Committee on March 3, 1994. 
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D. BILLS OF INTEREST. 
INTEREST ON INCOME TAX REFUNDS 
Senate Bill 3 
Introduced by Senators John D. Rogers and Tom Buford 
This bill would require Kentucky income tax refunds to bear interest 60 (rather than 90) 
days after the return is filed. 
The bill is currently in the Senate Appropriations and Revenue Committee. 
INTANGmLE TAX 
Senate Bill 28 
Introduced by Senator Tom Buford 
This bill amends KRS 132.020 to reduce the ad valorem tax on intangibles from $.25 to 
$.10 per $100 of value over a three year period beginning January 1, 1995. 
This bill is currently in the Senate Appropriations and Revenue Committee. 
FALSE REGULATORY REPORTS 
Senate Bill 58 
Introduced by Senator Tom Buford 
This bill amends KRS 519.040 to make it a Class A misdemeanor to file a false report 
with a regulatory or administrative agency. 
This bill is currently in the Senate Judiciary .Committee. 
INHERITANCE AND ESTATE TAXES 
Senate Bill 102 (See House Bills 196 and 279) 
Introduced by Senators Richard L. Roeding, David L. Williams, Charlie Borders, Tom Buford, Lindy Casebier, Gene Huff, 
Dan Kelly, Virgil Moore, Tim Philpot, John Rogers and Gex Williams 
This bill repeals existing Kentucky inheritance tax and imposes a tax equal to the "federal 
credit: " 
This bill is currently in the Senate Appropriations and Revenue Committee 
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KENTUCKY CONSTITUTION/INTANGffiLE TAX 
Senate Bills 103 and 105 (See House Bills 156 and 219) 
mtroduced by Senators Richard L. Roeding, David L. Williams, Charlie Borders, Tom Buford, Lindy Casebier, Gene Huff, 
Dan Kelly, Virgil Moore, Tim Philpot, John Rogers, Gex Williams and Joseph U. Meyer 
These bills amend Kentucky's Constitution to exempt intangible personal property from 
taxation after January 1, 1995. 
These bills are currently in the Senate State Government Committee. 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 
Senate Bill 184 
mtroduced by Senator Fred Bradley 
This bill, among other things, creates KRS Ch. 175 relating to limited liability companies 
- taxed as partnerships but with the company's owners having the same limited liability as 
corporate shareholders. 
This bill passed the Senate on February 25, 1994 and was posted in the House Judiciary 
Committee on March 3, 1994. 
ELECTRONIC EDITION OF THE KENTUCKY REVISED STATUTES 
Senate Bill 301 (See House Bill 553) 
mtroduced by Senator Walter A. Baker 
This bill amends KRS 7.138 to permit the Legislative Research Commission to designate 
an electronic version of the statutes as an "official electronic version" upon certain conditions. 
The bill was posted favorably to the Consent Calendar by the Senate State Government 
Committee on 'March 3, 1994. 
LIVING WILL DIRECTIVE ACT 
Senate Bill 311 
mtroduced by Senator David K. Karem 
This bill repeals Kentucky's current Living Will Act (KRS 311.622 to 311.644) and 
Health Care Surrogate Act (KRS 311.970 to 311.986) and establishes a comprehensive living 
will statutory scheme relating to health care decisions. 
The bill is currently in the Senate Judiciary Committee 
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MECHANIC'S LIENS 
House Bill 9 
Introduced by Representatives Marshall Long. Jim Callahan and William Donnermeyer 
This bills amends KRS 376.010 to grant mechanic's lien rights to suppliers and lessors. 
This bill passed the House on February 24, 1994 and is currently in the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. 
MOTOR VEHICLE REGISTRATION * 
House Bill 19 
Introduced by Representative Jim Callahan 
This bill amends KRS 186A.035 to provide for joint/survivorship ownership of motor 
vehicle by husband and wife unless registration states to the contrary. 
This bill passed both the House and Senate. It was signed by the Governor on February 
24, 1994. 
LIABILITY FOR REAL PROPERTY TAX 
House Bill 20 
Introduced by Representative Frank Rasche 
This bill amends KRS 132.220 to provide that if real property is transferred after the tax 
assessment date (January 1), the transferee is obligated for payment of the tax and is considered 
to be the owner of the property from the date the tax become delinquent. 
This bill is currently in the House Appropriations and Revenue Committee. 
PAYMENT OF SALES AND INCOME TAXES * 
House Bill 80 
Introduced by Representative Marshall Long 
This bill permits the Revenue Cabinet to require taxpayers, whose average monthly 
liability for sales tax or income tax withholding exceeds $25,000, to pay the taxes by electronic 
fund transfer. 
This bill passed both the House and Senate. It was signed by the Governor on February 
11, 1994. 
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INCOME TAX * 
House Bill 107 
Introduced by Representative Marshall Long 
This bill incorporates the federal Internal Revenue Code in effect on December 31, 1993 
into Kentucky's income tax provisions (KRS Ch. 141). 
This bill passed both the House and Senate. It was delivered to the Governor on 
February 28, 1994 for signing. 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
House Bill 148 
Introduced by Representative Marshall Long 
This bill requires political contributions by individual contributors to a candidate or 
committee to be by single check - thereby prohibiting "bundling" of contributions. 
This bill was posted in the Elections and Constitutional Amendments Committee on 
February 25, 1994. 
KENTUCKY CONSTITUTION/INTANGffiLE TAX 
House Bill 156 (See House Bill 219 and Senate Bills 103 and 105) 
Introduced by Representatives William Lear, Kenneth Harper and Leslie Trapp 
This bill amends the Kentucky Constitution to exempt intangible property from taxation; 
it is currently in the House Elections and Constitutional Amendments Committee. 
STANDBY GUARDIANS * 
House Bill 173 
Introduced by Representative Gross Lindsay 
This bill creates a new section of KRS Ch. 387 to provide a procedure for appointment 
of a "standby" guardian to be appointed following disability. 
This bill passed the House on February 1, 1994 and the Senate on March 2, 1994; it was 
delivered to the Governor for signing on March 3, 1994. 
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LOANS BY KENTUCKY HOUSING CORPORATION 
House Bill 234 
Introduced by Representative Jim Wayne 
This bill amends KRS 198A.065, relating to the Kentucky Housing Corporation, 
expanding the Corporation's authority to participate in residential housing project loans. 
This bill passed the House on March 3, 1994 .. 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 
House Bill 255 (See Senate Bill 184) 
Introduced by Representatives Louis Johnson and Stan Cave 
This bill creates a new KRS Ch. 275 relating to limited liability companies and is 
currently in the House Judiciary Committee. 
The bill is currently in the House Judiciary Committee. 
OPEN RECORDS OF PUBLIC AGENCIES 
House Bill 274 
Introduced by Representatives William Donnermeyer and Denver Butler 
This bill amends KRS 61.872 to require public agencies to make an effort reasonably 
calculated to locate a public record if requested to do so. 
This bill was posted in the House State Government Committee on February 22, 1994. 
"GOING OUT OF BUSINESS" AND "FIRE" SALES 
House Bill 314 
Introduced by Representative Steven Riggs 
This bill creates new provisions in KRS Ch. 367 regulating "going out of business" and 
"fire" sales. 
This bill is currently in the House Business Organizations and Professions Committee. 
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ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS 
House Bill 322 
Introduced by Representative Rex Smith 
This bill amends or adds sections to KRS Ch. 13A revising the procedure for adoption 
of administrative regulations. 
This bill passed the House on February 15, 1994 and is currently in the Senate Economic 
Development and Tourism Committee. 
INHERITANCE AND ESTATE TAXES 
House Bill 372 
Introduced by Representatives Jim LeMaster, William Lear, Robert Damron, Drew Graham, Kenneth Harper, Dave Stengel, 
Leslie Trapp and Charlie Walton 
This bill enacts new sections ofKRS Ch. 140A (effective for estates and decedents dying 
after 1/1/98) which provides for 4.;.year phase-in of new "pick-up" tax, i.~., equal to "federal 
credit. " 
This bill is currently in the House Appropriations and Revenue Committee. 
CIVIL JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURTS 
House Bill 461 
Introduced by Representative Dave Stengel 
This bill amends KRS 24A.120 to increase the amount in controversy jurisdiction of 
District Courts from $4,000 to $10,000. 
This bill was posted in the House Judiciary Committee on February 24, 1994. 
GiFTS BY ATTORN'EY-IN-FACT 
House Bill 589 
Introduced by Representative Jim LeMaster 
This bill creates or amends sections of KRS Ch. 386 and 387 to authorize an attorney-in-
fact to make gifts of the principal's property to establish an estate plan and minimize taxes 
subject to certain conditions and appointment by the district court of any attorney to represent 
the principal. 
This bill passed the House on March 1, 1994; it was received in the Senate March 2, 
1994 and is currently in the House Judiciary Committee. 
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S~ULTANEOUSDEATH 
House Bill 615 
Introduced by Representative Richard Lewis 
This bill adds new sections of KRS Ch. 397 relating to presumptions in the event of 
simultaneous deaths unless the governing instrument deals explicitly with simultaneous deaths 
or common disasters. 
This bill was posted in the House Judiciary Committee on March 3, 1994. 
EXEMPTING PENSIONS FROM INCOME TAX 
House Bill 654 
Introduced by Representative Leslie Trapp 
This bill creates new sections of KRS. Ch. 141 exempting pension distributions for 
Kentucky income taxes over a five year period beginning with the 1994 tax year. 
This bill is currently in the House Appropriations and Revenue Committee. 
WAGE AND HOUR VIOLATION LIENS 
House Bill 660 
Introduced by Representative Mark S. Brown 
This bill creates new sections of KRS Ch. 337 to impose a lien upon an employer for the 
amount of any civil penalty assessed for wage and hour violations. The lien is superior to 
encumbrances created after recording and continues for ten years unless released. 
This bill was posted in the House Labor and Judiciary Committee on March 1, 1994 and 
reported favorably on March 3, 1994. 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH VIOLATION LIENS 
House Bill 661 
Introduced by Representative Mark S. Brown 
This bill creates new sections of KRS Ch. 338 to impose a lien upon an employer for the 
amount any penalty fixed for occupational safety and health violations. The lien is superior to 
encumbrances created after recording and continues for ten years unless released. 
This bill was posted in the House Labor and Industry Committee on March 1, 1994 and 
reported favorably on March 3, 1994. 
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BUSINESS ENTITIES 
House Bill 717 
Introduced by Representative Jim LeMaster 
This bill creates new sections of KRS Ch. 271B and 362 authorizing merger of Kentucky 
corporations with limited liability companies and limited partnerships and specifying the merger 
procedure. 
This bill was posted in the House Judiciary Committee on March 2, 1994. 
WAIVER OF RIGHTS PROHmITED 
House Bill 762 
Introduced by Representative Joe Barrows 
This bill creates new sections of KRS Ch. 336 prohibiting an employer from requiring, 
as a condition of employment, that an employee waive any right under Kentucky or federal law . 
This bill is currently in the House Labor and Industry Committee. 
DECEDENT'S ESTATES 
House Bill 910 
Introduced by Representative Arnold Simpson 
This bill amends KRS 395.455 to include surviving children as persons to whom assets 
of an estate may be distributed when administration of the estate is dispensed with. 
The bill is currently in the House Judiciary Committee. 
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS 
House Bill 924 
Introduced by Representative Tom Riner 
This bill amends various provisions of the Kentucky Revised Statutes making social 
. security numbers confidential and, among other things, prohibiting social security numbers from 
appearing on driver's licenses issued after July 1, 1995. 
This bill is currently in the House State Government Committee. 
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This outline is designed to provide general information on the subject matters covered. It is not 
intended to provide either a complete survey of all possible developments or a comprehensive 
explanation or analysis of those developments mentioned. Readers should consult the original 
source materials referenced. Furthermore, this outline is not intended nor should it be used as a 
substitute for specific legal advice or opinion. Finally, this outline is published with the 
understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal service. 
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Federal Legislative Developments 
I. Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 (Title XIII of the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993; Pub. L. 103-66). 
A. New section 6050P of the Internal Revenue Code created to 
impose information reporting requirements for any 
discharge of indebtedness over $600 after December 31, 
1993. 
B. Every financial institution described in IRS 5581 or 
591(a) must file a return with the IRS and provide a 
statement to the debtor whenever it discharges indebted-
ness of $600 or more. Banks, savings institutions, and 
credit unions included. 
C. Return is made "at such time and in such form as the 
Secretary may be regulations describe". 
D. contents of return to IRS: 
1. The name, address and TIN of each person whose 
indebtedness was discharged during the calendar 
year; 
2. The date of the discharge and the amount of the 
indebtedness discharged; 
3. Such other information as the Secretary may pre-
scribe. 
E. Statement To Be Given To Debtor: 
1. Any financial institution required to make a return 
for a discharge of indebtedness must furnish to 
each person whose name is set forth in the return a 
written statement showing: 
a. the name and address of the entity required to 
make the return; 
b. the information required to be shown on the 
return with respect to that person. 
2. Statement must be furnished on or before January 31 
of the year following the calendar year for which 
the return was made. 
F. Penalties For Failure To Comply. 
B-1 
1. Failure to file with the IRS is subject to the 
penalties of IRC §6274(d) (1) (B) for failing to file 
a correct information return. 
2. Failure to provide a debtor with a correct written 
statement is subject to the penalties of IRC 
§6274(d) (2) for failure to provide a correct payee 
statement. 
G. IRS promulgated temporary regulations on December 27, 
1993, and proposed them as the final regulations. See 58 
Fed. Reg. 68,301 and 68,307. Comment period on proposed 
final regulation expired February 25, 1994. 
1. Amount discharged must be broken down into inter-
est, principal, administrative costs, and fines. 
2. Must describe "origin of the indebtedness" (i.e., 
student loan, mortgage, credi t card, etc. ), and 
also an indication that the indebtedness was dis-
charged in bankruptcy, if known. 
3. Multiple discharges do not have to be aggregated to 
reach $600 threshold unless separate discharges 
"are pursuant to a plan to evade the reporting 
requirements." 
4 • Indebtedness considered discharged "upon the occur-
rence of an identifiable event indicating that the 
indebtedness will never have to be paid by the 
debtor, taking into account all the facts and 
circumstances". Identifiable event includes, but 
is not limited to, the following: 
a. discharge in bankruptcy; 
b. agreement between creditor and debtor to 
discharge; 
c. "A cancellation or extinguishment by operation 
of law that renders the debt unenforceable 
(such as the expiration of the statute of 
limitations for collection of the indebted-
ness)". 
Bookkeeping entry is not, of itself, an identifi-
able event, but it is a circumstances that may be 
taken into account in determining whether a dis-
charge has occurred. 
5. Wha t if the creditor does not know the TIN? It 
"must be requested of the debtor for purposes of 
meeting the requirements" of the regulation. 
B-2 
f \ 
! 
II. Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1993 (Pub. L. No. 103-94; 107 
stat. 1001). 
A. section 9 of the Act adds 5 U.S.C. §5520a relating to the 
.garnishment of federal employees' pay. 
B. §5520a(b): "Subject to the provisions of this section 
and the provisions of section 303 of the Consumer Credit 
Protection Act (15 U.S.C. §1673) pay from an agency to an 
employee is subject to legal process in the same manner 
and to the same extent as if the agency were a private 
person." 
C. Definitions: 
1. "agency" means "each agency of the Federal Govern-
ment" and specifically includes 
a. an "executive agency, except for the General 
Accounting Office"; 
b. "any .agency of the judicial branch of the 
Government"; and 
c. 1.lany agency of the legislative branch of the 
Government, including the General Accounting 
Office, each office of a Member of Congress, a 
committee of the Congress, or other office of 
the Congress; 
2. "employee' means "an employee of an agency (includ-
ing a Member of Congress as defined under section 
2106)" 
3. "legal process" means "any writ, order, summons, or 
other similar process in the nature of a garnish-
ment, that --
a. is issued by a court of competent jurisdiction 
within any State, territory, possession of the 
United States, or an authorized official 
pursuant to an order of such a court or pur-
suant to state or local law; and 
b. orders the employing agency of such employee 
to withhold an amount from the pay of such 
employee, and make a payment. of such withhold-
ing to another person, for a specifically des-
cribed satisfaction' of a legal debt of the 
employee, or recovery of attorney's fees, 
interest, or court costs." 
4. Procedure for serving "legal process": 
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a. May be by certified or registered mail, return 
receipt requested or by personal service. 
b. Served upon: 
(1) appropriate agent designated for receipt 
of such service of process pursuant to 
regulations issued under this section; or 
(2) the head of the agency, if no agent had 
been so designated. 
c. Must be accompanied by "sufficient information 
to permi t prompt identification of the 
employee and the payments involved." 
d. Agent properly served must respond: 
(1) to person serving legal process within 30 
days or such longer period as may be 
prescribed by applicable state law 
(2) give written notice that legal process 
has been served (together with a copy) to 
the affected employee within 15 days. 
5. Agencies not required to vary their normal pay and 
disbursement cycles in order to comply with any 
such legal process. 
6. If agency receives more than one legal process, 
priority is based on the time of service; except 
that process under 42 U.S.C. §659, 661 and 662 for 
the enforcement of employee's legal obligation to 
provide child support or make alimony payments have 
priority over earlier legal process. 
7. Regulations to be promulgated and the regulations 
"shall provide that an agency' s administrative 
costs in executing a garnishment action may be 
added to the garnishment, and that the agency may 
retain costs recovered as offsetting collections." 
8. Special rules integrating the statute with the 
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 for 
members of the uniformed services. 
9. Effective Date: 120 days after date of enactment 
(which was october 6, 1993). 
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III. Housing and community Development Act of 1992 (Pub. L. No. 
102-550). 
A. §933 of the Act creates a new statute regulating rebates 
in connection with consumer credit transactions and 
prohibiting the use of the "Rule of 78's" in calculating 
such rebates in certain cases. 
B. "If a consumer prepays in full the financed amount under 
any consumer credi t transaction, the credi tor shall 
promptly refund any unearned portion of the interest 
charge to the consumer". 
C. In calculating the amount of the rebate in a precomputed 
consumer credit transaction of a term exceeding 61 months 
which is consummated after september 30, 1993, the 
creditor "shall compute the refund based on a method 
which is at least as favorable to the consumer as the 
actuarial method." This prohibits the use of the Rule of 
78's. 
D. Any prepayment triggers the rebate provisions, including 
a prepayment for a financing or an acceleration due to a 
default or otherwise. 
E. No refund is required if the total refund would be less 
than one dollar. 
F. statute adopts the Truth In Lending Act's definitions of 
"consumer" and "creditor". See 15 U.S.C. §1502(h) and 
(f) • In addition, the statute expressly states that 
"creditor" includes any "assignee" and "subassignee" of 
any creditor. 
G. Credi tor required, upon oral or wri tten request, to 
provide a statement of (A) the amount necessary to prepay 
the account in full and (B) the amount of any refund. 
1. The statement must be provided before the end of 
the 5-day period b~ginning on the date the request 
is received. 
2. If the request is in writing, the statement must be 
in writing. 
3. A customer is entitled to receive one free annual 
statement, and the creditor may impose a reasonable 
fee to cover the cost of producing additional 
statements provided the charge is disclosed to the 
consumer in advance. . 
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Federal Administrative Developments 
I. Problems with Non-Insured Investment Products. 
A. OCC issues on February 24, 1993, new §413 (Retail 
Nondeposit Investment Sales) for the Comptroller's 
Handbook for National Bank Examiners to supersede 
guidelines in Banking Circular 274 (7/19/93). section 
413 incorporates an Interagency Statement issued by the 
OCC, FRB, FDIC, and OTS on February 15, 1994. 
1. Agencies 
products 
products 
involves 
expect all banks dealing in uninsured 
to make it clear to customers that such 
are not FDIC insured and that the purchase 
possible risk to principal. 
2. Bank tellers are not to make specific recommenda-
tions about uninsured products and are not allowed 
to take customer orders for uninsured items. 
3. Bank should advertise uninsured products in a 
clearly different manner from insured products. 
4. Banks should obtain a signature from the customer 
acknowledging that the disclosures regarding the 
risks of investing in uninsured products are 
clearly understood. 
5. Banks are expected to ensure that sales recommenda-
tionsare suitable for a particular customer. 
6. Compensation of sales staff should be structured to 
protect the customer. 
B. Recent article in the March 1994 Consumer Reports 
magazine severely criticized bank involvement in the sale 
of mutual funds and did Ii ttle to help the image of 
banks. 
1. The article points out problems when mutual funds 
are being sold by employees with inadequate train-
ing. It also points out potential problems when 
third parties sell mutual funds from bank premises. 
2. The tone of the article is evident from the follow-
ing by-line appearing in large print on the first 
page: "Our investigation of 40 banks in five 
states found bad investment advice and outright 
lies about safety." 
B - 6 
\\ 
i 
II. Regulation B - Availability Of Real Estate·Appraisals. 
A. 
B. 
C. 
FRB issues final rules adding a new §202. 5a to its 
Regulation B (12 C.F.R. Part 202) to implement the 
appraisal report distribution require~ents of FDICIA 
§223. See 58 Fed. Reg. 65657 (12/16/93). 
§223 amended the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (15 U.S.C. 
§1691-1691f). ("ECOA") by adding a new paragraph (e) to 
ECOA §701 (15 U.S.C. §1691(e» stating: 
"Each creditor shall promptly furnish an 
applicant, upon written request by the appli-
cant made within a reasonable period of time 
of the application, a copy of the appraisal 
report used in connection with the applicant's 
application for a ldan that is or would have 
been secured by a lien on residential real 
property. The creditor may require the appli-
cant to reimburse the creditor for the cost of 
the appraisal." 
"Dwelling". 
1. The FRB substi tuted the term "residential real 
property" in the statute with the term "dwelling". 
See 12 C.F.R. §202.5a(a). "Dwelling" is then 
defined as follows: 
"[A] residential structure that contains 
one to four units whether or not that 
structure is attached to real property. 
The term includes, but is not limited to, 
an individual condominium or cooperative 
unit, and a mobile or other manufactured 
home." 12 C.F.R. §202.5a(c). 
2. The FRB refused suggestions to expand the defini-
tion of "dwelling" to include larger, multifamily 
units in the belief that this "could impose a 
significant burden on institutions which could 
outweigh the benefits to consumers." However, the 
FRB reminded creditors that the nondiscrimination 
requirements of Regulation B "are applicable to 
transactions involving multifamily dwellings". 
3. Note: the appraisal distribution requirement 
applies regardless of the purpose of the loan so 
long as it involves a loan secured or to be secured 
by a lien on a dwelling. Thus, a loan to start a 
small business would be covered if the requisite 
lien were taken •. 
D. "Appraisal Report". 
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.1. 12 C.F.R. §202.5(c) defines the term as "the docu-
mentes) relied upon by a creditor in evaluating the 
value of the dwelling." 
2. If a third party appraiser is used and his value is 
accepted, the FRB's explained that this would be 
"the complete appraisal report signed by the ap-
praiser, including all information submitted to the 
lender by the appraiser for the purpose of deter-
mining the value of the residential property." 
3. If the third party appraiser's value is not used, 
the FRB explained that the applicant would receive 
both the third party report and "a copy of docu-
ments that reflect the creditor's valuation of the 
dwelling • includ[ing] staff appraisals or 
other notes indicated why the value assigned by the 
third party appraiser is not the appropriate valua-
tion." 
4. If the credi tor performs an in-house appraisal, 
"the appraisal report would be the report of the 
credi tor's staff appraiser, where applicable, or 
the other documents of the creditor which assign 
value to the dwelling." 
E. Means Of Compliance - "Routine" Delivery Or Delivery Upon 
Request. 
1. Creditors may choose between two alternative 
methods of delivering appraisal reports. They may 
elect to automatically provide a copy of appraisal 
reports for all covered loan applications. See 12 
C.F.R. §202.5a{a) (1). Alternatively, creditors may 
choose to provide a copy upon the applicant's 
written request. See 12 C.F.R. §202.5a{a) (2). 
2. For so-called "routine delivery", the regulation 
does not establish mandatory deadlines or time-
tables for delivery. The regulation does state 
that delivery must routinely occur "whether credit 
is granted or denied or the application is with-
drawn. " The FRB' s explanation assumed good faith 
compliance and merely expected delivery "when the 
appraisal is completed, or later in the application 
process {for example, when notice is given of 
action taken on the application)". 
3. A creditor that only provides a copy upon receipt 
of a written request must comply with certain 
notice and timing requirements. 
a. First, the creditor must provide written 
notice to the applicant of his or her right to 
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b. 
c. 
receive an appraisal report. The notice may 
be gi ven at any time during the application 
process but no later than when the creditor 
provides notice of action taken under the 
deadlines established by §202.9 of Regulation 
B. 
The FRB decided not to require that the notice 
be in a separate form that the applicant can 
keep. Nor did the FRB impose size, typeface, 
or conspicuousness requirements. The FRB 
stated that the notice "may be included on or 
with the adverse action notice, the applica-
tion, or other documents." 
The written notice to the applicant "shall 
specify that the 'applicant's request must be 
in writing, give the creditor's mailing 
address, and state the time for making the 
request" • Model Form C-9 was added by the FRB 
to Appendix C of Regulation B, and proper use 
of this form satisfies compliance with the 
notice requirement. Credi tors are not re-
quired to use this form and may design their 
own provided the required information is 
included. 
d. The "time for making the request" refers to 
the fact that an creditor need not provide the 
appraisal report if the request is received 
more than 90 days after the credi tor has 
provided notice of action taken on the appli-
cation or 90 days after, the application is 
withdrawn. 
4. The statute requires that the appraisal report be 
"promptly furnished" , and the FRB's regulation 
establishes a generally rule of thumb which is 30 
days after the later of time the creditor receives 
an applicant's request , receives the' report, or 
receives reimbursement from the applicant for the 
report. 
a. The 30-day period is somewhat ambiguous since 
the specific language of the Regulation says 
"promptly (generally within 30-days)" after 
the triggerip.g events. The FRB wrote that 
, this language "provide [s] greater flexibility" 
and allows a longer time for providing a copy 
"in exceptional circumstances". On the other 
hand, if the applicant has a special need for 
the report and the creditor could have provid-
ed a report sooner, is there a violation if 
the creditor waits until the 30th day? 
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F. How Much Can The Creditor Charge For Providing The Report 
CO.py? 
1. The statute states that a creditor may "require the 
applicant to reimburse the creditor for the cost of 
the appraisal." There is no provision in the 
regulation explaining this requirement. 
2. The FRB did comment on this statutory language in 
its preamble to the regulation. It wrote that the 
"provision permits a creditor to require the con-
sumer to pay for the cost of the appraisal prior to 
providing a copy." However, if the applicant has 
already paid for the appraisal as part of the 
application fee, another charge for a copy could 
not be imposed. 
3. In any event, the FRB indicated that a creditor may 
"require reimbursement of photocopy and postage 
costs that are incurred in providing the copy of 
the report, unless prohibited by state or other 
law. " 
G. Effective Date - December 14, 1993, but compliance is 
optional until June 14, 1993. 
III. OCC Proposal To Amend National Bank Lending Limits: 59 Fed 
Reg. 6593 (2/11/93) (comment period expires April 12, 1994). 
A. Permits lending limits generally to be calculated based 
upon bank capital figures reported in quarterly call 
reports. "Unimpaired capital and surplus" is the total 
of a Bank's Tier 1, Tier 2, and ALLL not calculated in 
Tier 1 and Tier 2. 
B. Additional rules apply for investment securities and 
insider loans. 
C. Calculations will be made when a loan is made and 
quarterly thereafter unless (a) there is a adverse change 
in the bank's capital category for prompt corrective 
action, (b) a material event occurs that event causes 
bank's capital to decrease or increase by 10% or more, or 
(c) the OCC requires a specific bank to use more frequent 
capital calculations. 
D. If a loan that was within a bank's limit when made 
becomes non-conforming, 'a bank must exercise its "best 
eff'orts" to bring the loan into conformity with the 
lending limit. Special 5 business day conformity 
deadline for a loan is becomes nonconforming because 
collateral securing the loan to satisfy a lending limit 
exception has declined in value. 
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E. New exception to the lending limit that would permit a 
national bank to complete the financing of a project in 
progress in accordance with prior commitments up to an 
additional 5% of bank's capital and surplus. 
F. Clarifies other lending limit rules by incorporating 
prior significant OCC interpretations. 
IV. Department of Justice - ERISA: ERISA is violated when trust 
companies earn interest for their own account from the "float" 
between the time benefit checks are written to E~ISA plan 
participants and the time the checks are presented for pay-
ment. Trustee for ERISA plans would be directed to.pay bene-
fits. Trustee then transferred sufficient funds to a general 
account and issued checks to participants. until the checks 
were cashed, the trustee would earn income on the funds in the 
general account under a retail repurchase agreement wi th 
another financial institution. [Department of Labor Advisory 
opinion No. 93-24A (9/13/93)]. 
V. Department of Justice - ATK Accessibility Requirements. 
Effective February 17, 1994, the D~partment of Justice adopted 
amendments to regulations implementing the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 to change the reach requirements for 
accessible automated teller machines. 28 C.F.R. Part 36, 
Appendix A, §4.34.3 (59 Fed. Reg. 2674, 2677 (1/18/94). 
VI. Environmental Protection Aaencv CERCLA Secured Lender 
Exemption: On February 4, 1994, the United states Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia held in a 2-1 decision 
that the federal Environmental Protection Agency "lacks 
statutory authority" to promulgate its "lender liability" rule 
protecting lenders from having to pay under federal law for 
cleanups at hazardous waste sites (Subpart L of 40 C.F.R. Part 
300) • Chemical Mfgs. Ass'n v. Environmental Protection 
Agency, No. 92-1414 (1994 WL27881) (D.C. cir.). 
However, two major decisions have been rendered recently in. 
favor of lenders using analysis almost identical to the EPA's 
Rule but relying exclusively on the plain language of the 
statute: waterville Industries. Inc. v. Finance Authority of 
Maine, 984 F.2d 549 (1st Cir. 1993) (secured lender does not 
automatically lose its exemption merely by taking title to 
real property collateral when the debtor defaults "so long as 
the owner proceeds within a reasonable time to divest itself 
of ownership."); and United states v. McLamb, 5 F.3d 69 (4th 
Cir. 1993) (Wachovi~ Bank & Trust Co. was protected from 
liability by the secured creditor exemption even though 
Wachovia purchasedcontami:9q\~d property as the sole bidder at 
its foreclosure sale). 
State Administrative Developments 
Kentucky Real Estate Commission - Disclosure Of Condition 
Form. 
A. KRS 324.360 (enacted by the 1992 General Assembly) 
requires the Kentucky Real Estate Commission to promul-
gate an administrative regulation creating a "seller's 
disclosure of conditions form". Regulations are codified 
at 201 KAR 11:250 (1993). 
B. The form must be completed and signed by the seller of 
residential real estate if any licensed real estate agent 
receives compensation. 
1. If property is listed, form must be completed and 
signed by seller at the time of listing. 
2. If property is not listed, form must be completed 
and signed within 5 business days of any executory 
contract for sale. 
C. No form is required for: 
1. Residential purchases of new homes if written 
warranty is offered. 
2. Sale of real estate at auction. 
3. Court supervised foreclosure. 
D. Copy retained by real estate agent and delivered to 
prospective purchaser: 
1. Upon request and 
2. When makes a signed written offer to purchase. 
E. If seller refused to complete and sign the form, real 
estate agent must advise the prospective purchaser in 
writing and "without unreasonable delay". 
F. Question: If you were representing a lending bank, would 
you allow a closing to occur if the statute had not been 
complied with? 
Judicial Developments 
I. Kentucky Supreme Court. 
A. LENDER LIABILITY: 
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1. Hanson v. American National Bank & Trust Co., Ky., 
865 S.W.2d 302 (11/24/93) (after earlier decision 
vacated by united states Supreme Court). 
a. Jury's punitive damages award of $5.775 mil-
lion did not violate procedural or sUbstantive 
due process under the standards set forth in 
Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 
u.s. 1 (1992), and TXO Production Corp. v. 
Alliance Resources Corp., 509 u. S. 113 
S.ct. 2711 (1993). 
b. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, . u.s. ___ , 114 
S.ct. 751 (No. 93-644) (1/14/94) (granting 
certiorari on the issue of the constitutional-
ity of Oregon's procedure for reviewing puni-
tive damages in which an appellate court only 
examines whether the jury was properly 
instructed and whether there was evidence 
justifying punitive damages and cannot review 
actual dollar amount award). 
2. Denies motion for discretionary review of Liberty 
National Bank and Trust Co. v. Donaldson, Ky.App., 
No. 91-CA-2416 (jury verdict of $7 million (less 
directed verdict on unpaid promissory note) for 
failure to act in good faith in connection with 
claimed line of credit), on September 22, 1993. 
3. Steelvest. Inc.v. Scansteel Service Center, Jef-
ferson Circuit Court, No. 86-CI-4607 (on remand 
after Kentucky Supreme Court decision) finds viola-
tion of fiduciary duty by former officer who estab-
lished competing business but insufficient proof of 
damages. 
B. CLOSING ATTORNEYS ~ DANGERS OF DUAL REPRESE!,'TATION'i 
Reversing dismissal of seller's claim for fraud and 
malpractice against closing attorney who (a) represented 
both the seller and the purchaser of a car dealership and 
(b) was married to the principal individual controlling 
the purchaser. Conrad Chevrolet. Inc. v. Rood, Ky., 862 
S.W.2d 312 (1993). 
1. Seller claimed that security agreement in his favor 
and personal guaranty from the attorney's spouse 
were not included in closing documents. 
2. Waiver of conflicts that was signed at the closing 
but backdated to the date the representation 
started was, "as a matter of law", an insufficient 
basis for granting summary judgment in favor of the 
attorney. 
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a. The waiver could be considered evidence of 
overreaching . instead of evidence of proper 
conduct, and this created a genuine issue of 
fact requiring trial. 
b. The waiver could not constitute "consent after 
consultation" under Kentucky Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct governing attorneys because the 
conflict was so great that the attorney could 
not engage in the dual representation even 
with a client's purported consent. 
c. Merely including the waiver as a closing docu-
ment was not sufficient "consultation" to 
support a client's consent to the dual repre-
sentation. 
C. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: 
1. First Kentucky Trust Co. v. Christian, Ky., 849 
S.W.2d 534 (1993). "An action against a trustee 
for breach of fiduciary duty where the trust is 
continuing and sUbsisting and no repudiation has 
occurred may be brought at any time during the 
existence of the trust pursuant to KRS 413.340 and 
KRS 386.735." Action filed in 1989 based upon 1977 
trust activity was timely. 
2. Munday v. Mayfair Diagnostic Laboratory, Ky., 831 
S.W.2d 912 (1992). Failure of partners doing 
business under assumed name to comply with statute 
requiring filing of certificate of assumed name was 
sufficient to create estoppel under tolling 
statute, thereby tolling statute of limitations 
during period of non-compliance. In dicta, court 
states that "Parties are at liberty to contract for 
limitation period less than period fixed by stat-
ute." 
D. MECHANIC'S LIENS:' Greensburg Depos it Bank v. GGC-Goff 
Motors, Ky., 851 S.W.2d 476 (1993). 
1. Enforcing written mechanic's lien waiver demanded 
by bank before bank would make a loan to property 
owner. Consideration for waiver was bank approval 
and disbursement of loan. In any event, an implied 
waiver would arise since the bank detrimentally 
relied upon potential lien claimant's statements 
that he would not claim a lien if the loan was 
made. 
2. Court made this ruling even though lien claimant 
argued that the bank orally represented to him that 
he would be paid if he executed the lien waiver and 
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the loan proceeds were disbursed. Trial court had 
found that lien claimant had not proven the alleged 
modification of the lien waiver. 
E. APPEAL OF AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES: Where a judgment 
awards an attorney's fee, the attorney is required to be 
named as a party to an appeal thereof only if the 
judgment is "directed in favor of [the] attorney and 
enforce[able] in his name." If the judgment is "simply 
by way of reimbursing a party for an expense incurred", 
then the attorney is not required to be named in the 
notice of appeal. Knott v. Crown Colony Farm. Inc., 865 
S.W.2d 326 (11/24/93) (Liebson, J.). 
F. WILLS: Generally describing requirements for a holo-
graphic will and finding that the document in question 
did not meet those requirements. Mallory v. Mallory, 
Ky., 862 S.W.2d 879 (9/30/93). 
G. INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW OF DISCOVERY ORDERS: 
1. Refusing to issue writ of prohibition to set aside 
trial court's order authorizing discovery of peer 
review records in medical malpractice case. Appa-
lachian Regional Health Care. Inc. v. Johnson, Ky., 
862 S.W.2d 868 (May 27, 1993). 
2. Affirming Court of Appeal's writ of prohibition 
which set aside trial court's order prohibiting 
discovery for other car owners who allegedly had 
suffered sudden acceleration incidents. volvo Car 
Corp. v. Hopkins, Ky., 860 S.W.2d 777 (Sept. 2, 
1993) . 
II. Kentucky Court of Appeals. 
A. FRAUD CLAIMS: "Where a fraudulent representation is 
discerned while the contract is executory and before 
either party has substantially performed in conformance 
with the terms of the contract, we deem the appropriate 
rule to be that affirmance or continued performance by 
the defrauded party under the contract also effectively 
waives the right to sue for damages" in addition to 
waiving the right to rescind the contract. This rule 
applied to bar fraud claim brought by purchasers of tire 
company who completed closing after learning that the 
accounts payable were substantially understated by the 
seller. Hopkins v. Performance Tire & Auto Service 
Center. Inc., Ky.App., 866 S.W.2d 438 (12/10/93). 
B. JEOPARDY TAX ASSESSMENTS AND FORECLOSURE ACTIONS: 
In a foreclosure action, another lien claimant has 
standing to require the Revenue Cabinet prove that the 
B - 15 
amount of a tax lien based upon a jeopardy tax assessment 
is correct even if the taxpayer did not contest the 
assessment. Revenue Cabinet v. Liberty National Bank of 
Lexington, Ky.App., 858 S.W.2d 199 (1993). 
C. ATTORNEY'S LIEN/SET-OFF: Attorney's lien on proceeds of 
borrower's "lender liability" crossclaim is superior to 
bank's set-off claim based upon borrowers unpaid debt. 
Exchange Bank of Mt. Sterling v.Wells, Ky.App., 860 
S.W.2d 785 (3/19/93). 
D. RIGHTS OF REDEMPTION: Second mortgagee does not have 
right of redemption after foreclosure sale since right of 
redemption is limited to owner of property. Redemption 
by owner does not resurrect prior mortgages or liens when 
property sold free and clear of the liens. Kirklevington 
Associates« Ltd. v. Kirklevington North Associates, Ltd., 
Ky.App., 848 S.W.2d 453 (1993). 
E. COVENANT AGAINST ENCUMBRANCES: In purchaser' s suit 
against seller of real property for breach of general 
warranty based upon judgment lien against the property, 
Court of Appeals held that the warranty against encum-
brances was breached upon conveyance and purchaser did 
not have to wait until eviction. Blankenship v. Stovall, 
Ky.App., 862 S.W.2d 333 (1993). 
F. POWERS OF APPOINTMENT: Lillv v. citizens Fidelity Bank 
and Trust Company, Ky.App., 859 S.W.2d 666 (1993). 
1. Defines general and special powers of appointment 
which generally are "the power or authority given 
by a donor, such as a testator, to a donee to 
appoint the beneficiaries of the donor's property, 
or interest therein which is vested in a person 
other than the donee of the power. The power may 
be created by deed or will and is in the nature of 
a trust." 
a. General power - may be exercised in favor of 
any person including the donee. 
b. Special power - may be exercised only for the 
benefit of a particular group or class, which 
does not include the donee. 
2. Law governing a power of appointment is the law in 
effect at the time of the exercise of the power by 
the donee not the law in effect at the time the 
donor creates the power. 
3. KRS 394.060 applies to both general and special· 
powers of appointment. statute since 1972 has 
provided that a devise or bequest of property over 
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which the testator has any power of appointment is 
deemed to be an exercise of the power unless a 
contrary intention appears in the donee's will. 
Prior to 1972, statute only applied to general 
powers of appointment. 
4. Adopting the rule that "Under a power of appoint-
ment, ei ther general or special, containing no 
restriction as to the nature of the estate to be 
raised, the donee is not limited to an appointment 
of the legal estate, but may execute the power by 
an appointment in trust for the obj ects of the 
power, except where the instrument expressly or 
impliedly shows that the donor intended the ap-
pointees to take absolutely and not in trust." 
5. Applying "blue-pencil" rule to a Rule Against 
Perpetuities problem. 
G. DISCRIMINATION: (A) Union employee may bring a claim 
for sexual and racial discrimination under Kentucky's 
Civil Rights statute (KRS 344.010 et seq.) without first 
utilizing union grievance procedure. Presumably the same 
would be true for a non-unionize employer's personnel 
manual. (B) Although sexual or racial harassment by a 
co-worker is not a violation of KRS 344.010 et seq if 
employer did not know and should not have known of ha-
rassment, summary judgment against employee was improper 
where employee testified that supervisory personnel were 
informed of at least some of objectionable conduct and 
were participating in some. Kirkwood v. Courier-Journal 
andLouisville Times Co., Ky.App., 858 S.W.2d 194 (1993). 
H. WHAT ARE "MINUTES"?: There are no such thing as "unoffi-
cial minutes" because "a body's minutes do not have any 
legal existence until they are actually adopted or 
approved." In this case, Planning COlfindssion's decision 
based upon minutes that had not yet been formally 
approved was invalid because the decision was not based 
upon an official "public record". Helm v. Citizens To 
Protect the Prospect Area, Inc., Ky.App., 864 S.W.2d 312 
(10/29/93) . 
I. APPEAL OF ORDER CONFIRMING SALE: Notice of Appeal from 
an order confirming a foreclosure sale must include 
purchasers. Lagatella v. Farm Credit services of Mid-
America, Inc., No. 92-CA-31118 (3/15/93) (unpublished). 
III. United States Supreme Court. 
A. DISCRIMINATION: Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 
U.S. _ (11/9/93) (1993 WL 453611). 
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1 .. To be actionable as an "abusive work environment", 
discriminatory harassment need not seriously affect 
an employee's psychological well-being" or lead the 
employee to "suffer injury". 
2. What is unlawful sexual discrimination: 
"When the workplace is permeated with 'discri-
minatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult' 
that is "sufficiently seVere or pervasive to 
alter the conditions of the victim's employ-
ment and create an abusive working environ-
ment,' Title VII [of the civil Rights Act of 
1964] is violated." [Quoting Meritor Savings 
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-67 (1986)]. 
3. Combination of objective and subjective test mea-
sured under the facts and circumstances. 
a. Test],.s obj ecti ve - would the environment 
reasonably be perceived as hostile or abusive? 
b. Test is subjective was the environment 
actually perceived as hostile or abusive? 
c. "Whether an environment is 'hostile' or 'abus-
ive' can be determined only by looking at all 
the circumstances." 
4. What is not unlawful sexual discrimination: 
B. RICO: 
a. "mere utterance of an epi thet which 
engenders offensive feelings in an employee" 
because it does not "sufficiently affect the 
conditions of employment". 
b. "if the victim does not subjectively perceive 
the environment to be abusi ve" because the 
conduct "has not actually altered the condi-
tions of the victim's employment". 
1. Reves v. Ernst & Young, U.S. , 113 S.ct. 
1163 (1993). Supreme Court affirmed grant of 
summary judgment dismissing RICO claim against 
accounting firm that had prepared certain auditing 
reports for a bankrupt agricul tural cooperati ve 
which allegedly overvalued gasohol plant owned by. 
the cooperative. 
a. Plaintiff claiming a violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S1962(c) must, in opposing a motion for summa-
ry judgment, adduce facts from which a jury 
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could reasonably conclude that the defendant 
took "some part in directing the enterprise's 
affairs." 
b. In dicta, Supreme Court indicated that liabil-
i ty nevertheless may . extend to "lower-rung 
participants in the enterprise who are under 
the direction of upper management" and to 
"others 'associated with' the enterprise who 
exert control over it as, for example, by 
bribery." section 1962 (c) makes it illegal 
"to conduct or participate, directly or in-
directly, in the conduct of such enterprise's 
affairs through a pattern of racketeering 
activity". However, analysis explicitly does 
not apply to claims under §1962(a) or (b). 
2. NOW v. Scheidler, U.S. (No. 92-780) (re-
versing dismissal of RICO claims against anti-
abortion activists and. ruling that RICO does not 
contain an economic-motive requirement). 
C. CIVIL FORFEITURES: United states v. A Parcel of Land, 
Buildings, Appurtenances And Improvements Known As 92 
Buena Vista Avenue (S. ct. No. 91-781) (Feb. 24, 1993). 
1. Federal government sought civil forfei ture of a 
residence purchased with funds ($216,000 wire 
transferred to her) she allegedly received as a 
gift from a convicted drug dealer, the dealer now 
being a fugitive. Woman claims that she did not 
know the funds were drug proceeds. 
2. Government argued that there is no "innocent owner" 
defense to .civil forfeiture, only to criminal 
forfeiture. Government argued that under the 
"relation back" doctrine , title to the tainted 
funds vested in the government at the time the 
crime was committed, so drug dealer could not 
transfer ownership of those funds at all. 
3. Supreme Court (6-3) rejected government's theory 
and held that title does not vest in the government 
until a jUdicial decree of forfeiture is entered. 
Accordingly, a transferee of even tainted property 
was an "owner" and could assert an innocent owner 
defense. 
IV. u.S. court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 
A. FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT/LIABILITY OF GUARANTOR: In case 
arising out of the sale of a marina on Lake Cumberland, 
the Sixth Circuit held that genuine issues of material 
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fact existed as to whether or not guarantor of promissory 
note was fraudulent induced by alleged misstatements in 
seller's financial statements to enter into guaranty 
agreement. Furthermore, guarantor's liability could not 
be determined until amount of debtor's liability was 
finally determined which could not occur until resolution 
of debtor's set-off claims against the creditor. Moore. 
Owen. Thomas & Co. v. Coffey, 992 F.2d 1439 (6th Cir. 
1993). 
B. METHOD OF CALCULATING DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT: General rule 
is that "a debtor's deficiency judgment is calculated as 
of the time that the creditor has repossessed the secured 
property, has liquidated it in a commercially reasonable 
manner, and all cash from all transactions was realized." 
Parties may contract around this general rule, and sixth 
Circuit holds that parties did so in this case. Specifi-
cally, bank and debtor agreed that deficiency judgment 
would be determined when bank disposed of house which it 
received pursuant to deed in lieu of foreclosure and 
disposal was deemed to occur when bank traded debtor's 
house for another house. Disposal did not occur two 
years later when bank sold second house for lesser amount 
due to general decline in real estate market. Abrams v. 
F.D.I.C., 5 F.3d 1013 (6th Cir. 10/4/93). 
C. FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT: FDCPA was "not 
intended to govern attorneys engaged solely in the 
practice of law." Green v. Hocking, 9 F.3d 18 (6th Cir. 
·1993) • 
D. CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION: 
U. S • A.. Inc., F. 3 d 
App. LEXIS 23757). 
Banek v. Yoaurt ventures 
(6th Cir. 6/8/93) (1993 U.S. 
1. Enforcing a choice of law prov1s10n in a franchise 
agreement between a Michigan franchisee and a 
Georgia franchisor selecting Georgia law. 
2. Federal court in diversity will apply the rules of 
the state wher~ it sits in deciding whether or not 
to enforce a choice of law provision. 
3 • Although Michigan law applied to decide enforce-
ability, sixth Circuit noted that "we move cau-
tiously when asked to hold contract clauses unen-
forceable on public policy grounds." Also, party 
challenging choice of law had burden of showing the 
specific differences in the two laws and the 
specific public policy of the home state that. would 
be violated by application of the choice ·of law 
clause. 
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4. The following choice of law prov1s1on was suffi-
ciently broad to cover not only contract claims but 
fraud claims which were "directly related to the 
franchise agreement" and were not "tangentially 
related to the franchise relationship": 
"This Agreement was made and entered into 
in the state [of] Georgia and all rights 
and obligations of the parties shall be 
governed by and construed in accordance 
with the laws of the state of Georgia." 
E. BANKRUPTCY STAY: A creditor, having obtained a final 
judgment of non-dischargeability from a bankruptcy court 
as to its debt, is not required to seek relief from the 
bankruptcy automatic stay prior to execution on the 
judgment against property which is not a part of the 
bankruptcy estate. In re: Embry, 10 F.3d 401 (12/3/93). 
v. U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. 
A. FRAUD & PUNITIVE DAMAGES: Miller's Bottled Gas, Inc. v. 
Borg-Warner Corp., 817 F. Supp. 643 (W.o. Ky. 1993) 
(Heyburn, J.) 
1. Under Kentucky law, a plaintiff who presents enough 
evidence to go to a jury on a fraud claim is not 
automatically entitled to go to the jury on puni-
tive damages. 
2. A judge may refuse to instruct the jury on a puni-
tive damages claim on the ground that the plaintiff 
has not meet his burden of producing sufficient 
evidence to justify punitive damages. 
3. However, Judge Heyburn did note that he would 
"defer to the sound judgment of the . • . Kentucky 
Supreme Court to state an unequivocal rule of law 
to the contrary." 
B. FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES: Presence of a valid contractual 
forum selection clause selecting Tennessee as the forum 
does not automatically render venue in Kentucky improper. 
However, such a forum selection clause "constitutes a 
significant factor that figures centrally in a district 
court's calculus when evaluating a discretionary transfer 
under [28 U.S.C.] §1404(a). Such clauses are prima facie 
valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown 
by the resisting party to be unreasonable under the 
circumstances. " Credi tors Collection Bureau, Inc. v. 
Access Data, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 311 (W.O. Ky. 1993) 
(Heyburn, J.). 
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C. ENVIRONMENTAL: Property owner cannot state a viable 
negligence claim under Kentucky law based upon pollution 
crossing over onto owner's property where level of 
contamination is less than federally mandated safety 
levels. Also, nuisance claim cannot be based upon 
public's perception of contamination if such contamina-
tion, in fact, does not exist. Lamb v. Martin Marietta 
Energy Systems. Inc., 835 F. Supp. 959 (W.D. Ky. 7/27/93) 
(Foreman, J.). 
D. ENVIRONMENTAL: Fletcher v. Tenneco. Inc., No. 91-118 
(E.D. Ky. 1993) (opinion to be reported at 816 F. Supp. 
1186 withdrawn after case settled while motion to 
reconsider pending). 
1. Court held "that, as a matter of law, the contami-
nation of plaintiffs' land by a substance widely 
accepted as hazardous constitutes" a nuisance, that 
is a condition that "would substantially annoy or 
interfere with the use and enjoyment of property by 
a person of ordinary health and normal sensitivi-
ties." (quoting KRS 411.550(2». 
2. The Court ruled that in the absence of a claim by 
Tenneco, Inc. that the statutes and regulations 
regulating PCP's are invalid, the Court could not 
override the regulatory decision as to the danger 
of PCB's by considering extrinsic evidence that the 
PCB contamination would not cause health problems. 
3. Disposal of PCP's was an ultrahazardous activity 
for which Tenneco was liable even if Tenneco did 
not know at the time of disposal that the substance 
was toxic. . 
E. LIEN PRIORITY IN JOINTLY OWNED REAL PROPERTY: Where real 
property is jointly owned by husband and wife, lien of 
judgment creditor of husband (who subsequently become 
sole owner of property upon death of wife) is inferior to 
later judgment creditor of husband and wife. Raybro 
Electric Supplies. Inc. v. Barclay, 813 F. Supp. 1267 
(W. D • Ky. 1992). 
F. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: Declaring that the Interstate 
Horeseracing Act of 1978 (15 U.S.C. §§3001-3007) is an 
unconstitutional violation of substantive due process 
because it" is an unreasonable means of advancing a 
legitimate governmental interest." Specifically, its 
grant to private parties a absolute veto power over 
simulcasting of horse races assures that the statute will 
be applied to "favor selfish interests over public ones." 
Kentucky Division Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective 
Ass'n v. Turfway Park Racing, 832 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Ky. 
1993) (Bertelsman, C.J.). 
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VI. u.s. Bankruptcy courts for the Eastern and western Districts 
of Kentucky. 
A. PUNITIVE DAMAGES NOT DISCHARGEABLE: Award of punitive 
damages arising out of bankrupt's sale of house in which 
he misrepresented the quality of the house were nondis-
chargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523 (a) and adopting the 
reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in In re st. Laurent, 
991 F.2d 672 (11th Cir. 1993). In re winters, 159 B.R. 
789 (Bkrtcy. E.D.Ky. 10/18/93). 
B. APPROVED RATE FOR PARALEGALS: Maximum compensation for 
paralegal work will be one-third of the highest hourly 
rate allowed to attorneys (which is $175/hr). In re: 
optical Corporation of America, Inc., 157 B.R. 823 
(Bkrtcy. W.D. Ky. 8/30/93). 
C. DISMISSAL OF CHAPTER 7 CASE WHERE DEBTORS COULD REHABILI-
TATE UNDER CHAPTER 13: Chapter 7 debtors were not 
sufficiently "needy" and their case could be dismissed as 
"substantial abuse" of Chapter 7 under 11 U.S.C. §707(b) 
where debtors had sufficient income to fund three-year 
Chapter 13 plan that would pay all or almost all of their 
debts. Inre: Hutton, 158 B.R. 648 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Ky. 
1993). 
COMMENT - Forum shopping is now important in Kentucky. SUbstantial 
differences exist between state and federal courts concerning 
discovery, summary judgment standards, and judicial attitudes. 
VII. Kentucky Cases To Watch In The coming Months. 
A. Owensboro National Bank v. Stephens, 6th Cir., Nos. 92-
6330/6331. Appeal of District Court's decision that 
Kentucky national banks may act, pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 
§92, as insurance agents from their offices in towns of 
less than 5,000. 
Related cases are (a) Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. 
v. Gallagher, 11th Cir., No. 93-3508, which is an appeal 
from a contrary decision by the U.S. District Court for 
the Middle District of Florida; (b) Variable Annuity Life 
Insurance Co. v. Clarke, 998 F.2d 1295 (1993), holding 
that §92 impliedly restricts sales of fixed and variable 
annuities to national banks in small towns . Petition for 
certiorari to be filed with U.S. Supreme Court.; (c) New 
York state Association of Life Underwriters v. New York 
State Banking Department, N.Y.Ct. App., DOL#91133613, 
which raises the issue of whether a state bank's inciden-
tal powers only allows a bank to engage in activities 
necessary to put into effect an express power and that 
the sale of annuities is not incidental in such respect. 
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B. Peoples Bank of Sandy Hook v. Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency, E.D. Ky., No. 93-91. Petition by two 
state banks and the Kentucky Bankers Association to 
challenge decision of the OCC that a national bank may 
relocate its main office across county lines and retain 
branches in the county where the main office was located 
prior to the relocation. Companion case is Peoples Bank 
of Sandy Hook v. Kentucky Department of Financial 
Institutions, Franklin Circuit Court, No. 93-CI-1502 
(challenging DFI's parity letter on main office reloca-
tions). 
1. OCC has also approved two interstate main office 
relocations. 
a. Pennsylvania national bank relocates main 
office to Salem, New Jersey and then merges 
with New Jersey bank. Approved 1/10/94. 
b. National bank headquartered in D.C. with 
branches in Maryland relocated main office to 
Aspen Hill, Maryland and then merge with 
Maryland bank. Approved 2/4/94. 
C. General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Hulette, 
Kentucky Court of Appeals, No. 93-CA-000499 (Oral 
argument scheduled for April). Is County Clerk who fails 
to note a lien upon a motor vehicle when tendered a 
properly completed lien statement insulated from 
liability by the doctrine of sovereign immunity? 
D. Stephens v. Bank of Louisville, Franklin Circuit Court. 
Dispute over Bank of Louisville loan to Dudley Webb 
secured by pledge of bonds from Kentucky Central Life 
Insurance Company. 
E. U.s. ~ancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 
u.S. Sup. ct., No. 93-714. Supreme Court has granted 
certiorari to determine whether "new value" exception to 
absolute priority rule in bankruptcy survived the 
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978. The absolute 
priority rule disallows reorganizations plans in which 
the debtor retains an interest in the reorganized entity 
unless creditors consent to such plan or they receive 
full repayment of debts owed to them. The "new value" 
exception allows for a debtor to retain some interest in 
the property if new capital is infused as part of the 
reorganization plan. 
F. Arkansas v. Federated Department Stores, 6th Cir., No. 
92-4198. Appeal of bankruptcy decision allowing states 
to file proof of claims alleging entitlement under 
dormant account and escheat laws to various uncashed 
employee paychecks, dividend checks and accounts payable 
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checks of Federal Department stores. Bankruptcy Court 
had held that the only proper claimants were the "right-
ful owners" and thus had disallowed state claims. 
VIII. Other Decisions Rendered. 
A. California Grocers Ass'n v. Bank of America, Cal.App. 1st 
Dist., Nos. A055112 & A056217. Action by California 
Grocers Ass'n to declare invalid a bank's $3 fee charged 
to account holders who deposit NSF checks. Trial court 
held that bank's markup was 73.4% over cost and fair 
profit, that this was too high, and that the bank was 
required to return excess. On appeal, Court of Appeals 
reversed because a $3 fee was not unconscionable and was 
reasonable where it was toward the low end of similar 
charges assessed by other California banks. 
B. ABA Standing Committee On Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility, Formal Opinion No. 93-379. 
1. Reported to be the Committee's first ever opinion 
on hourly billing. 
2. Lawyers may not bill more than one client for the 
same hours spent. Example - airplane trip to 
meeting for Client A during which you do work for 
Client B. Cannot bill both clients for same time. 
3. Lawyers cannot add a surcharge for expenditures on 
behalf of a client. Example - buying donuts for 
meeting at a cost of $10.00 and billing $20.00. 
4. Lawyers must pass on any discounts for third party 
services. 
5 = In most circumstances, attorneys may recoup only 
their actual costs for services performed in-house 
such as photocopying, long-distance phone calls, 
computer research and secretarial overtime. 
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Deputy Comptroller, Compliance Management 
Comptroller of the Currency 
For generations, many Americans have shared a common dream -- taking charge of 
their lives, and through hard work and individual responsibility, making both a success of 
themselves and a contribution to a better society. For many -- perhaps most -- people in our 
capitalist society, access to credit is the key to achieving this dream. A person's ability to go 
to school, to buy a house, to start a business, is often determined by whether credit is 
available. Further, by enabling borrowers to become producers, credit can be the means 
through which people in a capitalist system escape poverty. Put simply: Credit is often the 
hammer that allows people to forge their future. 
Credit is critical to the workings of the capitalist economy. And credit allows people 
outside the mainstream of that economy to enter it. For all of these reasons, fair and equal 
access to credit is in the public interest. 
THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT 
The effort to reform the CRA has been a daily concern of mine for nearly a year. 
The proposed rule is intended to fulfill a directive from President Clinton to breathe new life 
and new purpose into the CRA. Fifteen years ago, Congress passed the CRA to ensure that 
banks and thrifts served the financial needs of their entire communities, and, in particular, to 
help economically empower persons of low and moderate income. For a number of reasons, 
however, the CRA never achieved the full promise Congress had intended. Recognizing 
this, President Clinton last July told the four federal bank and thrift regulatory agencies to 
rethink the entire system of regulation through which we put the CRA into effect. In 
December, we proposed our reform package. 
We crafted the reform package to achieve the goals the President established for us. 
The proposal is intended to set forth more objective, performance-based CRA assessment 
factors that focus on lending, investment, and the provision of banking reviews. 
In proposing these changes, we are eager for the public to comment on the package. 
We are more than half of the way through the 90-day comment period, so there is plenty of 
time left to do so. We want to hear if we have gotten things wrong, if we could do a better 
job. But we also want to hear if we have gotten things right. We will need positive 
reinforcement, as well as constructive criticism, when we craft the final package of reforms. 
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As you know, from the very beginning, we have been dedicated to a painstaking 
process of consultation and deliberation so the ftnal product would be right. The President 
gave us a difficult mission. We knew from the start that we could not perform it in a 
vacuum. Before we made a single decision on proposing reform, we turned to the public for 
direction. We held a series of hearings throughout the country -- hearings in Washington, 
Los Angeles, Albuquerque, San Antonio, Chicago, New York City, and Henderson, North 
Carolina -- the most extensive series of hearings ever held on CRA. We heard more than 
250 witnesses and recorded thousands of pages of testimony. We walked through South 
Central Los Angeles and a minority neighborhood in New York to see with our own eyes 
and to listen with our own ears to what should be done. We talked with representatives of 
the Navajo Nation -- to bankers large and small -- to poor people in rural America. What 
we saw and what we heard shaped the reform package we proposed. 
Here in Washington, we heard the Reverend Charles Cummings, Junior, tell us: 
"Low-income and minority communities here in D.C. are ravaged by a shortage of jobs and 
of affordable housing. Bank redlining has contributed to the spiral of decline in our 
communities. Abandoned houses, check-cashing outlets, vacant lots and boarded-up store 
fronts are the symptoms of a credit famine in our neighborhoods. Community reinvestment 
is not the only solution to our urban problems, but without bank participation, any plan to 
tum ·things around is doomed to fail. " 
At the same hearing, we heard a banker describe how the current system undercut 
lenders that were dedicated to achieving meaningful community reinvestment. 
"I would like to show you a photo," she said, "and believe it or not it's real, it's not 
a staged picture. The printouts here make up a pile about 20 feet high and represent the 
quarterly reports documenting just one aspect of our CRA efforts. Think of the people and 
the resources that it takes to produce those reports. Would any of you sitting here today 
wade through that stack of paper in order to make a decision? I don't think so. And our 
managers, who must balance the need to make community development loans with all of 
their other responsibilities, feel exactly the same way. " 
In Arizona, Richard Mike, a small businessman who is a member of the Navajo 
Nation, testified to his frustration in obtaining bank credit to expand his operations on the 
reservation. He was told that a government agency guarantee would be required for such a 
loan. Mr. Mike stated: "If the Navajo Nation and its people are to become financially 
independent, it is essential that they have access to credit and banking services. I believe the 
U.S. insured banks in Arizona have a long way to go to meet the requirements of the 
Community Reinvestment Act when an established businessman from the Navajo Nation is 
willing to offer a high equity loan, full personal guarantees, waiver of sovereign immunity by 
the Navajo Nation, liens on all other assets and properties, and still be unable with a good 
business record, a good location, and a good ftnancial position, to secure any loan without a 
government guarantee. " 
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I would also like to briefly mention what Angela Roberts told us. Ms. Roberts works 
with the BEC New Community Shepherds Program, an organization in Brooklyn, New York, 
that provides counseling to credit applicants. 
Ms. Roberts said: "There is no great mystery about the reasons our cities and rural 
areas are in trouble. Reinvestment is the key. Recycle our capital in part back into our 
communities so that we can build housing and small businesses and we will see the end of 
guns and drugs and an enormous decline to crime. Do that and we will see a new American 
renaissance. " 
If that sounds moving coming from me, imagine how moving it was listening to her. 
We had a big job to do. 
In setting the goals of reform last July, the President could not have been clearer. 
The implementation of CRA, he said, "has focused too much on documentation and process, 
and not enough on actual performance. Banks complain about excessive paperwork and 
inconsistent implementation of the law. Community groups complain that their communities 
remain unserved, and the CRA evaluations often fail to reflect actual community 
reinvestment activities." 
We were challenged to revise our regulatory approach to reduce unnecessary 
compliance burdens and to reward improved performance by lenders. 
We were challenged to recognize the diversity of lenders -- in size, in the product 
lines lenders offer -- and the diversity of the markets that lenders serve. Our regulations 
were to be made flexible to address that diversity. 
J We were challenged to strengthen enforcement of CRA, particularly in regard to 
lenders with consistently poor performance. 
In our reform package, we have tried to meet all of those goals. 
To provide clearer guidance to lenders, the reform package would eliminates the 12 
qualitative assessment factors that appear in current regulation. It would eliminate subjective 
evaluations of minutes, meetings, marketing efforts, and so forth. The proposed rule would 
make significant reductions in regulatory burden. 
No longer would lenders have to prepare CRA statements, review these statements 
annually and note these reviews in the minutes of the board of directors meetings, or justify 
the basis for their community delineations, or ascertain community credit needs and explain 
their methods of doing so. 
Instead of public relations or documentation, the proposal would stress quantitative 
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measures of performance: lending, service and investment performance -- the kind of 
performance you can bank on. No longer would a lender get an "A" just for effort. Under 
the proposed rule, not every institution would be subject to assessment in each measure of 
performance. Rather, the regulator would consider the products and services an institution 
offers in its normal course of business. Retail banks -- those that focus on individual 
consumers -- would be evaluated primarily on their lending performance. Wholesale banks -
- those that focus on serving business -- and limited purpose banks that do not engage in 
significant retail lending would be evaluated primarily on their investments. In this way, the 
proposal would respond to the diversity of markets that banks serve. The proposal would 
also respond to the range in bank size. It would provide for streamlined -- but rigorous --
examinations of small institutions, while stressing that these institutions would still be 
responsible for helping to meet the credit needs of their entire communities. 
Under the proposal, the regulators would publish a list of the institutions that are 
scheduled to undergo examinations and the public would be invited to submit comments on 
the CRA performance of any institution on the list. 
The proposed regulation would make clear that a lender found in substantial 
noncompliance with the law would be subject to formal enforcement actions. 
And we would work together to improve public access to data required by the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act and the proposed CRA regulations. 
CONCLUSION 
In the specific ways I have discussed the proposal would meet the goals the President 
set -- and would address the concerns and needs that we heard expressed in our public 
hearings. 
Let there be no mistake, this is an aggressive proposal. It responds to long and loud 
criticism of CRA: Bankers, community activists, academic experts, members of Congress 
and others identifying flaws in our current CR.A~ approach and advocating change. 
The proposal would restructure the system of evaluation under CRA -- because 
virtually everyone agrees that a restructuring is needed. The proposal would judge lenders 
by what they do, not by what they say -- because virtually everyone agrees that this shift in 
emphasis is needed. Our proposal would allow differing lenders to meet their CRA 
obligations in differing ways -- because virtually everyone agrees that this flexibility is 
needed. This proposal is aggressive -- an aggressive effort to cure the problems in the 
current system. 
Is the proposal perfect? If it were, we would not have had to put it out for comment. 
Public comment is -- and is intended to be -- a stress test that will reveal flaws and 
imperfections. 
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One problem has already come to light: We were not sufficiently clear in 
communicating several elements of the proposal and as a result there has been some 
confusion. I would like to address those elements briefly to clear up that confusion. 
First of all, there is a misconceptipn that small banks are exempted from eRA. That 
is certainly not the case. Under the proposal, small banks would be subject to a different 
kind of examination from large banks -- one that takes into account the differences in the 
way small banks operate and the size of their portfolios. But we would continue to examine 
small banks and hold them accountable for meeting all their eRA obligations. 
Second, some people have expressed concerns about the 60 percent loan-to-deposit 
ratio that would be applied to small banks. They have assumed that, if a small bank did not 
have 60 percent loans-to-deposits, it would automatically receive a less than satisfactory eRA 
rating. That is not true. 
The 60 percent ratio is a screen -- not a test -- one of five screens for small banks in 
the proposal. If a bank is picked up by this screen, it simply means that examiners will take 
a closer look at the bank's loans in its local community. There may be good reasons for the 
lower ratio. For example, it is certainly understandable that a local recession might translate 
into all banks in a community dropping below a 60 percent loan-to-deposit ratio. If that is 
the case, the banks' lending may well be satisfactory. 
Incidentally, some people have asked the source of that 60 percent ratio. It is nothing 
more than the median loan-to-deposit ratio for all banks with less than $250 million in assets. 
That means that at least half of all small banks will pass this screen -- though passing this 
screen will not alone ensure a satisfactory rating. I hope we will get comments on whether 
that is the correct ratio or whether we should adopt a more appropriate standard. 
A final point of confusion is the notion that the proposal would create a self-
contained, stand-alone compliance system -- that once the final rule is in place, nothing more 
will need to be done. Not true. After the rule is in place we will need to write detailed 
examination procedures and develop examiner training to ensure consistent application of 
eRA requirements. We will need to address managerial and day-to-day problems. We will 
need to establish procedures to govern a range of activities from approving eRA plans to 
collecting and analyzing data. And we will. 
Public comments are an essential part of rulemaking. Already, comments on our 
propose eRA rule have highlighted points that need clarification or a second look. As we go 
forward, the regulators will continue to listen to the voice of the public, and respond to it. 
Thank you. 
***************************** 
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Comptroller of the Currency 
Administrator of National Banks 
Washington, DC 20219 
For: Release After White House News Conference 
Date: December 8, 1993 
NEWS RELEASE 
NR 93-128 
Contact: (202) 874-4700 
CRA REFORM PROPOSAL WOULD INCREASE LOW-INCOME LENDING 
AND REDUCE REGULATORY BURDEN ON BANKS 
A new regulatory proposal would encourage banks to provide credit, services, and 
investments to America's low- and moderate-income communities, while reducing the 
regulatory burden on financial institutions. The proposal carries out President Clinton's 
initiative to reemphasize the original goal of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) by 
making credit and financial opportunities available to all people in all communities 
throughout urban and rural America. 
Comptroller of the Currency Eugene A. Ludwig today released a copy of the new proposed 
regulation for public comment. The other federal financial institution supervisory agencies 
(the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Office of 
Thrift Supervision) are expected to announce similar proposals later this week. 
"The proposed reform package we are unveiling today follows the President's directive and 
fulfills the promise of the law," said Comptroller Ludwig at a White House news conference. 
"It would channel billions of dollars in new credit into America's distressed communities, 
while at the same time reducing unnecessary burdens on the banks. . It would make the law 
work." 
The proposed CRA rule emphasizes performance over documentation. The following three 
evaluation standards, or tests, would replace the current 12 assessment factors for CRA 
review and rating: 
• The lending test would evaluate direct lending, and if the institution chose, 
indirect lending through loan pools, lending consortia, subsidiaries, funded 
non-chartered affiliates, or other lenders in which the institution had invested. 
• The service test would evaluate the provision of branches accessible to low-
and mcxierate-income areas, and the provision of services that promote credit 
~vailability . 
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• The investment test would take into account investment in organizations or 
initiatives that foster community development, small and minority-owned 
business development, or affordable housing lending. 
Banks would not be required to meet all three tests to get satisfactory ratings. Retail banks 
would be evaluated primarily on their lending, although their services and investment records 
would also be assessed. Wholesale and limited purpose banks would be evaluated primarily 
on their investment in organizations and initiatives that promote credit availability or funding 
for affordable housing, community development arid small and minority-owned business 
development. 
Sm?JI independent banks with under $250 million in assets, or members of a holding 
company structure with less than $250 million in assets, would be eligible for streamlined 
examinations. Larger banks would be required to report additional data to regulators on the 
geographic distribution of their small business and some consumer loans. New data 
reporting requirements would not apply to small institutions. 
A bank would also have the option of submitting to its regulator a CRA plan for approval 
and then be evaluated under that plan. The plan would have to be publicly available and 
have measurable goals. The regulator would consult with community groups to determine 
whether the plan responded to community credit needs. 
The Comptroller said that the proposed changes would improve the consistency of CRA 
examination and enforcement. Banks would continue to make CRA ratings public, and the 
public would have an opportunity to comment on CRA performance. 
The proposed changes would be phased in, and banks could elect to be evaluated under either 
the old or new standards until July 1995. 
"This reform package reflects -- not just the thinking of regulators -- but the best thinking of 
the American people," said Mr. Ludwig. "It represents the result -- not just of technical 
analysis -- but of participatory government. It stands -- not as a policy imposed from above 
-- but as a consensus -- and a compromise -- forged among those who will live with its 
results. " 
The proposed rule will be published in the Federal Register. The public will have 60 days to 
comment on the proposal from the date of publication. 
### 
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For Release After White House Press Conference 
December 8, 1993 
1. 
2. 
COMl\fUNITY REINVESTMENT ACI' REFORM PROPOSAL 
Major Issues 
What will be the underlying basis ror eRA performance evaluations under the 
rerorm proposal? 
In assessing an institution's CRA performance, regulators recognize that the institution 
is expected to help meet the credit needs of its entire community. In examinations, 
however, particular attention will be paid to the institution's record of helping to meet 
the credit needs in low- and moderate-income census tracts or rural areas (cnllectively 
referred to as low- and moderate-income geographies in the regulation) and of low- and 
moderate-income individuals. That record will be evaluated primarily using three 
measures -- a lending test, a service test, and an investment test. An institution's fair 
lending record will also be considered. 
Do banks and thrifts need to engage in aU three eRA activities - lending, 
investment, and service -- in order to earn a satisractory or better eRA rating? 
No. As a general rule, banks and thrifts will be evaluated on the basis of the product 
lines offered to their customers in the normal course of business. 
The lending test will apply to all retail banks and thrifts and will evaluate direct lending 
by the institution itself and, if the institution elects, indirect lending through loan pools; 
lending consortia; bank subsidiaries and funded non-charter afflliates; and other entities, 
in whom the bank or thrift has made investments, that lend in low- and moderate-income 
individuals or geographies. 
The service test evaluates the accessibility of a retail bank's branches and the extent to 
which the bank provides other facilities and services that enhance credit availability. The 
service test does not require any bank to expand its branch network or to operate its 
facilities at a loss. It considers non-traditional branches, including mini-branches in 
grocery stores or branches operated in conjunction with other banks, other local 
businesses, churches, or other non-profit organizations. Wholesale and Emited purpose 
institutions will be evaluated on the extent to which they provide other services that 
enhance credit availability. 
The investment test evaluates banks on the amount of their investments that ben~fit low-
and moderate-income geographies or persons. The investment test will constitute the 
principal test in evaluating the eRA performance of wholesale and limited-purpose 
institutions (instead of the lending test). The investment test will apply to provide extra 
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credit to retail institutions that make qualified investments (community development 
investments or investments that otherwise benefit low- and moderate-income 
communities) . 
3. Will banks and thrifts still delineate communities for purposes or tbeir eRA 
examinations? 
The geographic area in which a retail bank or thrift does the bulk of its lending shall be 
used to define an institution's service area. A bank or thrift may elect to delineate its 
service area for its supervisory agency, but will not be evaluated on the method used to 
delineate its service areas. 
A rebuttable presumption shall exist that an institution's service area is acceptable if that 
area: 
• is broad enough to include low- and moderate-income geographies; and 
• does not arbitrarily exclude low- and moderate-income geographies. 
An institution could demonstrate that its service area is acceptable despite its failure to 
satisfy these requirements by demonstrating, for example, that a service area that does 
not include low- and moderate-income geographies does not do so because there are no 
such geographies within any reasonable distance given the size and financial condition 
of the institution. 
Separate service areas shall exist where institutions serve substantial areas across state 
lines or across MSA lines. 
4. How will a bank or tbrirt's perfonnance be evaluated under the lending test? 
The guiding principle will be whether the bank or thrift is making loans in low- and 
moderate- income geographies as well as to wealthier geographies. At its core, the 
lending test requires a comparison of a lender's market share of loans made in low-and 
moderate-income geographies with its market share of loans in other geographies in its 
service area. A bank and thrift will also be evaluated on whether it makes loans 
throughout its service area or the percentage of its lending in low- and moderate-income 
geographies. Institutions will receive extra credit under the lending test for "second-
look" programs, creative or innovative underwriting, 10ans for which there is a 
particularly pressing need, and loans to third parties, such as community development 
organizations or intermediaries that make or facilitate lending in low- and moderate-
income geographies. 
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s. Will the loans have to be made directly by the bank or thrift to be considered in the 
institution's performance evaluation? 
No. An institution may elect to count· under the lending test loans made through a loan 
pool, a lending consortium, by subsidiaries or funded non-charter affiliates, or through 
community development and affordable housing lenders, women-owned or minority-
owned financial institutions, low-income credit unions, and others that lend directly to 
the low- and moderate-income community. 
Regulators will attribute to the institution its percentage (based on the level of the bank 
or thrift's investment or participation) of each loan in a loan pool, a loan consortium, 
subsidiary, funded non-charter affiliate or community lending organization in which the 
bank has invested or participated. Lending by the consortia or the community 
development lender need not be restricted to the institution's service area for it to be 
considered as helping to meet the institution's eRA responsibilities. 
6. What criteria will be used to evaluate an institution's performance under the lending 
test? 
• Outstanding 
Subject to rebuttal, the regulator will rate a bank or thrift's lending performance 
outstanding if: 
• The institution's market share of reported loans in low- and moderate-
income geographies in its service area significantly exceeds its market 
share of reported loans in other geographies in its service area; and 
• Either it has made a significant amount of loans in the vast majority of the 
low- and moderate-income geographies in its service area 
• Qr its loans to low- and moderate-income geographies in its service area 
represent a substantial percentage of its loans in its service area. 
• High Satisfactory 
Subject to rebuttal, the regulator will rate a bank or thrift's lending performance 
high satisfactory fashion if: 
• The institution's market share of reportable loans in low- and moderate-
income geographies in its service area is at least roughly comparable to 
its market share of reported loans in other geographies in its serviee area; 
and 
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• ~ it has made a significant amount of loans in most of the low- and 
moderate-income geographies in its service area 
• Qr its loans to low- and moderate-income geographies in its service area 
represent a very signijicafIJ percentage of its loans in its service area. 
• Low Satisfactory 
Subject to rebuttal, the regulator will rate a bank or thrift's performance low 
satisfactory if: 
• The institution's market share of reportable loans in low- and moderate-
income geographies in its service area is aI least roughly comparable to 
its market share of reported loans in its entire service area; and 
• Either it has made a significant number of loans to many of the low- and 
moderate-income geographies in its service area 
• Qr its loans to low- and moderate-income geographies in its service area 
represent a signijicafIJ percentage of its loans in its service area. 
• Needs to Improve 
Subject to rebuttal, the regulator will rate a bank or thrift's performance needs 
to improve if: 
• The institution's market share of reportable loans in low- and moderate-
income geographies in its service area is less than, and not roughly 
comparable to, its market share of reported loans in other geographies in 
its service area; or 
• It has made a significant amount of reportable loans in only a few of the 
low- and moderate-income geographies in its service area; and its 
reportable loans to low- and moderate-income geographies in its service 
area represent an insignificant percentage of its reportable loans to its 
servIce area. 
• Substantial Noncompliance 
Subject to rebuttal, the regulator will rate a bank or thrift's performance as 
substantial noncompliance if: 
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• The institution's market share of reportable loans in low- and moderate-
income geographies in its service area is signijicanr/y less than its market 
share of reported loans in its entire service area; and 
• It made very few, if any, loans in the low-and moderate-income 
geographies in its service area. 
7. Will regulators take other information into account in assessing a bank or thrift's 
performance under the lending test? 
Yes. The regulator may increase a presumptive rating if the bank or thrift participates 
in a program for giving second reviews to loan applications, particularly if done in 
conjunction with community organizations who participate in the review or offer 
applications from low- and moderate-income individuals that the bank will consider for 
credit. Regulators may also increase a presumptive rating if the institution makes a 
substantial amount of loans that require creative or innovative underwriting (while 
maintaining a safe and sound quality) or loans for which there is a particular need. 
Regulators will also consider favorably loans to third parties, such a community 
development organizations and intermediaries that make or facilitate lending in low- and 
moderate-income geographies. 
In exceptional cases, the regulator may reduce a presumptive rating if it concludes that 
the quantitative measures fail to reflect the institution's actual record of lending to low-
and moderate-income individuals or geographies. 
8. What factors will be considered under the service test? 
In order to keep the test relatively straightforward and to reflect the law's expectation 
that banks and thrifts be encouraged to help meet the credit needs of their communities, 
the service test for retail institutions will emphasize branch location in or readily 
accessible to low- and moderate-income geographies in the institution's service area. 
Provision of services such as accessible A TMs, credit counseling, low-cost check 
cashing, "lifeline" checking accounts, and other programs will be considered favorably, 
but generally will not be required. If a bank or thrift offers or provides support for these 
or other services designed to facilitate access to the institution in low- and moderate-
income communities, those programs will enhance the institution's service record. 
Wholesale and limited purpose institutions will be evaluated on the extent to which they 
provide other services that enhance credit availability. 
9. What criteria will be used to evaluate an institution's record under the Service test? 
For retail banks, the service test addresses the availability of branches throughout an 
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institution's service area. A rebuttable presumption will exist that an institution's serviye 
record in each area is: 
• Outstanding 
If a substalUial percentage of its branches are located in or readily accessible to 
low- and moderate-income geographies. 
• High Satisfactory 
If a very significant percentage of its branches are located in or readily accessible· 
to low- and moderate-income geographies. 
• Low Satisfactory 
If a significaIU percentage of its branches are located in or readily accessible to 
low- and moderate-income geographies. 
• Needs to Improve 
If an insignificaIU percentage of its branches are located in or readily accessible 
to low- and moderate-income geographies. 
• Substantial Noncompliance 
If very few, if any, of its branches are located in or readily accessible to low- and 
moderate-income geographies. 
No bank or thrift will be required to expand the size of its branching network or to 
operate facilities at a loss. Appropriate consideration will be given to the limitations 
faced by institutions with a small number of branches. As described above, services that 
ihcrease credit availability will not be required but a strong record of offering or 
providing support to other organizations that offer such services could improve an 
institution's rating by up to one level. 
10. Will other factors be taken into account under the service test? 
Yes. The regulator may adjust an institution's rating upward to reflect a strong record 
of offering or supporting services that promote credit availability for low- and moderate-
income geographies or individuals. These services include credit counseling, low-cost 
check cashing, "lifeline" checking accounts, financial planning, home ownership 
- counseling, loan packaging assisting small and minority businesses, partnerships with 
community-based organizations to promote credit-related services, extensive provision 
of A TMs that are particularly accessible and convenient to low- and moderate-income 
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geographies or individuals, and similar programs. 
A regulator may adjust a bank's record upward or downward to .refleCt more accurately 
its branch service to low- or moderate-income geographies or individuals. In determining 
the appropriateness and degree of any adjustment the regulator may consider the 
institution's record of opening and closing branches. The regulator might also consider 
whether branches in or readily-accessible to low- or moderate-income geographies serve 
low- and moderate-income individuals. Regulators may also take into account significant 
differences in the quantity, quality, or types of services offered to low- and moderate-
income individuals or geographies and similar considerations. 
A bank or thrift could rebut a presumption raised by the quantitative measures by 
demonstrating that they present an inaccurate picture of its service of low- and moderate-
income geographies and individuals because of peculiarities in the demographics of its 
service area, limitations imposed by its financial condition, economic limitations on 
branch operation, or similar considerations. 
11. Can wholesale banks and limited-purpose banks be evaluated under the service test? 
12. 
Yes. Wholesale and limited-purpose banks would be evaluated based on the extent to 
which they offer services to promote credit availability, or provide support to 
organizations that offer such services, in low- and moderate-income geographies or to 
low- and moderate-income individuals. 
What factors will be considered under the investment test? 
Wholesale and limited-purpose institutions will normally be evaluated under the 
investment test instead of the lending test. Retail institutions will be evaluated under the 
investment test (in addition to the lending and service tests), but investment performance 
cannot reduce their composite rating. 
Institutions will be evaluated based on the amount of capital they have devoted to 
qualified investments not already considered under the lending test. Qualified 
investments include investments: in support of local affordable housing and community, 
economic, or small business development; in community development banks, community 
development corporations, community development projects, small business investment 
corporations (including minority small business investment corporations), and minority-
and women-owned financial institutions and other community development financial 
intermediaries; in consortia or other structures serving low- and moderate-income 
individuals and areas; and in state and local government agency housing bonds or state 
and local government revenue bonds specifically aimed at helping low- an~ moderate-
income geographies and individuals. 
The focus of the investment test is the ultimate impact of the bank or thrift's investment 
c - 15 
not the investment per se. Therefore, qualified investments will not be credited under 
the test unless they have had a demonstrable impact, e.g. in providing loans to low- and 
moderate-income individuals or areas or community development projects that benefit 
low- and moderate-income individuals and geographies. 
13. What criteria will be used to assign ratings under the investment test? 
There will be a rebuttable presumption that an institution's investment performance is: 
• Outstanding 
If it has devoted a substantial amount of its capital to qualified investments; 
• High Satisfactory 
If it has devoted a very significant amount of its capital to qualified investments; 
• Low Satisfactory 
If it has devoted a significant amount of its capital to qualified investments; 
• Needs to Improve 
If it has devoted an insignificanJ amount of its capital to qualified investments; 
• Substantial Noncompliance 
If it has devoted very lillie, if any, capital to qualified investments. 
An institution's rating under the investment test may be increased up to one level if a 
large portion of its investments support community development activities that are 
particularly complex, innovative, or intensive for an institution its size. Examples of 
such activities include helping establish a new entity to conduct community development 
activities or providing significant service or assistance in support of a qualified. 
investment. In addition, qualified investments outside an institution's service area will 
be taken into consideration unless the institution has neglected investments that would 
benefit its service area. 
14. How will an institution's composite rating be determined? 
For retail institutions, the institution's rating under the lending test will form the basis 
- for its composite rating, For wholesale or limited-purpose institutions, the-institution's 
rating under the investment test will serve as the basis for the composite rating', 
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For retail institutions, the base rating may be increased by up to two levels (on the five 
rating scale) in the case of outstanding investment performance or by one level in the 
case of high satisfactory investment performance. This base rating may be increased by 
one level in the case of. outstanding service and decreased by one level in the case of 
substantial non-compliance in service. 
The rating will then be converted to the statutorily-required four level rating system, with 
high satisfactory and low satisfactory both scored as satisfactory. An institution that 
would otherwise receive a needs to improve rating will be rated in substantial 
noncompliance if the institution received no better than a needs to improve rating on both 
of its last two examinations. 
Finally, the rating will be adjusted, if necessary, to take into account illegal lending 
discrimination by the institution to arrive at a final composite rating. 
15. How will a reason to believe that an institution has engaged in illegal lending 
discrimination arrect its eRA rating? 
There will be a rebuttable presumption that to receive a composite rating of satisfactory 
or better a bank or thrift has not: 
• Engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination that it has not fully corrected; 
and 
• Committed an isolated act of illegal discrimination of which it has knowledge that 
it has not corrected fully or is not in the process of correcting fully. 
16. Will extenuating circumstances (little or no loan demand, an innovative product that 
did not or is taking time to catch on, etc.) be taken into account in assessing eRA 
ratings? 
Yes, in at least two ways. First, the tests are set up as rebuttable presumptions. 
Therefore a bank or thrift will have the opportunity to rebut the presumptive case by 
citing extraordinary circumstances. Second, the tests generally take into account any 
special circumstances related to the financial condition of the institution, its product lines, 
and the environment within which it is operating. 
17. Will banks and thrifts still be required to assess the credit needs of their 
communities? 
- To perform under the quantitative measures, banks and thrifts will have to offer products 
for which there is a market. Therefore, they have an incentive to perform needs 
. assessments in their communities. Under the proposal, however, the regulators will not 
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evaluate the methods used by an institution to assess credit needs. 
18. Will a bank or thrift have the option to submit to its regulators a eRA plan Cor 
approval and then be evaluated on its perfonnance under the plan? 
Yes. As an alternative to being rated ex post under the lending, service and investment 
tests, an institution may submit a eRA plan with measurable goals against which its 
subsequent performance will be assessed. 
A bank submitting a proposed plan for approval must provide notice to the community 
that its plan is available for public comment. An institution's regulator will consider 
public comments in the assessment of the institution's plan. 
Regulators will not approve a plan unless it provides measurable goals against which 
subsequent performance can be evaluated and the proposed performance is at least overall 
satisfactory. If an institution fails to meet or exceed the preponderance of the measurable 
goals set forth in the plan, its performance will be evaluated under the lending, service, 
and investment tests. 
19. Will there be differences between the examinations or small banks and large banks? 
Yes. Small institutions will be fully subject to the eRA, but examinations will be 
streamlined and data reporting requirements will be less stringent than for larger 
institutions. The streamlined exam procedures and reduced reporting requirements will 
apply to: 
• Independent banks and thrifts with total assets of $250 million or less, and 
• Members of a holding company, the total banking and thrift assets of which are 
$250 million or less. 
20. What will a small bank eRA examination entail? 
A small bank's overall eRA performance will be presumed to be satisfactory if the bank: 
• Has a reasonable loan-to-deposit ratio (a ratio of 60 percent, adjusted for seasonal 
variation, is presumed to be reasonable) given its size, its financial condition, and 
the credit needs in its service area; 
• Makes the majority of its loans in its service area; 
• Has a good loan mix <.i&.... makes, to the extent permitted by law and-regulation, 
a variety of loans to customers across economic levels); 
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• Has no legitimate, bona-fide complaints from community members; 
• Has not engaged in a pattern or practice of illegal lending disCrimination that it 
has not fully corrected; or committed isolated acts of discrimination, of which it 
has knowledge, that it has not corrected fully or is not in the process of 
correcting fully; and . 
• For a bank or thrift already subject to reporting home mortgage lending data 
under HMDA, has a reasonable geographic distribution of HMDA loans; 
A small bank or thrift that meets each of the standards for a satisfactory rating· and 
exceeds some or all of those standards may warrant consideration for an overall rating 
of outstanding. In assessing whether a small bank's eRA record is outstanding, its 
regulator will consider the extent to which the bank's loan to deposit ratio, its lending 
to its service area, and its loan mix exceed the standards for a satisfactory rating. In 
addition, at the option of the bank, the acc will evaluate: 
• Its record of making qualified investments, especially those in its local service 
area; and 
• Its record of providing branches, A TMs, and "'ther services that enhance credit 
availability or in other ways serve the convenience and needs of low- and 
moderate-income persons in its service area. 
21. Can a small bank or thrift receive a less than satisfactory rating using the 
streamlined procedures? 
Yes. A small bank or thrift that fails to meet or exceed ill of the standards for a 
satisfactory rating under the small bank examination is not presumed to be performing 
in a less than satisfactory manner, however. Rather, for those institutions, the regulator 
conducts a more extensive examination of the bank or thrift's loan to deposit record, its 
record of lending to its local community, and its loan mix. The regulator will also 
contact members of the community, particularly in response to complaints about the 
bank, and review the findings of its most recent fair lending examination. In addition, 
at the option of the bank or thrift, its regulator will assess: 
• Its record of making qualified affordable housing and community development 
investments, especially those in its local service area; and 
• Its record of providing branches, ATMs, and other services that enhance credit 
availability or in other ways meet the convenience and needs of low- and 
moderate-income persons in its service area. 
22. How will enforcement of the CRA be strengthened? 
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Under the revised regulation, an bank or thrift will have a continuing and affirmative 
obligation to help meet the credit needs of their communities, including low- and 
moderate-income areas, consistent with safe and sound operation.' Banks with a 
composite rating of Substantial Noncompliance will be subject to formal enforcement 
actions. 
23. What data disclosure will be required? 
Every bank, except small banks electing the small bank assessment method, will collect 
and maintain the data: on its government insured and other reportable loans (home 
purchase, home improvement, small business, small farm, and consumer loans) as 
follows: 
• number of written applications, 
• number of application denials, 
• number and amount of approvals, 
• number and amount of loans purchased, and 
• number and amount of indirect loans the bank elects to have evaluated using the 
lending test. 
All information is to be provided by census tract or block numbering area where the loan 
is located. A bank choosing to be rated under the strategic plan assessment is not relieved 
from its obligation to report these data. 
Summary data will be available to the public and to the banks. The data will be used by 
the regulators to apply the Lending Test. 
24. What smaU business loan data will be required? 
Small business loan data will be collected, reported, and disclosed in a summary format 
the following categories: 
• small businesses with average annual gross receipts of less than $250,000; 
• those with average annual gross receipts of more than $250,000 and less than $1 
million; 
• those with average annual gross receipts of more than $1 million and less than 
$10 million; and 
• manufacturing businesses with average annual gross receipts of more than $10 
million and less than 500 employees. 
25. What home mortgage loan data will be required? 
Home mortgage loan data will be collected, reported, and disclosed in the summary 
format as follows: 
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• Home purchase (1-4 family); 
• Home improvement (1-4 family); 
• Refinancings (1-4 family); 
• Multifamily (home purchase, home improvement, refinancings) 
Where possible, data collected on home mortgages will be con.sistent with data collected 
under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. 
26. Will all consumer loans be included in the consumer loan category? 
No. Credit card loans and auto and other vehicular loans will not be included in the 
consumer loan category. 
27. When will the data be collected? 
The information will be collected beginning July 1, 1994, for the remaining six months 
of 1994. The data for the six months will be submitted to a lending institution's primary 
regulator by January 31, 1995. 
Beginning January 1, 1995, on an annual basis, a summary of a bank or thrift's data 
collected under this regulation will be submitted to its primary regulator by January 31, 
of the following year. The summary data will be submitted in a format that will be 
prescribed in an appendix to the regulation. 
28. Will banks and thriftS be required to report data on indirect loans? 
A bank or a thrift will not be required to report indirect loans unless the institution elects 
to have the indirect loans attributed for purposes of the lending test. If a bank or thrift 
elects to report its indirect loans, it will report all attributable indirect loans outside low-
or moderate-income geographies as well as loans inside such geograph.ies. 
29. Will eRA perfonnance evaluations continue to be made public? 
Yes. The format will be revised to ensure that the evaluations include all data relevant 
in reaching a conclusion about an institution's CRA performance. 
30. How will the regulators conduct examinations involving affiliated banks or thrifts? 
Multiple Branches operating under a Single Chaner 
• The primary regulator will conduct complete lending and service tests in a sample 
of the service areas in which a bank operates. 
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• Separate composite eRA ratings will be assigned to the institution's performance 
in each of the service areas studied. A list of the service areas in which the 
institution's eRA performance was examined, along with the rating assigned to 
the institution's eRA record in the service area, shall be included in the 
institution's public performance evaluation. 
• The overall bank rating will reflect the performance of the bank in the service 
areas studied. 
Affiliated Banks operating under Separate Charters 
• eRA ratings are presently assigned to each separately chartered bank in a 
multibank holding company, but those ratings are in no way consolidated for 
purposes of assigning a eRA rating to the holding company as a whole. An 
interagency agreement will be developed on methodology to assign a corporate 
or consolidated eRA rating on a statewide, regional, andlor national level to bank 
holding companies with multiple affiliates. 
• As called for in the law, eRA ratings will be assigned and public performance 
evaluations prepared for each separately chartered bank or thrift. 
• As with the case of multiple branches operating under a single bank charter, the 
holding company rating will reflect the performance of the separately chartered 
affiliated banks studied. 
31. Will the Dew regulations go into effect immediately or will there be a transition 
period? 
There will be a transition period. 
Data collection will begin July 1, 1994. Data collected from July 1, 1994 to year end 
will be reported the regulators no later than January 31, 1995. Thereafter banks will 
collect data on an annual basis and the data shall be reported no later than January 31 of 
the following year. 
From April 1, 1995 to July 1, 1995, an institution could elect to be evaluated under the 
standards that were in place under the old system rather than the new standards. After 
July 1, 1995, the new standards will be mandatory except that, until April 1, 1996, an 
institution showing good cause could request evaluation under the old standards. An 
institution could also elect to be evaluated under a strategic plan during the transition 
period. . 
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.. Embargoed until 3 p.m. March 8, 1994 
/ 
INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON FAIR LENDING 
POLICY STATEMENT 
The Interagency Task Force on Fair Lending met on :March 8, 1994 to consider the 
following Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending. The Department of Housing 
and Urban Development, the Department of Justice, the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal Housing Finance Board, and 
the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight have adopted the Policy Statement. 
Governor Lawrence Lindsey was authorized by the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System to adopt the Policy Statement on behalf of the Board of Governors and 
has done so. The participants in the Task Force meeting representing the Board of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Board of the National Credit Union 
Administration, and the Federal Trade Commission fully support the Policy Statement 
and have agreed to seek approval of the Policy Statement from their agencies. The 
Task Force participants have agreed that the Policy Statement may be made public 
pending this process. Upon completion of this process, the Policy Statement will be 
published in the Federal Register as a Notice. The Notice will state that the agencies 
welcome comments about the application of the principles in the Policy Statement to 
specific policies and practices. The agencies anticipate providing further clarification 
and elaboration on the application of the principles in the future. 
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Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending 
The Depanment of Housing and Urban Development ("HUO"), the Department of Justice 
("DOJ"), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"), the Office of Thrift 
Supervision ("OTS"), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the "Board"). 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), the Federal Housing Finance Board 
("FHFB"), the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), the National Credit Union 
Administration ("NCVA"), and the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight 
("OFHEO") (collectively, "the Agencies") are concerned that some prospective home buyers 
and other borrowers may be experiencing discriminatory treatment in their efforts to obtain 
loans. The 1992 Federal Reserve Bank of Boston study on lending discrimination, 
Congressional hearings, and agency investigations have indicated that race is a factor in some 
lending decisions. Discrimination in lending on the basis of race or other prohibited factors 
is destructive, morally repugnant, and against the law. It prevents those who are 
discriminated against from enjoying the benefits of access to credit. The Agencies will not 
tolerate lending discrimination in any form. Further, fair lending is not inconsistent with 
safe and sound operations. Lenders must continue to ensure that their lending practices are 
consistent with safe and sound operating policies. 
This policy statement applies to all lenders, including mortgage brokers, issuers of credit 
cards, and any other person who extends credit of any type. The policy statement is being 
issued for several reasons, including: 
• To provide guidance about what the agencies consider in detennining if lending 
discrimination exists; and 
• To provide a foundation for future interpretations and rulemakings by the Agencies. 
A number of federal statutes seek to promote fair lending. For example, the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act ("HMDA") seeks to prevent lending discrimination and redlioing 
by requiring public disclosure of certain information about mortgage loan applications. The 
Community Reinvestment Act (" CRA ") seeks affmnatively to encourage institutions to help 
to meet the credit needs of the entire community served by each institution covered by the 
statute, and CRA ratings take into account lending discrimination by those institutions. The 
Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in 
the provision of goods and services, including credit services. This policy statement, 
however, is based upon and addresses only the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the Fair 
Housing Act, the two statutes that specifically prohibit discrimination in lending. 
This policy statement has been approved and adopted by the signatory Agencies listed above 
as a statement of the Agencies' general position on the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the 
Fair Housing Act for purposes of administrative enforcement of those statutes. It is intended 
to be consistent with those statutes and their implementing regulations and to provide 
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guidance to lenders seeking to comply with them. It does not create or confer any 
substantive or procedural rights on third parties which could be enforceable in any 
administrative or civil proceeding. 
This policy statement will discuss what constitutes lending discrimination under these statutes 
and answer questions about how the Agencies will respond to lending discrimination and 
what steps lenders might take to prevent discriminatory lending practices. 
A. lending Discrimination Statutes and Regulations 
(1) The Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA") prohibits discrimination in any aspect of 
a credit transaction. The ECOA is not limited to consumer loans. It applies to any 
extension of credit, including extensions of credit to small businesses, corporations, 
partnerships, and trusts. 
The ECOA prohibits discrimination based on: 
• Race or color; 
• Religion; 
• National origin; 
• -Sex; 
• Marital status; 
• Age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract); 
• The applicant's receipt of income derived from any public assistance program; 
and 
• The applicant's exercise, in good faith, of any right under the Consumer Credit 
Protection Act. 
The Federal Reserve Board's Regulation B, found at 12 C.F.R. Part 202, implements 
the ECOA. Regulation B describes lending acts and practices that are specifically 
prohibited, pennitted, or required. Official interpretations of the regulation are found 
in Supplement I to 12 C.F.R. Part 202. 
(2) The Fair Housing Act ("PH Act") prohibits discrimination in all aspects of residential 
real-estate related transactions, including, but not limited to: 
• Making loans to buy, build, repair or improve a dwelling; 
• Purchasing real estate loans; 
• Selling, brokering or appraising residential real estate; and 
-- • The sale or rental of a dwelling. 
The FH Act prohibits discrimination based on: 
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• Race or color; 
• National origin; 
• Religion; 
• Sex; 
• Familial status (defmed as children under the age of 18 living with a parent or 
legal custodian, pregnant women and people securing custody of children under 
18); and 
• Handicap. 
HUD's regulations implementing the PH Act are found at 24 C.F.R. Part 100. 
Because both the PH Act and the ECOA apply to mortgage lending, lenders may not 
discriminate in mortgage lending based on any of the prohibited factors in either list. 
Liability under these two statutes for discrimination on a prohibited basis is civil, not 
criminal. However, there is criminal liability under the PH Act for various forms of 
interference with efforts to enforce the FH Act, such as altering or withholding evidence or 
forcefully intimidating persons seeking to exercise their rights under the PH Act. 
What is prohibited. Under the ECOA, it is unlawful for a lender to discriminate on a 
prohibited basis in any aspect of a credit transaction and, under both the ECOA and the PH 
Act, it is unlawful for a lender to discriminate on a prohibited basis in a residential real 
estate related transaction. Under one or both of these laws, a lender may not, because of a 
prohibited factor: 
• Fail to provide information or services or provide different information or 
services regarding any aspect of the lending process, including credit availability, 
application procedures, or lending standards; 
• Discourage or selectively encourage applicants with respect to inquiries about or 
applications for credit; 
• Refuse to extend credit or use different standards in determining whether to 
extend credit; 
• Vary the terms of credit offered, inCluding the amount, interest rate, duration, or 
type of loan; 
• Use different standards to evaluate collateral; 
• Treat a borrower differently in servicing a loan or invoking default remedies; or 
• Use different standards for pooling or packaging a loan in the secondary market. 
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A lender may not express, orally or in writing, a preference based on prohibited factors or 
indicate that it will treat applicants differently on a prohibited basis. 
A lender may not discriminate on a prohibited basis because of the characteristics of: 
• A person associated with a credit applicant (for example, a co-applicant, spouse, 
business partner, or live-in aide); or 
•. The present or prospective occupants of the area where property to be fmanced is 
located. 
Finally, the FH Act requires lenders to make reasonable accommodations for a person with 
disabilities when such accommodations are necessary to afford the person an equal 
opportunity to apply for credit. 
B. Types of Lending Discrimination 
The courts have recognized three methods of proof of lending discrimination under the 
ECOA and the FH Act: 
• "Overt evidence of discrimination," when a lender blatantly discriminates on a 
prohibited basis; 
• Evidence of "disparate treatment," when a lender treats applicants differently 
based on one of the prohibited factors; and 
• Evidence of "disparate impact," when a lender applies a practice uniformly to all 
applicants but the practice has a discriminatory effect on a prohibited basis and is 
not justified by business necessity. 
Overt Evidence of Discrimination. There is overt evidence of discrimination when a lender 
openly discriminates on a prohibited basis. 
Example. A lender offered a credit card with a limit of up to $750 for 
·applicants aged 21-30 and $1500 for applicants over 30. This policy violated 
the ECOA' s prohibition on discrimination based on age. 
There is overt evidence of discrimination even when a lender expresses -- but does not act on 
-- a discriminatory preference: 
-.. 
Example. A lending officer told a customer, "We do not like to make home 
mortgages to Native Americans, but the law says we cannot discririlinate and 
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we have to comply with the law." This statement violated the PH Act's 
prohibition on statements expressing a discriminatory preference. 
Evidence of Disparate Treatment. Disparate treatment occurs when a lender treats a credit 
applicant differently based on one of the prohibited bases. Disparate treatment ranges from 
overt discrimination to more subtle disparities in treatment. It does not require any showing 
that the treatment was motivated by prejudice or a conscious intention to discriminate against 
a person beyond the difference in treatment itself. It is considered by courts to be intentional 
discrimination because no credible, nondiscriminatory reason explains the difference in 
treatment on a prohibited basis. 
Example. Two minority loan applicants were told that it would take several hours 
and require the payment of an application fee to determine whether they would qualify 
for a home mortgage loan. In contrast, a loan officer took fmancial information 
immediately from nonminority applicants and determined whether they qualified in 
minutes, without a fee being paid. The lender's differential treatment violated both 
the ECOA and the PH Act. 
Example: Redlining refers to the illegal practice of refusing to make 
residential loans or imposing more onerous terms on any loans made because 
of the predominant race, national origin, etc., of the neighborhood in which 
the property is located. Redlining violates both the PH Act and the ECOA. 
Disparate treatment may more likely occur in the treatment of applicants who are neither 
clearly well-qualified nor clearly unqualified. Discrimination may more readily affect 
applicants in this middle group for- two reasons. First, because the applications are all "close 
cases," there is more room and need for lender discretion. Second, whether or not an 
applicant qualifies may depend on the level of assistance the lender provides the applicant in 
preparing an application. The lender may, for example, propose solutions to problems on an 
application, identify compensating factors, and provide encouragement to the applicant. 
Lenders are under no obligation to provide such assistance, but to the extent that they do, the 
assistance must be provided in a nondiscriminatory way. 
Example: A nonminority couple applied for an automobile loan. The lender 
found adverse information in the couple's credit report. The lender discussed 
the credit report with them and determined that the adverse information, a 
judgment against the couple, was incorrect since the judgment had been 
vacated. The nonminority couple was granted their loan. A minority couple 
applied for a similar loan with the same lender. Upon discovering adverse 
information in the minority couple's credit report, the lender denied the loan 
application on the basis of the adverse infomiation without giving the couple 
an opportunity to discuss the report. 
c - 28 
- 7 -
Example: Two minority borrowers inquired with a lender about mortgage 
loans. They were given applications for fIxed-rate loans only and were not 
offered assistance in completing the loan applications. They completed the 
applications on their own and ultimately failed to qualify. Two similarly 
situated nonminority borrowers made an identical inquiry about mortgage loans 
to the same lender. They were given information about both adjustable-rate 
and fIxed-rate mortgages and were given assistance in preparing applications 
that the lender could accept. 
Both of these are examples of disparate treatment of similarly situated applicants, apparently 
based on a prohibited factor, in the amount of assistance and information the lender 
provided. The lender might also generally exercise its discretion to disfavor some 
individuals or favor others in a manner that results in a pattern or practice of disparate 
treatment that cannot be explained on grounds other than a prohibited basis. 
If a lender has treated similar applicants differently on the basis of a prohibited factor, it 
must provide an explanation for the difference in treatment. If the lender is unable to 
provide a credible and legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation, the agency may infer that 
the lender discriminated. 
If an agency determines that a lender's explanation for treating some applicants differently is 
a pretext for discrimination, the agency may fmd that the lender discriminated, 
notwithstanding the lender's explanation. 
Example: A lender rejected a loan application made by a female applicant 
with flaws in her credit report but accepted applications by male applicants 
with similar flaws. The lender offered the explanation that the rejected 
application had been processed by a new loan officer who was unfamiliar with 
the bank's policy to work with applicants to correct credit report problems. 
However, an investigation revealed that the same loan officer that processed 
the rejected application had accepted applications from males with similar 
credit problems after working with them to provide satisfactory explanations. 
When a lender's treatment of two applicants is compared, even when there is an apparently 
valid explanation for a particular difference in treatment, further investigation may establish 
disparate treatment on a prohibited basis. For example, seemingly valid explanations for 
denying loans to minority applicants may have been applied consistently to minority 
applicants and inconsistently to nonrninority applicants; or "offsetting" or "compensatory" 
factors cited as the reason for approving nonminority applicants may involve information that 
the lender usually failed to consider for minority applicants but usually considered for 
Roominorityapplicants. 
A pattern or practice of disparate treatment on a prohibited basis may also be established 
through a valid statistical analysis of detailed loan flle information, provided that the analysis 
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controls for possible legitimate explanations for differences in treatment. Where a lender's 
underwriting decisions are the subject of a statistical analysis, detailed information must be 
collected from individual loan flies about the applicants' qualifications for credit. Data 
reported by lenders under the HMDA do not, standing alone, provide sufficient information 
for such an analysis because they omit important variables, such as credit histories and debt 
ratios. HMDA data are useful, though, for identifying lenders whose practices may warrant 
investigation for compliance with fair lending laws. HMDA data may also be relevant, in 
conjunction with other evidence, to determine whether a lender has discriminated. 
Evidence of Disparate Impact. When a lender applies a policy or practice equally to credit 
applicants, but the policy or practice has a disproportionate adverse impact on applicants 
from a group protected against discrimination, the policy or practice is described as having a 
"disparate impact." Policies and practices that are neutral on their face and that are applied 
equally may still, on a prohibited basis, disproportionately and adversely affect a person's 
access to credit. 
Although the precise contours of the law on disparate impact as it applies to lending 
discrimination are under development, it has been clearly established that proof of lending 
discrimination using a disparate impact analysis encompasses several steps. The single fact 
that a policy or practice creates a disparity on a prohibited basis is not alone proof of a 
violation. Where the policy or practice is justified by "business necessity" and there is no 
less discriminatory alternative, a violation of the PH Act or the ECOA will not exist. 
The existence of a disparate impact may be established through review of how a particular 
practice, policy or standard operates with respect to those who are affected by it. The 
existence of disparate impact is not established by a mere assertion or general perception that 
a policy or practice disproportionately excludes or injures people on a prohibited basis. The 
existence of a disparate impact must be established by facts. Frequently this is done through 
a quantitative or statistical analysis. Sometimes the operation of the practice is reviewed by 
analyzing its effect on an applicant pool; sometimes it consists of an analysis of the practice's 
effect on possible applicants, or on the population in general. Not every member of the 
group must be adversely affected for the practice to have a disparate impact. Evidence of 
discriminatory intent is not necessary to establish that a policy or practice adopted or 
implemented by a lender that has a disparate impact is in violation of the PH Act or ECOA. 
Identifying the existence of a disparate impact is only the fIrst step in proving lending 
discrimination. When an Agency fmds that a lender's policy or practice has a disparate 
impact, the next step is to seek to determine whether the policy or practice is justified by 
!business necessity." The justification must be manifest and may not be hypothetical or 
speculative. Factors that may be relevant to the justification could include cost and 
profItability. 
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Even if a policy or practice that has a disparate impact on a prohibited basis tan be justified 
by business necessity, it still may be found to be discriminatory if an alternative policy or 
practice could serve the same purpose with less discriminatory effect. 
Example: A lender's policy is not to extend loans for single family residences 
for less than $60,000.00. This policy has been in effect for ten years. This 
minimum loan amount policy is shown to disproportionately exclude potential 
minority applicants from consideration because of their income levels or the 
value of the houses in the areas in which they live. The lender will be 
required to justify the "business necessity" for tbepolicy. 
Example: In the past, lenders primarily considered net income in making 
underwriting decisions. In recent years, the trend has been to consider gross 
income. A lender decided to switch its practices to consider gross income 
rather than net income. However, in calculating gross income, the lender did 
not distinguish between taxable and nontaxable income even though nontaxable 
income is of more value than the equivalent amount of taxable income. The 
lender's policy may have a disparate impact on individuals with disabilities and 
the elderly, both of whom are more likely than the general applicant pool to 
receive substantial nontaxable income. The lender's policy is likely to be 
proven discriminatory. First, the lender is unlikely to be able to show that the 
policy is compelled by business necessity. Second, even if the lender could 
show business necessity, the lender could achieve the same purpose with less 
discriminatory effect by "grossing up" nontaxable income (i.e., making it 
equivalent to gross taxable income by using formulas related to the applicant's 
tax bracket). 
Lenders will not have to justify every requirement and practice every time that they face a 
compliance examination. The Agencies recognize the relevance to credit decisions of factors 
related to the adequacy of the borrower's income to carry the loan, the likely continuation of 
that income, the adequacy of the collateral to secure the loan, the borrower's past 
performance in paying obligations, the availability of funds to close, and the existence of 
adequate reserves. While lenders should think critically about whether widespread, familiar 
requirements and practices have an unjustifiable disparate impact, they should look especially 
carefully at requirements that are more stringent than customary. Lenders should also stay 
informed of developments in underwriting and portfolio performance evaluation so that they 
are well positioned to consider all options by which their business objectives can be 
achieved. 
C. Answers to Questions Often Asked by Financial Institutions and 
the Public 
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Lending institutions and others often ask the Agencies questions about various aspects of 
lending discrilnination. The Agencies have compiled this list of common questions, with 
answers, in order to provide further guidance. 
Ql: Are disparities in application, approval, or denial rates revealed by Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act ("HMDA") data sufficient to establish lending . 
discrimination? 
A: HMDA data alone do not prove lending discrimination. The data do not contain 
enough information on major credit-related factors, such as employment and credit 
histories, to prove discrimination. Despite these limitations, the data can provide "red 
flags" that there may be problems at particular institutions. Therefore, regulatory and 
enforcement agencies may use HMDA data, along with other factors, to identify 
institutions whose lending practices warrant more scrutiny. Furthermore, HMDA 
data can be relevant, in conjunction with other data and information, to determine 
whether a lender has discriminated. 
Q2: Does a lending institution that submits inaccurate HMDA data violate lending 
discrimination laws? 
A: An inaccurate HMDA data submission constitutes a violation of the HMDA, the 
Federal Reserve Board's Regulation C, and other applicable laws, and may subject 
the lending institution to an enforcement action, which could include civil money 
penalties, and, if the lender is a HVD-approved mortgagee, the' sanctions of the HUD 
Mortgagee Review Board. An inaccurate HMDA data submission, however, is not in 
itself a violation of the ECOA or the PH Act. However, a person who intentionally 
submits incorrect or incomplete HMDA data in order to cover up a violation of the 
PH Act may be subject, under the PH Act and federal crLminal statutes, to a fme or 
prison term or both. In addition, a failure to ensure accurate HMDA data may be 
considered as a relevant fact during a PH Act investigation or an excirnination of the 
institution's lending activities. 
Q3: Does a second review program only for loan applicants who are members of a 
protected class violate laws prohibiting discrimination in lending? 
A: Such programs are permissible if they do no more than ensure that lending standards 
are applied fairly and uniformly to all applicants. For example, it is permissible to 
review the proposed denial of applicants who are members of a protected class by 
comparing their applications to the approved applications of similarly qualified 
individuals who are not members of a protected class to determine-if the applications 
were evaluated consistently. It is impermissible, however, to review the applications 
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of members of a protected class in order to apply standards to those applications 
different from the standards used to evaluate other applications for the same credit 
program or to apply the same standards in a different manner, unless such actions are 
otherwise permitted by law, as described in Question 4. 
Other types of second review programs are also permissible. For example, lenders 
could review the proposed denial of all applicants within a certain income range. 
Lenders also could review a sampling of all applications proposed for denial, or even 
review all such applications. 
Q4: :May a lender apply different lending standards to applicants who are members of 
a protected class in order to increase lending to that sector of its community? 
A: Generally, a lender that applies different lending standards or offers different levels of 
assistance on a prohibited basis, regardless of its motivation, would be violating both 
the PH Act and the ECOA. There are exceptions to the general rule; thus, applying 
different lending standards or offering different levels of assistance to applicants who 
are members of a protected class is permissible in some circumstances. For example, 
the PH Act requires lenders to provide reasonable accommodation to people with 
disabilities. In addition, providing different treatment to applicants to address past 
discrimination would be permissible if done in response to a court order or otherwise 
in accord with applicable legal precedent. However, the law in this area is complex 
and developing. Before implementing programs of this sort, a lender should seek 
legal advice. 
Q5: 
A: 
Of course, affmnative advertising and marketing efforts that do not involve 
application of different lending standards are permissible under both the ECOA and 
the PH Act. For example, special outreach to a minority community would be 
permissible. 
Should a lender engage in self-testing? 
Principles of sound lending dictate that adequate policies and procedures be in place 
to ensure safe and sound lending practices and compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations, and that a lender adopt appropriate audit and control systems to determine 
whether the institution's policies and procedures are functioning adequately. This is 
as true in the area of fair lending as in other operations. Lenders should employ 
reliable measures for auditing fair lending compliance. A well-designed and 
implemented program of self-testing could be a valuable part of this process. Lenders 
should be aware, however, that data documenting lending discrimination discovered in 
a self-test generally will not be shielded from disclosure. 
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Corrective actions should always be taken by any lender that discovers discrimination. 
Self-testing and corrective actions do not expunge or extinguish legal liability for the 
violations of law, insulate a lender from private suits, or eliminate the primary 
regulatory agency's obligation to make the referrals required by law. However, they 
will be considered as a substantial mitigating factor by the primary regulatory 
agencies when contemplating possible enforcement actions. In addition, HUD and 
DO] will consider as a substantial mitigating factor an institution's self-identification 
and self-correction when determining whether they will seek additional penalties or 
other relief under the PH Act and the ECOA. The Agencies strongly encourage self-
testing and will consider further steps that might be taken to provide greater 
incentives for institutions to undertake self-assessment and self-correction. 
Q6: What should a lender do if self-testing evidences lending discrimination? 
A: If a lender discovers discriminatory practices, it should make all reasonable efforts to 
determine the full extent of the discrimination and its cause, e.g., determine whether 
the practices were grounded in defective policies, poor implementation or control of 
those policies, or isolated to a particular area of the lender's operations. The lender 
should take all appropriate corrective actions to address the discrimination, including, 
but not limited to: 
• Identifying customers whose applications may have been inappropriately 
processed, offering to extend credit if they were improperly denied; and 
compensating them for any damages, both out-of-pocket and compensatory; and 
notifying them of their legal rights; 
• Correcting any institutional policies or procedures that may have contributed to 
the discrimination; 
• Identifying, and then training and/or disciplining, the employees involved; 
• Considering the need for community outreach programs and/or changes in 
marketing strategy or loan products to better serve minority segments of the 
lender's market; and 
• Improving audit and oversight systems in order to ensure there is no recurrence 
of the discrimination. 
An institution is not required to report to the Agencies a lending discrimination 
problem it has discovered. However, a lender that reports its discovery can ensure 
that the corrective actions it develops are appropriate and complete and thereby 
minimize the damages to which it will be subject. 
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Q7: Will a lender be held responsible for discriminatory lending engag'ed in by a 
single loan officer where the lending institution has good policies and procedures 
in place, is otherwise in full compliance with all applicable laws and regulations 
and neither knows or reasonably could have known that the officer was engaged 
in illegal discriminatory conduct? 
A: Fair lending violations can occur even in the most well-run lending institutions that 
have good policies in place to ensure compliance with fair lending laws and 
regulations. Of course, the chances that such violations will occur can be greatly 
reduced by backing up those policies with proper employee training and supervision 
and subjecting the lending process to proven systems of oversight and review. Self-
testing can further reduce the likelihood that violations may occur. Notwithstanding 
these efforts, a single loan officer might still improperly apply policies or, worse yet, 
deliberately circumvent them and manage to conceal or disguise the true nature of his 
or her practices for a time. It may be particularly difficult to discover this type of 
behavior when it occurs in the pre-application process. 
In any case where discriminatory lending by a lending institution is identified, the 
lender will be expected to identify and fairly compensate victims of discriminatory 
conduct just as it would be expected to compensate a customer if an employee's 
conduct resulted in physical injury to the customer. In addition, such a violation 
might constitute a "pattern or practice" that must be referred to DOJ or a violation 
that must be referred to HUD. 
As in other cases of discriminatory behavior, where a lender takes se1f-initiated 
corrective actions, such actions will be considered as a substantial mitigating factor by 
the Agencies in determining the nature of any enforcement action and what penalties 
or' other relief would be appropriate. 
Q8: H a federal fmancial institutions regulatory agency has "reason to believe" that a 
lender has engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination in violation of the 
ECOA, the ECOA requires the agency to refer the matter to OOJ. What 
constitutes a "reason to believe"? 
A: A federal financial institutions regulatory agency has reason to believe that an ECOA 
violation has occurred when a reasonable person would conclude from an examination 
of all credible information available that discrimination has occurred. This 
determination requires weighing the available evidence and applicable law and 
determining whether an apparent violation has occurred. Information supporting a 
reason to believe finding may include loan fIles and other documents, credible 
observations by persons with direct knowledge, statistical analysis, and the fmancial 
institution's response to the preliminary examination fmdings. --
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Reason to believe is more than an unfounded suspicion. While the evidence of 
discrimination need not be defInitive and need not include evidence of overt 
discrimination, it should be developed to the point that a reasonable person would 
conclude that a violation exists. 
Q9: If a federal rmandal institutions regulatory agency has reason to believe that a 
lender has engaged in a "pattern or practice" of discrimination in violation of the 
ECOA, the agency will refer the matter to DOJ. What constitutes a "pattern or 
practice" of lending discrimination? 
A: Determinations by federal financial institutions regulatory agencies regarding a pattern 
or practice of lending discrimination must be based on an analysis of the facts in a 
given case. Isolated, unrelated or accidental occurrences will not constitute a pattern 
or practice. However, repeated, intentional, regular, usual, deliberate, or 
institutionalized practices will almost always constitute a pattern or practice. The 
totality of the circumstances must be considered when assessing whether a pattern or 
practice is present. Considerations include, but are not limited to: 
QI0: 
-
• Whether the conduct appears to be grounded in a written or unwritten policy or 
established practice that is discriminatory in purpose or effect; 
• Whether there is evidence of similar conduct by a fmancial institution toward 
more than one applicant. Note, however, that this is not a mathematical process, 
e.g., "more than one" does not necessarily constitute a pattern or practice; 
• Whether the conduct has some common source or cause within the fmancial 
institution's control; 
• The relationship of the instances of conduct to one another (e.g., whether they all 
occurred in the same area of the fmancial institution's operations); and 
• The relationship of the number of instances of conduct to the fmancial 
institution's total lending activity. Note, however, that, depending on the 
circumstances, violations that involve only a small percentage of an institution'S 
total lending activity could constitute a pattern or practice. 
Depending on the egregiousness of the facts and circumstances involved, singly or in 
combination, these factors could provide evidence of a pattern or practice. 
How does the employment of few minorities and individuals from other protected 
classes in lending positions -- e.g., Account Executive, Underwriter, Loan 
Counselor, Loan Processor, Staff Appraiser, Assistant Branch ~nager and 
Branch Manager - affect compliance with lending discrimination laws? 
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A: The employment of few minorities and others in protected classes, in itself, is not a 
violation of the PH Act or the ECOA. However, employment of few members of 
protected classes in lending positions can contribute to a climate in which lending 
discrimination could occur by affecting the delivery of services. 
Therefore, lenders might consider the following steps, as appropriate to their . 
institutions: 
• Advertising lending job openings in local minority-oriented publications; 
• Notifying predominantly minority organizations of such openings; 
• Seeking employment referrals from current minority employees, minority real 
estate boards and local historically minority colleges and other institutions that 
serve minority groups in the community; and 
• Seeking qualified independent fee appraisers from local minority appraisal 
organizations. 
Similar outreach steps could be considered to recruit women, persons with disabilities, 
and other persons protected by the FH Act and the ECOA. 
Qll: What is the role of the guidelines of secondary market purchasers and private 
and governmental loan insurers in determining whether primary lenders practice 
lending discrimination? 
A: 
-... 
Many lenders make mortgage loans only when they can be sold on the secondary 
market, or they may place some loans in their own portfolios and sell others on the 
secondary market. The principal secondary market purchasers, Federal National 
Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae") and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
("Freddie Mac"), publish underwriting guidelines to inform primary lenders of the 
conditions under which they will buy loans. For example, ability to repay the loan is 
measured by suggested ratios of monthly housing expense to income (28 %) and toW 
obligations to income (36%). However, these guidelines allow considerable discretion 
on the part of the primary lender. In addition, the secondary market guidelines have 
in some cases been made more flexible, for example, with respect to factors such as 
stability of income (rather than stability of employment) and use of nontraditional 
ways of establishing good credit and ability to pay (e.g., use of past rent and utility 
payment records). Lenders should ensure that their loan processors and underwriters 
are aware of the provisions of the secondary market guidelines that provide various 
alternative and flexible means by which applicants may demonstrate their ability and 
willingness to repay their loans. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac nof iiJfrequently 
purchase mortgages exceeding the suggested ratios, and their guidelines contain 
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detailed discussions of the compensating factors that can justify higher. ratios (and 
which. must be documented by the primary lender). 
A lender who rejects an application from an applicant who is a member of a protected 
class and who has ratios above those of the guideliries and approves an application 
from another applicant with similar ratios should be prepared to show that the reason 
for the rejection was based on factors that are applied consistently without regard to 
any of the prohibited factors. 
These same principles apply equally to the guidelines of private and governmental 
loan insurers. 
QU: What criteria will be employed in taking enforcement actions or seeking remedial 
measures when lending discrimination is discovered? 
A: Enforcement sanctions and remedial measures for lending discrimination violations 
vary depending on whether such sanctions are sought by the appropriate federal 
fmancial institutions regulatory agencies, DOJ, HUD or other federal agencies 
charged with enforcing either the ECOA or the FH Act. The following discussion 
sets out the criteria typically employed by the federal banking agencies (Le., OCC, 
OTS, the Board and FDIC), NCUA, DOJ, HUD, OFHEO, FHFB and FrC in 
determining the nature and severity of sanctions that may be used to address 
discriminatory lending practices. As discussed in Questions 8 and 9, above, in certain 
situations, the primary regulatory agencies will also refer enforcement matters to 
HUD or DOJ. 
The federal banking agencies: 
The federal banking agencies are authorized to use the full range of their enforcement 
authority under 12 U. S. C. § 1818 to address discriminatory lending practices. This 
includes the authority to seek: 
• Eriforcement actions that may require both prospective and retrospective relief; 
. and 
• Civil money penalties ("CMPs") in varying amounts against the fmancial 
institution or any institution-affiliated party ("lAP") within the meaning of 12 
U.S.C. § 1813(u), depending, among other things, on the nature of the violation 
and the degree of culpability. 
In addition to the above actions, the federal banking agencies may also take removal 
and prohibition actions against any IAP where the statutory require_ments for such 
actions are met. 
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The federal banking agencies will make deten:ninations as to the appropriateness of 
any potential enforcement action after giving full consideration to a variety of factors. 
In making these determinations, the banking agencies will take into account: 
• The number and duration of violations identified; 
• The nature of the evidence of discrimination (i.e., overt discrimination, disparate 
treatment or disparate impact); 
• Whether the discrimination was limited to a particular office or unit of the 
fmancial institution or was more pervasive in nature; 
• The presence and effectiveness of any anti-discrimination policies; 
• Any history of discriminatory conduct; and 
• Any corrective measures implemented or proposed by the fmancial institution. 
The severity of the federal banking agencies' enforcement response will depend on the 
egregiousness of the fmancial institution's conduct. Voluntary identification and 
correction of violations disclosed through a self-testing program will be a substantial 
mitigating factor in considering whether to inltiate an enforcement action. 
In addition, the federal banking agencies may consider whether an institution has 
provided victims of discrimination with all the relief available to them under 
applicable civil rights laws. 
The federal banking agencies may seek both prospective and retrospective relief for 
fair lending violations. 
Prospective relief may include requiring the fmancial institution to: 
• Adopt corrective policies and procedures and correct any fmancial institution 
policies or procedures that may have contributed to the discrimination; 
• Train fmancial institution employees involved; 
• Establish community outreach programs and changing marketing strategy or loan 
products to better serve all sectors of the fmancial institution's service area; 
• Improve internal audit controls and oversight systems in order to ensure there is 
no recurrence of discrimination; or 
• Monitor compliance and provide periodic reports to the primary federal regulator. 
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, Retrospective relief may include: 
• Identifying customers who may have been subject to discrimination and offering 
to extend credit if the customers were improperly denied; 
• Requiring the fmancial institution to make payments to injured parties: 
• Restitution: This may include any out-of-pocket expenses incurred as a result 
of the violation to make the vIctim of discrimination whole, such as: fees or 
expenses in connection with the application; the difference between any greater 
fees or expenses of another loan granted· elsewhere after denial by the 
discriminating lender; and, when loans were granted on disparate terms, 
appropriate modification of those terms and refunds of any greater amounts 
paid. 
• Other AffIrmative Action As Awropriate to Correct Conditions Resulting 
From Discrimination: The federal banking agencies also have the authority to 
require a fmancial institution to take affIrmative action to correct or remedy 
any conditions resulting from any violation or practice. The banking agencies 
will determine whether such affIrmative action is appropriate in a given case 
and, if such action is appropriate, the type of remedy to order. 
• Requiring the fmancial institution to pay CMPs: 
The banking agencies have the authority to assess CMPs against fmancial 
institutions or individuals for violating fair lending laws or regulations. Each 
agency has the authority to assess CMPs of up to $5,000 per day for any 
violation of law, rule or regulation. Penalties of up to $25,000 per day are also 
permitted, but only if the violations represent a pattern of misconduct, cause 
more than minimal loss to the fmancial institution, or result in gain or benefIt to 
the party involved. CMPs are paid to the U.S. Treasury and therefore do not 
compensate victims of discrimination. 
National Credit Union Administration: 
For federally insured credit unions, NCUA will employ criteria comparable to those 
of the other federal fmancial institutions regulatory agencies, pursuant to its authority 
under 12 U.S.C. § 1786. 
The Department of Justice: 
The Department of Justice is authorized to use the full range of it~ enforcement 
authority under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et ~., and the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et~. DOJ has authority to commence pattern 
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or practice investigations of possible lending discrimination on its own- initiative or 
through referrals from the federal fmancial institutions regulatory agencies, and to me 
lawsuits in federal court where there is reasonable cause to believe that such 
violations have occurred. DOl is also authorized under the FH Act to bring suit 
based on individual complaints flIed with HUD where one of the parties to the 
complaint elects to have the case heard in federal court. 
The relief sought by DOJ in lending discrimination lawsuits may include: 
• An injunction which may require both prospective and retrospective relief; and, 
• In enforcement actions under the FH Act, CMPs not to exceed $50,000 per 
defendant for a frrst violation and $100,000 for any subsequent violation. 
Prospective injunctive relief may include: 
• A permanent injunction to insure against a recurrence of the unlawful practices; 
• AffIrmative measures to correct past discriminatory policies, procedures, or 
practices, so long as consistent with safety and soundness, such as: 
• Expansion of the lender's service areas to include previously excluded minority 
neighborhoods; 
• Opening branches or other credit facilities in under-served minority 
neighborhoods; 
• Targeted sales calls on real estate agents and builders active in minority 
neighborhoods; 
• Advertising through minority-oriented media; 
• Self-testing; 
• Employee training; 
• Changes to commission structures which tend to discourage lending in 
minority and low-income neighborhoods; and 
• Changes in loan processing and underwriting procedures (including second 
reviews of denied applications) to ensure equal treatment without regard to 
prohibited factors; and 
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• Record keeping and reporting requirements to monitor compliance with remedial 
obligations. 
Retrospective injunctive relief may include relief for victims of past discrimination, 
actual and punitive damages, and offers or adjustments of credit or other forms of 
loan commitments. 
The Department of Housing and Urban Development: 
The Department of Housing and Urban Development is fully authorized to investigate 
complaints alleging discrimination in lending in violation of the FH Act and has the 
authority to initiate complaints and investigations even when an individual complaint 
has not been received. HUD issues determinations on whether or not reasonable 
cause exists to believe that the FH Act has been violated. HUD also may authorize 
actions for temporary and preliminary injunctions to be brought by DO] and has 
authority to issue enforceable subpoenas for information related to investigations. 
Following issuance of a determination of reasonable cause under the FH Act, HUD 
enforces the FH Act administratively unless one of the parties elects to have the case 
heard in federal court in a case brought by DO]. 
Relief under the FH Act that may be awarded by an administrative law judge (" All ") 
after a hearing, or by the Secretary on review of a decision by an All, includes: 
• Injunctive or other appropriate relief, including a variety of actions designed to 
correct discriminatory practices, such as changes in loan processes or procedures, 
modifications of loan service areas or branching actions, approval of previously 
denied loans to aggrieved persons, additional record-keeping and reporting on 
future activities or other aJ"fmnative relief; 
• Actual damages suffered by persons who are aggrieved by any violation of the 
FH Act, including damages for mental distress and out-of-pocket losses 
attributable to a violation; and 
• Civil penalties of up to $10,000 for each initial violation and up to $25,000 and 
$50,000 for successive violations within specific time frames. 
HUD also is authorized to direct Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to undertake various 
remedial actions, including suspension, probation, reprimand, or settlement, against 
lenders found to have engaged in discriminatory lending practices in violation of the 
FH Act or the ECOA. 
The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight: 
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The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight is authorized to use -its 
enforcement authority under 12 U.S.C. §§ 4631 and 4636, including cease and desist 
orders and CMPs for violations by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac of the fair housing 
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of HUD pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 4545. 
The Federal Housing Finance Board: 
While the Federal Housing Finance Board does not have enforcement authority under 
the ECOA or the PH Act, in reviewing the members of the Federal Home Loan Bank 
System for community support, it may restrict access to long-tenn System advances to 
any member that within two years prior to the due date of submission of a 
Community Support Statement, had a fmal administrative or judicial ruling against it 
based on violations of those statutes (or any similar state or local law prohibiting 
discrimination in lending). System members in this situation are asked to submit to 
the Finance Board an explanation of steps taken to remedy the violation or prevent a 
recurrence. 
The Federal Trade Commission: 
The Federal Trade Commission enforces the requirements of the ECOA and 
Regulation B for all lenders subject to the ECOA, except where enforcement is 
specifically committed to another agency. The FTC may exercise all of its functions 
and powers under the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act") to enforce the 
ECOA, and a violation of any requirement under the ECOA is deemed to be a 
violation of a requirement under the FTC Act. The FTC . has the power to enforce 
Regulation B in the same manner as if a violation of Regulation B were a violation of 
an FTC trade regulation rule. 
This means that the FTC has the power to investigate lenders suspected of lending 
. discrimination a.'1d to use compulsory process in doing so. The Commission, through 
DOJ or on its own behalf where the Justice Department declines to act, may me suit 
in federal court against suspected violators and seek relief including: 
• Injunctions against the violative practice; 
• Civil penalties of up to $10,000 for each violation; and 
• Redress to affected consumers. 
In addition, the Commission routinely imposes recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements to monitor compliance. 
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Q13: Will a rmancial institution be subjected to multiple actions by DO] or HUD and 
its primary regulator if discriminatory practices are discovered? 
A: In all cases where referrals to other agencies are made, the appropriate federal 
fmancial institutions regulatory agency will engage in ongoing consultations with DO] 
or HUD regarding coordination of each agency's actions. The Agencies will 
coordinate their enforcement actions and make every effort to eliminate unnecessarily 
duplicative actions. Where both a federal fmancial institutions regulatory agency and 
either DO] or HUD are contemplating taking actions under their own respective 
authorities, the Agencies will seek to coordinate their actions to ensure that each 
agency's action is consistent and complementary. The fmancial institutions regulatory 
agencies also will discuss referrals on a case-by-case basis with DO] or HUD to 
determine whether multiple actions are necessary and appropriate. 
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I 
I. Introduction 
For decades, Kentucky commercial banks were limited 
in their geographic scope. They were prohibited from 
establishing branches outside their home county and from 
forming multi-bank holding companies. In the meantime, 
market forces were pressuring commercial banks to expand 
across county lines. Over the last decade a number of 
changes have taken place that enable Kentucky commercial 
banking organizations to cross county and even state 
lines. While commercial banking organizations are still 
limited in many respects in their ability to establish or 
acquire banking offices outside their home county, they 
now have a remarkable amount of flexibility in doing so. 
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II. What Changes Have Occurred? 
A. Multi-bank holding companies (KRS §§287. 900 through 910) 
1. Enacted in 1984. 
2. Permits a bank holding company to acquire control 
of banks that have been in existence at least five 
years. 
3. Permits out of state bank holding companies to 
acquire Kentucky banks on a reciprocal basis. 
4. Contains a different definition for "bank" than the 
rest of KRS Chapter 287: "any institution organized 
under this chapter, the banking laws of another 
state, or the National Bank Act, as amended, to do 
a banking business." 
a. General definitions for Chapter 287: 
(1) " 'Bank' means any bank which is now or 
may hereafter be organized under the laws 
of this state .... " 
(2) " 'National bank' or 'national bank 
association' means a bank created by 
congress and organized pursuant to the 
provisions of federal law. 
B. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement 
Act of 1989 
1. Authorizes bank holding companies to acquire thrift 
institutions. 
2. Permits the merger of thrifts and commercial banks 
(Oakar transaction) . 
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3. Permits the conversion of thrifts into commercial 
banks (Sasser transaction) . 
C. Commissioner of Financial Institutions Finding 92-3 
1. Issued in 1993. 
2. Permits a state chartered commercial bank to 
relocate across county lines (up to 30 miles) and 
retain its branch offices (but not its main 
office) . 
3. Finding is based on previous ruling by the 
Comptroller of the Currency that national banks may 
do the same (12 U.S.C. §30(b). 
4. Presently subject of litigation brought by the 
Kentucky Bankers Association. 
D. Branch by Acquisition (KRS §287.915) 
1. Enacted in 1990. 
2. Permits a bank holding company controlling more 
than one bank in Kentucky to "combine" two or more 
of them into a single bank and to retain branching 
rights in each county where any of the combining 
banks could branch. 
a. Each combining bank must then be in existence 
for at least five years. 
b. "Combine" means either a merger or the 
acquisition of all or substantially all of the 
assets of a bank. 
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c. "Control" means direct or indirect ownership 
of at least 80% of the issued and outstanding 
voting securities of the bank. 
III. E~pansion Opportunities 
A. Commercial bank acquisitions 
1. Straight acquisition 
a. Bank holding company may acquire a bank that 
is at least five years old. 
2. Stake-out 
a. Bank holding company may obtain non-
controlling interest in a younger bank and may 
hold an option to acquire control exercisable 
once the bank becomes five years old. 
3. Guppy Swallowing Whale 
a. A bank holding company controlling a bank less 
than five years old may nonetheless acquire 
control of banks five or more years old --
even if the acquiring holding company is much 
smaller than the target. 
b. As "loophole" to five year rule, this approach 
has limitations. 
(1) May only be done every five years. 
(2) Requires shareholder vote of "target". 
(3) Requires securities law compliance for 
"target" shareholders. 
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B. Thrift Acquisitions 
1. No age limit for first thrift acquired (thrift is 
not a bank for purposes of KRS §287.900). 
a. KRS §289.900 imposes five year rule on second 
and subsequent thrifts. 
(1) Younger thrifts may be acquired by 
merging them into thrift subsidiaries 
rather than holding them separately. 
b. If bank holding company controls no thrifts, 
it may establish a de novo thrift. 
c. Federally chartered thrifts may branch 
statewide (actually, nationwide). 
d. Bank holding companies may acquire mutual 
thrifts (Ilmerger conversions") . 
(1) These transactions are very attractive to 
acquirors but are presently subject to a 
moratorium imposed by the OTS. 
C. Opportunities to Establish Out-of-County Commercial Bank 
Off"ices. 
1. Combination of commonly controlled commercial banks 
under KRS §287.915. 
a. May not include banks less than five years 
old. 
2. Convert a thrift into a commercial bank. 
a. Sasser transaction - - FDIC insurance continues 
in SAIF. 
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b. Federal savings banks are national banks under 
KRS §287.010. 
c. KRS §287.170 et seq. provides for conversion 
of national bank to state commercial bank. 
d. Once converted, state bank's existence 
continues (i.e., existence does not begin at 
conversion) . 
3. Combine Thrifts into Bank. 
a. Oakar transaction 
between BIF and SAIF. 
FDIC insurance split 
b. Federal savings banks are national banks for 
purposes of KRS §287.915o 
co Post combination branching rights? 
4. Relocate Commercial Bank Office. 
a. Bare charter relocation. 
(1) Involves relocation of main office of 
bank to new county leaving no offices of 
that bank in old county. 
(2) Has been done in Kentucky a number of 
times without challenge. 
(3) Typically done when holding company 
controls more than one bank in a single 
county -- one bank purchases and assumes 
substantially all of the other bank's 
assets and liabilities and establishes 
the other bank's offices as its branch 
1) - 6 
IV. Conclusion 
offices; the 
relocated. 
(4) Bare charter 
combination? 
other 
through 
bank is then 
KRS §287.915 
(5) Bare charter through P & A by de novo 
thrift? 
b. Relocation leaving behind branches. 
(1) Supported by Commissioner and Comptroller 
(so long as old main office not to be 
retained as a branch) . 
(2) Not feasible until l£tigation resolved. 
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FINDING OF PERMISSIBLE ACTIVITIES, SERVICES, OR PRODUCTS 
92-3 
MAIN OFFICE RELOCATIONS 
The Commissioner of Financial Institutions issues this Finding of Permissible Activities, 
Services, or Products pursuant to KRS 287.020(3). Competitive inequality exists between state 
banks and national banks as a result of the difference in policies and rules governing relocation 
of the banks' main offices and retention of existing branches. The relocation. of a state bank's 
-main office is governed by KRS 287.185, while 12 USC Section 30(b) governs the relocation of 
a main office of a national bank. 12 USC Section 30(b) provides that a main office may be 
relocated not more than thirty miles from its present site. The Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency has interpreted 12 USC Section 30(b) as allowing national banks to relocate their main 
offices across county lines and to retain existing branches in the original county of operation. 
Using this interpretation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has approved several 
transactions involving main office relocations across county lines by national banks in Kentucky, 
some of which included retention of existing branches in the original county of operation. 
Therefore, a state bank may, through a resolution of its board of directors, adopt the 
provisions of 12 USC Section 30(b); and upon a vote of the shareholders owning two-thirds of 
the stock of the bank and upon approval of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions, a state 
bank may relocate its main office within thirty miles from the city, town, or village in which the 
main office was originally located. Existing branches in the original county may be retained, but 
no new branches may be opened in the original county. The main office in the original county 
must close. 
Effective date: dwa~ 21f, 1'113 
D - 9 
EDWARD . HATCHETT, 
COMMISSIONER 
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STATUTORY APPENDIX 
* 12 USC 30 
* KRS 287.010 
* KRS 287.160 
* KRS 287.170 
* KRS 287.172 
* KRS 287.173 
* KRS 287.174 
* KRS 287.900 
* KRS 287.905 
* KRS 287.910 
* KRS 287.915 
* KRS 289.900 
* KRS 289~905 
* KRS 289.910 
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12 USC 
§ 30. Change of name or location 
(a) Any national banking association, upon written notice to the 
Comptroller of the Currency, may change its name, except that such 
new name shall include the word "National". 
(b) Any national banking association, upon written notice to the 
Comptroller of the Currency, may change the location of its main 
office to any authorized branch location within the limits of the 
city, town, or village in which it is situated, or, with a vote of 
shareholders owning two-thirds of the stock of such association for 
a relocation outside such limits and upon receipt of a certificate of 
approval from the Comptroller of the Currency, to any other loca-
tion within or outside the limits of the city, town, or village in 
which it is located, but not more than thirty miles beyond such 
limits. 
(May 1, 1886, c. 73, § 2, 24 Stat. 18; Sept. 8, 1959, Pub. L. 86-230, § 3, 73 
Stat. 457; Oct. 15, 1982, Pub. L. 97-320, Title IV, § 405(a), 96 Stat. 1512; 
Jan. 12, 1983, Pub. L. 97-457, § 19(a), 96 Stat. 2509.) 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Ren.lon Note. and LealtlaUve Reportl 
1959 Act. Senate Report No. 730. see 
1959 U.S.Code Congo and Am. News. p. 
2232. 
1981 Act. Senate Report No. 97-536 
and Senate Conference Report No. 
97~41. see 1982 U.S.Code Congo and 
Adm.News. p. 3054. 
Amendmenu 
1983 Amendment. Subsec. (b). Pub, 
L. 97-457 added "for a relocation outside 
such limits" following "stock of such as· 
sociation". 
1982 Amendment. Subsec. (a). Pub. 
L. 97-320 designated existing provisions 
as subsec. (a). and in subsec. (a) as so 
designated. substituted provisions per· 
D - 13· 
mittlng a change of name upon written 
notice to the Comptroller. such new 
name to include "National", for provi. 
sions permitting a change of name or 
location of the main office, with approv· 
al of the Comptroller. within city limit., 
etc.. or outside such limits by vote of 
shareholders. such change to be validat· 
ed by certificate of approval. 
Subsec. (b). Pub.L. 97-320 added 
subsec. (b). 
1959 Amendment. Pub.I- 86-230 re-
quired approval of the Comptroller of 
the Currency before a national bank 
could change the location of III main 
office within the limitations of the city. 
town. or village In which it Is situated. 
I 
I 
D - 14 
KENTUCKY REVISED STATUTES 
287.010. Definitions. - As used in this chapter, unless the context 
requires otherwise: 
(1) "Bank" means any bank which is now or may hereafter be organized 
under the laws of this state or a combined bank and trust company; 
(2) "National bank" or "national bank association" means a bank created 
by congress and organized pursuant to the provisions of federal law; 
(3) "Commissioner" means the commissioner of financial institutions; 
(4) "Department" means the department of financial institutions; 
(5) "Population" means the population as indicated by the latest regular 
United States census; and 
(6) "Trust company" includes every corporation authorized by this chap-
ter to do a trust business; 
(7) "Undivided profits" means the composite of the bank's net retained 
earnings from current and prior years' operations; 
(8) "Capital stock" shall mean, at any particular time, the sum of: 
(a) The par value of all shares of the corporation having a par value that 
have been issued; 
(b) The amount of the consideration received by the corporation for all 
shares of the corporation that have been issued without par value except 
such part of the consideration as has been allocated to surplus in a manner 
permitted by law; and 
(c) Such amounts not included in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsec-
tion as have been transferred to stated capital of the corporation, whether 
through the issuance of stock dividends, resolution of the bank's board of 
directors under applicable corporate law or otherwise by law; and 
(9) "Surplus" means the amount of consideration received by the corpo-
ration for all shares issued without par value that has not been allocated to 
capital stock or the amount of consideration received by the corporation in 
excess of par value for all shares with a par value or both. (165a-1, 577,603, 
612a, 883c-1, 883c-3: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 191, § 7; 1970, ch. 92, § 82; 
1982, ch. 251, § 1, effective April 1, 1982; 1984, ch. 324, § 1, effective July 
13, 1984; 1984, ch. 388, § 2, effective July 13, 1984.) 
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287.160. State bank may reorganize as natioDal bank. - AIly state 
bank desiring to reorganize under the laws of the United S~tes as a ~a­
tional bank may, after its dissolution, and as soon as it obtainS ~uthonty 
from the comptroller of the currency to commence business, retaIn any of 
the assets, real or personal, which it acqUired as a state bank, subject to all 
liabilities existing against the bank at the time of its reorganization. (588.) 
287.170. National bank may reorganize as state bank. - Whenever 
any national bank is authorized to dissolve, a majority of the directors of 
the bank, upon authority in writing of the owners of two-thirds (2/3) of its 
capital stock, may organize a state bahk.. The articles of incorporation shall 
include a statement of the authority derived from the stockholders of the 
. dissolved bank. All assets, real and personal, of such bank shall be vested 
in and become the property of the state bank, subject to all liabilities exist-
ing against the bank at the time of its reorganization. (589.) 
287.172. Conditions of and procedure for conversion of National 
Banking Association to state bank or merger with state bank. - (1) A 
National Banking Association may convert into or merge with a state bank 
under a state charter, provided that: 
(a) The action taken complies with federal law; 
(b) In the case of a merger, the institutions to be merged are located in 
the same city or county. 
(2) In the case of each conversion, a written plan of conversion shall be 
submitted, in duplicate, to the commissioner. Such plan shall be in form 
satisfactory to the cOmmlssioner, shall prescribe the terms and conditions 
of the conversion and the mode of carrying it into effect, and shall have 
annexed thereto and forming a part thereof the proposed articles of incorpo-
ration of the state bank. which is to result from the conversion. Such arti-
cles of incorporation shall be in the form prescribed by law for the organiza-
tion of state banks, with such variations, if any, as shall be satisfactory to 
the commissioner. With such plan of conversion there shall be submitted, 
in duplicate, to the commissioner a certificate of the president, secretary or 
cashier of the National Banking Association certifying that all steps have 
been taken which are necessary under federal law to the consummation of 
the conversion. The commissioner shall approve or disapprove such plan of 
conversion within sixty (60) days of the submission thereof to him. In con-
sidering the approval or disapproval of the conversion plan the commis-
sioner shall take into account: 
(a) Any pending administrative or judicial action to which the bank or 
any officer or director of the bank is a party; 
(b) The performance of the converting national bank for the five (5) years 
preceding the application for conversion as compared to similarly situated 
state-chartered banks; and 
(c) The proposed name of the bank after conversion which shall not be 
the same as or deceptively similar to any existing state-chartered bank. 
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If the commissioner shall approve such plan, he shall file one (1) dupli-
cate thereof, together with one (1) duplicate of such certificate submitted 
therewith and the original of the approval of the commissioner, in the office 
of the commissioner, and the other duplicate of such plan, together with a 
duplicate of such certificate and a duplicate of the commissioner's approval, 
shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the county in which the principal 
office of the state bank is to be located. After such filing in the office of the 
commission, the conversion shall become effective upon the filing and re-
cording of the articles of incorporation as provided in KRS 287.050, unless a 
later date is specified in the plan, in which event the conversion shall 
become effective upon such later date. If the commissioner shall disapprove 
the conversion plan, he shall state his reasons for such disapproval in 
writing to which the converting national bank shall have the right of ap-
peal as permitted by law. 
(3) In the case of each merger, a written plan of merger shall be submit-
ted, in duplicate, to the commissioner. Such plan shall be in form satisfac-
tory to the commissioner and shall prescribe the terms and conditions of the 
merger and the mode of carrying it into effect. Such plan may provide the 
name to be borne by the state bank, as receiving corporation, if such name 
is to be changed. Such plan may also name the persons who shall constitute 
the first board of directors of the state bank after the merger shall have 
been accomplished, provided that the number and qualifications of such 
. person shall be in accordance with the provisions of KRS Chapter 287 
relating to the number and qualifications of directors of a state bank; or 
such plan may provide for a meeting of the stockholders to elect a board of 
directors within sixty (60) days after such merger, and may make provision 
for conducting the affairs of the state bank meanwhile. With such plan of 
merger there shall be submitted, in duplicate, to the commissioner the 
following: 
(a) By the National Banking Association, a certificate of the president, 
secretary or cashier of such association certifying that all steps have been 
taken which are necessary under federal law to the consummation of their 
merger; 
(b) By the state bank, a certificate of the president, secretary or cashier 
certifying that such plan of merger has been approved by the board of 
directors of the state bank by a majority vote of all the members thereof, 
that such plan has been submitted to the stockholders of the state bank at a 
meeting thereof held; upon notice of at least fifteen (15) days, specifying the 
time, and place and object of such meeting and addressed to each stock-
holder at the address appearing upon the books of the state bank and 
published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424, and that such plan of merger has 
been approved at such meeting by the vote of the stockholders owning at 
least two thirds (2/3) in amount of the stock of the state bank. 
(4) The commissioner shall approve or disapprove such plan of merger 
within sixty (60) days of such submission thereof to him. If the commis-
sioner shall approve such plan, he shall file one (1) duplicate thereof, to-
gether with one (1) duplicate of each of such certificates and the original of 
the approval of the commissioner, in the office of the commissioner, and the 
other duplicate of such plan, together with a duplicate of each of such 
certificates and a duplicate of the commissioner's approval, shall be filed in 
the office of the clerk of the county in which the principal office of the state 
bank is to be located. Upon such filing in the office of the commissioner, the 
merger shall become effective, unless a later date is specified in the plan, in 
which event the merger shall become effective upon such later date. 
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(5) At the time when such conversion or merger becomes effective: 
(a) The resulting state bank shall be considered the same business and 
corporate entity as the National Banking Association, although as to 
rights, powers and duties, the resulting bank is a state bank; 
(b) All of the property, rights and powers and franchises of the National 
Banking Association shan vest in the resulting state bank and the result-
ing state bank shall be subject to and deemed to have assumed all of the 
debts, liabilities, obligations and duties of the National Banking Associa-
tion and to have succeeded to all of its relationships, fiduciary or otherwise, 
as fully and to the same extent as if such property, rights, powers, fran-
chises, debts, liabilities, obligations, duties and relationships had been 
originally acquired, incurred or entered into by the resulting state bank; 
provided, however, that the resulting state bank shall not, through such 
conversion or merger, acquire power to engage in any business or to exer-
cise any right, privilege or franchise which is not conferred by the provi-
. sions of KRS Chapter 287 upon such resulting state bank; 
(c) Any reference to the National Banking Association in any contract, 
will or document, whether executed or taking effect before or after the 
conversion or merger, shall be considered a reference to the resulting state 
bank if not inconsistent with the other provisions of the contract, will or 
document; 
(d) A pending action or other judicial proceeding to which the National 
Banking Association is a party, shall not be deemed to have abated or to 
have discontinued by reason of the conversion or merger, but may be prose-
cuted to final judgment, order or decree in the same manner as if the 
conversion or merger had not been made; or the resulting state bank may 
be substituted as a party to such action or proceeding, and any judgment, 
order or decree may be rendered for or against it that might have been 
rendered for or against the National Banking Association if the· conversion 
or merger had not occurred. (Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 222, § 2; 1966, ch. 239, 
§ 200; 1980, ch. 192, § 1, effective July 15, 1980.) 
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187.173. Conversion of state bank to or merger with National 
Banking Association. - (1) A state bank may convert into, or merge or 
consolidate with, a National Banking Association under the charter of a 
National Banking Association in the manner provided by federal law and 
without approval of any state authority. 
(2) The franchise of a state bank as a state bank shall automatically 
terminate when its conversion into or its merger or consolidation with a 
National Banking Association under a federal charter is consummated and 
the resulting National Banking Association shall be considered the same 
business and corporate entity as the state bank, although as to rights, 
powers and duties the resulting bank is a National Banking Association. 
(3) At the time when such conversion, merger or consolidation becomes 
effective: 
(a) All of the property, rights, powers and franchises of the state bank 
shall vest in the National Banking Association and the National Banking 
Association shall be subject to and be deemed to have assumed all of the 
debts, liabilities, obligations and duties of the state bank and to have suc-
ceeded to all of its relationships, fiduciary or otherwise, as fully and to the 
same extent as if such property, rights, powers, franchises, debts, liabili-
ties, obligations, duties and relationships had been originally acquired, 
incurred or entered into by the National Banking Association; 
(b) Any reference to the state bank in any contract, will or document, 
whether executed or taking effect before or after the conversion, merger or 
consolidation, shall be considered a reference to the National Banking As-
sociation if not inconsistent with the other provisions of the contract, will or 
document; 
(c) A pending action or other judicial proceeding to which the state bank 
is a party, shall not be deemed to have abated or to have discontinued by 
reason of the conversion, merger or consolidation, but may be prosecuted to 
final judgment, order or decree in the same manner as if the conversion, 
merger or consolidation had not been made; or the National Banking Asso-
ciation may be substituted as a party to such action or proceeding, and any 
judgment, order or decree may be rendered for or against it that might have 
been rendered for or against the state bank if the conversion, merger or 
consolidation had not occurred. (Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 222, § 3, effective 
March 21, 1952.) 
Cross-References. Articles of incorpora- Collateral References. 9 C.J.S., Banks 
tion of business corporations, contents, KRS and Banking, §§ 468, 738, 739. 
27IB.2-020. 
287.174. Provisions ofKRS 287.172 and 287.173 to constitute alter-
native method - Legislative purpose declared. - The methods and 
procedures set out in KRS 287.172 and 287.173 are authorized in addition 
to any other methods or procedures for the accomplishment of the same or 
similar purposes which heretofore may have been established by law. It is 
the purpose of KRS 287.172, 287.173 and this section to make effective in 
this Commonwealth the provisions and purposes of the act of congress 
dated August 17, 1950, which is compiled as chapter 729 of volume 64_ of 
the United States Statutes, and as 12 U.S.C.A. sec. 214. (Enact. Acts 1952, 
ch. 222, § 4, effective March 21, 1952; 1984, ch. 111, § 124, effective July 
13, 1984.) 
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ACQL"ISITION OF BANKS 
287.900. Definition of terms used in this section and KRS 287.905 
- Acquisition of one or more banks, wherever located - Limitations 
- Acquisition by out-of-state banks - Limitation - In-county 
merger or consolidation. - (1) For purposes of this section and KRS 
287.905: ' 
(a) "Bank" means any institution organized under this chapter, the 
banking laws of another state, or the National Bank Act, as amended, to do 
a banking business. However, it shall not include an "interim bank" char-
tered solely for the purpose of facilitating the acquisition of an existing 
bank unless the existing bank has been in existence for less than five (5) 
years; . 
(b) "Bank holding company," "company," and "control" have the mean-
ings accorded them in the Federal Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as 
amended. (12 U.S.C. Section 1841, et seq.). "Control" may be acquired by 
acquisition of voting securities, by purchase of assets, by merger or consoli-
dation, by contract, or othernise; 
(c) "Individual" means a natural person, partnership, association, busi-
ness trust, voting trust, or similar organiiation. Individual does not include 
a corporation; and 
(d) "Deposit" has the meaning accorded it in the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Act, as amended, and regulations promulgated thereunder; excluded, 
however, from deposits are all interbank deposits and all deposits in foreign 
branches and international banking facilities, as shown in the reports 
made by all federally-insured depository institutions to their respective 
supervisory authorities. 
(2) Any individual, or any bank holding company having its principal 
place of business in this state, may acquire control of one (1) or more banks 
or bank holding companies wherever located, except that no individual, 
who on July 13, 1984, controls a bank or bank holding company wherever 
located, and no bank holding company wherever located, may acquire, di-
rectly or indirectly, control of a bank having its principal place of business 
in this state if the bank was chartered after July 13, 1984, and if, at the 
time of the acquisition, the bank, has been in existence less than five (5) 
years. The provisions of this subsection shall.not prohibit the organization 
of a one (1) bank holding company for the purpose of acquiring control of a 
bank even if the bank was chartered after July 13, 1984, and has been in 
existence less than five (5) years at the time of the acquisition. 
(3) No individual or bank holding company wherever located may ac~ 
quire control of any bank or bank holding company if, upon the acquisition, 
the individual or bank holding company would control banks in this state 
holding more than fifteen percent (15%) of the total deposits and member 
accounts in the offices of all federally-insured depository institutions in this 
state as reported in the most recent year-end reports made by the institu-
tions to their respective supervisory authorities which are available at the 
time of the acquisition. 
(4)(a) During the period expiring five (5) years after July 13, 1984, no 
individual or company wherever located may, directly or indirectly, by 
merger, consolidation, purchase, or any other means, acquire control of a 
bank or bank holding company if as a result the individual or company 
would acqq.ire control of more than three (3) banks in this state during any 
twelve (12) month period; 
(b) Provided, however, a bank holding company wherever lc'cated, may 
acquire control of a bank holding company which has its principal place of 
business in this state and which controls more than three (3) banks located 
in this state under conditions approved by the commissioner which would 
require the following: 
1. That an acquisition made under this subsection shall be limited to 
only one (1) acquisition; 
2. That the banks acquired in excess of the three (3) bank per year 
limitation included in this acquisition shall be counted against future ac-
quisitions during the remaining five (5) year period provided in this subsec-
tion; and 
3. That the total barik acquisitions by a bank holding company shall not 
exceed in the aggregate fifteen (15) banks during the five (5) year period 
provided in this subsection. 
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(5) The limitations set forth in this section or any other provision of this 
chapter or any regulation promulgated ~hereunder, as now in effect or 
amended after July 13, 1984, shall not apply to the acquisition of a bank if, 
in his discretion, the commissioner, if the bank is organized under the laws 
of this state, or the comptroller of the currency, if the bank is a national 
bank, determines that an emergency exists and the acquisition is appropri-
ate in order to prevent the probable failure of the bank which is closed or is 
in danger of closing. 
(6)(a) Any bank holding company having its principal place of business 
in a state which is c;ontiguous to this state may acquire control of any bank 
or bank holding company having its principal place of business in this 
state, if the state wherein the bank holding company has its principal place 
of business shall authorize the acquisition of control of a bank or bank 
holding company in that state by a bank holding company having its prin-
cipal place of business in this state under conditions substantially no more 
restrictive than those imposed by this section; 
(b) From and after two (2) years after July 13, 1984, any bank holding 
company having its principal place of business in a state other than a state 
which is contiguous to this state may acquire control of any bank or bank 
holding company having its principal place of business in this state, if the 
state wherein the bank holding company has its principal place of business 
shall authorize the acquisition of control of a bank or bank holding com-
pany in that state by a bank holding company having its principal place of 
business in this state under conditions substantially no more restrictive 
than those imposed by this section; and . 
(c) For the purposes of this subsection, a bank holding company shall be 
deemed to be located or have its principal place of business in the state or 
other jurisdiction in which the total deposits of all the bank holding com-
pany's banking subsidiaries are largest. 
(7). The provisions of this ~ecti.on shall not be construed to prohibit or 
restrict the merger or consohdatlon of banks or bank holding companies 
~ving their principal place~ of business in the same county and the opera-
tIOn by the merged or consohdated corporation of the banks nor to prohibit 
the sale of any bank or bank holding company to, and the p~chase thereof 
by, .any ~ther bank or bank holding compB;ny with its principal place of 
bUSIness In the same county and the operatIon of the bank as a branch so 
long as the provisions of KRS 287.180(4) have been satisfied. (Enact. Acts 
1984, ch. 130, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 444, § 12 effective 
July 15, 1986; 1992, ch. 226, § 2, effective July 14, 1992.) , 
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287.905. Filing of application to acquire bank with commissioner 
- Examination of applicant - Cooperative agreements by commis-
sioner to examine out-of-state bank or exchange confidential infor-
mation. - (1) Any bank holding company which proposes to acquire con-
trol of a bank chartered in this state or a bank holding company which 
includes a bank chartered in this state, shall concurrently file with the 
commissioner copies of the application filed with the federal reserve board 
under applicable federal law. The commissioner shall approve such acquisi-
tion within ninety (90) days of acceptance of a complete application if he 
finds that: . 
(a) The terms of the acquisition are in accordance with the laws of this 
state; 
(b) The financial condition, or the competence, experience and integrity 
of the acquiring company or its principals are such as will not jeopardize 
the financial stability of the acquired bank or bank holding company; 
(c) The public convenience and advantage will be served by the acquisi-
tion; and 
(d) No federal regulatory authority whose approval is required has dis-
approved the transaction because it would result in a monopoly or substan-
tially lessen competition. 
(2) A non-refundable fee shall accompany each application and shall be 
set by the commissioner in accordance with KRS 287.480'. 
(3) The commissioner may examine or elect to participate in a joint ex-
amination, with the applicable federal or state regulatory agency, of any 
holding company or nonbank subsidiary of the holding company that con-
trols or is affiliated with a state-chartered bank. 
(4) The commissioner may enter into cooperative agreements with fed-
eral or state regulatory authorities to examine an out-of-state bank that is 
controlled by a Kentucky bank holding company or is controlled by a bank 
holding company which includes a state-chartered bank, or accept reports 
of examinations of such out-of-state banks from federal or state regulatory 
authorities in lieu of conducting examinations. 
(5) The commissioner may enter into cooperative agreements with fed-
eral or state regulatory authorities to exchange confidential information 
and reports of examination relating to interstate acquisitions of banks and 
bank holding companies. 
(6) The cost of an examination shall be assessed against and paid by the 
company examined. The assessment for the examination shall be calcu-
lated in the same manner as that used for bank examinations. (Enact. Acts 
1984, ch. 130, § 3, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 444, § 13, effective 
July 15, 1986.) 
287.910. illegal acquisitions. - For purposes of this chapter, it shall 
be illegal for any individual, corporation or bank holding company to di-
rectly or indirectly acquire, control, hold, charter, convert or operate any 
bank, as defined in KRS 287.900, located in this state which is an "insured 
bank" or eligible to become an "insured bank" as that term is defined in the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, which does not both accept deposits that the 
depositor has the legal right to withdraw on demand and actively engage in 
the business of making commercial loans. (Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 444, § 14, 
effective July 15, 1986.) 
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287.915. Bank combinations - Operation of a combined bank as 
• branch of the surviving bank - Other branches - Taxes - Defini-
tions. - (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of KRS Chapter 287: 
(a) An individual or bank holding company that controls two (2) or more 
banks having their principal offices in this Commonwealth may, from time 
to time, combine any or all of the commonly controlled banks in this Com-
monwealth into and with anyone of the banks, and thereafter the surviv-
ing bank, which shall have its principal office in this Commonwealth, shall 
continue to operate its principal office and may operate the other autho-
rized offices of the banks so combined as branches of the'surviving bank; 
and 
(b) Any combination authorized by this section shall not require the 
approval of the commissioner of financial institutions, but on or before 
thirty (30) days prior to consummation of any combination, the proposed 
surviving bank shall notify the commissioner of the combination, and on 
the effective date of any such combination the charter of any combined 
bank organized under the laws of this Commonwealth shall be surrendered. 
(2) Following any combination authorized by this section: 
(a) The surviving bank may, subject to the approval of the commissioner 
as provided in KRS 287.180(2), establish and operate additional branches 
at any location where a combined bank could, on or after the combination 
authorized by this section, have established and operated a branch; 
(b) Any combined bank which is being operated as a branch of the sur-
viving bank shall have a board of directors, a majority of which shall be 
residents of the combined bank's community, which shall meet not less 
often than monthly to advise the branch in a nonfiduciary capacity with 
respect to the branch's community activities and affairs, customer rela-
tions, and local charitable activities; 
(c)1. The surviving bank and each combined bank shall, for purposes of 
the tax which may be imposed pursuant to the provisions of subsections (2) 
or (3) ofKRS 136.270, be deemed to be located in the city or county in which 
it was located prior to such combination, and that city or county may con-
tinue to impose the tax provided for in subsections (2) or (3) of KRS 136.270 
upon that proportion of the taxable fair cash value of shares of the surviv-
ing bank as the deposits of the surviving bank within that city or county 
bears to the total deposits of the surviving bank wherever located as re-
ported to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or other applicable 
regulatory authorities by the surviving bank; provided, that, so long as the 
surviving bank maintains a branch or branches within a city or county 
imposing the tax provided for in subsections (2) or (3) of KRS 136.270, such 
tax shall in no event be less than the tax imposed by the city or county for 
the year immediately prior to such combination. A copy of the deposit 
report of the surviving bank and of any combined bank where deposits are 
not included in the report of the surviving bank shall be submitted to the 
Revenue Cabinet by the surviving bank with its annual report of banks and 
trust companies for Kentucky property tax purposes as of the beginning of 
each year and to the assessing officer of each city and county in which the 
surviving bank and any combined bank is deemed to be located pursuant to 
this subsection; 
2. The surviving bank shall maintain a record of the deposits in each of 
its offices resulting from such combination or thereafter established as 
provided in paragraph (a) of this subsectio~ and, except for deposits trans-
ferred or relocated at the request of the depositor, shall not cause or permit 
such deposits to be transferred or relocated to another branch with the 
intent to reduce the amount of any tax imposed by any city or county 
pursuant to subparagraph 1. of this paragraph; 
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(3) For purposes of this section: 
(a) The term "combine" or "combination" includes a merger or the acqui-
sition of all or substantially all of the assets of a bank already controlled by 
an individual or bank holding company; 
(b) An individual or bank holding company "controls" a bank if that 
individual or company, directly or indirectly, owns, controls or has the 
power to vote at least eighty percent (80%) of the issued and outstanding 
voting securities of the bank; 
(c) "Combined bank" means any bank participating in a combination 
authorized by this section other than the surviving bank; 
(d) "Surviving bank" means a bank into which a combined bank has 
been combined; 
(e) "Bank" includes a national bank but does not include a bank which 
has been in existence less than five (5) years; and 
(f) "Individual", "bank holding company" and "deposit" shall have the 
same meanings attributed to them in KRS 287.900(1). (Enact. Acts 1990, 
ch. 181, § 1, effective July 13, 1990.) 
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ACQUISITION OF SAVINGS AND LoAN AsSOCIATIONS 
289.900. Definitions. - As used in KRS 289.905 and 289.910, unless 
the context otherwise requires: 
(1) "Control" shall have the meaning accorded the term in the Federal 
Savings and Loan Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. sec. 1730a(a)(2), as 
amended. "Control" may be acquired by acquisition of voting securities, by 
purchase of assets, by merger or consolidation, by contract, or otherwise; 
(2) "Deposit" means any demand negotiable order of withdrawal, time 
certificate, savings deposit, or savings share account made by an individ-
ual, corporation, state or federal governmental unit or any other organiza-
tion without regard to the location of the depositor; however, excluded from 
deposits are all inter-savings and loan association or interbank deposits 
and all deposits in foreign branches and international banking facilities as 
shown in the reports made by all savings and loan associations to their 
respective supervisory authorities; 
(3) "Individual" means a natural person, partnership, association, busi-
ness trust, voting trust, or similar organization. Individual does not include 
a corporation; 
(4) "Savings and loan association" means any savings and loan associa-
tion or savings bank organized under the laws of this state, under the laws 
of any other state, or under the laws of the United States; 
(5) "Kentucky savings and loan association" means a savings and loan 
association having its principal place of business in this state; 
(6) "Principal place of business" means: 
(a) With respect to a savings and loan association, the state or territory 
in which the savings and loan association's total deposits are the largest, as 
shown in the most recent report of condition or summary report filed by the 
savings and loan association with its supervisory authority; and 
(b) With respect to a savings and loan association holding company, the 
state or territory in which the total deposits of all direct and indirect sav-
ingsand loan subsidiaries of the savings and loan association holding com-
pany are the largest, as shown in the most recent reports of condition or 
summary reports filed by the savings and loan association holding company 
and its savings and loan subsidiaries with their respective supervisory 
authorities; 
(7) "Savings and loan association holding company" has the meaning 
accorded the term in the Federal Savings and Loan Holding Company Act, 
12 U.s.C. sec. 1730a(a)(1)(D), as amended, except that the term shall in-
clude mutual savings and loan association holding companies organized 
pursuant to Section 408 of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. sec. 
1730a(s), as amended. (Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 156, § 1, effective July 15, 
1988.) 
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289.905. Acquisition of one or more associations wherever lo-
cated - Limitations - Acquisition by out-of-state associations -
Merge or consolidation. - (1) Any individual, or any Kentucky savings 
and loan association holding company, may acquire control of one (1) or 
more savings and loan associations or savings and loan association holding 
companies wherever located, except that no individual who on July 15, 
1988, controls a savings and loan association or savings and loan associa-
tion holding company wherever located, and no savings and loan associa-
tion holding company wherever located, shall acquire, directly or indi-
rectly, control of a Kentucky savings and loan association if the Kentucky 
savings and loan association was chartered after July 15, 1988 and if, at 
the time of the acquisition, the Kentucky savings and loan association has 
been in existence less than five (5) years. The provisions of this subsection 
shall not prohibit the organization of a one (1) savings and loan association 
holding company for the purpose of acquiring control of a savings and loan 
association even if the savings and loan association was chartered after 
July 15, 1988, and has been in existence less than five (5) years at the time 
of the acquisition. 
(2) No individual or savings and loan association holding company wher-
ever located shall acquire control of any savings and loan association or 
savings and loan association holding company if, upon the acquisition, the 
individual or savings and loan association holding company would control 
Kentucky savings and loan associations holding more than fifteen percent 
(15%) of the total deposits in all Kentucky savings and loan associations as 
reported in the most recent year-end reports made by Kentucky savings 
and loan associations to their respective supervisory authorities which are 
available at the time of the acquisition. 
(3) (a) During the period expiring five (5) years after July 15, 1988, no 
individual or corporation wherever located shall, directly or indirectly, by 
merger, consolidation, purchase or any other means, acquire control of a 
savings and loan association or savings and loan association holding com-
pany if as a result thereof such individual or corporation would acquire 
control of more than three (3) Kentucky savings and loan associations 
during any twelve (12) month period; 
(b) However, a savings and loan association holding company wherever 
located, :may acquire control of a savings and loan association holding com-
pany which has its principal place of business in this state and which 
controls more than three (3) Kentucky savings and loan associations under 
conditions approved by the commissioner which would require the follow-
ing: 
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1. That an acquisition made under this subsection shall be limited to 
only one (1) acquisition; 
2. That the Kentucky savings and loan associations acquired in excess of 
the three (3) Kentucky savings and loan associations per year limitation 
included in this acquisition shall be counted against future acquisitions 
during the remaining five (5) year period provided in this subsection; and 
3. That the total Kentucky savings and loan association acquisitions by 
a savings and loan association holding company shall not exceed in the 
aggregate five (5) Kentucky savings and loan associations during any five 
(5) year period. 
(4) The limitations set forth in this section or any other provision of this 
chapter or any regulation promulgated thereunder, as now in effect or 
amended after July 15, 1988, shall not apply to the acquisition of a Ken-
tucky savings and loan association if, in his discretion, the commissioner, if 
the Kentucky savings and loan association is organized under the laws of 
this state, or the federal home loan bank board, if the Kentucky savings 
and loan association is federally chartered, determines that an emergency 
exists and the acquisition is appropriate in order to prevent the probable 
failure of a Kentucky savings and loan association or savings and loan 
holding company having its principal place of business in this state which 
is closed or is in danger of closing. 
(5) Any savings and loan association holding company having its princi-
pal place of business in any state may acquire control of any Kentucky 
savings and loan association or of any savings and loan association holding 
company having its principal place of business in this state, if the state 
wherein the savings and loan association holding company has its principal 
place of business shall authorize the acquisition of control of a savings and 
loan association or savings and loan association holding company in that 
state by a savings and loan association holding company having its prinCi-
pal place of business in this state under conditions substantially no more 
restrictive than those imposed by this section; 
(6) The provisions of this section shall not be construed to prohibit or 
restrict the merger, consolidation or other acquisition of Kentucky savings 
and loan associations or of savings and loan association holding companies 
having their principal places of business in this state and the operation by 
the merged or consolidated corporation of the Kentucky savings and loan 
associations, nor to prohibit the sale of any savings and loan association or 
savings and loan association holding company to, and the purchase thereof 
by, any Kentucky savings and loan association or any savings and loan 
association holding company with its principal place of business in this 
state or the operation of the savings and loan association as a branch. 
(Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 156, § 2, effective July 15, 1988.) 
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289.910. Filing of application to acquire association or holding 
company - Examination of applicant - Cooperative agreements for 
examination of out-of-state associations or exchange of confidential 
information. - (1) Any savings and loan association holding company 
which proposes to acquire control of a Kentucky state chartered savings 
and loan association, or of a savings and loan association holding company 
which controls a Kentucky state chartered savings and loan association, 
shall concurrently file with the commissioner copies of the application filed 
with the applicable federal supervisory authority. The commissioner shall 
approve such acquisition within ninety (90) days of acceptance of a com-
plete application if he finds that: 
(a) The terms of the acquisition are in accordance with the laws of this 
state; 
(b) The financial condition, or the competence, experience and integrity 
of the acquiring company or its principals are such as will not jeopardize 
the financial stability of the acquired savings· and loan association or sav-
ings and loan association holding company; 
(c) The public convenience and advantage will be served by the acquisi-
tion; and 
(d) No fed.eral regulatory authority whose approval is required. has dis-
approved. the transaction because it would result in a monopoly or substan-
tially lessen competition, or has otherwise disapproved. the transaction. 
(2) A nonrefundable fee shall accompany each application and shall be 
set by the commissioner in accordance with the fee-setting principles set 
out in KRS 287.480. 
(3) The commissioner may enter into cooperative agreements with fed-
eral or state regulatory authorities to examine an out-of-state savings and 
loan association that is controlled by a savings and loan association holding 
company having its principal place of business in this state, or accept re-
ports of examinations of such out-of-state regulatory authorities in lieu of 
conducting examinations. 
(4) The commissioner may enter into cooperative agreements with fed-
eral or state regulatory authorities to exchange confidential information 
and reports of examination relating to interstate acquisitions of savings 
and loan associations and savings and loan association holding companies. 
(5) The cost of an examination shall be assessed. against and paid by the 
savings and loan association or savings and loan association holding com- . 
pany examined. The assessment for the examination shall be calculated. in 
the same manner as that used for savings and loan association examina-
tions. (Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 156, § 3, effective July 15, 1988.) 
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SECTIONE 
, I 
NON-TRADITIONAL BANKING PRODUCTS: 
INSURANCE, ANNUITIES AND MUTUAL FUNDS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The scope of this outline is to provide an overview as to current issues a.f(ecting 
a bank's ability to sell insurance, mutual funds and .annuities. For anyone that 
has not followed this area, the banking industry is in a state of flux over the 
sale of insurance and retail nondeposit investments and .substantial changes 
will likely occur in the near term which may substantially affect the contents of 
this outline. This outline does not purport to be a road-map or a comprehensive 
ex3.mination of the many issues facing banks in this area, but merely an 
overview of certain current issues. 
B. Banks, insurance companies and mutual funds are increasingly competing with 
each other and offering each other's product lines to customers. As banks offer 
these non-traditional services to their customers, they are exposing themselves 
to new legal and regulatory issues that are complex, often overlapping, and not 
always consistent. 
C. Banks are usually enticed to offer nondeposit investments and insurance 
products to enhance fee income and help solidify customer loyalty. A recent 
American Banker article on mutual funds indicated that bank-managed mutual 
funds grew by 34 percent in 1993. Bank trade groups recently indicated that 
Americans were purchasing approximately $30 billion per month of mutual 
funds with banks accounting for roughly 15 percent of that total. The current 
low interest rate environment, as measured by low yields on insured depoSitory 
instruments, are partially responsible for this growth. 
D. Banks may offer non-deposit investment products to customers in many ways. 
One way is for the bank to lease space to a distributor of the product and in 
return receive a rental fee for the space and, possibly, a percentage override of 
the net or gross profits. A second way is for the bank to permit an outside 
distributor to directly solicit its customers and the bank may perform 
administrative services for the mutual fund with respect to its customers and, 
possibly, investment advisory services to the fund for a fee. A,third 
arrangement is for the bank to make mutual funds directly available to its 
customers using its own employees to market the product. While the manner in 
which the sale of uninsured products at banks may be conducted is varied, the 
legal issues presented and the degree of regulatory overlap is obviously directly 
related to the manner in which the product is marketed at each bank. The 
more direct involvement a bank chooses to take in offering the product results 
in greater fee generation, along with a more complex regulatory and legal 
environment for the bank to operate. 
E. All retail sales of investment products by banks are regulated. as follows: 
1. National banks are subject to the rules and regulations of the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency ["OCC"J. 
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2. State chartered member banks are subject to the rules and regulations 
of the Federal Reserve System ("Federal Reserve"). 
3. State chartered non-member banks are subject to the rules and 
regulations of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"). 
4. Federally chartered and insured state-chartered savings associations 
and savings banks are regulated by the Office of Thrift Supervision 
("OTS"). 
At the present time, banks are exempt from registration under federal and state 
securities laws from registration as an investment company and as a 
broker/dealer. The federal securities laws include the Securities Act of 1933, 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and 
the Investment Company Act of 1940. This exemption from registration with 
the SEC is not available for thrifts, subsidiaries of banks and holding companies 
or joint ventures with banks. 
While banks are exempt from the registration requirements of federal and state 
securities laws, all banks and bank affiliates that engage in retail investment 
sales are subject to the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. 
When a bank utilizes a third-party broker-dealer. the broker-dea1er's activities 
are regulated by the SEC. Pursuant to the requirements set forth under federal 
securities laws, broker-dealers are also subject to the rules and regulations of 
securities self-regulatory organizations such as the National Association of 
Securities Dealers ("NASD") and the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"). The 
prOvisions of ERISA may also regulate the sale of mutual funds that deal with 
benefit plans and other areas regulated by ERISA. 
F. There have been many studies authorized recently by the SEC, GAO, trade 
groups, American Association of Retired Persons, and others. that indicate there 
is some confusion on they part of many investors with respect to banks 
involvement in the mutual fund business. A recent SEC study showed that 66 
percent of those surveyed thought that money market funds purchased through 
the banks were federally insured by he FDIC and 56 percent thought that all 
mutual funds sold by banks were backed bi the assets of the bank or were 
federally insured. The existence of investor confusion in the sale of mutual 
funds has resulted in new guidelines being issued by each of the bank 
regulators and by trade associations. There has also been concern expressed by 
the SEC, and concern and new legislation proposed by members of Congress. 
II. UPDATE ON BANKS SELLING INSURANCE PRODUCTS 
A. Agent for General Insurance. 
1. State Banks and Bank Holding Companies in Kentucky. Kentucky 
banking laws in KRS 287.030 appear to substantially limit banks and 
bank holding companies in Kentucky acting as insurance agent or 
broker except: [1) credit life; (2) credit health; and (3) insurance of the 
interest of a real property mortgagee in mortgaged property, other than 
title insurance. The relevant section reads: 
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(4) No person who after July 13, 1984, owns or acquires 
more than one-half (1/2) of the capital stock of a bank 
shall act as insurance agent or broker with respect to any 
insurance except credit life insurance, credit health 
insurance, insurance of the interest of a real property 
mortgagee in mortgaged property, other than title 
insurance. (KRS 287.030(4)). 
With respect to bank holding companies owning banks in Kentucky, the 
attorney general in OAG 81-173 has said: 
A bank holding company may not acquire 100% of the 
outstanding common stock of an insurance agency, since 
the language of this section expresses the clear intent of 
the legislature to limit the involvement of a bank's 
majority shareholders, including one-bank holding. 
companies, in insurance-related activities; accordingly, 
any construction which would authorize ownership of an 
insurance agency as a wholly-owned subsidiary on the 
theory that it is a separate entity and is "acting" indirectly 
or independently of its controlling parent corporation 
would render that portion of the statute a nullity and lead 
to the absurd result that the statute can be avoided by 
mere organization as a bank holding company. (OAG 81-
173). 
The Commissioner of the De~ent of Financial Institutions may be 
limited in making a finding of permissible activities pursuant to KRS 
287.020.3 (commonly referred to as "parity letters"). The relevant 
restriction in KRS 287.020(3) states that " ... This section shall not 
apply to activities prohibited under Subtitle 9 of KRS Chapter 304." 
2. National Banks. 
(a) 12 U.S.C. § 92. Federal banking laws permit national banks 
located in places the population of which does not exceed 5,000 
inhabitants to engage as agents in general insurance. The law 
reads as follows: . 
§ 92 Action as insurance agent or broker; 
procuring loans on real estate 
In addition to the powers now vested by law in 
national banking associations organized under the 
laws of the United States any such association 
located and doing business in any place the 
population of which does not exceed five thousand 
inhabitants, as shown by the last preceding 
decennial census .. may, under such rules and 
regulations as may be prescribed by the 
Comptroller of the Currency, act as the agent for 
any fire, life .. or other insurance company 
authorized by the authorities of the State in which 
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such bank is loCated to do business in said State, 
by soliciting and selling insurance and collecting 
premiums on policies issued by such company; 
and may receive for services so rendered such fees 
or commissions as may be agreed upon between. 
the said association and the insurance company 
for which it may act as agent: Provided, however, 
That no such bank shall in any case assume or 
guarantee the payment of any premium on 
insurance policies issued through its agency by its 
principal:andprovidedjiuther, That the bank shall 
not guarantee truth of any statement made by an 
assured in filing his application for insurance. (12 
U.S.C.§ 92). 
The oce has also issued the following regulations: 
§ 7.7100 National banks acting as general 
insurance agents. 
12 U.S.C. 92 provides that national banks may 
act as agents for any fire, life, or other insurance 
company in any place the population of which 
d~ not exceed 5,000 inhabitants. This provision 
is applicable to any office of a national bank when 
the office is located in a community having a 
population of less than 5,000 even though the 
principal office of such bank is located in a 
community whose population exceeds 5,000. (12 
C.F.R. Part 7.7100). 
§ 7.7495 Debt cancellation contracts. 
A national bank may provide for losses arising 
from cancellation of outstanding loans upon the 
death of borrowers. The imposition of an 
additional charge and the establishment of 
necessary reserves in order to enable the bank to 
enter into such debt cancellation contracts are a 
lawful exercise of the powers of a national bank 
and necessary to the business of banking. (12 
C.F.R. Par 7.7495). 
(b) Recent Court Decisions. 
(1) On June 7, 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in 
United states National Bank of Oregon v. Independent 
Insurance Agents of America, Inc., 124 L. Ed. 2d 402, 113 
S. Ct. 2173 (1993), 61 U.S.L.W. 4564 (1993), held that 
Section 92 remains in force and preserves the statutory 
power of national banks in the insurance field in towns of 
5,000 orIess people. 
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(2) On July 16, 1993, the U.S. CircUit Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit in Independent Insurance 
Agents of America v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 
1993) upheld a ruling by the OCC that national banks 
may sell any type of insurance nationwide from small . 
towns of 5,000 people or less. The decision noted that no 
specific congressional intent could be found to restrict the 
geographical reach of insurance sales authorized by 
Section 92. 
(3) The Fifth Circuit in Saxon v. Georgia Association of 
Independent Insurance Agents, 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 
1968) relied on Section 92 to declare unlawful Comptroller 
Saxon's ruling that permitted a national bank to sell its 
borrowers "broad forms of automobile, home, casualty and 
liability insurance." Saxon, 399 F.2d at 1012. The court 
applied the principle of expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius and reviewed the legislative history to conclude 
that national banks have no power to act as insurance 
agents in towns greater than 5,000 people. 
(4) The Second Circuit on June 15, 1992 in American Land 
Title Association v. Clarke, 968 F.2d ISO (2nd Cir. 1992), 
the court struck down the OCC's decision that Chase 
Manhattan Bank could sell title insurance as an 
incidental activity under 12 U.S.C. § 24(7). The court 
concluded that a power that had been withheld by 
Congress cannot be found to be incidental and necessary. 
This decision leaves in question the extent to which a 
national bank may use Section 24(7) to conduct any form 
of insurance activity. The court did distinguish 
Independent Bankers Association v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 
1164 (D.C. Cir. 1979), which held that Section 92 did not 
bar a national bank from selling credit life insurance in a 
town with over 5,000 inhabitants, based largely on the 
nature of credit life insurance as being unique to banking. 
(5) On August 4, 1992, the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Kentucky. Frankfort Division, in 
The Owensboro National Bank v. Moore, 803 F. Supp. 24 
(E.D. Ky. 1993), held that Section 92 preempts KRS 
287.030(4) and, accordingly, the plaintiff banks may not 
.be prevented from applying for insurance licenses. Judge 
Hood also noted that KRS 287.030(4) does not constitute 
insurance regulation and, accordingly, the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § lOll, et seq. ("McCarran Act") 
has no application. However, Judge Hood in conclusion 
noted: 
The court specifically declines to determine 
whether the Commissioner is required to 
issue licenses once the completed 
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applications are received. Whether 
national banks are subject to Kentucky's 
criteria for the issuance of an insurance 
license is not properly before the court, and 
may well implicate McCarran-Ferguson in 
other respects. In any event, the court 
need not reach this issue in narrowly 
deciding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 287.030(4), as 
interpreted, is preempted by 12 U.S.C. § 92, 
and does not permit the Commissioner to 
refuse to provide the requested 
applications. 
The decision has been appealed to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and is presently awaiting 
oral argument which should occur in April. 
(6) . On December 2, 1993, the United States District Court in 
Barnett Banks oj Marion County, N.A. v. Florida, 839 F. 
Supp. 835 (1993) ruled that Section 92 did not preempt a 
Florida insurance statute that limits bank subsidiaries of 
bank holding companies from insurance agency activities. 
The court concluded that the McCarran Act grants to the 
states the right to regulate the business of insurance. 
The court distinguished the Owensboro National decision 
as follows: 
Additionally, the outcome of that court's 
McCarran-Ferguson analysis differed from 
that in the present case, Judge Hood 
finding that the Kentucky statute did not 
constitute insurance regulation. 
Owensboro, however, is distinguishable for 
three important reasons. First, there was 
no state caselaw upon which Judge Hood 
could rely for the meaning and/or purpose 
of the state regulation. Second, the 
Kentucky provision was located within that 
chapter of the state statutes regulating 
banks and trust companies, not that 
portion which regulates insurance. Lastly, 
the court there applied the tripartite test 
announced in Union Labor We Ins. Co. v. 
Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 73 L. Ed. 2d 647,102 
S. Ct. 3002 {1982} for determining whether 
a state law governs the "business of 
insurance." As the subsequently decided 
Fabe made clear, and as the instant 
Defendants have duly noted, the Pireno test 
applies to the second clause of McCarran- . 
Ferguson (relating to the scope of antitrust 
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immunity), while the instant analysis--and 
that in Fabe--re1ates to the first clause of 
the Act. In this vein, it should also be 
noted that Fabe was a Sixth Circuit case, 
and was remanded to that court of appeals, 
before which an appeal from Owensboro 
presently lies. [803 F. Supp. at 35). 
(7) While the courts have recently supported the ability of 
national banks that have offices in towns of 5,000 or less 
to act as agent for the sale of insurance as set forth above, 
the next test for national banks may be satisfying the 
requirements of the Department of Insurance to obtain an 
insurance license. The issue, as in Barnett Bank above, 
appears to be whether section 92 preempts state 
insurance laws that bar or limit the sale of insurance by 
certain parties. Since the McCarran Act clearly appears 
to give states the right to regulate the business of 
insurance, how do you reconcile limits that may be 
imposed under the McCarran Act and Section 92 
insurance authority? As an example, KRS 304.9-100 
deals with the situation where the granting of a license for 
engaging in the business of insurance is to be with 
respect to the general public and not for the purpose of 
permitting the licensee to write insurance for "controlled 
business." The commissioner may withhold any license 
". . . if he finds that the license has been or is being, or 
will probably be used by the applicant or licensee 
principally for the purpose of writing 'controlled 
business' .... " that is: 
[b) Insurance or annuity contracts covering 
himself or members of his family, or the 
officers, directors, stockholders, partners, 
employees or debtors of a partnership, 
association, or corporation of which he or a 
member of his family is an officer, director, 
stockholder, partner. associate, or 
employee. (Emphasis added). [KRS 304.9-
1000. . 
B. Credit Life and Credit Health Insurance. 
1. Kentucky chartered banks pursuant to KRS 287.030(4) and national 
banks as an incidental power imder 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) permit the bank to 
act as agent in the sale of credit life and credit health insurance. 
2. The oce in 12 C.F.R. Part 2.1 regulates the disposition of credit life 
insurance income. The OCC's position on credit life insurance was 
upheld in Independent Bankers Association of America v. Heimann, 613 
F.2d 1164 (O".C. Cir. 1980). 
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3. Banks must comply with the rules and regulations of the Department of 
Insurance to sell credit life and credit health insurance. 
C. Update on the Sale of Annuities by Banks. The direct sale of annuities by 
banks has become questionable based upon several recent court decisions. 
Annuities have been traditionally sold by insurance companies. There are 
variable and fixed rate annuities. The variable rate annuity is very similar to a 
mutual fund and the fixed rate annuity is more like an insurance product. 
1. National Banks. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on 
August 26, 1993, in Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company v. Clarke, 
998 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1993), held that national banks were barred 
from selling annuities in towns with more than 5,000 inhabitants and 
further determined that "annuities" are an "insurance product" and not 
financial investment instruments as the OCC had claimed. The court 
also rejected the OCC's argument that Section 24(7) of the National Bank 
Act provides independent authority for national banks to sell annuities. 
The OCC requested that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
rehear the case but the court declined on January 13, 1993, with a' 
lengthy dissent from four judges; which sets the stage for a possible 
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
2. State Banks in Kentucky. The Commissioner of the Kentucky 
Department of Financial Institutions has taken the position in a letter 
. dated May 25, 1990 and has recently verbally confirmed his position 
with respect to variable and fixed annuities as follows: 
We believe that KRS 287.210(2) permitsstate-chartered 
banks to act as compensated agents for their customers 
in purchasing or selling variable and fixed annuities. We 
infer from this section the incidental authority to enter 
into agreements with issuers or marketers of such 
contracts whereby the banks may for a fee promote the 
contracts and solicit their purchase by the banks' 
customers, subject to the following requirements: 
1. The fee paid to the bank for each contract 
sold may not vary with the volume of 
contracts sold; 
2. Prospectuses, promotional materials, 
advertising, and forms must clearly and 
conspicuously state that the contract is a . 
prod uct of the issuer, that it is not a 
product of the bank, and that it is not 
insured by the FDIC; and 
3. The bank must obtain a signed statement 
prior to the sale of a contract in which its 
customer acknowledges thaf the annuity is 
an obligation of the issuer and not of the 
bank, that the bank is acting as a 
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compensated agent for the issuer, and that 
. the obligation is not insured by the FDIC. 
While your letter does not ask, I would add that 
state-chartered banks may implement an incentive 
program involving a pass-through of commissions to 
employees who sell the contracts so long as full disclosure 
of the compensation is made by the employee during the 
sale of the contract. In addition, the employee's 
percentage interest in commissions must not vary with 
the volume of contracts sold, and the bank must have 
written policies and adequate controls in place to prevent 
product tie-ins and unsound lending practices. (Letter 
from Commissioner ofKDFI dated May 25, 1990 to M. 
Brooks Senn). 
3. Department of Insurance. The Department of Insurance appears, based 
upon informal discussions with staff members, to take the position that 
an annuity in Kentucky is the.sale of an insurance product and that any 
. sale of an . annuity must be in compliance with the rules and regulations 
of the Department of Insurance .. 
D. Leasing Space in Banking Facilities to Third-Party Distributors. 
1. National Banks. The OCC has indicated that national banks may lease 
space in their lobbies to insurance agents and receive a percentage 
override on the gross income from the sales. For a discussion on this 
type of arrangement, see OCC Interpretive Letter No. 294, Fed. Banking 
L. Rep. (CCH) 1f 85,438 (December 21, 1983). In 12 C.F.R. Part 7.7516, 
the OCC's regulation states: 
§ 7.7516 Sharing of banking quarters. 
The operations of a national bank and another finan$1 
institution should be separately identified and maintained 
within any banking quarters which may be shared by 
these institutions. Similarly, the assets and records of 
such institutions should be segregated. Where a national 
bank and another financial institution share banking 
quarters, an active officer or employee of one institution 
may engage in the performance of work for the other 
institution pursuant to an agency agreement and under 
such conditions as to insure that the agency relationship 
is readily known to the customers of either institution. 
The terms of any lease arrangement with a third party vendor should be 
reviewed ~th the staff of the OCC prior to implementation. 
2. State Banks in Kentucky. The Commissioner of the KDFI has authorized 
state-chartered banks in Kentucky to lease space in its lobby to a third-
party vendor and has previously not taken exception to the bank 
receiving compensation in the form of a rental payment of both fixed rent 
and a percentage rent based on the volume of sale. 
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Because no statute or regulation clearly authorizing such an 
arrangement exists under Kentucky law, I would suggest any state bank 
pursuing such an arrangement obtain a letter from the Commissioner 
authorizing such a lease. 
3. Department of Insurance. The Department of ' Insurance may well object 
to a bank entering such an arrangement with a third-party vendor if the 
percentage rent based upon volume sold appears high and is the 
equivalent of commission sharing. (See KRS 304.9-421. Sharing of 
commissions prohibited.) 
E. oee Insurance Guidelines. The oce has announced its intent to issue 
guidelines on the sale of insurance by national banks in the form of an advisory 
letter in the near future. At this time, these guidelines are not available. 
Ill. UPDATE ON THE SALE OF MUTUAL FUNDS BY STATE BANKS AND NATIONAL 
BANKS IN KENTUCKY. 
A. 'Overview. Unlike the authority for banks to sell insurance products the 
permissibility of bank mutual fund activities under the Glass-Steagall Act 
basically remains unquestioned. While banks may not underwrite or ~tribute 
mutual funds, the real issue with respect to mutual funds has shifted to 
supervisory and compliance concerns dealing with protecting the consumer, 
providing adequate disclosure and insuring appropriate suitability standards 
are instituted, among other issues. Each of the banking regulators, the banking 
trade association, and others has set forth guidelines for banks that market, 
directly or indirectly, mutual funds and annuities to their customers. 
B. Bank Regulatory Guidelines. The following bank regulators have issued 
guidelines on the marketing of non-insured products to a bank's customers: 
1. The oce in Section 413 for the Comptroller's Handbookfor National 
Bank Examiners (OCe 94-13) on February 24, 1994 issued guidelines 
with respect to retail nondeposit investment sales. A copy of oce 94-13 
is attached'to this outline. oce 94-13 replaces Banking Circular 274, 
which is rescinded. 
2. The OTS on September 7, 1993 in Thrift Bulletin 23-1 ("TB 23-1") issued 
guidelines for thrifts on sales of uninsured products. 
3. The FDIe issued a supervisory statement ("FIL-71-93) on October 8, 
1993 on sales of nondeposit investments. 
4. The Federal Reserve on June 25, 1993 issued a letter (SR 93-35) on the 
separation of mutual funds sales activities from insured deposit-taking 
activities. 
5. Interagency Statement on Retail Sales of Nondeposit Investment 
Products (NR 94-21) was released on February 15, 1994 under the 
auspices of the fou.r bailking and thrift regulators. The guidelines 
oversee sale of annuities, mutual funds and securities products made by 
bank employees, sales made by employees of affiliated or unaffiliated 
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entities occurring on bank premises and sales resulting from customer 
referrals when the bank receives a benefit for the referral. NR 94-21 
supersedes guidelines previously issued by the four banking agencies. A 
copy of NR 94-21 is attached to this outline as a part of OCC 94-13. 
C. SEC. The SEC has long lobbied for functional regulation of sale of securities by 
banks. In a recent speech to 1994 NASAA Winter Enforcement Conference, the 
SEC Commissioner, Richard Y. Roberts, stated that he "would support the idea 
that banks should be permitted to engage in the business of dealing in, 
underwriting, and distributing the shares of investment companies and to 
organize, sponsor, manage or control investment companies by conducting 
these activities through separate non-bank affiliates. 
D. Bank Trade Group Guidelines. 
1. On February 1, 1994, the American Bankers Association, The Bankers 
Roundtable, Consumer Bankers Association, Independent Bankers 
Association, National Bankers Association and the Savings & 
Community Bankers of America released guidelines on Retail Investment 
Sales. These guidelines are intended to complement the guidelines set 
. forth by bank regulators. 
2. A discussion of some of the provisions follows: 
(a) Purpose. 
(1) Enhance Customer Protection. 
(2) Complement Regulatory Policy. 
(3) Help Banks Comply 
(4) Encourage Training and Qualifications 
(b) Summary. 
(1) Oral and written disclosures. Oral and written 
disclosures should be provided to the customer stating 
that such products: 
.are not bank deposits; 
.are not obligations of or guaranteed by any bank; 
.are not insured or guaranteed by the FDIC or any other 
government agency; and 
.involve investment risk, including the possible loss of 
principal. 
E - 11 
(2) Signed disclosures. The customer should sign a 
disclosure form acknowledging that the customer has 
read and understands the written disclosure. 
(3) Advertising and promotion. All advertising should contain 
conspicuous and prominent notice of the uninsured 
nature of investment products. 
(4) Location. Sales of nondeposit investment products should 
take place in areas physically separate from deposit-
taking activities. 
(5) Settiru! and circumstances. Tellers should not- be 
permitted to sell nondepositinvestment products and to 
offer investment products. Nondeposit investment 
products should only be sold by qualified personnel. 
(6) Employee qualifications and training. Bank management, 
sales representatives and audit and compliance personnel 
should demonstrate competence appropriate to the 
function or responsibilities assigned to them. When 
appropriate, and possible, sales representatives should 
obtain a NASD license, such as Series 6 or 7. A NASD 
license equivalency certificate may be appropriate. 
Background checks for all sales repreSentatives are 
strongly recommended. 
(7) Employee compensation and referral fees. Suitability, not 
compensation, should guide in the sale of nondeposit 
investments products. Referral fees to tellers and other 
bank employees is permissible if not based upon the 
success of the referral generating a sale. 
(8) Bank management and board of director oversight. 
Banks should establish written policies and procedures 
regarding retail sales of non-deposit investments 
products. Policies should encompass third-party and 
affiliated vend.or sales. Such policies should be designed 
to achieve compliance with applicable banking, securities 
and insurance laws and regulations. A compliance 
program should be established, which is independent of 
the sales program. 
IV. MISCELLANEOUS AND CURRENT EVENTS. 
A. The American Bankers Association announced in the American Banker on 
February 10, 1994 that· it is developing a new series of training programs for 
banks that sell mutual funds. The programs range from basic overview to 
preparation for licensing. 
B. On February 1, 1994, Treasury Secretary Lloyd Benson speaking before-the 
American Association of'Retired Persons called for mandatory disclosure 
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requirements for bank mutual fund sales so the public will have sufficient 
awareness as they make decisions. 
C. On November 4, 1993, Rep. John Dingell (D-Mich.) introduced a bill (Securities 
Regulatory Equality Act of 1993 (HR 3447)) requiring separate bank affiliates to 
carry on securities activities and vested in the SEC the power to regulate them. 
D. On October 19, 1993 Rep. Henry Gonzalez (D-Texas) and Rep. Charles Schumer 
(D-NY) introduced a bill (Depository Institution Retail Investment Sales and 
Disclosure Act (HR 3306)) to insure consumers investing in mutual funds 
through banks know their investments possess some risk and are not covered 
by federal deposit insurance. The bill, if adopted, requires the bank to 
physically separate the sale of uninsured products from the rest of the bank. 
E. As most of you are aware, Mellon Bank Corp. and The Dreyfus Corp. on 
December 6, 1993 announced their intention to combine and form one financial 
services company. The transaction has created much congressional interest, as 
well as regulatory complexity as Mellon announced its intent to operate Dreyfus 
as a subsidiary of its lead bank. On February 24, 1994 the OCC took an 
unusual step of inviting public comments on the application. 
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C) NEWS RELEASE 
Comptroller of the Currency 
Administrator of National Banks 
Washington. DC 20219 
For: IMMEDIATE RELEASE 
Date: February 24, 1994 
NR 94-23 
Contlct: (202) 874-4700 
COMPTROLLER ISSUES GUIDANCE TO EXAMINERS ON MUTUAL FUND SALES 
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) today released procedures for 
examining the mutual fund or other retail nondeposit investment sales operations of national 
banks. The guidance implements the statement on nondeposit investment products issue9 by 
the federal bank and thrift regulators last week. . 
"Today's action is the result of draft exam procedures that our examiners have been field 
testing for the past six months. All OCC examiners will now have detailed guidance about 
how to examine bank mutual fund sales," said Comptroller of the Currency Eugene A. 
Ludwig. "I'm instructing examiners to determine that bank management responds 
immediately to any matter that has the potential to confuse customers. as to the uninsured 
nature of nondeposit investment products. " 
The examination procedures cover all aspects of a national bank's retail sales activities, 
including sales made by bank employees and sales on bank premises made by employees of 
third party vendors. The procedures are more detailed than the acc's previous guidance 
and offer specific examples of what the OCC expects from national banks that engage in this 
business . 
. Among other things, the procedures instruct examiners to: 
• Criticize sales programs with fund names so similar to the bank's ,that even mitigating 
circumstances are unlikely to eliminate customer confusion. For example, a bank 
named First National Bank would be misleading customers if it operated an uninsured 
fund called First National Bank Fund. 
• Increase scrutiny of ALL aspects of a bank's sales program if the bank's name is 
greatly similar to the fund's name. 
- more -
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Assess the independence and thoroughness with which banks select the products they 
will offer. In particular, examiners should criticize bank managers who choose 
investment products simply because they generate the largest sales fees. 
• Verify that banks with investment sales programs have disclosed that mutual funds 
and other nondeposit investment products (1) are not FDIC insured, (2) are not 
deposits or other obligations or' guarantees of the bank, and (3) involve investment 
risks. including possible loss of principal amount invested. 
• Determine whether these disclosures are featured conspicuously in all written or oral 
sales presentations. advertising and promotional materials. confirmations. and periodic 
statements that include the name or the logo of the bank or an affiliate. The 
procedures state that disclosures in advertisements and brochures should appear in text 
at least as large as that describing the product. The OCC will consider disclosures to 
be conspicuous if they are on brochure covers or at the front of descriptive text. 
• Determine whether products recommended for sale are suitable investments for 
customers. In p,articular. the prOcedures call for special attention for product 
recommendations made to flfSt-time, risk averse, elderly. or surviving spouse 
customers. 
• Verify that a bank has assigned a bank officer to be responsible for resolving any 
customer complaims. 
The procedures also include other examples of steps banks can take to minimize customer 
confusion. For example. they give advice about how banks can ensure that sales personnel 
are giving accurate disclosures to customers by using "testers." They also have guidance on 
oversight of third party vendors seUing on bank premises and describe techniques used by 
wen-managed banks to sele;t mutual funds or other investment products, such as annuities, 
for sale to the bank's custoIIic;tS • 
. The 'oce will send copies of the examination procedures to all national banks and all 
riatioDal bank examiners. 
##### 
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C) 
Comptroller of the Curren~y 
Administrator of National Banks 
Subject: Nondeposit Investment Sales 
Examination Procedures 
acc 94-13 
acc BULLETIN 
Description: Temporary Insert - Handbook 
for National Bank Examiners 
TO: All Users of the Comptroller's Handbook for National Bank Examiners 
PURPOSE 
This issuance transmits a new section 413, Retail Nondeposit Investment Sales, for the 
Comptroller's Handbook for National Bank Examiners. This section should be inserted in the 
handbook at the end of the "Other Areas of Examination Interest" section, behind section 412, 
Discount Brokerage Activity. 
REFERENCES 
Banking Circular 274, Retail Nondeposit Investment Sales, is rescinded and replaced by new 
section 413 to theComptroller's Handbookfor National Bank Examiners, dated February 1994, 
attached. 
BACKGROUND 
On July 19, 1993, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currenc;y issued Banking Circular 274, 
Retail Nondeposit Investment Sales, which provided guidelines for national banks involved in 
the sale to retail customers of mutual funds, annuities, and other nondeposit investments. 
Those guidelines were superseded on February 15, 1994, by the issuance of an Interagency 
Statement, developed by the OCC, the Federal Reserve Board, the FDIC, and the OTS. The 
Interagency Statement will apply uniform standards to federally insured fmancial institutions 
offering these services. 
SCOPE 
The Interagency Statement is incorporated in this insert, which provides national bank. 
examiners with procedures for examining the nondeposit investment sales activities of national 
banks. The questions and procedures presented here check for compliance with. the Interagency 
Statement as well as laws, rules, and regulations. They also provide national bank. examiners 
with a basis for evaluating management and controls in this type of operation. 
Date: February 24, 1994 Page 1 of 2 
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Comptroller of the Currency 
Administrator of National Banks 
Subject: Nondeposit Investment Sales 
Examination Procedures 
RESPONsmLE OFFICE 
acc 94-13 
acc BULLETIN 
Description: Temporary Insert - Handbook 
for National Bank Examiners 
Questions concerning the Interagency Statement or any part of the insert may be directed to 
the Office of the Chief National Bank Examiner, Capital Markets Group, in Washington, DC 
at (202) 874-5070. 
Susan F. Krause 
Senior Deputy Comptroller for Bank Supervision Policy 
Enclosure 
Date: February 24, 1?94 Page 2 of 2 
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Retail Nondeposit Investment Sales 
Introduction Section 413.1 
This section sets forth guidance for exam-
iners reviewing bank nondeposit invest-
ment product retail sales operations, includ-
ing bank-related marketing and promotional 
activities. Examiners will review a bank's 
programs for consistency with the Inter-
agency Statement on Retail Sales of 
Nondeposit Investment Products, dated 
February 15, 1994 (Interagency State-
ment). The evaluation will cover all bank-
related activities including: 
• Sales or recommendations made by 
bank employees; 
• Sales or recommendations made by 
employees of affiliated or unaffiliated 
entities occurring on bank premises 
(including sales or recommendations 
initiated by telephone or by mail 
from bank premises); and 
• Sales resulting from referrals of retail 
customers to a third party when the 
bank receives a benefit for the refer-
ral. 
When reviewing a bank's nondeposit in-
vestment sales operation, examiners should 
determine that the bank views customers' 
interests as critical to all aspects of its 
sales programs. Examiners should evaluate 
a bank's policies and procedures from the 
customers' perspective and should ascer-
tain that customers are provided with a 
high level of protection. If it becomes 
necessary to recommend remedial action, 
examiners should determine that bank 
management responds immediately to any 
matter that has the potential to confuse 
customers as to the uninsured nature of 
nondeposit investment products. 
Banks that do not operate programs safely 
and soundly or that engage in violations of 
law or regulations will be subject to appro-
priate regulatory action. When determining 
the appropriate action, examiners should be 
mindful that some banks, especially banks 
relying on third parties for sales of 
nondeposit investment products, may need 
time to conform their programs to the 
Interagency Statement and to the guidance 
contained'herein. At a minimum, however, 
examiners should determine whether bank 
management is making a good faith effort 
Comptroller's Handbook for National Bank Examiners 
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to comply with this regulatory guidance in 
a timely manner. 
This section applies to sales to individual 
customers but does not apply to the whole-
sale sale of nondeposit investment prod-
ucts to non-retail customers, such as sales 
to institutional customers or to fiduciary 
accounts administered by an institution. 
As part of its general responsibilities, how-
ever, a national bank should take appropri-
ate steps to avoid potential customer con-
fusion when providing nondeposit invest-
ment products to institutional customers or 
to the bank's fiduciary customers. For 
additional information on restrictions on a 
national bank's use as fiduciary of the 
bank's brokerage service or other entity 
with which the bank has a conflict of 
interest, including purchases of the bank's 
proprietary and other products, see 12 CFR 
9.12 and "Sales to Fiduciary Accounts," 
later in this section. 
Scope 
Examiner reviews of a bank's mutual fund 
or other nondeposit investment sales pro-
gram will concentrate on the policies and 
procedures the bank .adopts and on the 
effectiveness of their implementation. 
When reviewing implementation of a 
bank's program, examiners will investigate 
whether senior bank management has: 
(1) Participated in planning the bank's 
investment sales program; 
(2) Adopted a framework to ensure 
compliance with all applicable laws, 
rules, regulations, regulatory condi-
tions, and the Interagency State-
ment; and 
(3) Ensured effective supervision of indi-
viduals engaged in sales activities, 
including employees of the bank and 
any other entity involved in bank-
related sales of investment products. 
Where relevant, references in this hand-
book section to bank management or bank 
employees includes third party managers or 
third party employees. 
Retail Nondeposit Investment Sales 
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Minimum Standards for Nondeposit 
Investment Programs 
Antifraud provisions of the federal securi-
ties laws prohibit materially misleading or 
inaccurate representation in connection 
with offers and sales of securities. (See, 
for example, Section 10 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-S.) If 
customers are misled about the nature of 
nondeposit investment products, including 
their uninsured status, sellers could face 
potential liability under these antifraud 
provisions. Safe and sound banking also 
requires that bank-related retail sales activi-
ties be operated to avoid confusing cus-
tomers about the products being offered. 
Use of nonbank employees to sell these 
products does not relieve bank manage-
ment of the responsibility to take reason-
able steps to ensure that the investment 
sales activities meet these requirements. 
The Rules of Fair Practice of the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) 
expressly govern sales of securities by 
broker/dealers who are members of NASD.· 
These rules apply to bank-related securities 
sales by banking subsidiaries registered as 
broker/dealers, affiliated broker/dealers, 
and unaffiliated broker/dealers operating 
under agreements with banks. These rules 
apply whether such sales are made on 
bank premises or at a separate location. 
These rules do not expressly apply to sales 
or recommendations made directly by the 
bank. Even when these rules do not ex-
pressly apply, however, they are an appro-
priate reference for a bank compliance 
program designed to ensure that the bank's 
retail sales of all nondeposit investment 
products are operated in a safe and sound 
manner. 
Before beginning to operate a nondeposit 
investment sales program, banks may also 
consider notifying their blanket bond carri-
ers of plans to engage in these activities. 
If applicable, this could permit the bank to 
obtain written assurances from the carrier 
that the bank's insurance coverage for 
employees includes staff representing third 
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party vendors. 
Examiners also should encourage bank 
management to review Retail Investment 
5.ales: Guidelines for Banks. The publica-
tion, prepared jointly by six banking indus-
try trade associations, contains voluntary 
guidelines for bank sales of nondeposit 
investment products as well as common 
sense suggestions for putting many of the 
DCC's recommendations into action. 
Program Management 
Banks must comply with all applicable 
laws, rules,. regulations, and ~egulatory 
conditions, and operate consistently with 
the Interagency Sta.tement for any of their 
bank-related retail sales of mutual funds, 
annuities, or other retail nondeposit invest-
ment products. Bank.directors· are respon-
sible for evaluating the risks imposed by 
bank-related sales and are expected to 
adopt a program statement and self-regula-
tory policies and procedures to ensure 
compliance with all requirements. A bank's 
policies and procedures must address bank-
related retail sales made directly by a bank, 
through an operating subsidiary or affiliate, 
or by an unaffiliated entity. 
Examiners should expect that banks will 
tailor their policies and procedures to the 
scope of the bank's sales activities. The 
level of detail contained in a bank's policies. 
and procedures will depend on the struc-
ture and complexity of the bank's program. 
Examiners will review the bank's securities 
sales activities to determine that' the bank 
has adopted a' statement that addresses 
the risks associated with the sales program 
and describes the features of the sales pro-
gram, the roles of. bank employees, and the 
roles of third party entities. The statement 
should set forth the strategies the bank will 
employ to achieve its objectives. It also 
should outline the self-regulatory proce-
dures bank management will implement to 
ensure that the program's objectives are 
met without compromising the customers' 
best interests. 
2 
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At a minimum, examiners should expect 
bank policies and procedures to address: 
Supervision of personnel involved in 
nondeposit investment sales programs -
Senior bank managers will be expected to 
ensure that specific individuals employed 
by the bank, an affiliated broker/dealer, or 
a third party vendor are responsible for 
each activity outlined in the bank's policies 
and procedures. Managers of the bank's 
securities sales activities will be account-
able for understanding the investment 
products offered and the sales process, as 
well as for assuring compliance with secu-
rities and banking laws, rules, and regula-
tions. 
Designation of employees authorized to sell 
investment products· - This should serve 
as a guide for all bank-related employees 
dealing with retail nondeposit investment 
• product customers. The program state-
ment should specify that only properly' 
trained and supervised employees are 
permitted to make investment sales or 
recommendations. It should describe the 
responsibilities of personnel authorized to 
sell or recommend nondeposit investment 
products and of other personnel who may 
have contact with retail customers con-
cerning the sales program. It also should 
include a description of appropriate and . 
inappropriate referral activities and the· 
training requirements and compensation ar-
rangements for each category of personnel. 
The roles of other entities selling on bank 
premises, including supervision of selling 
employees - Bank management must plan 
to monitor compliance by other entities on 
an ongoing basis. The degree of bank 
management's involvement should be 
dictated by the nature and extent of 
nondeposit investment product sales, the 
effectiveness of customer protection sys-
tems, and customer responses. (See 
"Third Party Vendors," later in this section 
for more details on programs operated by 
third parties.) 
The types of products sold - Policies and 
procedures should include the criteria the 
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bank will use to select and review each 
type of product sold or recommended. 
For each type of product sold by bank 
employees, the bank should identify specif-
ic laws, regulations, regulatory conditions, 
and any other limitation or requirements, 
including qualitative considerations, that 
will expressly govern the selection and 
marketing of products the bank will offer. 
(See "Product Selection, n later in this 
section for further discussion of these 
issues.) 
Examiners should review: 
• The process the bank uses to select 
the products it will offer, 
• What the bank did to ensure the 
products meet its customers' needs 
and expectations, and 
• How well the bank is performing an 
ongoing analysis of the appropriate-
ness of the products offered for sale . 
Examiners will also assess the indepen-
dence and thoroughness of the analysis 
and the degree to which the bank relies on 
ratings services. Examiners should be 
critical of· bank managers who simply 
choose products that generate the largest 
sales fees or accept what a third party has 
to offer without performing an independent 
analysis of the suitability of the products to 
the bank's strategy and customer mix. 
Examiners should not give the impression 
that the agency expects bank managers to 
be "stock pickers" or that it intends to 
expand or limit the types of products banks 
offer. Instead, examiners should determine 
that bankers are selecting products that 
generally meet their customers' needs. 
(See "Third Party Vendors," later in this 
section, for more details on the bank's 
oversight roles when it relies on its third 
party vendor to select products.) 
Policies governing the permissible uses of 
bank customer information - Examiners 
should determine that bank customer infor-
mation policies address the permissible 
uses of such information for any purpose 
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associated with bank-related retail invest-
ment sales activity. In particular, if the 
bank intends to use customer lists to tele-
phone depositors whose certificates of 
deposit are due to mature to inform them 
about alternative investment products, the 
policies should outline steps the bank will 
take to avoid confusing customers as to 
the risks associated with nondeposit in-
vestment products, including their unin-
sured nature. 
Bank.s may also supply customer informa-
tion lists to a third party vendor. Supplying 
such information should only occur, how-
ever, after bank management has evaluated 
steps the third party is taking to avoid 
confusing customers and after determining 
such steps are consistent with bank policy. 
Bank management. also may wish to con-
sider obtaining a legal opinion concerning 
the bank's authority to share customer 
information with third parties. 
Communications with customers - Exam-
iners should determine whether the bank's 
policies consider the need for periodic and 
.or,going communications with customers to 
help them understand their investments 
and to remind customers periodically that 
the products they have purchased are not 
insured deposits. Policies should outline 
customer communications for the bank 
during periods of market stress and assign 
responsibilities for such communications. 
Setting and Circumstances of 
Nondeposit Investment Product 
Sales . 
Banks should market nondeposit products 
in a manner that does not mislead or con-
fuse customers as to the nature of the 
products or their risks. The setting and 
circumstances surrounding sales of invest-
ment products is fundamental to ensuring 
that customers can readily distinguish 
between nondeposit investment products 
and insured deposits. Examiners will deter-
mine ttJat bank management has estab-
lished controls to distinguish retail deposit-
taking activi~ies from the promotion, sale, 
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and subsequent customer relationships 
related to retail nondeposit investment 
sales. 
To minimize customer confusion, sales of, 
or recommendations for, nondeposit invest-
ment products on the bank's premises 
should be conducted in a physical location 
distinct from the area where retail deposits 
are taken. Signs or other means should be 
used to distinguish the investment sales 
area from the retail deposit-taking area of 
the institution. 
In the limited situation in which physical 
considerations prevent nondeposit invest-
ment product operations from being con-
ducted in a distinct area of the bank, a 
bank has a heightened responsibility to 
ensure that measures are in place to mini-
mize customer· confusion. To minimize 
customer confusion, the bank should make 
an officer responsible for each of the loca-
tions at which the investment product 
sales will take place. 
The bank also should . employ signs and, 
where possible, separate desks and person-
nel for deposit-taking and investment prod-
uct.sales. Investment product salespeople 
should clearly identify themselves by the . 
use of appropriate methods such as name 
tags or separate business cards. In banks 
where the investment program is likely to 
be less elaborate, the examiner should 
determine, at a minimum, that the bank 
utilizes the written and oral disclosures 
described below. 
In no case should any employee, while 
located in the routine deposit-taking area, 
such as the teller window, make general or 
specific investment recommendations 
regarding nondeposit investment products, 
or accept orders for such products, even if 
unsolicited. Tellers and other employees 
who are not authorized to sell nondeposit 
investment products may only refer cus-
tomers to individuals who are specifically 
designated and trained to assist customers 
interested in the purchase of such prod-
ucts. 
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Product names - Banks may -not offer 
nondeposit investment products with a 
product name identical to the bank's name. 
Names that imply that mutual funds are 
U.S. government guaranteed also are pro-
hibited. 
Banks also should recognize that the poten-
tial for customer confusion may be in-
creased if the bank offers nondeposit prod-
uct names that are similar to the bank's 
name. If the bank offers such nondeposit 
products with names similar to the bank's, 
it should design sales training programs to 
minimize the risk of confusing customers. 
In addition, Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) staff have issued an opinion 
that common names between a bank and a 
mutual fund sold or marketed by or through 
that bank are presumed to be misleading 
and a violation of the Investment Company 
Act of 1940. SEC staff contends, howev-
er, that a common name fund can rebut the 
presumption that a fund's name is mislead-
ing by ensuring that the cover page of the 
prospectus prominently discloses that the 
fund's shares are not deposits or obliga-
tions of the bank and are not federally 
insured. 
When examining investment sales pro-
grams in a bank that is selling funds with 
names similar to the bank's, examiners will 
evaluate the steps that bank management 
has taken to avoid confusing customers. 
The greater the similarity between bank 
and fund names, the more closelyexamin-
ers will scrutinize all aspects of a bank's 
sales program. 
Examiners should criticize sales programs 
in which fund names are so similar to the 
bank's that even mitigating circumstances 
are unlikely to eliminate customer confu-
sion. For example, it may be acceptable 
for "First National Bank" to offer a 
nondeposit investment product named 
"First Fund" as long as the bank has imple-
mented sufficient disclosures, training, and 
other measures to mitigate customer con-
fusion. Other names, however, such as 
"First Bank Fund" or "First National Fund" 
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are so similar to a bank's name that they 
are inappropriate because they are inher-
ently confusing. 
Examiners and bank management should 
also be aware that the potential for cus-
tomer confusion can depend on the context 
in which the sales are taking place. For 
example, it may be inappropriate for the 
First National Bank to offer a mutual fund 
product named "FNB Money Market Fund" 
if First National Bank were also offering an 
insured deposit product named "FNB Mon-
ey Market Account." 
Overall setting and circumstances - When 
reviewing nondeposit investment product 
sales operations, examiners should not 
place undue weight on a single aspect of 
the setting and circumstances of the sale. 
Each bank's sales program is different, and 
one set of rules may not cover all circum-
stances or provide all customers with the 
necessary level of protection. Before judg-
ing a particular bank's operations, examin-
ers should consider how the various ele-
ments of the program interact and whether 
the elements combined mislead or avoid 
misleading customers. 
The following example illustrates how the 
combination of certain elements can poten-
tially mislead customers: 
-An employee of the First National Bank 
sits at a desk in the lobby. This em-
ployee sells money market mutual funds 
and renews CDs. The employee tells 
customers about two products the bank 
is offering: the FNB Money Market 
Fund, an uninsured retail nondeposit 
investment product, and the FNB Mon-
ey Market Account, an insured deposit. 
This employee may have an incentive to 
market the uninsured product because 
the employee gets a commission for 
selling a mutual fund but receives noth-
ing for selling or renewing a deposit. 
This situation could confuse customers. 
To mitigate customer confusion, the bank 
should ensure that the employee has exten-
sive knowledge of the products being sold 
and that the employee is thoroughly aware 
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of customer protection issues. When 
selling noninsured products, the employee 
should also require customers to sign a 
new account form acknowledging that the 
product is not insured. 
If space and personnel limitations appear to 
increase the potential for customer confu-
sion, examiners should encourage bank 
management to require additional training . 
and disclosures, to develop signs and 
product names that clearly distinguish 
among the products being sold, and to 
assure that compensation for selling unin-
sured and insured products is equalized. 
Examiners should expect banks with non-
deposit investment sales programs already 
in operation when this section is issued to 
initiate actions immediately to conform all 
aspects of the setting and circumstances 
of the bank's program to these require-
ments. In particular, banks should take 
immediate steps to correct any elements 
that could confuse customers. 
Disclosures and Advertising 
Disclosures 
Complete and accurate disclosure must be 
provided to avoid customer confusion as to 
whether a bank-related product is an in-
vestment product or an insured bank de-
posit. Examiners should determine that 
banks selling, advertising,. or otherwise 
marketing nondeposit investment products 
to retail customers provide the following 
product disclosures conspicuously: The 
products offered (1) are not FDIC insured, 
(2) are not deposits or other obligations or 
guarantees of the bank, and (3) involve 
investment risks, including possible loss of 
principal amount invested. 
The minimum disclosures should be provid-
ed to the customer: 
• Orally during any sales presentation. 
• Orally when investment advice con-
cerning nondeposit investment prod-
ucts is provided. 
• Orally and in writing prior to or at 
the time an investment account is 
opened to purchase these products. 
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• In advertisements and other promo-
tional materials, as described below. 
Examiners will determine whether these 
disclosures are featured conspicuously in 
all written or oral sales presentations, 
advertising and promotional materials, 
prospectuses, confirmations, and periodic 
statements that include the name or the 
logo of the bank or an affiliate. 
Advertisements and brochures also should 
feature these disclosures at least as large 
as the text describing the bank's nondepos-
it investment products. The OCC believes 
that these disclosures are conspicuous 
when they appear on the cover of a bro-
chure or on the first part of relevant writ-
ten text. A bank's disclosures could also 
be considered conspicuous if it prints the 
required disclosures in a box or by display-
ing them in bold type or with bullet points. 
The bank should obtain a signed statement 
acknowledging such. disclosures from 
customers at the time a retail nondeposit 
investment account is opened. For ac-
counts establ:;;'1ed before issuance of this 
section, the bee";\', should consider obtaining 
such a signed. statement prior to the next 
sale. If the bank solicits customers by 
telephone or mail, it should be assured that 
customers agreeing to purchase nondeposlt 
investment products receive the disclosure 
acknowledgement form when they open a 
new account. A bank shouid aiso request 
all customers who previously opened in-
vestment accounts by mail without receiv-
ing these written disclosures to sign and 
return a disclosure acknowledgement to 
the bank. 
Confirmations and account statements for 
nondeposit investment products should 
contain at least the minimum disclosures if 
the confirmation or account statement 
contains the name or logo of the bank or 
its affiliate. If a customer's periodic depos-
it account statement includes account 
information about nondeposit investment 
products, the bank should clearly separate 
that information from information about the 
deposit account. The material on the cus-
6 
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tomer's periodic deposit account relating to 
nondeposit investment products also 
should begin with the disclosures described 
above as well as the identity of the entity 
conducting the nondeposit transaction. 
, Where applicable, examiners should deter-
mine that the bank has made additional 
disclosures described in the Interagency 
Statement regarding affiliate relationships 
and specific fees and penalties. 
Some disdosure obligations may arise from 
the roles a bank or a bank affiliate may 
play in the distribution, administration, 
and/or management processes. For exam-
ple, a bank' should disclose remuneration 
'received for performing investment advi-
sory services and administrative services 
such as shareholder accounting. This 
dis'Closure obJigation may be met through 
fee disclosures in a prospectus. If the 
prospectus does not include such fee dis-
closures, the bank must make the disclo-
sures by some other means. State law 
requirements may also govern fee disclo-
sures. 
Additional disclosure responsibilities may 
occur because of the manner in which 
'nondeposit investment products are mar-
keted. Examiners should determine wheth-
er public statements about the selection of 
, the products a bank offers are reasonable. 
As an example, if management represents 
to customers that it has performed an 
independent analysis of the product select-
ed, the examiner should determine that the 
bank has actually done so. Examiners will 
also evaluate management's disclosure to 
prospective customers of ratings applicable 
to a particular product, including the source 
of the rating. If ratings are used to pro-
mote certain products, examiners should 
expect bank management to review wheth-
er the bank will disclose ratings changes 
and, if so, determine how such disclosures 
will occur. 
Examiners should also determine whether 
a bank-related sales program includes any 
written or oral representations to custom-
ers concerning insurance coverage provided 
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by any other entity apart from FDIC, e.g., 
the Securities Investor Protection Corpora-
tion (SIPC), a state insurance fund, or an 
insurance' company. If these types of 
representations are made, examiners 
should determine whether training concern-
ing differences in insurance coverage is 
provided to appropriate personnel. Appro-
priate personnel includes anyone who is 
likely to respond to customer inquiries or 
individuals designated to sell such prod-
ucts. Examiners should also determine if 
written or oral explanations of the differ-
ences in coverage are provided to all cus-
tomers. 
Advertising 
Examiners should assess the procedures 
the bank uses to ensure that bank-related 
sales advertisements are accurate, do not 
mislead customers about the nature of the 
product, and include required disclosures. 
For example, claims about "no fees" or "no 
charges" are not accurate if the selling 
bank collects fees for investment advisory 
services or collects fees for shareholder 
accounting on the product or service being 
advertised. In this case a bank could claim 
that there are no "sales" charges and .in-
form readers that ~ description of other 
charges is contained in the prospectus. 
Examiners should determine that the bank 
does not imply in advertising or in written 
and oral presentations that the bank stands 
behind an investment product. 
The bank's marketing department should 
not be solely responsible for bank-related 
investment sales advertisements. The 
issuer, or, if a mutual fund, the distributer, 
may prepare advertisements of specific 
investment products that conform to stand-
ards developed by self-regulatory organi-
zations such as NASD. Senior bank man-
agement should appoint an officer respon-
sible for ensuring that bank investment 
advertisements as well as advertisements 
prepared by another party that make refer-
ence to the bank, or any advertisement 
used in bank-related sales, are accurate, 
not misleading, and include all required 
7 
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disclosures. 
Suitability 
Consistent with the Rules of Fair Practice, 
the OCC expects banks to determine 
whether a product being recommended is 
an appropriate investment for the custom-
er. Banks should ensure that any salespeo-
ple involved in bank-related sales obtain 
sufficient information from customers to 
enable the salesperson to make a judgment 
about the suitability of recommendations 
for particular customers. At a minimum, 
suitability inquiries should be made consist-
ent with the Rules of Fair Practice con-
cerning the customer's financial and tax 
status, investment objectives, and other 
factors that may be relevant, prior to mak-
ing recommendations to the customer. 
This information should be documented 
and updated periodically.' 
A well-documented suitability inquiry can 
protect a bank from dissatisfied customers 
who threaten litigation. Such litigation 
could introduce risk to the bank's capital. 
Accordingly, the OCC may view banks 
operating a retail securities business with-
out appropriate suitability procedures to be 
engaging in an unsafe and unsound prac-
tice. 
Many banks use software programs that 
document investor profiles to assist in 
making suitability judgments. Each profile 
is based on a customer's responses to 
inquiries as to his or her financial and rele-
vant personal history. The software pro-
gram subsequently matches the customer's 
investment needs and objectives to the 
bank's available products. This type of 
software is a tool, not a substitute for 
professional judgement; it should not 
weight bank proprietary products too heavi-
ly or bank deposits too lightly. 
One example of a critical suitability deter-
mination involves sales to elderly bank 
customers. Many of these customers rely 
upon investments or savings for retirement 
income and may consequently demand high 
yields. They may not, however, have the 
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ability to absorb or recover losses. A 
nondeposit investment salesperson should 
also be aware that it is especially important 
to make a careful suitability recommenda-
tion when dealing with a surviving spouse 
who is not experienced in investment 
matters. 
Examiners should investigate potential 
suitability problems in mutual fund sales 
when reviewing "breakpoints" and "letters 
of intent." Breakpoints are discounts that 
are available to investors who purchase a 
large amount of mutual fund shares in a 
lump sum or as part of a cumulative invest-
ment program (e.g. under a "letter of in-
tent"). The potential for abuse usually 
occurs when the sale of several different 
mutual fund shares takes place in quanti-
ties just below the level at which the pur-
chaser would qualify for reduced sales 
charges on anyone of the funds. 
Examiners should determine whether a 
bank officer has been assigned responsibili-
ty for implementing and/or monitoring the 
suitability system. The examination ap-
proach should focus on the system the 
bank has in place to make suitability inquir-
ies, suitability judgements, and periodic 
account reviews. Examiners generally 
should review sales patterns rather than 
individual sales for suitability issues. To 
determine the types of sales to test for 
suitabilitv, examiners should investiaate 
. marketing programs that target a cl~ass of 
customers, customer complaints, sales to 
first-time and risk-averse investors, sales 
made by high- or low-volume salespersons, 
volatile and new products, and the exist-
ence of mutual fund redemptions after 
relatively short holding periods. 
Qualifications and Training 
Banks should implement detailed training 
programs to ensure that sales personnel 
have thorough product knowledge (as 
opposed to simple sales training for a 
product) and understand customer protec-
tion requirements. Examiners should as-
sess the process the bank 'uses to ensure 
that sales personnel are properly qualified 
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and adequately trained to sell all bank-
related nondeposit investment products. If 
bank personnel sell or recommend securi-
ties, the training should be substantively 
equivalent to that required for personnel 
qualified to sell securities as registered 
representatives. Securities industry train-
ing is available in most metropolitan areas. 
Examiners also should determine that the 
bank's audit and compliance personnel and 
persons with supervisory responsibilities 
are properly trained and knowledgeable. 
A bank's hiring practices and training plan 
should be designed around the complexity 
and risks of the particular investment prod-
ucts being offered. While it may be appro-
priate JO have a banking generalist with no 
securities industry background sell money 
market mutual funds, it could be inappro-
priate to allow this individual to sell fixed-
rate annuities without extensive training. 
If individuals with securities industry expe-
rience are hired to sell investment products 
. for banks, they should have an understand-
ing of securities industry customer protec-
tion and control systems and have an 
adequate knowledge of the products being 
·offered. Since they may not be familiar 
with general banking regulations and may 
not understand the needs of bank custom-
ers, banks should also ensure that these 
individuals are instructed as to the special-
ized obligations' of selling investment prod-
ucts in a retail banking environment. Ex-
aminers should _ expect management to 
check with securities regulators to deter-
mine if potential bank sales employees with 
previous securities industry experience 
have a disciplinary history. 
Banks engaging in lower volume mutual 
fund and annuity sales frequently train 
existing bank employees to sell investment 
products. Examiners should determine that 
bank management is satisfied that these 
individuals have acquired "product knowl-
edge," and thoroughly understand the need 
to safeguard the customers' interests. 
More specialized "product knowledge" 
training is generally provided by the mar-
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keting'division of a mutual fund sponsor or 
another third party vendor. Bank staff 
should also receive customer protection 
and compliance training. 
Examiners should .determine whether a 
bank officer has been assigned responsibil-
ity for ensuring' that adequate training is 
provided to bank staff, and for reviewing 
the hiring and training practices of a third 
party· vendor. 
Compensation 
Incentive compensation systems, which are 
standard in the securities and insurance 
businesses, are becoming increasingly 
common in commercial banking. Personnel 
who are authorized to sell nondeposit 
investment products may receive incentive 
compensation, such as commissions, - for 
transactions entered into by customers. 
However, . incentive compensation pro-
grams must not be structured in such a 
way as to result in unsuitable recommenda-
tions or sales being m~de to customers. 
An improperly designed compensation 
system can provide a bank employee with 
the incentive to place his or her own com-
pensation interests above the interests of 
bank customers. Examiners should assess 
the steps management has taken to ensure 
that compensation programs do not oper-
ate as an incentive for salespeople to make 
unsuitable recommendations or sales to 
customers. 
One way to avoid having the compensation 
system drive the recommendation toward 
mutual funds and away from certificate of 
deposit renewals would be to separate the 
nondeposit investment product sales and 
CD renewal functions. Alternatively, if 
employees are permitted to offer both 
deposits and nondeposit investment prod-
ucts, a bank could reduce the temptation 
by compensating the employee for renew-
ing maturing deposits as well as for selling 
nondeposit investment products. Examin-
ers should discuss with bank management 
where appropriate the methods used to 
avoid possible conflicts of interest poten-
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tially arising from the bank's' compensation 
plan. 
To investigate whether incentive compen-
sation schemes could induce salespersons 
to recommend products with higher com-
missions over a more suitable option, ex-
aminers should look to customer com-
plaints and to sales patterns rather than to 
individual sales. For example, an examiner 
can look for instances in which sales for a 
particular product increased after changes 
to an incentive compensation system. 
Examiners also should expect a bank to 
increase its supervision of sales programs 
as it increases its incentive compensation. 
Examiners should be critical of supervision 
that does not take into account the possi-
bility that recommendations for purchases 
of nondeposit investment products could 
be influenced by the incentive compensa-
tion scheme. 
If the overall setting and circumstances of ' 
a bank's investment sales program appears 
to be only marginally satisfactory, examin-
ers should regard higher incentive compen-
sation on certain 'investment products and 
lower compensation on deposits and other 
investment products as having the poten-
tial for causing serious problems. In this 
case the compensation system itself should 
justify an increase in the level of bank 
management supervision. If supervision is 
not adequate, the examiner should criticize 
the compensation system and other objec-
tionabie factors in the setting and circum-
stance of the sale. 
Bank supervisory employees who review 
and approve individual sales, accept new 
accounts, and review established customer 
accounts should not receive incentive 
compensation based on the profitability of 
individual trades or accounts that are sub-
ject to their review. Similarly, department 
auditors or compliance personnel should 
not participate in incentive, compensation 
programs that are based directly on the 
'success of sales efforts nor should they 
report to a mBnager who receives this type 
of incentive c.ompensation. In addition, 
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bank management should not rely on third 
, party audit and control systems if that 
vendor's control personnel receive transac-
tion-based incentive compensation. 
Bank employees, including tellers, may 
receive a one-time nominal fee of a fixed 
dollar amount for each customer referred 
for nondeposit investment products. The 
payment of this referral fee should not 
depend on whether the referral results in a 
transaction. 
Fiduciary' Accounts 
Pursuant to 12 CFR 9.11 (d), examiners will 
revieW' the investments held by national 
banks as fiduciary to determine whether 
such investments are in accordance with 
law, 12 CFR 9, and sound fiduciary princi-
ples. In so doing, they will ensure that the 
bank has complied with all applicable state 
and federal restrictions on investment 
transactions involving the bank's fiduciary 
accounts. 
Under 12 CFR 9.12, national bank fiduci-
aries may not invest funds held as fiduciary 
in the stock of organizations with which 
there exists such a connection as may 
affect the exercise of the, best judgment of 
the bank in acquiring the stock, unless 
there exists specific authority for such an 
investment in the governing instrument, 
local law, a court order or through con-
sents from all beneficiaries. As to ac-
counts subject to the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974, such invest-
ments must be within the authority of that 
Act. These principles govern purchases of 
a bank's proprietary products, such as 
. bank-advised mutual funds and private 
label mutual funds for fiduciary accounts. 
In addition, pursuant to 12 CFR 9.11 (d), 
examiners will determine that fiduciary 
purchases and retention of bank proprietary 
products for fiduciary accounts are in 
accord with sound fiduciary principles. 
This requires that even if specific authority 
exists for fiduciary accounts to purchase or 
retain bank-advised or bank private label 
mutual funds, the assets must be appropri-
70 
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ate for each account. The investment 
must be consistent with the purpose for 
which each account was created, and 
suitable for the beneficial interest holders 
of each account. This requirement exists 
as to purchases for individual accounts, 
and for conversions of collective invest-
ment funds to bank-advised mutual funds. 
Twelve CFR 9.7 requires banks to conduct 
initial and annual reviews of each fiduciary 
account as well as a separate review of all 
securities by issuer to ensure compliance 
with these requirements. These reviews 
include: . 
• A documented review of each ac-
count to determine that the asset.s 
of that account, including any propri-
etary products, meet the investment 
objectives of the account. In struc- . 
turing the account portfolio, the 
fiduciary must consider the provi-
sions of the document establishing 
the account. The review must also 
take into account the needs of the 
beneficial· interest holders. This 
review should address the issues set 
forth in the Comptroller's Handbook 
for Fiduciary Activities, "Portfolio 
Management. n 
• A documented annual review of all 
assets by issuer, including propri-
etary products. This review should 
consider the quality of fund man-
agement, fee structure, risk diversifi-
cation and anticipated rates of re-
turn. It should also address the con-
siderations set forth in the 
Comptroller's Handbook for Fiduciary 
Activities, "Investments." 
Compliance Program 
Banks must maintain compliance programs 
capable of verifying compliance with the 
guidelines specified in the Interagency 
Statement and with any other applicable 
requirements. Banks should perform 
nondeposit investment compliance pro-
grams independently of investment product 
sales and management. At a minimum, the 
compliance function should include a sys-
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tem to monitor customer complaints and to 
review customer accounts periodically to 
detect and prevent abusive practices. 
Examiners reviewing the compliance opera-
tions of a bank offering a variety of retail 
investment products should ensure that the 
bank has comprehensive self-regulatory 
policies and that it is conducting an ongo-
ing comparison of the bank's investment 
sales practices with its stated investment 
policy. In banks with a less elaborate 
investment sales program, where an inter-
nal auditing group may perform all of the 
bank'.s compliance functions, the examiner 
should ensure that these auditors are peri-
odically comparing sales practices with 
policy. 
Individuals performing the audit or compli-
ance of the bank's investment program 
should be qualified and should have the 
necessary experience to perform the as-
signed tasks. Compliance personnel should 
also' engage in ongoing training to keep 
abreast of emerging developments in bank-
ing and securities laws and regulations. 
Banks can establish independence of audit 
or compliance personnel if such personnel 
determine the scope, frequency, and depth 
of their own reviews; report their findings 
directly to the board of directors or an 
appropriate committee of the board; have 
their performance evaluated by persons 
independent of the investment product 
sales function; and receive compensation 
that is not connected to the success of 
investment product sales. 
Bank compliance programs should be mod-
eled after those in the securities business 
where it is customary for compliance per-
sonnel to conduct regular and frequent 
customer account reviews in order to 
detect and prevent abuses. The extent and 
frequency of customer account supervision 
should be dictated by the aggressiveness 
of the sales program and the riskiness of 
products being offered. 
Examiners should expect the bank to as-
sign individuals independent of the sales 
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force to review periodically customer re-
sponses to suitability inquiries and to com-
pare these responses to the type and vol-
ume of account activity to determine 
whether the activity in an account is appro-
priate. If account activity is unusual rela-
tive to the customer's stated objectives 
and risk tolerance, or if account activity is 
brisk relative to the size of a customer's 
investment or past practices, management 
should make follow-up inquiries to deter-
mine if the activity serves the best inter-
ests of the customer. 
If examinations or routine oversight by 
bank management indicates that suitability 
problems may exist, bank management is 
expected to conduct its own review of all 
affected accounts and to institute correc-
tive actions. If it is determined that cus-
tomers . may ,have been disadvantaged, 
corrective actions should be designed on a 
case-by-case basis and ,may include full 
explanations to customers and, where 
appropriate, offers to rescind trades. 
Customer complaints are an indication of 
potential problems that warrant a prompt 
account review. Examiners should expect 
the bank to assign a bank officer who is 
independent of the sales force the respon-
sibility for approving the resolution of 
complaints or reviewing the resolution of 
complaints by a third party vendor. The 
examiner should evaluate the system for 
assuring that all complaints (written and 
oral) receive management's attention by 
reviewing the bank's audit of the complaint 
resolution system. 
Managers of high-volume investment sales 
programs also often use automated excep-
tion reporting systems to flag, potential 
problems before customers complain. 
Such systems monitor product sales and 
the performance of salespersons. If the 
bank has such systems in place, and if the 
reports show significant volumes of mutual 
fund redemptions after short holding peri-
ods, examiners should review the steps 
management has 'taken to investigate 
whether the product is being sold properly. 
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If early redemptions are restricted to one 
salesperson or one branch, management 
can reasonably conclude that the problem 
is localized. However, early redemptions 
occurring throughout the sales network 
may indicate that something is wrong with 
the product itself or with the training pro-
vided to salespeople. Similarly, if reports 
indicate that a salesperson is selling one 
type of product almost exclusively, man-
agement may need to review that 
individual's performance or training. 
Ultimately, the way for bank management 
to assure itself that the securities salesper-
sons are providing the required disclosures 
and making suitable recommendations to 
customers is to "test" the sales program. 
Effective "tests" can be conducted in 
several ways. Larger banks sometimes 
employ "testers" Who pose as prospective 
customers and test the sales presentations 
for a variety of issues including adherence 
to customer protection standards. Many 
other well-managed banks (of all sizes) 
have instituted follow-up programs to 
verify that their customers understood their 
investment transactions. A bank manager, 
who is independent of the sales force, may 
telephone customers a few days after an 
investment account is opened or an unusu-
al transaction has taken place. The manag-
er will determine if the customer under-
stands what he or she has purchased; 
understands the risks, including the unin-
sured nature of the product; understands 
the bank's role in the transaction; and can 
generally confirm responses to a suitability 
inquiry previously provided. 
A bank officer usually can determine if a 
customer understands an investment by 
asking the customer to describe its general 
features. The customer should be able to 
describe how the product works and its 
risks rather than simply recite what he or 
she hopes to gain from the particular in:. 
vestment. Managers usually also deter-
mine if the customer is satisfied with the 
product and service or has any problems or 
suggestions for improving service. If a 
bank institutes a telephone follow-up pro-
gram, it should maintain a record of con-
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versations with customers to resolve prob-
lems or disputes that may arise at a later 
date. 
"Negative consent" letters (e.g., notices 
informing customers that unless they ob-
ject, the bank assumes the customer un-
derstands and does not object to the trans-
actions) may be a useful element in a 
compliance program but should not be the 
sole means of verifying that customers 
understand nondeposit investment product 
transactions and the bank's role in the 
process. 
Examiners should determine whether a 
bank officer has been assigned the respon-
sibility for assuring that the bank adequ~te­
Iy _ monitors the nondeposit investment 
acpounts of customers. Examiners should 
also determine whether the officer. has 
developed or is developing a system to 
monitor the customer account reviews of 
outside vendors operating bank-related 
sales programs. 
Oversight of Third Party Vendors 
When a bank uses a third party vendor to 
sell nondeposit investment products, the 
bank's board of directors must adopt a 
written policy addressing the scope of the 
activities of the third party, as well as the 
procedures the bank intends to use for 
monitoring the third party's compliance 
with the Interagency Statement. 
To select the third party vendor and moni-
tor the ongoing acceptability of the vendor, 
bank management usually reviews the 
vendor's experience in the business and 
the vendor's financial statement. Bank 
management also usually contacts other 
banks with which the vendor has done 
business for references. Examiners should 
also expect that bank management 
checked with the vendor's regulator before 
it entered into an agreement with the ven-
dor and that management has continued to 
review reports furnished to the vendor by 
its regulator(s). 
Bank management should enter into a 
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written agreement with a third party ven-
dor that has been approved by the bank's 
board of directors before the vendor is 
permitted, to offer nondeposit investment 
products to the bank's customers. The 
agreement should outline the duties and 
responsibilities of each party and should 
include a description of all of the activities 
the third party is permitted to engage in on 
the bank's premises. The agreement also 
should set forth terms for the use of the 
bank's space, personnel, and equipment as 
well as compensation arrangements for 
personnel of the bank and the third party. 
The agreement also should: 
• Specify that the third party will com-
ply with all applicable laws and 
regulations and will act consistently 
with the provisions of this temporary 
insert, especially the provisions 
relating to customer disclosures, 
• Authorize the bank to monitor the' 
third party by periodically reviewing 
and verifying that the third party and 
its sales represe,ntatives are comply-
ing with its agreement with the 
bank, with all applicable laws and 
regulations, and with the provisions 
of this temporary insert, 
• Specify the type, scope, and fre-
quency ~f reports the third party is 
to furnish to bank management to 
permit bank management to fulfill its 
oversight responsibilities, 
• Authorize' the institution and the 
OCC to have access to appropriate 
records of the third party, 
• Require the third party to agree to in-
demnify the bank for any liability 
that resulted from third party invest-
ment product sales program actions, 
• Set forth the training which the bank 
expects its employees and third 
party personnel to possess, and 
• Provide for written employment con-
tracts between' the bank and the 
third party vendor's employees. 
Examiners will review the agreement to 
determine that it specifies that the third 
party vendor will comply with all applicable 
requirements contained in the Interagency 
Statement. Examiners also will review the 
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agreement to determine if it includes provi-
sions regarding bank oversight and examin-
er access to appropriate records. It is 
expected that compliance with the agree-
ment will be periodically monitored by the 
institution's senior management. 
Before entering into an agreement with a 
third party vendor, bank management also 
should be satisfied that the vendor uses a 
product selection process similar to the one 
outlined below. Banks relying on a third 
party vendor to select products also should 
understand and agree with the vendor's 
method of analysis and document its con-
currence with that method. Examiners 
should determine whether management has 
understood and concurred. Bank manage-
ment should periodically investigate the 
vendor's product selection process to 
ensure that it continues to be appropriate 
to the bank's customer mix. Examiners 
. also should determine whether bank man-
agement understands and agrees with 
contingency plans developed by the third 
party vendor and the product issuer to 
respond to customer orders during unusual 
surges in redemptions. 
To fulfill its oversight responsibilities, it is 
expected that bank management will re-
ceive various reports from the third party 
vendor and have access to the vendor's 
appropriate records. The reports received 
will vary with the scope of the sales pro-
gram and should be tailored to the needs of 
the institution. The reports should always 
include a list of all customer complaints 
and their resolution. Other reports that 
may facilitate bank management's over-
sight role, could include: 
• A periodic listing of all new account 
openings and descriptions of the 
initial trades; 
• A list of significant or unusual (for 
. the customer) individual sales during 
. a reporting period; 
• Sales reports by product, salesper-
son, and location during a reporting 
period; and 
• Reports of internal compliance re-
views of customer accounts originat-
ed at the bank and reports furnished 
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to the third party vendor by its regu-
lator(s) on at least an annual basis. 
Bank management must monitor compli-
ance by third party vendors on an ongoing 
basis. Senior bank managers will be ex-
pected to ensure that specific individuals 
employed by the bank and by the third 
party vendor are responsible for each ,activ-
ity outlined in the bank's investment sales 
policy. The degree of bank management's 
involvement should be dictated by the 
types of products being offered, the vol-
ume of sales, the nature of customers' 
complaints, and the effectiveness of the 
third party vendor's customer protection 
systems. 
Senior bank management also should ap-
point an officer responsible for ensuring 
that bank' investment advertisements as 
well as advertisements prepared by another 
party that refer to the bank, or· any adver-
tisement used in bank-related sales, are 
accurate, not misleading, and include all 
required disclosures. In addition, any ad-
vertising or promotional material - pre-
pared by or on behalf of a third party ven-
dor - should clearly identify the company 
selling the nondeposit investment product 
and should not suggest that the depository 
institution is the se"er. 
Examiner access to the records of third 
party vendors should be governed by pre-
liminary examination findings. \Vhen such 
findings make it clear that bank manage-
ment has discharged its oversight responsi-
bility by reviewing and responding appropri-
ately to third party reports, only a few 
customer complaints have been filed 
against the vendor, and the vendor's re-
ports are timely, sufficiently detailed, and. 
prepared by someone independent of the 
vendor's sales force, examiner access to 
third party records should generally be 
limited to the reports furnished to manage-
ment by the vendor. 
Product Selection 
This section describes in general terms the 
methods that well-managed banks use to 
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select specific non deposit investment 
products and to determine that such prod-
ucts continue to be acceptable to the 
bank's customer mix . . This information is 
provided to help examiners understand and 
review the process used by well-managed 
banks to make this determination. 
Bank management should determine the 
specific laws, regulations, regulatory condi-
tions or other limitations or requirements, 
including qualitative considerations, that 
will govern the sale of products to be 
offered. Although not required, most well-
run bank investment sales programs limit 
the number of products offered so that 
customers and salespersons will not be 
presented with an overwhelming number of 
choices. Limitations based on product 
quality may also make it easier for sales 
managers to shield certain classes of cus-
tomers from inappropriate products. 
As a general practice, bank investment 
programs offer at least one type of money 
market mutual fund for customers who are 
interested in liquidity. In addition, most 
banks offer a U.S. government bond fund 
for customers who stress safety and 
steady income, an equity fund for custom-
ers interested in capital growth, and a tax-
exempt bond fund for customers who wish 
to avoid taxes on investment earnings. 
When deciding which funds to offer, man-
agers should review the fund's perfor-
mance over an extended period of time. 
Most bank managers prefer to avoid mutual 
funds with volatile records. Management's 
selection of a family of funds should not be 
based on the performance of one particular 
fund; each fund selection should stand on 
its own merits. 
Management's selection of investment 
products usually begins with an evaluation 
of the stability of asset values over time 
and an assessment of yields to investors. 
Management also compares the perfor-
mance of other funds with similar objec-
tives over the same period(s). Specialized 
ratings services (such as Morningstar or 
Lipper) or ran kings by analytical services 
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are usually regarded as necessary but 
secondary considerations. 
Management also considers the fund's 
track record in terms of both risk and re-
ward. Management analyzes the fund's 
net asset value versus total return, its 
management or operating expenses, the 
turnover within the fund's portfolio, and 
capital gains and other sources of income. 
Other key considerations include the com-
position of the portfolio and concentrations 
in types of holdings, sector weights, and, 
in the case of equity funds, the percentage 
of ownership represented by individual 
issues. 
Management also evaluates important non-
statistical factors such as the continuity, 
tenure, and demonstrated talent of the 
fund's management. They also may con-
sider factors such as the quality of a mutu-
al fund's operational and marketing sup-
port. 
The bank itself, and not another -entity's 
marketing· department, should select the 
funds to be offered. Independent commit-
tees and qualified analysts should make the 
final selections, not a sales manager whose 
view of the commission structure may 
affect this judgment. 
If the bank uses outside consultants to help 
select a mutual fund, bank management 
should determine whether the consultant 
receives compensation from mutual funds 
or mutual fund wholesalers. If the analysis 
is performed by another party, such as a 
clearing broker or third party vendor, bank 
management should understand and agree 
with the method of analysis and should 
document the bank's concurrence. 
Regardless of who selects the mutual fund 
products, bank management will be expect-
ed to consider the issuer's contingency 
plans for handling unusual surges in re-
demptions at the time such products are 
being considered. Such contingency plans 
normally include emergency staffing, com-
munications, and operational programs that 
are based on various market scenarios. 
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Bank management should compare these 
contingency plans to the expected needs of 
bank customers during periods of stress. 
Finally, once the initial selection process is 
complete, bank management should con-
duct ongoing reviews to assur~ that the 
products remain acceptable in light of the 
bank's objectives and customer's needs. 
Selection of annuity products is conducted 
in the same manner. A variable-rate annu-
ity, a hybrid form of investment that con-
tains elements of mutual funds and insur-
ance, could be characterized as a mutual 
fund operated by an insurance company. 
During product selection, bank manage-
ment should consider the performance and 
composition of the portfolio that is dedicat-
ed to the annuity holders. 
Selection analysis for fixed-rate annuities 
differs from variable-rate annuities. Since 
fixed-rate annuities are obligations of insur-
ance companies, the risks associated with 
them.relate to the issuer's ability to honor 
the terms of the annuity contract. Accord-
ingly, the safety of an annuity depends 
upon the financial standing of the firm that 
issues it and the selection analysis involves 
an assessment of the quality and diversifi-
cation of. the company's assets, its hold-
ings of junk bonds, mortgage-backed secu-
rities, and problem real estate' loans, as 
well as the continuity of management. 
Because it is difficult to independently . 
. analyze insurance companies, ratings pro-
vided by rating agencies such as A.M. 
Best, Standard & Poor's, Duff & Phelps, 
Moody's and Weiss Research playa part in 
annuity analysis. If bank management 
relies significantly on such ratings rather 
than on its own analysis, however, examin-
ers should expect that the issuer selected 
by the bank has received top ratings from . 
most of the ratings services. 
When analyzing annuities, management 
also should recognize that an issuing insur-
ance company can, in certain circum-
stances, sell or simply transfer the annuity 
contract to another insurance company, 
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thereby extinguishing its obligation to the 
purchaser of the annuity. Annuity owners 
are generally, but not always, asked to 
consent to this transfer. A bank selling 
annuities should consider the possibility of 
such a transfer in its product selection 
analysis. At a minimum, the bank should 
disclose this possibility to prospective 
customers. 
Interagency Statement on Retail 
Sales on Nondeposit Investment 
Products 
The full text of the interagency statement 
begins on the next page. 
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Interagency Statement on Retail 
Sales on Nondeposit Investment 
Products 
February 15, 1994 
Introduction 
Recently many insured depository institu-
tions have expanded their activities in 
recommending or selling to retail customers 
nondeposit investment products, such a.s 
mutual funds and annuities. Many deposI-
tory institutions are providing these serv-
ices at the retail level, directly or through 
various types of arrangements with third 
parties. 
Sales activities for nondeposit investment 
products should ensure that customers for 
these products are clearly and fully in-
formed of the nature and risks associated 
with these products. In particular, where 
nondeposit investment products are recom-
mended or sold to retail customers, deposi-
tory institutions should ensure that custom-
ers are fully informed that the products: 
• Are not insured by the FDIC; 
• Are not deposits or other obligations of 
the institution and are not guaranteed 
by the institution; and, 
• Are subject to investment risks, includ-
ing possible loss of principal invested. 
Moreover, sales activities involving these 
investment products should be designed to 
minimize the possibility of customer confu-
sion and to safeguard the institution from 
liability under the applicable. ~nti-fraud 
provisions of the federal seCUritIes laws, 
which, among other things, prohibit materi-
ally misleading or inaccurate represent~­
tions in connection with.the sale of securi-
ties. 
The four federal banking agencies - the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, the Office of the . Comptroll~r 
of the Currency, and the OffIce of Thrift 
Supervision - are issuing this State~ent 
to provide unifor~ gu.idance to d~~o.sltory 
institutions engagIng In these actIvItIes. 
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(Note: Each of the four banking agencies 
has in the past issued guidelines addressing 
various aspects of the retail sale of 
nondeposit investment products. . OCC 
Banking Circular.274 (July 19, 1993); FDIC 
Supervisory Statement FIL-71-93 (October 
8, 1993); Federal Reserve Letters SR 93-
35 (June 17,1993), and SR 91-14 (June 
6, 1991); OTS Thrift Bulletin 23-1 (Sep-
tember 7, 1993). This Statement is intend-
ed to consolidate and make uniform the 
guidance contained in the various existing 
statements of each of the agencies, all of 
which are superseded by this Statement. 
Some of the banking agencies have adopt-
ed additional guidelines covering the sale of 
certain specific types of instruments by 
depository institutions, i. e., obligations of 
the institution itself or of an affiliate of the 
institution. These guidelines remain in 
effect except where clearly inapplicable.) 
Scope 
This Statement applies when retail recom-
mendations or sales of nondeposit invest-
ment products are made by: 
•. Employees of the depository institution; 
• Employees of a third· party, which may 
or may not be affiliated with the institu-
tion (see Note, below, addressing which 
institutions are covered), occurring on 
the premises of the institution (including 
telephone sales or recommendations by 
employees or from the instituti?n's 
. premises and sales or recommendatIons 
initiated by mail from its premises); and 
• Sales resulting from a referral of retail 
customers by the institution to a third 
party when the depository institution 
receives a benefit for" the referral. 
(Note: This Statement does not apply to 
the subsidiaries of insured state nonmem-
ber banks, which are subject to separate 
provisions, contained in 12 CFR 337.4, 
relating to securities activities. For OTS-
regulated institutions that conduct sales of 
nondeposit investment products through a 
subsidiary, these guidelines apply to the 
-subsidiary. 12 CFR 545.74 also applies to 
such sales. Branches and agencies of U.S. 
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foreign banks should follow these guide-
lines with respect to their nondeposit in-
vestment sales programs.) 
These guidelines generally do not apply to 
the sale of nondeposit investment products 
to non-retail customers, such as sales to 
fiduciary accounts administered by an 
institution. (Note: Restrictions on a na-
tional bank's use as fiduciary of the bank's 
brokerage service or other entity with 
which the bank has a conflict of interest, 
including purchases of the bank's propri-
etary and other products, are set out in 12 
CFR 9.12. Similar restrictions on transac-
tions between funds held by a federal 
savings association as fiduciary and any 
person or organization with whom there 
exists an interest that might affect the best 
judgment of the association acting in its 
fiduciary capacity are set out in 1 2 CFR 
550.10. However, as part of its fiduciary 
responsibility, an institution should take 
appropriate steps to avoid potential cus-
tomer confusion when providing 
nondeposit investment products to the 
institution's fiduciary customers.) 
Adoption of Policies and Procedures 
Program Management. A depository insti-
tution involved in the activities described 
above for the sale of .nondeposit invest-
ment. products to its retail customers 
should adopt a written statement that 
addresses the risks associated with the 
sales program and contains a summary of 
policies and procedures outlining the fea-
tures of the institution's program and 
addressing, at a minimum, the concerns 
described in this Statement. The written 
statement should address the scope of 
activities of any third party involved, as 
well as the procedures for monitoring 
compliance by third parties in accordance 
with the guidelines below. The scope and 
level of detail of the statement should 
appropriately reflect the level of the 
institution's involvement in the sale or 
recommendation of nondeposit .investment 
products. The institution's statement 
should be adopted and reviewed periodi-
Comptroller's Handbook for National Bank Examiners 
Temporary Insert - February 1994 
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institutions are encouraged to consult with 
legal counsel with regard to the implemen-
tation of a nondeposit investment product 
sales program. 
The institution'S policies and procedures 
should include the following: 
• Compliance procedures. The proce-
dures for ensuring compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations and 
consistency with the provisions of this 
Statement. 
• Supervision of personnel involved in 
sales. A designation by senior man-
agers of specific individuals to exercise 
supervisory responsibility for each activ-
ity outlined in the institution's policies 
and procedures. 
• Types of products sold. The criteria 
governing the selection and review of 
each type of product sold or recom-
mended. 
.• Permissible use of customer informa-
tion. The procedures for the use of 
information regarding the institution's 
customers for any purpose in connec-
tion with the retail sale of nondeposit 
investment products. 
• Designation of employees to sell invest-
ment products. A description of the 
responsibilities of those personnel au-
thorized to sell nondeposit investment 
products and of other personnel who 
may have contact with retail customers 
concerning the sales program, and a 
description of any appropriate and 
inappropriate referral activities and the 
training requirements and compensation 
arrangements for each class of person-
nel. 
Arrangements with Third Parties. If a 
depository institution directly or indirectly, 
including through a subsidiary or service 
corporation, engages inactivities as de-
scribed above under which a third party 
sells or recommends nondeposit invest-
ment products, the institution should, prior 
to entering into the arrangement, conduct 
an appropriate review of the third party. 
The institution should have a written agree-
ment with the third party that is approved 
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by the institution's board of directors. 
Compliance with the agreement should be 
periodically monitored by the institution's 
senior management. At a minimum, the 
written agreement should: 
• Describe the duties and responsibilities 
of each party, including a description of 
permissible activities by the third party 
on the institution's premises, terms as 
to the use of the institution's space, 
personnel, and equipment, and compen-
sation arrangements for personnel of 
the institution and the third party. 
• Specify that the third party will comply 
with all applicable laws and regulations, 
and will act consistently with the provi-
sions of this Statement and, in particu-
lar, with the provisions relating to cus-
tomer disclosures. 
• Authorize the institution to monitor the 
third party and periodically review and 
verify that the third party and its sales 
representatives are complying with its 
agreement with the institution. 
• Authorize the institution and the appro-
priate banking agency to have access to 
such records of the third party as are 
necessary or appropriate to evaluate 
such compliance. 
• Require the third party to indemnify the 
institution for potential liability resulting 
from actions of the third party with 
regard to the investment product sales 
program. 
• Provide for written employment con-
tracts, satisfactory to the institution, for 
personnel who are employees of both 
the institution and the third party. 
General Guidelines 
1. Disclosures and Advertising 
The banking agencies believe that recom-
mending or selling nondeposit investment 
products to retail customers should occur 
in a manner that assures that the products 
are clearly differentiated from insured 
deposits. Conspicuous and easy to com-
prehend disclosures concerning the nature 
of nondeposit investment products and the 
risk inherent in investing in these products 
are one of the most important ways of en-
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nondeposit products and insured deposits 
are understood. 
Content and Form of Disclosure. Disclo-
sures with respect to the sale or recom-
mendation of these products should, at a 
minimum, specify that the product is: 
• Not insured by the FDIC; 
• Not a deposit or other obligation of, or 
guaranteed by, the depository institu-
tion; 
• Subject to investment risks, including 
possible loss of the principal amount 
invested. 
The written disclosures described above 
should be conspicuous and presented in a 
clear and concise manner. Depository 
institutions may provide any additional 
disclosures that further clarify the risks 
involved with particular nondeposit invest-
ment products. 
Timing of Disclosure. The minimum disclo-
sures should be provided to the customer: 
• Orally during any sales presentation, 
• Orally when investment advice concern-
ing nondeposit investment products is 
provided, 
• Orally and in writing prior to or at the 
time an investment account is opened 
to purchase these products, and 
• In advertisements and other promotional 
materials, as described below. 
A statement, signed by the customer, 
should be obtained at the time such an 
account is opened, acknowledging that the 
customer has received and understands the 
disclosures. For investment accounts 
established prior to the issuance of these 
guidelines, the institution should consider 
obtaining such a signed statement at the 
time of the next transaction. 
Confirmations and account statements for 
such products should contain at least the 
minimum disclosures if the confirmations or 
account statements contain the name or 
the logo of the depository institution or an 
affiliate. (Note: These disclosures should 
be made in addition to any other confirma-
79 
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tion disclosures that are required by law or 
regulation, e.g., 12 CFR 12, 208.8(k)(3), 
and 344.) If a customer's periodic deposit 
account statement includes account infor-
mation concerning the customer's 
nondeposit investment products, the infor-
mation concerning these products should 
be clearly separate from the information 
concerning the deposit account, and should 
be introduced with the minimum disclo-
sures and the identity of the entity con-
ducting the nondeposit transaction. 
Advertisements and Other Promotional 
Material. Advertisements and other promo-
tional and sales material, written or other-
wise, about nondeposit investment prod-
ucts sold to retail customers should con-
spicuously include at least the minimum 
disclosures discussed above and must not 
suggest or convey any inaccurate or mis-
leading impression about the nature of the 
product or its lack of FDIC insurance. The 
minimum disclosures should also be em-
phasized in telemarketing contacts. Any 
third party advertising or promotional ma-
terial should clearly identify the company 
selling the nondeposit investment product 
and should not suggest that the depository 
institution is the seller. If brochures, signs, 
or other written material contain informa-
tion about both FDIC-insured deposits and 
nondeposit investment products, these 
materials should clearly segregate informa-
tion about nondeposit investment products 
from the information about deposits. 
Additional Disclosures. Where applicable, 
the depository institution should disclose 
the existence of an advisory or other ma-
terial relationship between the institution or 
an affiliate of the institution and an invest-
ment company whose shares are sold by 
the institution and any material relationship 
between the institution and an affiliate 
involved in providing nondeposit invest-
ment products. In addition, where applica-
ble, the existence of any fees, penalties, or 
surrender charges should be disclosed. 
These additional disclosures should be 
made prior to or at the time an investment 
account is opened to purchase these prod-
ucts. 
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If sales activities include any written or oral 
representations concerning insurance cov-
erage provided by any entity other than the 
FDIC, e.g., the Securities Investor Protec-
tion Corporation (SIPC)' a state insurance 
fund, or a private insurance company, then 
clear and accurate written or oral explana-
tions of the coverage must also be provid-
ed to customers when the representations 
concerning insurance coverage are made, 
in order to minimize possible confusion 
with FDIC insurance. Such representations 
should not suggest or imply that any alter-
native insurance coverage is the same as or 
similar to FDIC insurance. 
Because of the possibility of customer 
confusion, a nondeposit investment prod-
uct must not have a name that is identical 
to the name of the depository institution. 
Recommending or selling a nondeposit. 
investment product with a name similar to 
that of the depository institution should 
only occur pursuant to a sales program 
designed to minimize the risk of customer 
confusion. The institution should take 
appropriate steps to assure that the issuer 
of the product has complied with any 
applicable requirements established by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission re-
garding the use of similar names. 
2. Setting and Circumstances 
Selling or recommending nondeposit invest-
ment products on the premises of a deposi-
tory institution may give the impression 
that the products are FDIC-insured or are 
obligations of the depository institution. 
To minimize customer confusion with 
deposit products, sales or recommenda-
tions of nondeposit investment products on 
the premises of a depository institution 
should be conducted in a physical location 
distinct from the area where retail deposits 
are taken. Signs or other means should be 
used to distinguish the investment sales 
area from the retail deposit-taking area of 
the institution. However, in the limited 
situation where physical considerations 
prevent sales of nondeposit products from 
being conducted in a distinct area, the 
institution has a heightened responsibility 
to ensure appropriate measures are in place 
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to minimize customer confusion. 
In no case, however, should tellers and 
other employees, while located in the 
routine deposit-taking area, such as the 
teller window, make general or specific 
investment recommendations regarding 
nondeposit investment products, qualify a 
customer as eligible to purchase such 
products, or accept orders for such prod-
ucts, even if unsolicited. Tellers and other 
employees who are not authorized to sell 
nondeposit investment products may refer 
customers to individuals who are specifi-
cally designated and trained to assist cus-
tomers interested in the purchase of such 
products. 
3. QIJalifications and Training 
The depo~itory -institution should ensure 
that its personnel who are authorized to 
sell nondeposit investment products or to 
. provide investment advice with respect to 
such products are adequately trained with 
regard to the specific products being sold 
or recommended. Training should not be 
limited to sales methods, but should impart 
a thorough knowledge of the products 
involved, of applicable legal restrictions, 
and of customer protection requirements. 
If depository institution personnel sell or 
recommend securities, the training should 
be the substantive equivalent of that re-
quired for personnel qualified to sell securi-
ties as registered representatives. (Note: 
Savings associations are not exempt from 
the definitions of "broker" and "dealer" in 
Sections 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(5) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934; therefore, all 
securities sales personnel in savings associ-
ations must be registered representatives.) 
Depository institution personnel with super-
visory responsibilities should receive train-
ing appropriate to that position. Training 
should also be provided to employees of 
. the depository institution who have direct 
contact with customers to ensure a basic 
understanding of the institution's sales 
activities and the policy of limiting the 
involvement of employees who are not 
authorized to sell investment products to 
customer referrals. Training should be 
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updated periodically and should occur on 
an ongoing basis. _ 
Depository institutions should investigate 
the backgrounds of employees hired for 
their nondeposit investment products sales 
programs, including checking for possible 
disciplinary actions by securities and other 
regulators if the employees have previous 
investment industry experience. 
4. Suitability and Sales Practices 
Depository institution personnel involved in 
selling nondeposit investment products 
must adhere to fair and reasonable sales 
practices and be subject to effective man-
agement and compliance reviews with 
regard to such practices. In this regard, if 
depository institution personnel recommend 
nondeposit investment products to custom-
ers, they should have reasonable grounds 
for believing that the specific product 
recommended is suitable for the particular 
customer on the basis of information dis-
closed by the customer. Personnel should 
make reasonable efforts to obtain informa-
tion directly from the customer regarding, 
at a minimum, the customer's financial and 
tax status, investment objectives, and 
other information that may be useful or 
reasonable in making investment recom-
mendations to that customer. This infor-
mation should be documented and updated 
periodically. 
5. Compensation . 
Depository institution employees, including 
tellers, may receive a one-time nominal fee 
of a fixed dollar amount for each customer 
referral for nondeposit investment prod-
ucts. The payment of this referral fee 
should not depend on whether the referral 
results in a transaction. 
Personnel who are authorized to sell 
nondeposit investment products may re-
ceive incentive compensation, such as 
commissions, for transactions entered into 
by customers. However, incentive com-
pensation programs must not be structured 
in such a way as to result in unsuitable 
recommendations or sales being made to 
customers. 
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Depository institution compliance and audit 
personnel . should not receive incentive 
compensation directly related to results of 
the nondeposit investment sales program. 
6. Compliance 
Depository institutions should develop and 
implement policies and procedures to en-
sure that nondeposit investment product 
sales activities are conducted in compliance 
with applicable laws and regulations, the 
institution's internal policies and proce-
dures, and in a manner consistent with this 
Statement. Compliance procedures should 
identify any potential conflicts of interest 
and how such conflicts should be ad-
dressed. The compliance procedures 
should also provide for a system to monitor 
customer complaints and their resolution. 
Where applicable, compliance procedures 
also should call for verification that third 
party sales are being conducted in a man-
ner consistent with the governing agree-
ment with the depository institution. 
The compliance function should be con-
ducted independently of nondeposit in-
vestment product sales and management 
activities. Compliance personnel should 
determine the scope and frequency of their 
own review, and findings of compliance 
reviews should be periodically reported 
directly to the institution's board of direc-
tors, or to a designated committee of the 
board. Appropriate procedures for the 
nondeposit investment product programs 
should also be incorporated into the 
institution's audit program. 
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Supervision by Banking Agencies 
The federal banking agencies will continue 
to review a depository institution's policies 
and procedures governing recommenda-
tions and sales of nondeposit investment 
products, as well as management's imple-
mentation and compliance with such poli-
cies and all other applicable requirements. 
The banking agencies will monitor compli-
ance with the institution's policies and 
procedures by third parties that participate 
in the sale of these products. The failure 
of a depository institution to establish and 
observe appropriate policies and procedures 
consistent with this Statement in connec-
tion with sales activities involving 
nondeposit investment products will be 
subject to criticism and appropriate correc-
tive action. 
Questions on the Statement may be sub-
mitted to: 
FRS - Division of Banking Supervision 
and Regulation,· Securities Regu-
lation Section, (202) 452-2781; 
Legal Division, (202) 452-2246. 
FDIC - Office of Policy, Division of 
Supervision, (202) 898-6759; 
Regulation and Legislation Sec-
tion, Legal Division (202) 898-
3796. 
OCC - Office of the Chief National Bank 
Examiner, Capital Markets Group, 
(202) 874-5070. 
OTS - Office of Supervision Policy, 
(202) 906-5740; Corporate and 
Securities Division, (202) 906-
7289. 
Effective date: February 15, 1994 
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1. To determine if the bank has taken 
reasonable steps to ensure that retail 
customers can distinguish between 
insured deposits and uninsured-
nondeposit investment products. 
2. To determine if the banks' policies, 
procedures, and practices provide for 
an adequate self-regulatory system 
that is designed to ensure customer 
protections in all aspects of the sales 
programs. 
Comptroller's Handbook for National Bank Examiners 
Temporary Insert - February 7994 
E - 41 
3. To ensure that bank management 
operates the bank's nondeposit 
investment sales program in a safe 
and sound manner and complies 
with ace guidelines, interagency 
statements, and all applicable laws 
and regulations. 
4. TQ initiate cor:rective action when 
the bank's policies, practices, proce-
dures, or managerial controls are 
deficient or when the bank has failed 
to comply with laws, rules, regula-
tions or ace guidelines. 
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All examiners should be familiar with all 
examination procedures, and should com-
plete any steps they think are necessary. 
However, there are some reasonable stand-
ards for which procedures form the basis 
of review of certain types of operations: 
For a community bank that uses an inde-
pendent third party vendor to operate its 
retail sales program, examiners may find it 
adequate to complete only the Third Party 
Vendor section of the ICQs and the related 
examination procedures. 
For a bank that operates its own sales pro-
gram or operates through a joint venture or 
an affiliated broker/dealer, an examiner will 
usually find it necessary to complete all 
sections at the first examination. At sub-
sequent examinations of sales programs 
with no apparent weaknesses, completion 
of only the core examination· procedures 
(indicated in bold type) may be adequate. 
Any concern that surfaces when applying 
the core procedures may be addressed by 
expanding the examination. 
1 . Complete the Internal Control Ques-
tionnaire (lCO). Note explanations for 
any negative answers and changes 
since the last examination. 
Scope of the Examination . 
2. To determine the scope of the exami-
nation: 
a. Meet with senior management of 
the bank or department to discuss 
the scope and direction of the retail 
non deposit investment sales pro-
gram. 
b. Review the business plan and poli-
cy and procedure manual to gain 
perspective on the nature of the. 
bank's program. Note any signifi-
cant changes since the last exami-
nation. 
c. Review compliance and/or audit 
coverage and reports since the last 
examination. Note: 
- Previously identified strengths 
and weaknesses, and 
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- Responses to criticisms in previ-
ous audit/compliance and exam-
ination reports. 
Program Management 
3. Determine the extent of management 
involvement in the operation, and the 
quality of management of the retail 
nondeposit investment sales program. 
Review: 
• Responses to the Program Manage-
ment section of the ICQ. 
• Resumes of key officials involved 
in the management of the sales 
program to determine their experi-
ence and tenure with the bank. 
• Written performance objectives and 
performance appraisals of key 
management personnel to ,deter-
mine whether objectives and ap-
praisals incorporate· compliance 
issues, particularly compliance with 
disclosure and customer protection 
standards. 
• Reports furnished to senior man-
agement and the board of directors 
to determine whether they are 
sufficiently timely, accurate and 
meaningful to permit effective 
oversight. 
4. Review senior management's actions 
in implementing the retail nondeposit 
investment sales program and in offer-
ing any new products. Specifically 
determine whether bank management: 
• Participated in the development of 
the bank's investment sales pro-
gram strategic plan. . 
• Conducted a risk and regulatory as-
sessment and adopted a compli-
ance program directed at ensuring 
compliance with all applicable 
laws, rules, regulations, regulatory 
conditions, and the Interagency 
Statement's guidelines. 
• Provided for internal audit/compli-
ance participation in the develop-
mentof the program. 
• Adopted a program management 
statement aimed at ensuring effec-
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tive supervision of the individuals 
engaged in sales activities - wheth-
er they are employees of the bank 
or of another entity involved in 
bank-related sales of investment 
products. 
5. Determine how the retail nondeposit 
investment sales program is managed. 
a. Analyze sales program growth and 
earnings performance and deter-
mine why certain products have 
high levels of performance. Con-
sider how this performance relates 
to incentive compensation and the 
suitability of recommendations to 
customers. 
b. Review the customer mix and mar-
ket surveys. Look at trends in 
identifiable classes of customers 
and be alert for concentrations by 
types of customers. Also, try to 
determine whether customers are 
viewed as one-time buyers or are 
being cultivated to establish longer 
term relationships. 
c. Review the products offered and 
any market surveys and determine 
the risk inherent in different prod-
ucts. Consider whether manage-
. ment has attempted to match 
products to investors' needs in 
general. 
d. Review projections for the sales 
program and for different products 
and determine whether they: 
- Are realistic in light of the 
bank's customer mix; 
- Relate to bank staffing and 
training plans for the sales, 
supervision, and compliance 
functions; and 
- Are consistent with the bank's 
overall strategic plan. 
e. Determine the effectiveness of the 
bank's self-regulatory policies and 
procedures as measured by the 
number and type of customer 
complaints and by responses to the 
ICO. 
, Comptroller's Handbook for National Bank Examiners 
Temporary Insert - February 7994 
E - 44 
Product Selection 
6. Assess the adequacy of management 
processes to select and review prod-
ucts sold. Review: 
• Responses to the Product Selection 
section of the ICO. 
• Methods bank management uses 
to select products to meet cus-
tomer needs. 
• Management's comparison of the 
performance of the products they 
offer to general market products 
with similar objectives. 
7. Discuss your findings from the prod-
uct selection review with senior man-
agement and make a judgement about 
the appropriateness of management's 
decision to continue to offer these 
products. 
Use of Customer Information 
··8; Determine whether policies governing 
the permissible uses of bank customer -
information address the steps to be 
taken to reduce possible confusion 
among depositors· who are ~ei!1g 
solicited to purchase nondeposlt In-
vestment products. 
Setting and Circumstances of. Sales 
9. Determine whether bank management 
has established effective controls to 
distinguish retail deposit-taking activi-
ties from retail nondeposit investment 
sales. Consider how the various ele-
ments of the setting and circumstanc-
es may interact to influence the cus-
tomers' perception. 
10. Where the deposit-taking and securi-
ties sale functions are performed by 
the same personnel, determine if the 
bank uses appropriate written and oral 
disclosures to guard against customer 
confusion, and the extent to which 
bank staff is trained to use, and does 
use, such disclosures. 
2 
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Disclosures and Advertising 
11 . Review responses to the Disclosures . 
and Advertising section of the Ica 
and a representative sample of each 
type of advertising and promotional 
material. 
a. Determine whether all of the re-
quired disclosures are featured 
conspicuously in: 
- All written or oral· sales presen-
tations, 
- Advertising and promotional 
materials, 
- Confirmations and account 
statements that contain the 
name or the logo of the bank or 
an affiliate, and 
- Periodic statements that include 
information on both deposit and 
nondeposit products. 
b. Determine, where applicable, if the 
bank has disclosed the existence 
of: 
- An advisory or other. relation-
ship between the bank and any 
affiliate involved in providing 
non deposit investment prod-
ucts, and 
- Any early withdrawal penalties, 
surrender charge penalties, and 
deferred sales charges. 
c. Determine whether bank-related 
sales advertisements are: 
- Accurate, and 
- Not likely to mislead customers 
about the nature of the product. 
d. Review product brochures and 
advertising to ensure that they do 
not imply that the bank stands 
behind an investment product; 
Also determine whether public 
statements concerning the selec-
tion of the products a bank offer~ 
are reasonable. 
e. Determine whether personnel make 
any written or oral representations 
concerning insurance coverage by 
any entity other than the FDIC, 
e.g., Securities Investor Protection 
Corporation (SIPC); a state insur-
ance fund; or an insurance com-
Comptroller's Handbook for National Bank Examiners 
Temporary Insert - February 1994 
E - 45 
pany. 
If representations about non-FDIC 
insurance coverage are made, 
determine whether: 
- Each appropriate person who 
has contact with customers is 
trained concerning the differ-
ences among those coverages, 
and 
- Written or oral explanations of 
the differences in coverage are 
provided to all customers. 
Suitability 
12. Judge whether systems in place are 
adequate to ensure that sales per-
sonnel make suitable recommenda-
tions and whether management is dis-
charging its responsibilities under 
these systems by reviewing: 
• Responses to the Suitability sec-
tion of the ICa, 
• Customer complaints and resolu-
tions, 
• Sales patterns, 
• Compensation differentials that 
may influence recommendations, 
and 
• Compliance and/or audit reports. 
13. If your findings in 12, above, are 
negative or uncertain, review a sample 
of sales to determine if transactions 
appear unsuitable for a customer, 
based on responses to the suitability 
inquiries. The sample should include 
transactions involving: 
• Customer complaints, 
• Marketing programs that target a 
class of customers, 
• First-time and risk-averse investors, 
• High or low volume salespersons, 
• More volatile and newer products, 
and 
• Redemptions of annuities or mutual 
funds after relatively short holding 
periods. 
14. If, after the review in 13, above, you 
are still not certain that recommenda-
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tions are suitable, direct bank manage-
ment to conduct an independent re-
view of all affected accounts and to 
report their findings to the EIC. 
15. If you determine that customers may 
have been disadvantaged, discuss 
appropriate corrective action with 
senior management. Such action 
should be designed on a case by case 
basis and may include: 
• Full explanations to customers and, 
where appropriate, offers to re-
scind trade. 
• A recommendation to bring in 'an 
independent audit or special coun-
sel to perform further review of 
customer transactions. 
• Other action agreed upon between 
bank management and the EIC. 
Qualifications and Training 
16. Assess the bank's process for ensur-
ing that supervisory, investment sales, 
audit, ,and compliance personnel are 
properly qualified· and adequately 
trained by reviewing hiring and train-
ing practices and future plans and 
determining whether they are: 
• Designed around the complexity 
and risks of the investment prod-
ucts being offered, and 
• Consistent with the organization's 
projections for growth and product 
line expansion. 
Compensation 
17. Review the compensation plan and as-
sess the steps management has taken 
to ensure that compensation programs 
are not structured in a way that result 
in unsuitable recommendations or 
sales being made to customers. 
a. Be alert to increases in the sales 
volume of a particular product, to 
customer complaints, and to suit-
ability problems that may relate to 
the incentive compensation system 
and/or changes in compensation. 
b. Determine whether supervision of 
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sales programs or of individual 
product offerings increases as 
incentive compensation increases. 
c. Determine whether referral fees 
are, in any way, based on a sale 
being made. 
d. Review written performance objec-
tives and a sample of performance 
appraisals' for salespersons and 
determine if the system for moti-
vating and rewarding salespersons 
strikes a reasonable balance be-
tween profitability and the need to 
protect customer ,interests. 
Sales to Fi,duciary Accounts 
18. Determine whether, on retail nonde-
posit investment transactions involv-
ing the bank's fiduciary accounts, the 
bank has complied with all applicable 
state and federal restrictions, includ-
ing the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974. 
a. If proprietary or private label sales 
to trust accounts were executed 
through the bank's nondeposit 
investment sales program, deter-
mine if the transactions were expr-
essly authorized under state law or 
if authorization were obtained by 
the bank. 
b. Determine whether managef'!'lent's 
justification of any transfer of trust 
account investments to invest-
ments acquired through the bank's 
nondeposit investment sales pro-
gram has taken i'nto account all 
relevant circumstances, account by 
acccout. Relevant circumstances 
include: 
- The provisions of the trust ac-
count, 
- The beneficiaries' needs, 
- The quality of fund manage-
ment, 
- The fee structure, 
- Risk diversification, and 
- Rates of return. 
c. Determine' whether the trust de-
partment conducts periodic re-
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views of the ongoing prudence of 
the investment. Such reviews 
should cover: 
- The quality of the holdings, 
- The compatibility of investment 
objectives, and . 
- The availability of competing in-
vestments, including non-propri-
etary products, which might 
better meet the fiduciary ac-
count's investment objectives. 
Compliance Program 
19. Determine how effective the bank's 
compliance program is by reviewing: 
• Responses to the Compliance Pro-
gram section of the ICa, 
• The independence of compliance 
personnel, 
• Training provided to compliance 
personnel, 
• Automated exception reporting 
systems, and 
• The scope, frequency, and findings 
of compliance reviews, and re-
sponses to findings. 
20. Determine whether results of periodic 
reviews are formally communicated to 
senior managers independent of the 
sales function, and whether a follow-
up system tracks management re-
sponses to noted exceptions. 
21 . If prior examination findings, compli-
ance reports, a pattern of customer 
complaints, or routine oversight by 
bank management identifies the pos-
sibility that suitability problems may 
exist, determine if bank management 
has conducted a thorough review of 
all affected accounts and instituted 
appropriate corrective actions. 
Third Party Vendors 
22. Determine the effectiveness of the 
bank's oversight program and whether 
bank management has discharged its 
responsibilities under the program. 
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a. Review responses under the Third 
Party Vendor section of the ICO 
and the text of the bank's over-
sight program. 
b. Review the scope and frequency of 
completed and scheduled oversight 
reviews and reviews of customer 
complaints and their resolution. 
c. Review bank management's re-
sponse to recommendations made 
during past examinations. 
d. Review the third party vendor 
agreement and determine: 
- Whether it specifies that such 
entities will comply with all 
applicable requirements, includ-
ing those in the Interagency 
Statement. 
- How bank management assures 
itself that third party vendors 
comply with the terms of the 
agreement. 
e. Review how bank management 
determined the adequacy of the 
steps a third party vendor takes to 
avoid customer confusion about 
the nature of the product and the 
bank's role in the sales process . 
. f. Determine whether bank manage-
ment understands and agrees with 
the way the third party vendor 
selects products. 
23. After making a judgment about the 
effectiveness of the oversight of third 
party vendor sales, complete any 
other examination procedures that 
appear appropriate. 
Summary 
24. Determine if bank management has 
demonstrated by its actions whether 
it believes customers' interests are 
critical to all aspects of its nondeposit 
investment product sales programs. 
25. Discuss significant findings with the 
EIC and bank management and pre-
pare written comments. 
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Program Ma'nagement 
1. Has the bank's board of directors 
adopted a program management 
statement that addresses: 
• The features of the sales program? 
• The associated risks? 
• The roles of bank employees? 
• The roles of third party entities? 
2. Do the bank's policies address the 
following issues: 
• Program objectives? 
• Strategies to be employed to 
achieve objectives? 
• Supervision of personnel involved 
in nondeposit investment sales pro-
grams? 
• Supervisory responsibilities of third 
party vendors who are selling on 
bank premises? 
• Selection of the products the bank 
will sell? 
• Permissible uses of bank customer 
information? 
• Communications with customers? 
• The setting and circumstances of 
nondeposit product sales? 
• Disclosures and advertising? 
• Suitability of recommendations? 
• Employee qualifications and train-
ing? 
• Employee compensation systems? 
• A compliance program? 
3. Do written supervisory procedures 
assign a manager the responsibility 
for: 
• Reviewing and authorizing each 
sale? 
• Accepting each new account? 
• Reviewing and authorizing all sales-
or account-related correspondence 
with customers? 
• Reviewing and authorizing all ad-
vertising and promotional materials 
prior to use? 
4. Does the bank use written job descrip-
tions to assign management responsi-
bilities? 
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5. Do policies and procedures for person-
nel who are not directly involved in 
nondeposit investment product sales 
detail what the employees may say 
and not say about investment prod-
ucts? 
Product Selection 
6. Does the bank select the products to 
be offered? 
7. If so, does the selection process make 
use of predetermined criteria that 
consider the customers' needs? 
8. Does a qualified committee or an 
analyst who is independent of the 
sales function make the product selec-
tions? 
9. If the bank uses outside consultants 
to help select products, does bank 
management determine if the consult-
ant receives compensation from prod-
uct issuers or wholesalers? 
10. If the product selection analysis is per-
formed by another party, such as a 
clearing broker or third party vendor, 
does bank management understand 
and agree with the analysis method? 
11 . Does the bank conduct continuing re-
views of product offeiings to assure 
that they remain acceptable and are 
such reviews done at least annually? 
12. Does bank management consider, as 
part of the selection process, the 
product issuer's contingency plans for 
dealing with unusual surges in re-
demptions? 
13. Are these contingency plans based on 
various market scenarios? 
14. Do the contingency plans include: 
• Emergency staffing? 
• Additional communications capabil-
ities? 
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• Enhanced operational support? 
15. Does the analysis of fixed and variable 
rate annuities include a determination 
of the credit quality of the issuing 
insurance company? 
16. Does the analysis of fixed and variable 
rate annuities include determining 
whether the issuing insurance com-
pany can sell or simply transfer the 
annuity contract to another insurance 
company? 
Use of Customer Information 
17. Do written policies concerning the use 
of information about bank customers 
address: 
• The minimum standards or criteria 
for identifying a customer for so-
licitation? 
• Acceptable calling times? 
• The number of times a customer 
may be called? 
• The steps to be taken to avoid 
confusing depositors about the 
nature of the products being of-
fered? 
Setting and Circumstances of 
Nondeposit Sales 
18. Has a bank officer been assigned 
responsibility for reviewing all current 
and planned nondeposit investment 
sales locations to determine whether 
appropriate measures are in place to 
minimize customer confusion? 
19. Are nondeposit investment products 
sold only at locations distinct from 
where deposits are accepted? 
20. Are sales locations distinguished by 
use of: 
• Separate desks? 
• Distinguishing partitions, railings, 
or planters? 
• Signs? 
21 . If personnel both accept deposits and 
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do operating procedures address safe-
guards to prevent possible customer 
confusion? 
22. Are the people who sell nondeposit in-
vestment products distinguished from 
people who accept deposits by such 
means as: 
• Name tags or badges? 
• Business cards? 
23. Do operating procedures prohibit 
tellers from offering investment ad-
vice, making sales recommendations, 
or discussing the merits of any nonde-
posit investment product with cus-
tomers? 
24. Does the bank offer nondeposit in-
vestment products with product 
names that are not: 
• Identical to the bank's name? 
• Similar to a deposit product? 
(Example: XYZ Money Market Fund 
vs. XYZ Money Market Account.) 
25. Does the bank avoid using the words 
'.'insured," "bank," or "national" in 
. product names? 
Disclosures and Advertising 
26. Has bank management designated an 
officer to be responsible for ensuring 
that bank-prepared investment adver-
tisements and advertisements pre-
pared by any other party are accurate 
and include all required disclosures? 
27; Is a signed statement acknowledging 
disclosures obtained from each cus-
tomer at the time that a retail' non-
deposit investment account is 
opened? 
28. For accounts established prior to the 
issuance of the Interagency State-
ment, are procedures in place to en-
sure that such a signed statement is 
obtained prior to, or at the time of, 
the next transaction? 
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29. Is there a tracking system designed to 
monitor and obtain missing acknowl-
. edgments? 
30. Are all salespeople provided written 
disclosure guidelines for oral presenta-
tions? 
31 . Do the guidelines for oral presenta-
t,ions clearly direct the speaker to: 
• State the required disclosures? 
• Clarify the bank's role in the sales 
process? 
32. If ratings are used in promoting cer-
tain products, does bank policy indi-
cate whether the bank will disclose 
ratings changes? 
33. If so, does policy indicate how such 
disclosures will occur? 
34. If the bank is selling annuities which 
can be transferred to another obligor, 
is this possibility disclosed to prospec~ 
tive customers? 
Suitability 
35. Has a bank officer been assigned 
responsibility for implementing and 
monitoring the suitability system? 
36. Are systems in place to ensure that 
any salespeople involved in bank-
. related sales obtain sufficient informa-
tion from customers to enable them to 
make a judgment about the suitability 
of recommendations for particular 
customers? 
37. Do suitability inquiries include informa-
tion concerning the customer's: 
• Financial and tax status? 
• Investment objectives? 
• Other information such as date of 
birth, employment, net worth (net 
of residential real estate), income, 
current investments, or risk toler-
ance? 
38. ' Are customer responses to suitability 
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form or any other method that permits 
ready review? 
39. Is there a tracking system designed to 
monitor and obtain missing suitability 
information? 
40. Are new accounts reviewed and for-
mally accepted by a manager before 
the first transfer is finalized? 
41 . Does the new account acceptance 
process include a review of the suit-
ability inquiry and customer re-
sponses? 
42. Is each sale approved in writing by a 
designated manager? 
43. Are breakpoints considered in both 
the initial recommendation and in the 
review of the suitability of those rec-
ommendations? 
44. Is suitability information for active ac-
counts updated periodically? 
45. If the bank uses software programs to 
assist salespersons in making suitabil-
ity judgments, does the program: 
• Weight bank proprietary products 
and bank deposits similarly to other 
products? 
• Consider breakpoints? 
46. If a software program is not used, has 
management identified which prod-
ucts meet certain investment objec-
tives, or has management generally 
categorized products as suitable for 
either unsophisticated, sophisticated, 
or risk-averse customers? 
47. Does the bank use suitability guide-
lines that would limit certain transac-
tions with first time or risk-averse 
investors, or would require a higher 
level of approval? 
48. Is a bank officer who is independent 
of the sales force assigned responsi-
bility for reviewing complaints and 
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their resolution? 
Qualifications and Training 
49. Does the bank's staffing plan consider 
its nondeposit investment sales pro-
gram? 
50. Does the bank seek to employ dedi-
cated investment specialists and not 
platform generalists as sales represen-
tatives? 
51. Does management have written quali-
fication requirements for outside hires 
of salespeople and sales program 
managers? 
52. Is a system in place to document 
background inquiries made about new 
bank sales employees who have previ-
ous securities industry experience to 
check for a possible disciplinary histo-
ry? 
53. Has a bank officer been assigned 
responsibility for ensuring that 
adequate training is provided to bank 
staff? 
54. Does the bank have a formal training 
program for individuals who: 
• Make customer referrals for non-
deposit products? 
• Are engaged in retail sales of non-
deposit investment products? . 
• Are· responsible for supervising 
people who make referrals and/or 
who engage in selling? 
55. Is this training offered as part of: 
• Initial training? 
• Continuing training? 
56. Is there a training manual showing the 
objectives of each initial and subse-
quent training session? 
57. Have lesson plans been developed for 
in-house programs? 
58. Are tellers trained: 
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• To not accept orders or sell nonde-
posit investment products? 
• To avoid offering investment ad-
vice? 
• To not make recommendations? 
• To not discuss the merits of any 
securities with customers? 
59. Does the bank provide training that 
addresses suitability issues? 
60. Does suitability training specifically 
address customer protection issues 
associated with the most vulnerable 
classes of investors who may actually 
prefer the" no investment risk" aspect 
of insured bank deposits? 
61 . Is product training provided to: 
• Compliance staff? 
• Audit staff? 
62. Does the bank have a formal plan to 
meet future retail nondeposit invest-
ment product sales training needs? 
Compensation 
63. Are compensation· systems set up to 
avoid pa·ying the same people incen-
tive compensation for the sale of 
nondeposit investment products when 
no incentives are paid for renewing 
certificates of deposit? 
64. Do supervisory policies control incen-
tive compensation increases associ-
ated with sales contests or the intro-
duction of new products? 
65. Are referral programs designed so that 
employees, including tellers, may 
receive a one-time nominal fee of a 
fixed dollar amount for each customer 
referred, without regard for whether 
the sale is made? 
66. Do policies prohibit tellers from 
participating in contests or other pro-
motional programs in which prizes are . 
based on successful sales to custom-
ers referred? 
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67. Do policies and procedures preclude 
incentive compensation based on the 
profitability of individual trades by, or 
accounts subject to the review of, 
bank employees who: 
• Review and approve individual 
sales? 
• Accept new accounts? 
• Review established customer ac-
counts? 
68. Do policies and procedures preclude 
payment of incentive compensation to 
department auditors or compliance 
personnel? 
69. Does the management structure pre-
clude control, audit or compliance 
personnel from reporting to managers 
whose compensation is based on 
profits from nondeposit investment 
products sales? 
70. Does the compensation program 
reduce remuneration to sales program 
managers whose accounts show: 
• Missing documents? 
• Unreported customer complaints? 
• Reversed or "bad" sales? 
• Compliance problems? 
Compliance Program 
71. Do audit or compliance personnel: 
• Determine the scope and frequency 
ot their own nondeposit investment 
sales program reviews? 
• Report their findings directly to th.e 
board of directors or an appropriate 
committee of the board? . 
• Have their performance evaluated 
by persons independent of the 
investment product sales function? 
• Receive compensation that in no 
way is connected to the success of 
investment product sales? 
• Receive training in products and 
customer protection issues? 
• Keep abreast of emerging develop-
ments in banking and securities 
laws and regulations through ongo-
ing training? 
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72. Does the bank's written compliance 
. program call for periodic reviews to 
determine compliance with policies, 
procedures, applicable laws and regu-
lations, and the Interagency State-
ment? Do those reviews cover: 
.. Customer complaints and their 
resolution? 
• Customer correspondence? 
• Transactions with employees and 
directors or their business inter-
ests? 
• All advertising and promotional 
materials? 
• Scripts or written guidelines for 
oral presentations? 
• Training materials? 
• Regular and frequent reviews of 
active customer accounts? 
• Customer responses to suitability 
inquiries and a periodic comparison 
of those responses to the type and 
volume of account activity, with 
the goal of determining whether 
the activity in an account is appro-
priate? -
73. Does the compliance program call for 
compliance personnel to perform 
continuing reviews of: 
• Changes in the system for report-
ing customer complaints and reso-
lutions? 
• Changes in previously approved 
standard correspondence with 
customers? 
• New advertising and promotional 
materials prior to use? 
• Changes in existing training pro-
grams or new training programs? 
• Changes in incentive compensation 
systems? 
• New products under development? 
74. Does the timing, scope, and frequency 
of compliance reviews consider fac-
tors such as: 
• Changes or differences in incentive 
compensation paid on different or 
new products? 
• Sales or referral contests? 
• Patterns of sales for specific, espe-
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cially new, products? 
• Patterns of sales to customers who 
have been identified as risk-averse 
investors? 
• New salespeople? 
• Customer complaints? 
75. Does the bank have a system for 
ensuring that all c,omplaints (written 
and oral) receive bank management's 
attention? 
76. Is that system periodically tested by 
internal audit to determine whether 
bimk management receives notice of 
all complaints? ' 
77. Does the bank use automated excep-
tion reporting systems to flag poten-
tial complianc~ problems? 
78. Do reports list: 
~ Sales by product? 
• Significant or unusual (for the cus-
tomer) individual sales? 
• Sales of products' the bank 
considers more volatile to custom-
ers whose suitability inquiry re-
sponses indicate an aversion to 
risk? 
• Customer complaints by product, 
salesperson, and reason, so that 
patterns can be discerned? 
• Unusual performance by salesper-
sons, e.g., high or low volume or 
single product sales? 
• Significant volumes of annuity or 
mutual fund redemptions after 
short holding periods? 
79. Do reports provide adequate informa-, 
tion to conduct specific suitability 
reviews for customers such as: 
• Risk-averse investors? 
• First-time investors? 
• Customers with other narrow in-
vestment objectives? 
80. Does the bank employ "testers" who 
pose as prospective customers and 
test the sales presentations for adher-
ence to customer protection stand-
ards? 
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81 . Has the bank instituted a follow-up 
contact program to verify whether 
customers understand their invest-
ment transactions? 
82. Do inquiries in the follow-up contact 
program include discussion of the 
customer's: 
• Understanding of what he or she 
has purchased? 
• Understanding of the investment 
risks and the absence of deposit 
insurance coverage? 
• Initial responses to the 
salesperson's suitability inquiry? 
• Understanding of fees? 
• Problems or complaints? 
• Understanding of the bank's role in 
the transaction? 
83. If the bank operates a follow-up con-
tact program, are records of custom-
ers responses maintained? 
Third Party Vendors 
84. Has a bank officer been assigned 
responsibility for ensuring that the 
bank adequately monitors the effec-
tiveness of ,~ustomer protection sys-
, tems? 
85. Has the bank developed a written 
oversight program to monitor the 
activities of outside vendors operating' 
bank-related sales programs? 
86. Does the governing agreement with 
third party vendors include provisions 
regarding: 
• Training for bank employees? 
• Methods of implementing the cus-
tomer protection standards con-
tained in the bank's policy? 
• Permission for the acc and the 
bank to have access to appropriate 
records involved in bank-related 
sales? 
• The scope and frequency of re-
ports to be furnished? 
87. Do reports furnished by third party 
6 
E - 54, 
Retail Nondeposit Investment Sales 
Internal Control Questionnaire Section 413.4 
vendors include: 
• A list of all new account openings 
and initial trades? 
• A list of significant or unusual (for 
the customer) individual sales? 
• A list of all written and oral cus-
tomer complaints and their resolu-
tion? 
• Sales reports by product, salesper-
son, and location? 
• Internal compliance reviews of ac-
counts originated at the bank? 
• . Copies of reports furnished to the 
third party vendor by their regula-
tor? 
88. Are reports furnished by a third party 
vendor: 
• Prepared by someone independent 
of the vendor's sales force? . 
• Timely and sufficiently detailed? 
89. Does bank management have proce-
. dures in place to avoid reliance on 
Comptroller's Handbook for NationlJl Bank Examiners 
Temporary Insert - February 1994 
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third party audit and control systems 
if the vendor's control personnel re-
ceive transaction-based incentive 
compensation? 
90. If the product selection analysis is per-
formed by another party, such as a 
clearing broker or third party vendor, 
does bank management understand· 
and agree with the analysis method? 
91 . If customer information is provided to 
the third party vendor, has a legal 
opinion concerning the bank's author-
ity to share customer information with 
third parties been obtained? 
92. Has a b.ank officer been assigned 
responsibility for ensuring that 
adequate training is provided to bank 
'staff, and for reviewing the hiring and 
training practices of any third party 
vendor? 
7 
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Retail Nondeposit Investment Sales 
Laws, Regulations and Rulings 
Customer disclosure 
requirements 
Use of common names 
Investments in 
trust accounts 
Recordkeeping and 
confirmation require-
ments for securities 
transactions 
Antifraud restrictions 
Uniform guidelines 
Customer protection 
rules 
Laws· 
15 USC 77a, 
78a, and 
80a 
15 USC 80a 
29 USC 
1001 
(ERISA) 
15 USC 77a 
and 78a 
15 USC 77a, 
78a, and 
80a 
+ 
'2 USC, unless specifically stated otherwise. 
'2 CFR, unless sepcifically atated otherwise. 
Regulations + 
17 CFR 240 
(Rule 10b-5) 
9 
12 
17 CFR 240 
(Rule 10b-5) 
17 CFR 240 
(Rule 10b-5) 
.. BC - Banking Circular, EC - Examining Circular, AL - Advisory Letter • 
Comptroller's Handbook for National Bank Examiners 
Temporary Insert - February 1994 
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Rulings + 
Section 413.5 
OCC and Other 
Issuances· • 
Interagency 
Statement on 
Retail Sales of 
Nondeposit 
Products 
(February 15, 
1994) 
Interagency 
Statement 
Interagency 
Statement 
Interagency 
Statement 
AL 93-11 and 
Interagency 
Statement 
NASD Rules of 
Fair Practice 
and Interagen-
cy Statement 
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KENTUCKY REVISED STATUTES 
287.050. Organization to be approved by commissioner. - (1) Be-
fore filing the articles of incorporation of any financial institution men-
tioned in KRS 287.040, the incorporators shall present a copy of their pro-
posed articles to the commissioner who shall investigate the financial 
standing, moral character and capability of each of the incorporators and 
proposed executive officers and directors, if known, and determine whether 
there is reasonable assurance of sufficient volume of business for the pro-
posed corporation to be successful, and whether the public convenience and 
advantage will be promoted by the opening of the proposed corporation. 
(2) In the event that the institution for which a charter is sought is to be 
created solely for the purpose of effectuating a merger or consolidation to 
facilitate the formation of a bank holding company, the commissioner may 
waive all or any part of the requirements of subsection (1) of this section. 
(3) If the commissioner determines that it is expedient and desirable to 
permit the proposed corporation to engage in business, he shall approve the 
articles of incorporation in writing, and the articles then may be filed and 
recorded as provided in the g~neral corporation law. 
(4) All amendments to the articles of incorporation of any financialinsti-
tution mentioned in KRS 287.040 shall be approved by the commissioner 
before filing with the secretary of state. (165a-20: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 
141, § 29; 1982, ch. 251, § 4, effective April 1, 1982; 1984, ch. 324, § 7, 
effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 444, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.) 
Kentucky Law Journal. Comments, 
Keeping Kentucky Banks Competitive in the 
Financial Industry: The Multibank Holding 
Company Statute, 72 Ky. L.J. 689 (1983-84). 
Opinions of Attorney General. If the 
identity of the chief executive officer of a pro-
posed bank is material to the department of 
banking in passing on an application to orga-
nize a bank. it is also material to any person 
having standing to protest the application, 
therefore if the commissioner of banking 
(now financial institutions) elicits the iden-
tity of the executive officers from the appli-
cants and has that information on file in a 
public record, it should be made available for 
public inspection. OAG 80-444. 
Cited: First Nat'l Bank v. Peoples State 
Bank, Inc., 574 S.W.2d 300 (Ky. 1978). 
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287.050 BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
AI'iALYSIS 
1. Discretion of commissioner. 
2. Sufficient evidence. 
3. Notice and hearing. 
4. Effect of approval. 
5. Effect of denial. 
6. Judicial review. 
7. Branth banks. 
1. Discretion of Commissioner. 
In approving the organization of banks, the 
commissioner has only such discretion as is 
given him by statute. Beyond this his duties 
are ministerial and enforceable by manda-
mus. Speer v. Dossey, 177 Ky. 761, 198 S.W. 
19 (1917). 
Although the commissioner was not re-
quired to conduct a hearing to afford protest-
ing banks an opportunity to protest the ap-
proval of the articles of incorporation of a pro-
posed bank, the fact that the hearing was not 
conducted could be considered as evidence 
bearing upon the question of the arbitrari-
ness of the commissioner's· order. Phelps v. 
Sallee, 529 S.W.2d 361 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975). 
2. Sufficient Evidence. 
Where the reports of the commissioner of 
banking favorably showed the financial 
standing, the moral character and the capa-
bility of each of the prospective incorporators 
coupled with a reasonable assurance of a suf-
ficient volume of business and the promotion 
of public convenience, the commission did not 
arbitrarily or capriciously authorize the in-
corporation of the new bank. Commercial 
Bank v. Hall, 500 S.W.2d 77 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1973). 
The denial of an application for a new bank 
. charter was based on substantial evidence 
and was not arbitrary or capricious, where 
the commissioner considered all of the evi-
dence pertaining to the probable successful 
operation requirement and not merely the 
fact that there was some evidence that the 
new bank might be profitable within the 
third year. Department of Banking & Sec. v. 
Coleman, 594 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1979). 
Expert financial testimony on deposit 
growth, projected profits and. unusually low 
penetration rate in county, as well as testi-
mony on demographic and economic condi-
tions, constituted substantial evidence of a 
reasonable assurance of a sufficient volume 
of business for a proposed bank to be success-
ful. Farmers Deposit Bank v. Department of 
Banking & Sec., 669 S.W.2d 22 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1984). 
Where the letters of many of the local mer-
chants and citizens banking outside the 
F-2 
county indicated that their banking habits 
were the result of the inadequate service and 
hours of the existing bank, it was clear that a 
new bank with increased hours and Saturday 
banking would greatly service the public con-
venience and advantage. Farmers Deposit 
Bank v. Department of Banking & Sec., 669 
S.W.2d 22 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984). 
3. Notice and Hearing. 
The commissioner of banking and securi-
ties (now financial institutions) is not re-
quired to give notice of the filing of the arti-
cles of incorporation of a proposed bank for 
approval under this section, nor is the com-
missioner required to conduct hearings upon 
the application. Phelps v. Sallee, 529 S.W.2d 
361 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975). 
4. Effect of Approval. 
Where the commissioner of banking and 
securities (now financial institutions) ap-
proved the articles of incorporation of a pro-
posed bank but either neglected or refused to 
stamp his approval on the articles and for-
ward them to the secretary of state for record-
ing, the department was without authority to 
L'1ereafter modify, change, or set aside the 
commissioner's order that the articles were 
approved. Phelps v. Sallee, 529 S.W.2d 361 
(Ky. Ct. App. 1975). 
5. Effect of Denial. 
Repeated hearings before administrative 
agencies, brought about by changing commis-
sions, were not intended by the legislative 
direction to the commissioner of banking 
(now financial institutions); thus the denial 
of an application for a bank or a branch 
thereof shall operate as res judicata, and an 
exception will be allowed only upon a show-
ing of significant change of conditions or cir-
cumstances. Williams v. Cumberland Valley 
Nat'! Bank, 569 S.W.2d 711 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1978). 
6. Judicial Review. 
Although there is no provision for an ap-
peal from any order of the commissioner of 
banking and securities (now financial insti-
tutions), protesting parties would be entitled 
to judicial review on the question of arbitrari-
ness of any administrative action. Phelps v. 
Sallee, 529 S.W.2d 361 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975). 
Except in cases where the commissioner's 
findings are clearly erroneous and arbitrary, 
courts should be inclined to follow the exper-
tise of the banking and securities department 
(now department of financial institutions) in 
determining whether there is a reasonable 
assurance of sufficient volume of business for 
the proposed corporation to be successful. De- '. 
BANKS AND TRl"ST COMPANIES 
partment of Banking & Sec. v. Coleman, 594 
S.W.2d.895 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). 
7. Branch Banks. 
Inasmuch as the same standard applies to 
original bank charters compared with li-
censes for branch banks, the commissioner's 
duties under the statutes are the same. Wil-
liams v. Cumberland Valley Nat'l Bank, 569 
S.W.2d 711 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). 
This section provides for the establishment 
of a new bank, while KRS 287.180 relates to 
the establishment of bank branches; however 
the commissioner's duties under the two stat-
utes are identical, and essentially the same 
standards are applicable to the establishment 
of branches as well as new banks. Depart-
ment of Banking & Sec. v. Coleman, 594 
S.W.2d 895 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). 
Collateral References. 10 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Banks, §§ 7, 17. 
9 C.J.S., Banks and Banking, §§ 7, 8. 
Antimonopoly or antitrust laws, applica-
tion to banks and banking institutions of. 83 
A.L.R.2d 374. 
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287.330. Assets may be pledged to secure deposits - Security not 
required if deposit insured. - (D Banks, subject to statutory or charter 
limitations, may pledge such portion of their assets as may be required by 
law as collateral security for government deposits made with them, or any 
of them, by or under the authority of the United States, or for any other 
deposit required by law to be secured. 
(2) Notwithstanding any law requiring security for deposits in the form 
of collateral, surety bond or in any other form, security for such deposits 
shall not be required to the extent said deposits are insured under the 
provisions of section 12B of the Federal Reserve Act (38 Stat. 251) as 
amended. 
(3) If a hank proposes to sell its assets and transfer its deposit liability to 
another bank and the purchasing bank is unwilling to accept a sufficient 
amount of the assets to cover the liability to depositors and other creditors, 
the selling bank may, with the consent of the commissioner, pledge all or a 
part of its remaining or unacceptable assets to secure a loan for an amount 
sufficient to cover the remaining liability to the depositors and other credi-
tors. (579: amend. Acts 1984, ch. 324, § 27, effective July 13, 1984.) 
Compiler's Notes. The Federal Reserve tion is compiled throughout Title 12 of the 
Act referred to in subsection (2) of this sec- United States Code. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
1. Pledge of assets. 
2. Securing public funds. 
3. Liquidation. 
1. Pledge of Assets. 
Except in instances specifically authorized 
by statute a bank has no authority to pledge 
its assets as security for deposits. Commer-
cial Bank & Trust Co. v. Citizens' Trust & 
Guar. Co., 153 Ky. 566, 156 S.W. 160, 45 
L.R.A. (n.s.) 950 (1913). See City of Louisville 
v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 245 Ky. 
704, 54 S.W.2d 40 (1932). 
2. Securing Public Funds. 
Federal reserve members may secure pub-
lic funds by transferring such deposits to its 
commercial department and transferring spe-
cific and readily marketable securities to its 
trust department to secure the repayment of 
same. Louisville Bridge Comm'n v. Louisville 
Trust Co., 258 Ky. 846, 81 S.W.2d 894 (1935). 
Revenues of the Louisville Bridge Commis-
sion are public funds, the deposits of which 
may be secured by a pledge of specific collat-
eral. Louisville Bridge Comm'n v. Louisville 
Trust Co., 258 Ky. 846, 81 S.W.2d 894 (1935). 
3. Liquidation. 
A bank has no authority to contract with a 
secured depositor that in event of the bank's 
liquidation the depositor may reCeive its pro 
rata distributable share upon its debt before 
applying the security, such a contract being 
in violation of KRS 287.610 (now repealed), 
City of Louisville v. Fidelity & Columbia 
Trust Co., 245 Ky. 704, 54 S.W.2d 40 (1932). 
Collateral References. 10 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Banks, §§ 419, 420. 
9 C.J.S., Banks and Banking, § 157. 
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TO: 
FROM: 
DATE: 
RE: 
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I 
.~ . 
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
477 VERSAI~~ES ROAD 
FRANKFORT. KENTUCKY 40601 
TE~E. 5021564-3390 
FAX 5021564-8787 
MEMORANDUM 
Chief Executive Officers 
All Kentucky State-Chartered Banks 
Ella D. Robinson, Direct'1llL1 ~ 
Division of Supervision y---
October 11, 1993 
••• DOW (502) 573-3390 
Faz(502) 573-8787 
ECWA"C B ...... ATCI-4ElT . ..JR. 
COMMISSIONER 
Participation Loan Documentation and Examination Procedures 
During the course of recent examinations, field personnel of the Department have 
experienced an unusual incidence of documentation exceptions on purchased loans. The 
lack of proper structuring and documentation can cause undue risks to both the buying and 
selling banks involved in a loan participation. The use of loan participations is considered 
a viable tool for bankers in portfolio management and is not being discouraged by t~is 
Agency. However, in light of the foregoing problems, and in order to insure improved 
portfolio administration in this area. the following guidelines are being recommended. 
Lending policy guidelines and considerations: 
banks which anticipate activity in purchasing loan participations 
shall incorporate into their lending policy guidelines which 
address such activities; . 
these guidelines should insure that all loans purchased shall 
conform to all policy provisions. including independent credit 
analysis, just as if the credit were a direct extension. 
Written participation agreements should. at a minimum, 
address the following considerations: 
F-7 
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obligation of the lead institution in providi~g credit information 
on a timely basis and notice of material changes in the 
obligor's financial condition: 
procedures which require consultation with participants before 
the lead lender modifies loan terms or any attendant loan 
documents, such as security instruments or guarantees: 
specific rights and remedies to involved parties upon default or 
insolvency of the borrower: 
procedures for the resolution -of workouts when the lead and 
participating banks disagree on the handling of defaulted loans: 
procedures for the resolution of conflicts which arise if more 
than one obligation of the borrower enters into default status: 
and 
provIsions which provide for termination of the agency 
relationship between participants upon the occurrence of events 
such as breach of duty, negligence, misappropriation, or 
insolvency. 
In addition to the above considerations, participations between affiliated institutions 
require that utmost care be exercised in application of underwriting standards. and also 
require compliance with Section °23A of the Federal Reserve Act. A participation 
purchased from an affiliate is exempt from Section 23A provided that (1) the commitment 
for purchase is obtained prior to the funding of the loan by the affiliate, and (2) the 
purchasing bank's decision is predicated upon an independent analysis of the 
creditworthiness of the borrower. 
In summary, this Agency stands ready to assist its banks in any way regarding loan 
participations, interpretation of governing rules and regulations or any questions regarding 
this transmittal. Please do not hesitate to contact the Division of Supervision at (502) 
564-3390, in the event of any questions. 
EDR:CRR:kdw 
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
911 LEAWOOD DRIVE ••• DOW 577 Venallles Road 
FRANKFORT. KENTUCKY 40601 l'raDkfort KY 40601 
TEL..E. 502/564-3390 (502) 573-3390 
FAX 5021564-8787 I'u (502) 573-8787 
aRERETON C. .JONES 
GOVEANOFt 
Parity Letter 92-1 
EOW ..... D B. H ... TCHETT . .J .... 
COMMISSIONE1'I 
The Commissioner of the Department of Financial Institutions issues thi~ Finding 
of Permissible Activity, Product, or Service pursuant to KRS 287.020(3). Competitive 
inequality exists betWeen some state banks and national banks as a result of the different 
calculations of their legal lending limits, which for state banks is found in KRS 287.280 and 
for national banks is found in 12 USC 84 and 12 CFR § 32.4. Because of the differences 
in the two legal lending limits, a state bank having the same capital as a national bank 
nonetheless has different legal lending limits. 
Therefore, a state bank may in its discretion choose to calculate its legal lending 
limits as if it were a national bank Any state bank making such a choice shall: 
(1) Pass a fonnal resolution by it's board of directors adopting the 
legal lending limits set forth in 12 USC 84 and 12 CFR § 32.4; 
(2) Amend the bank's loan policy to conform to the new legal 
lending limits; . 
(3) Secure and maintain updated copies of all national bank rules 
and regulations' relating to legal lending limits; and 
(4) Notify the Department and the FDIC that the bank has made 
such a choice., 
Any state bank electing to operate under the national bank lending limits shall make 
all loans under such limits. The legal lending limit in effect when the loan is extended shall 
be the applicable legallending'limit for examination purposes. A bank is advised to consult 
with its legal counsel for assistance in determining whether it would be better served by 
electing to operate under the national bank lending limits. 
Effective Date: August 25, 1992 [[j~~ 
Edward B. Hatchett, Jr. 
Commissioner 
AN EQUAL.. OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER MIFIH 
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FINDING OF PERMISSmLE ACTIVITIES, SERVICES, OR PRODUcrS 
92-2 
OTHER REAL ESTATE OWNED 
The Commissioner of Financial Institutions issues this Finding of Permissible Activities, 
Services, or Products pursuant to KRS 287.020(3). Competitive inequality exists between some 
state banks and national banks as a result of different rules relating to the treatment of Other real 
estate owned, which for state banks is found in KRS 287.100(3) and for national banks is found 
in 12 USC Section 29 and 12 CPR § 7.3025. Because of the differences between the two 
treatments, state banks must write down the value of Other real estate owned by 10% annually, 
while national banks may carry on their books a realistic fair market value determined by annual 
appraisal. 
Therefore, a state bank may at its discretion choose to handle Other real estate owned 
as if it were a national bank. Any state bank making such a choice .shall: 
(1) Pass a formal resolution by its board of directors adopting the rules for 
handling Other real estate owned set forth in 12 USC Section 29· and 12 
CFR § 7.3025; 
(2) Amend the bank's policies to conform to these new rules; 
(3) Secure and maintain updated copies of all national bank rules and 
regulations relating to the handling of Other real estate owned; and 
(4) Notify the Department and the FDIC that the Bank has made such a 
choice. 
Any state bank electing to handle Other real estate owned under the national bank rules 
shall handle all such real estate acquired after the date of the election under such rules. A bank 
is advised to consult with its legal counsel and accountant for assistance in determining whether 
it would be better served by electing to operate under the national bank rules. 
F - 11 
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FINDING OF PERMISSIBLE ACTIVITIES, SERVICES, OR PRODUCTS 
92-3 
MAIN OFFICE RELOCATIONS 
The Commissioner of Financial Institutions issues this Finding of Permissible Activities, 
Services, or Products pursuant to KRS 287.020(3). Competitive inequality exists between state 
banks and national banks as a result of the difference in policies and rules governing relocation 
of the banks' main offices and retention of existing branches.· The relocation of a state bank's 
main office is governed by KRS 287.185, while 12 USC Section 30(b) governs the relocation of 
a main office of a national bank. 12 USC Section 30(b) provides that a main office may be 
relocated not more than thirty miles from its present site. The Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency has interpreted 12 USC Section 30(b) as allowing national banks to relocate their main 
offices across county lines and to retain existing branches in the original county of operation. 
Using this interpretation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has approved several 
transactions involving main office relocations across county lines by national banks in Kentucky, 
some of which included retention of existing branches in the original county of operation. 
Therefore, a state bank may, through a resolution of its board of directors, adopt the 
provisions of 12 USC Section 30(b); and upon a vote of the shareholders owning two-thirds of 
the stock of the bank and upon approval of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions, a state 
bank may relocate its main office within thirty miles from the city, town, or village in which the 
main office was originally located. Existing branches in the original county may be retained, but 
no new branches may be opened in the original county. The main office in the original county 
must close. 
Erfective date: ~~ 2'+, 1't<f3 
EDWARD . HATCHETT, 
COMMISSIONER 
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ATIORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: WHEN ARE 
CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS PROTECfED? 
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for 
confidential communications known to the common law. Its 
purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between 
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public 
interests in the observance of law and administration of justice. 
The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves 
public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the 
lawyer's being fully infonned by the client. . .. Admittedly 
comglications in the application of the privilege arise when the 
client is a corporation. which in theory is an artificial creature of 
the law. and not an individual: but this Court has assumed that 
the privilege applies when the client is a corporation. . . . 
Uroohn Co. v. United States, 449 U;$. 383, 389-90 (1981) (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted). 
1. OVERVIEW 
The attorney-client privilege is a rule of evidence which shields from 
disclosure confidential communications made between an actual or potential client and· an 
attorney acting in his capacity as a lawyer, when the communications pertain to the 
rendering of legal advice or services. See, U, Humphreys. Hutcheson and Moselet v. 
Donovan, 755 F.2d 1211, 1219 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280, 281 
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 976 (1964). The purpose of the rule is "to encourage full 
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader 
public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice." Uroohn Co. v. 
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981), quoted in United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 
(1989). See also Fausek v. White, 965 F.2d 126, 129 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 814 
(1992); In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 162 (6th Cir. 1986). 
To establish the attorney-client privilege, the following elements must be 
demonstrated: (1) legal advice was sought, (2) from a professional legal advisor in his/her 
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capacity as such, (3) by a client, (4) who made the communications in confidence, (5) which 
communications are at the client's insistence permanently protected, (6) from disclosure by 
the client or his legal advisor, (7) unless the protection is waived. Fausek v. White, 965 
F.2d 126, 129 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 814 (1992). 
As a practical matter, courts tend to CQnstrue the privilege narrowly. See 
Wei! Ceramics & Glass. Inc. v.Work, 110 F.R.D. 500, 503 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (privilege is an 
exception to the fundamental principle that discovery should be liberal and broad so as to 
further the search for truth); Humphreys. Hutcheson and Moseley v. Donovan, 755 F.2d 
at 1219; In Re Grand JUly Proceedings (Doe), 575· F. Supp. 197, 200 (N.D. Ohio 1983), 
affd, 754 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1985). In addition, the proponent of the privilege has the 
burden of establishing that all elements of the privilege, including non-waiver, are present. 
See PRE. Inc. v. Department of Justice, 139 F.R.D. 249, 254 (D.D.C. 1991); Varo. Inc. v. 
Litton Sys. Inc., 129 F.R.D. 139, 142 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (proponent must show precise facts 
exist to support claim of privilege; failure of proof as to any element causes claim of 
privilege to fail); In re Grand JUly Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447, 450 (6th Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1246 (1984); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Doe), 575 F. 
Supp. at 200. 
2. THE PRIVILEGE PROTECTS COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE 
CUENT TO THE LAWYER; NOT ALL COURTS EXTEND THE 
PRIVILEGE TO COMMUNICATIONS FROM ATTORNEYS TO 
CLIENTS. 
Courts uniformly recognize the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to 
communications from the client to the lawyer. Such communications comprise the 
fou:ndation of the privilege. The more difficult question sometimes arises, however, when 
the communication is from the lawyer to the client. Some courts decline to apply the 
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privilege in such circumstances, finding that no privilege attaches unless the communication 
from the lawyer to the client relates quite directly to the client's confidential information. 
See,~, American Standard. Inc. v. Pfizer. Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Mead 
Data Cent.. Inc. v. United States, 566 F.2d 242, 254 (D.e. Cir. 1977). While this narrow 
approach is not always utilized, ~, In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 601-03 (N.D. 
Tex. 1981), counsel must be cognizant of this threat to invocation of the privilege. Prudent 
counsel is advised, to the greatest extent possible, to base his/her legal advice upon 
confidential communications from the client to .the attorney. By so enveloping counsel's 
communications with client confidences, the likelihood of successfully invoking the privilege 
will be greater. 
The attorney-client privilege does not protect against disclosure of the facts 
underlying the communication. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. at 395; Humphreys. 
Hutcheson and Moseley v. Donovan, 755 F.2d at 1219. 
3. THE CORPORATE CliENT IS ALSO PROTECTED BY THE 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE. 
The privilege attaches to corporations as well as to individuals. Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985); Upjohn Co. v. United 
States, 449 U.S. at 390; Fausek V. White, 965 F.2d at 129; United States v. Bartone, 400 
F.2d 459, 461 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1027 (1969). It is well-settled that the 
attorney-client privilege is not lost or diluted merely because the attorney is an employee 
of the corporate client. See~, Leonen v. Johns-Manville, 135 F.R.D. 94, 98 (D.N.J. 
1990); In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 99 (D.e. Cir. 1984); Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. 
United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); United States v. United 
Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D. Mass. 1950). Thus, courts have uniformly held 
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that confidential communications with "in-house" corporate counsel, acting in their capacity 
as lawyers, are protected by the privilege. See,~, In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d at 99-
100; Jaroslawicz v. Engelhard Corp., 115 F.R.D. 515, 518 (D.N.J. 1987); Jonathan Corp. v. 
Prime Computer. Inc., 114 F.R.D. 693, 696 (E.D. Va. 1987); Air-Shield. Inc. v. Air 
Reduction Co., 46 F.R.D. 96, 97 (N.D. m. 1968); 8 in 1 Pet Prods .. Inc. v. Swift & Co., 218 
F. Supp. 253, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. FMC Corp., 215 F. 
Supp. 249, 251 (E.D. Wis. 1963); Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515, 519 
(S.D. Cal. 1963); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Supp. 251, 252 
(N.D.N.Y. 1960). 
However, "complications in the application of the privilege arise when the 
client is a corporation." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. at 389; see also Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 348 (administration of attorney-client 
privilege presents special problems in the case of corporations). The Upjohn Co. Court 
explained: 
In the case of the individual client the provider of infor-
mation and the person who acts on the lawyer's advice are one 
and the same. In the corporate context, however, it will 
frequently be employees beyond the control group as defined 
by the court below-- "officers and agents . . . responsible for 
directing· [the company's] actions in· response to legal 
advice"--who will possess the information needed by the corpo-
ration's lawyers. Middle-Ievel--and indeed lower-level--
employees can, by actions within the scope of their employment, 
embroil the corporation in serious legal difficulties, and it is 
only natural that these employees would have the relevant infor-
mation needed by corporate counsel if he is adequately to 
advise the client with respect to such actual or potential diffi-
culties. 
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. at 391. (Copy included in Appendix). The Upjohn 
Co. Court thus rejected the "control group" test in favor of a "case-by-case" analysis of the 
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existence and scope of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context. Id. at 396-
97. Under the Upjohn Co. analysis, the determination of whether the communications 
involving a corporate client are protected depends upon whether, under the circumstances, 
application of the attorney-client privilege will serve the underlying purposes and policies 
of the privilege. Id. at 392, 396-97. See also Thomas v. Pansy Ellen Prods .. Inc., 672 F. 
Supp. 237, 243 (W.D.N.C. 1987); Union Carbide Corp. v. Dow Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp. 
1036, 1047 (D. Del. 1985). 
The Upjohn Co. Court, in acknowledging the privilege, gave weight to the 
following factors: (a) the employees communicated with counsel expressly to procure legal 
advice, (b) the communications related to matters in the scope of their employment, (c) 
employees were directed by superiors to consult witp counsel, and (d) top management did 
not have knowledge of the subject matters. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 394. 
4. COMMUNICATIONS MUST BE CONFIDENTIAL. 
Because the attorney-client privilege is premised upon a need to protect 
confidential communications,the privilege does not apply if the circumstances indicate that 
no confidentiality was intended. See United States v. Weger, 709 F.2d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir. 
1983) ("[i]nformation imparted to c01ffi:Sel without any expectation of confidentiality is I?-0t . 
privileged"); United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641, 645 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. 
Waller, 581 F.2d, 585, 587 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1051 (1978). Thus, communica-
tions between an attorney and client made in the presence of third persons are not 
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privileged, unless the third person is an agent of the attorney or the client.1 See Parsons 
v. Jefferson-Pilot Corp., 141 F.R.D. at 417; Humphreys. Hutcheson and Moseley v. 
Donovan, 755 F.2d at 1219; John H. Wigmore, Evidence, § 2311, at 602 (John T. 
McNaughton rev. 1961 & 1990 Supp.). The privilege also is waived if the client voluntarily 
discloses the contents of the communications to a third person. See United States v. 
Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1227 n.12 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other ~ounds, 449 U.S. 383 
(1981). 
5. 1HE COMMUNICATION MUST PREDOMINAN1LY INVOLVE 
LEGAL ADVICE. 
Furthermore, as is discussed elsewhere in these materials, the privilege does 
not attach when counsel acts in a non-legal manner, providing primarily business and not 
legal advice. See,~, United States v. Loften, 518 F. Supp. 839, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 
(where advice is primarily non-legal, mere presence of legal advice will not render 
communication privileged), affd, 819 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir. 1987). Courts are particularly 
reluctant to use the privilege to shield communications from discovery merely because 
corporate officials who happen to be Jawyers are involved. See Radio Corp. of America 
v. Rauland Corp., 18 F.R.D. 440, 443 (N.D. m. 1955). See also Avianca Inc. v. Corriea, 
705 F. Supp 666, 676 (D.D.C. 1989); S.E.c. v. Gulf & Western Indus .. Inc., 518 F. Supp. 
675, 681-83 (D.D.C. 1981) (limitation necessary to prevent corporation from shielding 
business tra~actions from discovery merely by funneling communications through a 
licensed attorney). Accordingly, courts will find that some discussions are privileged only 
1 In order to qualify as an "agent", the third party must have more than a mere working 
relationship with the attorney or client. Parsons v. Jefferson-Pilot Corp., 141 F.R.D. 408, 
417 (M.D.N.C. 1992). See also Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 40 (D. Md. 
1974) ("Agents are only those persons essential to the lawyer's performance- of legal 
services"). 
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upon a "clear showing" that the manager-lawyers were giving their advice "in a professional 
legal capacity." In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d at 99. 
likewise, the privilege is not applicable to legal advice rendered in aid of a 
fraudulent scheme or criminal activity. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989) (so-
called "crime-fraud" exception is a recognized exception to attorney-client privilege). See 
also Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933); Fausek v. White, 965 F.2d at 129; Misek-
Falkoff v. International Business Mach. Corp., 144 F.R.D. 48, 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re 
Antitrust Grand JUlY, 805 F.2d 155, 162 (6th Cir. 1986) (reason for attorney-client privilege 
completely eviscerated where client consults attorney for legal assistance in carrying out a 
contemplated or ongoing crime or fraud). See also Horizon of Hope Ministty v. Clark 
County. Ohio, 115 F.R.D. 1, 5 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (communications between an attorney and 
a client are not privileged if prepared in order to perpetrate a tort); but see Coleman v. 
American Broadcasting Co .. Inc., 106 F.R.D. 201 (D.D.C. 1985) (crime fraud exception 
does not extend to communications allegedly in furtherance of an attempt to conceal acts 
of sexual harassment or other violations of the federal civil rights law). 
6. EXTENSION OR WAIVER OF EXISTING ATIORNEY-CLIENT 
PRIVILEGE. 
While individual discussions may be protected on the basis of their specific 
. circumstances, all discussions about the legal meetings betWeen manager-lawyers and other 
corporate officials, without regard to purpose, probably will not be protected by an 
independent, ''blanket'' attorney-client privilege. As such, we now tum to the question of 
whether the attorney-client privilege protecting communications made at corporate "legal 
meetings" protects subsequent discussions of those communications, or whether those 
subsequent discussions constitute a waiver of the privilege. 
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A Only Those Who Need To Know Should Have Access To 
Privileged Communications. 
The determination of whether the attorney-client privilege created during the 
legal meetings extends to protect subsequent discussions of communications made during 
those meetings, or whether those discussions amount to waiver of the privilege, is 
complicated by the nature of the corporate client. 
Prior to Upjohn Co., courts had reached an apparent consensus that the 
subsequent intracorporate discussion of legal advice, or dissemination of privileged 
materials, did not vitiate the privilege so long as continued confidentiality was intended and 
the scope of the intracorporate dissemination was limited. One court, applying the "control 
group" test, noted: 
The fact that the communication at issue in this case [a 
document] may have been circulated among more than one 
employee of the Air Force does not necessarily destroy their 
confidentiality, however. Where the client is an organization, 
the privilege extends to those communications between 
attorneys and all agents or employees of the organization who 
are authorized to act or speak for the organization in relation 
to the subject matter of the communication. 
Mead Data Central. Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 253 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 
1977). See also Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 644 F.2d 969, 977 n.38 
(3d Cir. 1981); Falcone v. Internal Revenue Serv., 479 F. Supp. 985, 989 (E.D. Mich. 1979). 
This view applied equally to subsequent oral discussion of an attorney's advice: 
A privileged communication should not lose its protection if an 
executive relays legal advice to another who shares 
responsibility for the subject matter underlying the consultation. 
. .. It would be an unnecessary restriction 6f the privilege to 
consider it lost when top management personnel discuss legal 
advice. 
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SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 518 (D. Conn.), app. dismissed, 534 F.2d 1031 
(2d Cir. 1976). See also United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Supp. at 253 
(communication which "simply submits to non-legal personnel legal advice already received" 
is privileged). 
Courts applying the "control group" test thus held that the privilege extends 
to discussion and dissemination of privileged communications among members of the 
"control group" (however defined). See,~, Mead Data Cent.. Inc. v. U.S. Department of 
Air Force, supra; Barr Marine Prods. Co .. Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 84 F.R.D. at 634; 
SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., supra; United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Supp. 
at 253. If the privileged communication was disseminated beyond the control group, it was 
no longer privileged. Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 693 (10th Cir. 1968); Duplan Corp. v. 
Deering Milliken. Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1163 (D.S.e. 1974). 
For courts applying the more flexible "multi-factor" tests of the corporate 
attorney-client privilege, the critical question was whether dissemination of the privileged 
communication was limited to those employees who, regardless of their status, were 
involved with the subject matter of the communication by virtue of their corporate duties. 
See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. A 
T & T Co., 86 F.R.D. 603, 623 (D.D.e. 1979); SEC v. Texas Int'l Airport. Inc., 29 Fed R. 
Servo 2d 408, 409-10 (D.D.C. 1979); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 25 Fed R. Servo 2d 
1248, 1254 (D.D.e. 1978); Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v. Imoco-Gateway Corp., 62 F.R.D. 
454,456 (N.D. TIL 1974), affd, 534 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1976); Rockwell Mfg. CO. V. Chicago 
Pneumatic Tool Co., 57 F.R.D. 111, 113 (N.D. TIL 1972). 
In Upjohn Co., the Supreme Court rejected a "control group" test which 
limited the attorney-client privilege to communications with "senior management" who 
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"playa 'substantial role' in deciding and directing a corporation's legal response." 449 U.S. 
at 390, 393, 397. In lieu of the "control group" test, the Court sanctioned case-by-case 
analysis of the privilege in the corporate context. Id. at 396-97. The Court's discussion, 
however, suggests that the policies of the privilege would be furthered by extending the 
privilege to cover the relaying of legal advice between and among certain "non-control 
group" corporate employees: 
The control group test adopted by the court below thus 
frustrates the very purpose of the privilege by discouraging the 
communication of relevant information by employees of the 
client to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client 
corporation. The attorney's advice will also frequently be more 
significant to noncontrol group members than to those who 
officially sanction the advice, and the control group test makes 
it more difficult to convey full and frank legal advice to the 
employees who will put into effect the client corporation's 
policy. See,~, Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken. Inc., 397 
F. Supp. 1146, 1164 (D.S.C. 1974) ("After the lawyer forms his 
or her opinion, it is of no immediate benefit to the chairman 
of the board or the president. It must be given to the corporate 
personnel who will apply it"). 
Id. at 392. The Upjohn Co. Court also noted that the "narrow scope" of the "control group" 
test "threatens to limit the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client's 
compliance with the law." Id. 
Following Upjohn Co., courts addressing the question have concluded that, 
for the corporate attorney-client privilege to apply, "the communication must originate in 
confidence and not be disseminated beyond those persons who need to knoW; its contents." 
SEC v. Gulf & Western Indus .. Inc., 518 F. Supp. 675, 681 (D.D.C. 1981). See also In re 
Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Dec. 18. 1981, 561 F. Supp. 1247, 1258-59 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) 
(attorney-client privilege only attaches "if the communication is disseminated to an 
employee who needs to know the material because he has a direct responsibility-over the 
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subject matter"). Thus, disclosure of confidential information to employees who will utilize 
the information in performance of their duties should not destroy the privilege. See United 
States v. Davis, 131 F.R.D. 391, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Cuno. Inc. v. Pall Corp., 121 F.R.D. 
198,203 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety 
Co., 672 F. Supp. 1,4 (D.D.C. 1986); Leucadia. Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 101 F.R.D. 674, 
680 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). See also In re Dayco Corp. Derivative Sec. litig., 102 F.R.D. 468, 
470 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (privileged corporate document retained privilege when only "selected 
personnel" had access to it). 
The conclusion that a limited dissemination of privileged communications 
does not abrogate the privilege comports with general attorney-client privilege principles. 
See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. at 396-97 (referring to "policies" and "principles 
of the common law" in ascertaining extent of corporate attorney-client privilege). Courts 
have generally recognized that disclosure of confidences to agents of the attorney or client 
does not destroy the privilege. See Golden Trade v. Lee Apparel Co., 143 F.R.D. 514, 518 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); Parsons v. Jefferson-Pilot Corp., 141 F.R.D. at 417. Courts also have 
held that disclosure of attorney-client communications to third parties constitutes waiver of 
the privilege "unless the third parties' presence is consistent with an intention to keep the 
communications confidential." In re Consol. Litig. Concerning Int'l Harvester's Disposition 
of Wisconsin Steel, 666 F. Supp. 1148, 1155-57 (N.D. m. 1987); accord, Ferguson v. Lurie, 
139 F.R.D. 362, 364 (N.D. m. 1991); see also In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 488-
89 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 
(1973); Liggett Group. Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 116 F.R.D. 205, 210-
11 (M.D.N.C. 1986); Eglin Fed. Credit Union v. Cantor. Fitzgerald Sec. Corp., 91 F.R.D. 
414, 418-19 (N.D. Ga. 1981); SEC v. Texas Int'l Airport. Inc., 29 Fed R. Servo 2d at 409. 
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Similarly, the "common interest rule" applied by some courts "protects communications 
made when a nonparty sharing the client's interest is present at a confidential 
communication between attorney and client." United States v. Zolin, 809 F.2d 1411, 1417 
(9th Cir. 1987) (citing Burlington Industries v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. at 44-45), affd in 
part vacated in part, 491 U.S. 554 (1989); Stanley Works v. Haeger Potteries. Inc., 35 
F.R.D. 551, 554-55 (N.D. TIL 1964). See also Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 94 
(3rd Cir. 1992); United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1989), affd 924 F.2d 
443, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 55 (1991); Cheeves v. Southern Clays. Inc., 128 F.R.D. 128, 
129-30 (M.D. Ga. 1989). 
Each of these general principles supports the conclusion that the attorney-
client privilege is not waived as a result of limited dissemination of confidential 
communications to corporate employees whose duties will be affected by such 
communications. Employees whose employment duties relate to the communications 
clearly are "agents" of the corporate client for purposes of those communications. Likewise, 
limited disclosure to such employees is "consistent with an intention to keep the com-
munications confidential," and such employees would "share the client's interest" with 
respect to the communications. 
To enhance the argument that the attorney-client privilege created during 
corporate legal meetings extends to protect the subsequent intracorporate dissemination of 
such communications, several considerations should be borne in mind. First, the 
dissemination must be made with the intent that the privileged communications remain 
confidential. Second, the dissemination should be limited to those corporate officials and 
employees who will utilize the privileged communications within the scope of their 
employment. Third, dissemination should also be restricted to those who need to know. 
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B. Overly Broad Dissemination May Result In A Waiver Of The 
Attorney-Client Privilege. 
On the other hand, the privilege will likely not extend to widespread 
dissemination of communications made at the legal meetings, or even to limited. 
dissemination of such communications to corporate officials and employees who, by virtue 
of their employment, would not be concerned with the communications in their daily duties. 
In one post-Upjohn Co. case, the court held that the company lost the attorney-client 
privilege when a document was circulated to a corporate officer who had "deliberate[ly] 
withdraw[n] from any responsibility" over the subject matter of the document. In re Grand· 
JUly Subpoenas Dated Dec. 18. 1981, 561 F. Supp. at 1258-59. 
In the event that the manager-lawyers have disseminated confidential 
communications to. corporate officials who do not need to know of the communications 
because of their job duties, three questions are raised: (1) Whether the manager-lawyers 
have the ability to waive a privilege held by the corporation as a whole? (2) Whether the 
disclosures would amount to waiver when the disclosures presumably were not intended 
by the manager-lawyers to effect a waiver? (3) What is the ext~nt and effect of any waiver 
resultig from the disclosures? 
It is clear that corporate officers and directors possess the power to waive the 
corporate attorney-client privilege. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 
471 U.S. at 348. Thus, courts have concluded that volunt~ry statements by corporate 
directors and officers about confidential communications waive the corporate privilege as 
to those communications. See Wei! v. Investment/Indicators. Research and Management. 
Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 25 (9th Cir. 1981); Velsicol Chern. Corp. v. Parsons, 561 F.2d 671, 674-
76 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1978); In re Consol. Litig. Concerning Int'l 
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Harvester's Disposition of Wisconsin Steel, 666 F. Supp. at 1151-54; Lee National Corp. v. 
Deramus, 313 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D. Del. 1970). In addition, a corporation's voluntary 
disclosure of privileged documents to government agencies is generally held to effect a total 
waiver of the privilege as to those documents. Westinghouse Blec. Corp. v. Republic of 
Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1423-27 (3rd Cir. 1991); United States v. Rockwell Int'l, 897 
F.2d 1255, 1265 (3rd Cir. 1990) ("attorney-client privilege does not apply to communications 
that are intended to be disclosed to third parties or are in fact so disclosed"); In re 
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1369-70 (D.C. Cir. 1984); United States v. Upjohn 
Co., 600 F.2d at 1227 n.12; Artesian Indus .. Inc. v. Department of Health and Human 
Servs., 646 F. Supp. 1004, 1008 (D.D.C. 1986); United States v. Vehicular Parking; 52 F. 
Supp. 751, 754 (D. Del. 1943). There is some discrepancy, however, as to whether the 
privilege will attach to drafts of the final product. Compare In re Air Crash Disaster at 
Sioux City. Iowa, 133 F.R.D. 515, 518 (N.D. lli. 1990) (an underlying privilege attaching to 
drafts is not destroyed simply because a final product is disclosed to the public) with 
United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871, 875 n.7 (4th Cir. 1984) (details underlying 
published data, including drafts, are not privileged) and North Carolina Blec. Membership 
Corp. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 110 F.R.D. 511, 517 (M.D.N.e. 1986) and Schenet 
v. Anderson, 678 F. Supp. 1280, 1283 (B.D. Mich. 1988) (attorney-client privilege applies 
to all information conveyed by clients to their attorneys for the purpose of drafting 
documents to be disclosed to third person and all documents reflecting such information 
to the extent it is not contained in the disclosed document or not otherwise disclosed to 
third persons). 
To the extent that the manager-lawyers are high-ranking corporate officers, 
their disclosures could be deemed a corporate waiver of the privilege simply by virtue of 
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their positions with the corporation. Furthermore, their disclosures could constitute waiver 
on another ground. Courts have held that if a corporation fails to take adequate steps to 
protect the confidentiality of privileged communications, the disclosure of such 
communications will constitute a waiver. See Thomas v. Pansy Ellen Prods .. Inc., 672 F. 
Supp. at 243; In re Conso!. Litig. Concerning Int'l Harvester's Disposition of Wisconsin 
Steel, 666 F. Supp. at 1154-55; Jonathan Corp. v. Prime Computer. Inc., 114 F.R.D. at 697-
700; Underwater Storage. Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D.D.C. 
1970); United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 465 (E.D. Mich. 1954). 
In Jonathan Corp., the court reasoned that the Upjohn Co. decision 
precluded the conclusion that o:nJ.y "control group" members could waive the corporation's 
attorney-client privilege and held that an employee's voluntary disclosure of a privileged 
document constituted a waiver because the corporation "intentionally put the individual in 
a position to make the disclosure as well as gave him the inforination to disclose." 114 
F.R.D. at 697-700. Accordingly, a· manager-lawyer's dissemination of privileged 
communications to "inappropriate" employees could be viewed as a waiver of the 
corporation's privilege. 
Some courts have held that an inadvertent disclosure of confidential material 
does not waive the privilege because a waiver must be "intentional." See Mendenhall v. 
Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 954-55 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Georgetown Manor. Inc. v. 
Ethan Allen. I~c., 753 F. Supp. 936, 938 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (endorsed Mendenhall approach 
as the ''better reasoned rule"); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448, 451 
(S.D.N.Y. 1955). Other courts have found that inadvertent disclosure always causes a 
waiver as once confidentiality is lost, the privilege cannot be restored. In re Sealed Case, 
877 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The majority position, however, seems to be that an intent 
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to waive is not required and even inadvertent or intentionally limited disclosure constitutes 
a waiver. See 8 John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 2327, at 636 (John T. McNaughton rev. 
1961 & 1990 Supp.); McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 93, at 194 n.14 (2d 
ed. 1972); see also Hydraflow. Inc. v. Enidine Inc., 145 F.R.D. 626, 637-38 (W.D.N.Y. 
1993); Western Trails. Inc. v. Camp Coast to Coast. Inc., 144 F.R.D. at 8; In re Sealed 
Case, 676 F.2d 793, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Weil v. Investment/Indicators. Research & 
Management. Inc., 647 F.2d at 24; Thomas v. Pansy Ellen Prods. Inc., 672 F. Supp. at 243; 
Ranney-Brown Distrib .. Inc. v. E.T. Barwick Indus .. Inc., 75 F.R.D. 3, 6 (S.D. Ohio 1977); 
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken. Inc., 397 F. Supp. at 1161-62; Underwater Storage. Inc. 
v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. at 549. But see KL Group v. Case. Kay & 
Lynch, 829 F.2d 909, 919 (9th Cir. 1987) (law firm's inadvertent disclosure of privileged 
document did not constitute waiver because the disclosure was not the voluntary decision 
of the corporate client); United States v. Zolin, 809 F.2d at 1417 (when personal secretary 
to corporate officer delivered privileged tapes to third party under mistaken impression that 
they were blank, no waiver occurred because the disclosure was inadvertent and 
involuntary); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. at 519 (inadvertent disclosure did not 
constitute waiver of privilege). 
Courts adopting the majority approach typically apply a balancing test in 
order to determine whether inadvertent disclosure waives the attorney-client privilege. 
See, ~, In re Grand JUly Investigation, 142 F.R.D. 276, 279 (M.D.N.C. 1992). The 
following factors have been found to be relevant in deciding whether an inadvertent 
. disclosure constitutes a waiver of the privilege: 
(1) the reasonableness of precautions taken to prevent 
disclosure; (2) the amount of time taken to remedy the error; 
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(3) the scope of discovery; (4) the extent of the disclosure; and 
(5) the overriding issue of fairness. 
Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1433 (5th Cir. 1993) (inadvertent disclosure by 
attorneys for city defending Fair Labor Standards Act Claim). See also In re Grand Jury 
Investi~ation, 142 F.R.D. at 279; In re Sause Bros. Ocean Towin~, 144 F.R.D. 111, 115 
(D. Or. 1991); F.D.I.C. Corp. v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp, 138 F.R.D. 479, 482 
(E.D. Va. 1991); Bud Antle. Inc. v. Grow-Tech Inc., 131 F.R.D. 179, 183-84 (N.D. Cal. 
1990); Kansas City Li~ht. & Power Co. v. Pittsbur~h & Midway Coal Minin~ Co., 133 
F.R.D. 171, 172 (D.Kan. 1989); Parkway Gallery Furniture. Inc. v. Kittin~er/Pennsylvania 
House Group. Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46, 50-52 (M.D.N.C. 1987). 
In the event that a waiver is found, it is likely that a court would determine 
that the waiver existed only as to those confidential communications actually disclosed by 
the manager-lawyers. Courts are careful to ensure that the attorney-client privilege is not 
applied so as to give the party asserting the privilege an advantage by allowing him to 
disclose only those communications which are advantageous to his position. See Fox v. 
California Sierra Fin. Servs., 120 F.R.D. 520, 527 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Burlington Indus. v. 
Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. at 46; Duplan Corp. v. Deerin~ Milliken. Inc., 397 F. Supp. at 1162; 
Syl~ab Steel & Wire Corp. v. Imoco-Gateway Corp., 62 F.R.D. at 457-58; but see Western 
Trails. Inc. v. Camp Coast to Coast. Inc., 139 F.R.D. at 12 (court has discretion to impose 
less than the full scope of waiver lias to all communications on same subject matter where 
the client has merely disclosed a communication to a third party, as opposed to making 
some use of it") quotin~ In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 809 n. 54; Chinnici v. Central 
Dupa~e Hosp. Ass'n, 136 F.R.D. 464, 465 (N.D. m. 1991) (production of some privileged 
documents waives the privilege as to all documents of the same subject matter); -Standard 
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Chartered Bank PLC v. Ayala Int'l Holdings. Inc., 111 F.R.D. 76, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). H 
the privilege is being asserted for such purposes, courts will hold the privilege waived for 
all communications relating to the same subject matter as the communications already 
disclosed. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v Republic of Philippines, 951 F.2d at 1426; In 
re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980-81 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Burlin~on Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 
65 F.R.D. at 46; Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken. Inc., 397 F. Supp. at 1162~ 
However, "[t]he rule of partial disclosure as a qualification on the privilege 
should not be applied without reference both to the objectives of the privilege and the 
qualification. ... [T]he rule of partial disclosure [is] one dictated by considerations of 
fairness." International Business Mach. Corp. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D. 
Del. 1968). Where disclosures made by the manager-lawyers clearly were not made to gain 
a tactical advantage in litigation a broad waiver should not result. See In re Sause Bros. 
Ocean Towing, 144 F.R.D. at 116 (defendant could not argue that it had been prejudiced 
by disclosure; nor were the documents disclosed to gain an advantage, therefore, expanding 
scope of waiver inappropriate); In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 1987) (no 
"subject matter" waiver when party asserting privilege did not make advantageous use of 
disclosure). As such, any waiver should be limited to the communications actually disclosed 
by the manager-lawyers. See In re Sause Bros. Ocean Towing, 144 F.R.D. at 116; Well v. 
Investment/Indicators. Research & Management. Inc., 647 F.2d at 25; Status Time Corp. 
v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 95 F.R.D. 27, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Champion Int'l Corp. v. 
International Paper Co., 486 F. Supp. 1328, 1332-33 (N.D. Ga. 1980). 
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WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE: 
CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS WITH 
AN EYE TOWARD LITIGATION 
Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound 
to work for the advancement of justice while faithfully protecting 
the rightful interests of his clients. In perfonning his various duties, 
however, it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of 
privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and 
their counseL Proper preparation of a client's case demands that 
he assemble infonnation, sift what he Gonsiders to be the relevant 
from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his 
strategy without undue and needless interference. That is the 
historical and the necessary way in which lawyers act within the 
framework of our system of jurisprudence to promote justice and 
to protect their clients' interests . 
. " .. 
Were such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, 
much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. 
An attorney:S- thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own.. 
Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably 
develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of 
cases for triaL The effect on the legal profession would be 
demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of 
justice would be poorly served. 
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947). 
1. OVERVIEW 
Many lawyers and, indeed, some courts confuse the protections provided by 
the work-product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege. These concepts are separate 
although they do interrelate. ,Notably, some of the gaps in the protection offered by the 
attorney-client privilege discussed above can be filled by the work-product doctrine. 
The United States Supreme Court first articulated the work-product doctrine 
in the seminal case of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (copy included in Appendix). 
The holding in Hickman was later codified in Rule 26(b )(3) of the Federal Ru1es of Civil 
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Procedure. Many states, too, have adopted some form of the work-product doctrine as 
well. 
While some lawyers and courts refer to the protection provided to an 
attorney's work-product as a "privilege," the doctrine creates no more than a qualified 
immunity for (1) documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable that were 
(2) prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial (3) by a lawyer, a party, or a party's 
representative. As with the attorney-client privilege, the underlying facts incorporated into 
the work-product are not protected from discovery. 
However, unlike the attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine is not 
absolute; it can be overcome, in some situations, by the requisite showing of substantial 
need and undue hardship. Fed. R. Civ. P.26(b)(3). Moreover, Rule 26 makes a 
distinction between "factual work-product", which encompasses documents or exhibits 
prepared in anticipation of litigation, and "opinion work-product." "Opinion work-product" 
includes mental impressions, opinions or legal theories. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 
508. Rule 26(b)(3) warns that even if substantial need and undue hardship are shown and 
production of "factual work-product" ordered, "the court shall [nonetheless] protect against 
the disclosure of "opinion work-product." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b )(3). 
Lastly, just as the attorney-client privilege can be waived, so too can the 
protection provided by the work-product doctrine be waived, intentionally or otherwise. 
Caution, therefore, must be exercised by in-house and outside counsel to avoid the 
unintentional waiver of the protections afforded by the work-product doctrine.2 
2Tbis section of the materials addresses applications of the federal work product 
doctrine by the federal courts. These materials, for the most part, do not discuss the doc-
trine's application in criminal cases. (Note, however, that the Supreme Court has stated: 
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2. FEDERAL WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 
"[A]pplication of the work-product rule in federal courts is governed by 
federal, not state, law." Harper v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 138 F.R.D. 655, 658 (S.D. Ind. 
1991); see also Henderson v. Zurn Industries. Inc., 131 F.R.D. 560, 569 (S.D. Ind. 1990). 
The federal work-product doctrine, which codifies the Supreme Court's holdings in 
Hickman v. Taylor, supra, is set forth in Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which states, in pertinent part: 
A party may obtain discove:ry of documents and 
tangible things otherwise discoverable under 
subdivision (b )(1) of this rule and prepared in 
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for 
another party or by or for that other party's 
representative (including the other party's 
attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, 
or agent) only upon a showing that the party 
seeking discove:ry has substantial need of the 
materials in the preparation of the party's case 
and that the party is unable without uridue 
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of 
the materials by other means. In ordering 
discovery of such materials when the required 
showing has been made, the court shall protect 
against disclosure of the mental impressions, 
conclusions. opinions, or legal theories of an 
attorney _or other representative of a party 
concerning the litigation. (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, Rule 26(b )(3) consists of five different components. First, "documents and tangible 
things" must be involved. Second, those materials must have been "prepared in anticipa-
tion of litigation or for trial." Third, the preparer must be a lawyer, a party or the party's 
representative. Fourth, discovery of the materials is available only upon a showing of 
"we agree that [the work product] doctrine applies to criminal litigation as well as civil." 
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236 (1975»; see also Rule 16(b)(2) of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Finally, these materials do not address the doctrine as it 
relates to the preparation of experts for testimony at trial. 
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substantial need and undue hardship to obtain substantially equivalent materials. Fifth, 
" "mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories" of the representative are given 
special protection by the court. Each of these components, and other considerations, will 
be addressed in turn. 
A Work-Product Doctrine Protects Tangible And Intangible 
Things. 
Although Rule 26(b )(3) states that the work-product doctrine applies only to 
"documents and tangible things" (the first component), some courts have held that the rule 
applies to intangible materials as well. In re Grand Ju:ry Subpoena Dated November 8. 
1979, 622 F.2d 933, 935 (6th Cir. 1980) ("[w]ork product consists of the tangible and 
intangible material which reflects an attorney's efforts at investigating and preparing a 
case"); EEOC v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 31 FEP Cases 1049, 1050 (S.D. Ohio 1981) 
("[a]1though unwritten and intangible material is not within the express scope of Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 26(b )(3), the work-product doctrine in nevertheless applicable to unwritten material 
developed in anticipation of litigation"); Herwig v. Marine Shale Processors. Inc., No. 
92-2753, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7781, at *5 (E.D. La. June 8, 1993) ("[d]efendants have 
made no showing which can overcome the special protection afforded an attorney's 
recollections"); but see McLaughlin v. Miles Laboratories. Inc., 124 F.R.D. 629, 630 
(N.D. Ind. 1988) ("the material must be: ... documents or tangible things"); Anderson v. 
Torrington Co., 120 F.R.D. 82, 86 (N.D. Ind. 1987) ("[t]he material must ... be documents 
and tangible things"); Toledo Edison v. G A Technologies. Inc., 847 F.2d 335, 339 (6th Cir. 
1988) ("the application of subdivision (b )(3) is limited to 'documents and tangible things 
oth~rwise discoverable under subdivision (b )(1 )"'). . 
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B. Work-Product Protection Only Attaches H Materials Are 
Prepared In Anticipation Of Litigation Or For Trial. 
Ru1e 26(b )(3) requires that the materials in question, in order to be immune 
from discovery under the doctrine, must have been "prepared in anticipation of litigation 
or for trial" (the second component). Thus, materials prepared in the ordinary course of 
a business pursuant to normal practice are not protected by the work-product doctrine. 
Linde Thomson Langworthy Kohn & Van Dyke. P.c. v. Resolution Trust Corporation, 5 
F.3d 1508, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 25279, at *22 (D.C. Cir. October 5, 1993) ("litigant must 
demonstrate that documents were created 'with a specific claini supported by concrete 
facts which wou1d likely lead to litigation in mind,' not merely assembled in the ordinary 
course of business or for other nonlitigation purposes") (quoting Coastal States Gas Corp. 
v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Harper, 138 F.R.D. at 660 
("[i]f documents and materials are produced in the ordinary and regu1ar course of a party's 
business, and not to prepare for litigation, they are outside the scope of work-product"); 
. Stout v. Norfolk & W. RY. Co., 90 F.R.D. 160, 162 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (''we conclude that 
the statements taken ... in this case were records made in the ordinary course of business 
and were not taken in anticipation of litigation"), even if the possibility of litigation exists. 
Binks Mfg. Co.v. Nat. Presto Industries. Inc., 709 F.2d 1109, 1120 (7th Cir. 1983) (remote 
prospect of litigation is not enough to satisfy the requirement that the materials must be 
prepared in anticipation of litigation); Galambus v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 64 
F.R.D. 468, 472 (N.D. Ind. 1974) ("even though litigation is already in prospect, there is no 
work-product immunity for documents prepared in the regular course of business rather 
thap. for the purposes of litigation"); Urseth v. City of Dayton, 110 F.R.D. 245, 255 (S.D. 
Ohio 1986) ("'mere possibility' of litigation is insufficient to prevent disclosure"). 
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Moreover, just because "litigation does eventually ensue does not, by itself, cloak materials 
prepared by an attorney with the protection of the work-product privilege." Binks, 709 
F.2d at 1118; Taroli v. General Electric Co., 114 F.R.D. 97, 98 (N.D. Ind. 1987), affd 840 
F.2d 920 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[n]either does the fact that a lawsuit subsequently was filed 
automatically require a finding that the investigation was conducted in anticipation of 
litigation"); Mazan v. Schmelzer, 111 F.R.D. 470, 471 (N.D. Ind. 1986) ("[a] statement is 
not deemed to have been prepared in anticipation of litigation merely because an accident 
has occurred, an investigation was made, and a lawsuit subsequently was filed"). 
The Sixth Circuit and district courts in that Circuit have not set forth any 
guidelines with respect to this requirement other than there be more than a "mere 
possibility" of litigation. See Guy v. United Healthcare Corp., No. 2:92-CV-397, 1993 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 8406 (S.D. Ohio June 16, 1993) (reviewing standards applied by other courts 
but not adopting a specific standard). Courts in the Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, 
have construed this requirement to mean "that the document in question be produced 
because of the anticipation of litigation, i.e., to prepare for litigation or for trial." Harper, 
138 F.R.D. at 659; see also Binks, 709 F.2d at 1120; Henderson, 131 F.R.D. at 570 ("the 
document sought to be protected can be said to have been prepared or obtained because 
of the prospect of litigation when the primary motivation was to aid in possible future 
litigation"); Anderson, 120 F.R.D. at 86; Mazan, 111 F.R.D. at 472; Galambus, 64 F.R.D. 
at 472. However, whereas one Indiana district court has suggested that the probability of 
litigation must be substantial and imminent for the work-product doctrine to attach to 
materials prepared at that time, Mazan, 111 F.R.D. at 472, the Seventh Circuit has 
suggested otherwise. Binks, 709 F.2d at 1119 (adopting the reasoning of Janicker v. 
George Washington University, 94 F.R.D. 648, 650 (D.D.C. 1982), which stated: "[w]hile 
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litigation need not be imminent, the primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the 
document or investigative report must be to aid in possible future litigation"). 
C. Protected Materials Must Be Prepared By A Lawyer, A Party 
Or A Party's Representative. 
The third component is that the materials desired to be protected must be 
prepared by a lawyer, a party or other representative of the party working on behalf of the 
party's interest. Thus, "[t]he work-product rule has no application to a document prepared 
by and in the hands of a third person who is neither a party to nor interested in the 
action." Galambus, 64 F.R.D. at 473. Although the language of some cases might seem to 
suggest otherwise,see Mazan, 111 F.R.D, at 472 ("[ s ]ince the statements were neither 
requested by nor prepared for an attorney, they were not prepared in anticipation of 
litigation"), most courts have held that the doctrine does, in fact, apply to work performed 
by non-attorneys. Henderson, 131 F.R.D. at 569, n. 8 (''by the express language of the 
Rule, the work-product privilege is not dependent upon an attorney's involvement, but 
instead only requires that the materials be prepared by a 'representative' for purposes of 
the work-product doctrine"); McLaughlin, 124 F.R.D. at 630 ("[t]he qualified work-product 
privilege extends to documents prepared by or for a representative of a party, including his 
agent"); Toledo Edison, 847 F.2d at 339. Eoppolo v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 108 
F.R.D. 292, 295 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (attorney need not be involved for doctrine to apply); 
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1975) (the doctrine protects "material 
prepared by agents for the attorney as well as those prepared by the attorney himself."). 
D. Overcoming The Work-Product Doctrine. 
The fourth and fifth components draw a distinction between "opinion work-
product" -- "mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or 
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other representative of a party concerning the litigation" -- and other materials -- "factual 
work-product." "Factual work-product" is discoverable "upon a showing that the party 
seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's 
case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial 
equivalent of the materials by other means." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26{b )(3); see ~ Harper, 138 
F.R.D. at 671; McLaughlin, 124 F.R.D. at 631; Toledo Edison, 847 F.2d at 340. 
"Opinion work-product" however, requires, if it is even discoverable, a much 
higher showing. The Sixth Circuit recently held that the "opinion work-product" is simply 
undiscoverable. Toledo Edison, 847 F.2d at 340 ("the rule flatly states that the court is to 
not permit discovery of 'mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an 
attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation'''). Other courts, as 
well as an earlier decision of the Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, have declared that 
"opinion work-product" is discoverable upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances or 
the like. In re Special September 1978 Grand Jury, 640 F.2d 49, 52 (7th Cir. 1980) 
("extraordinary need"); Roberts v. Carrier Corp., 107 F.R.D. 678, 688 (N.D. Ind. 1985) 
(standard is "much higher"); Tronitech v. NCR Corp., 108 F.R.D. 655, 656 (S.D. Ind. 1985) 
("[s]uch material will be disclosed, if at all, only under extraordinary circumstances .... as 
when the activities of counsel are directly at issue"); Grand Jury Subpoena, 622 F.2d at 936 
("rare and extraordinary circumstances"); United States v. David A Beck. Potter and Co., 
1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14988, *25 (E.D. Ky. 1987) ("such work-product cannot be disclosed 
simply on a showing of substantial need and inability ... to obtain the equivalent without 
undue hardship"); EEOC, 31 FEP Cases at 1050 ("far stronger showing"). The Supreme 
Court, while acknowledging that a stronger showing is required for discovery of attorneys' 
mental processes, expressly declined to resolve the issue of whether those processes are dis-
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coverable at all, stating, "[w]e do not decide the issue at this time." Upjohn v. United 
States, 449 U.S. 383, 401-02 (1981). 
E. Waiver Of The Doctrine And Other Considerations. 
Other facets of the work-product doctrine should be noted. For instance, 
most courts have held that the work-product doctrine proteCts ''work produced in 
anticipation of other litigation," United States v. Leggett & Platt. Inc., 542 F.2d 655, 660 
(6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 430 U.S. 945 (1977). However, some courts have limited the 
use of the doctrine to related proceedings. Clark v. City of Munster, 115 F.R.D. 609, 614 
(N.D. Ind. 1987) ("[t]he work-product may be claimed in a related proceeding even if the 
litigation for which the file was created has been terminated"); see also Federal Trade 
Commission v. Grolier Inc., 462 U.S. 19,26 (1983). Furthermore, the doctrine's immunity 
may be claimed by either the attorney or the client. Special September 1978 Grand JUlY, 
640 F.2d at 62 ("the work-product doctrine may be asserted by either the client or the 
attorney"); Clark, 115 F.R.D. at 614 (adopting statement in Special September 1978 Grand 
Jury); Tronitech, 108 F.R.D. at 657 ("[t]he client as well as the attorney may assert work-
. product protection"); but see Anderson, 120 F.R.D. at 82 ("[w]ork-product is the privilege 
of the attorney and not of the client"). Moreover, facts are not protected by the doctrine. 
EEOC, 31FEP Cases at 1051. 
Finally, there are two instances when, even if the requirements for 
application of the doctrine are met, immunity will not exist. First, actions taken by the 
attorney or client can waive the protection of the immunity. ~ Nobles, 422 U.S. at 239 
(waiver occurred when attorney made testimonial use of protected materials at trial); 
Anderson, 120 F.R.D. at 87 ("[i]f documents otherwise protected by the work-product have 
been disclosed to others with an actual intention that an opposing party may see the 
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documents, the disclosing party should not subsequently be able to claim protection for the 
documents as work-product"); Roberts, 107 F.R.D. at 688 (no waiver despite disclosure to 
a non-party ''because there is nothing to suggest that [the defendant] disclosed the 
documents with an eye towards allowing [the plaintiff] access to the information"); 
Tronitech, 108 F.R.D. at 657 (immunity "is not ordinarily waived by disclosure to third 
parties"); In re Dayco Corp. Derivative Securities Litigation, 102 F.R.D. 468, 470 (S.D. 
Ohio 1984) (involuntary disclosure of diary to a newspaper and subsequent publication of 
excerpts is not a waiver of the immunity). 
Second, the "crime-fraud" exception provides that the immunity is not 
available "when there has been a showing of ongoing client fraud," Special September 
1978 Grand Jury, 640 F.2d at 63, or when the work-product is in perpetuation of a tort. 
Horizon of Hope Ministry v. Clark County, Ohio, 115 F.R.D. 1, 5 (S.D. Ohio 1986). 
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LAWYER ACTING AS BUSINESS PERSON: WHEN 
DOES THE ATIORNEY·CLIENT PRMLEGE APPLY? 
1. OVERVIEW 
Perhaps one of the most difficult privilege questions arises when the 
attorney's duties with the corporation include "certain responsibilities outside the lawyer's 
sphere." In Re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d at 99. In such circumstances, courts scrutinize the 
context and content of the pertinent communications to determine whether the attorney 
acted as a lawyer with. respect to those communications. Id.; see also Rossi v. Blue Cross 
& Blue Shield, 540 N.E.2d 703, 705 (N.Y. 1989) ("the need to apply it [attorney·client 
privilege] cautiously and narrowly is heightened in the case of corporate staff counsel"); 
Valente v. Pepsico. Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361, 367 (D. Del. 1975); Malco Mfg. Co. v. E1co Corp., 
45 F.R.D. 24, 26 (D. Minn. 1968). "The possession of a law degree and admission to the 
bar is not enough to establish a person as an attorney for purposes of determining whether 
the attorney-client privilege applies." North Am. Mortgage Investors v. First Wis. Nat'l 
Bank, 69 F.R.D. 9, 11 (E.D. Wisc. 1975). 
As always, the communication pertaining to the rendering of legal advice 
must be made with the intention of confidentiality before the privilege applies. See Great 
Plains Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mutual Reinsurance Bureau, 150 F.R.D. 193, 197 (D. Kan. 1993) 
(minutes of board meeting held privileged when participants kept content of meeting 
confidential and attorney acted in legal capacity during relevant portions of meetings); In 
Re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d at 100; Burlington Industries v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 37 
(D. Md. 1974). Moreover, if the communication involves predominantly legal advice, it is 
privileged even if relevant non-legal and business considerations are discussed as well. See 
Advanced Cardiovascular Sys .. v. C.R. Bard. Inc .. 144 F.R.D. 372, 375·77 (N.D. Cal. 1992); 
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Western Trails. Inc. v. Camp Coast to Coast. Inc., 139 F.R.D. 4, 8 (D.D.C. 1991); Leonen 
v. Johns-Manville, 135 F.R.D. at 98-99; Cuno. Inc. v. Pall Corp., 121 F.R.D. at 204 
("[w]here a lawyer mixes legal and business advice the communication is not privileged 
unless the communication ... can ... be characterized as predominantly legal"); Coleman v. 
American Broadcasting Co., 106 F.R.D. 201, 206 (D.D.C. 1985) ("mere fact that business 
considerations are weighed in the rendering of legal advice does not vitiate attorney-client 
privilege"); Barr Marine Products Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 84 F.R.D. 631, 634-35 (E.D. 
Pa. 1979); United States v. ruM Corp., 66 F.R.D. 206, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Zenith Radio 
Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del. 1954); United States v. 
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. at 359. 
On the other hand, "[ c ]ommunications dealing exclusively with the solicitation 
or giving of business advice ... or with any other matters which may as easily be handled 
by laymen are not privileged." Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood 
Corp., 18 F.R.D. at 464; accord United States v. Bartone, 400 F.2d at 461; Ray v. Cutter 
Lab. Div. of Miles, 746 F. Supp. 86, 87 (M.D. Fla. 1990); Valente v. Pepsico. Inc., 68 
F.R.D. at 367; American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85, 88-89 (D. 
Del. 1962); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. at 794; see also 
Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397, 403 (8th Cir.) ("attorney-client privilege does 
not protect client communications that relate only business or technical data"), cert. denied, 
484 U.S. 917 (1987); United States v. Huberts, 637 F.2d 630, 640 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 451 U.S. 975 (1981) (overseeing sale of equipment not a legal service). But see 
Hydroflow. Inc. v. Endine. Inc., 145 F.R.D. 626, 630 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (inclusion of 
technical information does not vitiate privilege "[i]f the primary purpose of the 
communication was to receive legal advice or services"). Similarly, if a court concludes that 
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the attorney is acting in his/her business capacity as a corporate director or officer, 
communications with respect to those actions are not protected. See United States v. 
Gleave, 786 F. Supp. 258, 292 (W.D.N.Y. 1992); Teltron Inc. v. Alexander, 132 F.R.D.394 
(B.D.Pa. 1990) ("an attorney who serves a client in a business capacity may not assert the 
attorney-client privilege because of the lack of a confidential relationship"); Youn~ v. 
Taylor, 466 F.2d 1329, 1332 (10th Cir. 1972); Radiant Burn'ers. Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 
320 F.2d 314,324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963); Federal Savin~s & Loan Ins. 
Corp. v. Fieldin~, 343 F. Supp. 537, 546 (D. Nev. 1972); Radio Corp. of America v. 
Rauland Corp., 18 F.R.D. 440, 443 (N.D. TIL 1955); United States v. Vehicular Parkin~. 
Ltd., 52 F. Supp. 751, 753-54 (D. Del. 1943). 
2. THE APPLICATION OF THE ATIORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
TO COMMUNICATIONS INVOLVING A LAWYER ACTING AS 
BUSINESS PERSON REOUIRES A FACT SPECIFIC ANALYSIS. 
Communications between a corporation and its in-house counsel are 
protected to the same extent and in the same manner as those with outside counsel. ' 
Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389-97; United States v. Mobil Corp., 149 F.R.D. 533, 537 (N.D. 
Tex. 1993). Nevertheless, the determination of whether the discussions between manager-
lawyers and other corporate officials are privileged turns upon the particular circumstances 
of those discussions. Several factors will be relevant. In order to be within the privilege: 
(1) the communications must have been made with the intent of confidentiality; (2) the 
manager-lawyers must have acted in their capacity as lawyers; and (3) the communications 
must have pertained primarily to the rendering of legal advice by the manager-lawyers. 
Since the analysis applied by courts in such situations is fact-specific, both 
under the authority discussed above and the Upjohn Co. analysis, it is impossible to 
determine whether the discussions would be protected without exploring the individual 
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circumstances of each such discussion. Several factors can weigh against a finding that the 
attorney-client privilege applies, however. First, when the manager-lawyers are not directly 
affiliated with the corporation's legal department, and they do not engage in the practice 
of law in their daily corporate duties, it is unlikely that either party to the discussions 
would view the manager-lawyers as acting as attorneys with respect to the discussion. 
Second, it is also unlikely that such discussions would pertain to the rendering of legal 
advice by the manager-lawyers; rather, the discussions presumably would involve the 
reporting of legal advice rendered by the corporation's in-house and outside counsel. 
Third, the reporting (or rendering) of legal advice probably would not be the predominant 
purpose of the discussions. To the extent the discussions relate to dissemination and 
implementation of business decisions made on the basis of discussions at the legal 
meetings, the manager-lawyers may be viewed as acting in their business capacity. See 
Hardy v. New York News. Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 644-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (corporate 
affirmative action plan documents were not within corporate attorney-client privilege when 
they were part of an "ongoing business effort" to develop a plan and were drafted by a 
corporate employee who, while he was also an attorney, was acting in his capacity as 
director of employee relations). 
Several examples illustrate how courts assess the lawyer's role: (1) Where an 
attorney negotiates on behalf of his/her client, many courts hold that these 
communications, and even related communications between the attorney and client, are not 
privileged. See United States v. Wilson, 798 F.2d 509, 513 (1st Cir. 1986); J.P. Foley & Co. 
v. Vanderbilt, 65 F.R.D. 523, 526-27 (SD.N.Y. 1974); and (2) Where a lawyer simply 
traced transfers of funds, courts have denied the privilege claim, explaining: "The mere 
fact that a person is an attorney does not render as privileged everything he does for a 
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client. Ministerial or clerical services such as those testified to here are not within the 
privilege." United States v. Bartone, 400 F.2d 459, 461 (6th CiT. 1968), cert. denied, 393 
U.S. 1027 (1969). 
Business people operating under the misperception that a privilege arises 
merely by funneling documents past counsel will be sorely disappointed. Communications 
such as carbon copies to the law department, which reflect the business persons' 
assessments will be discoverable where their primary purpose is to report on business 
matters, and not to procure legal advice. See Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397, 
402-04 (8th Cir. 1987); First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wisc. Corp., 86 F.R.D. 160, 174 
(B.D. Wisc. 1980). Nevertheless, "the attorney-client privilege clearly applies to 
communications made to corporate counsel in the course of conducting an internal 
investigation." United States v. Shyres, 898 F.2d 647, 655 (8th CiT.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
821 (1990). 
Because the in-house lawyer often plays a legal and business role within a 
corporation, two questions should continually be asked before communicating with 
corporate clients: Which hat am I wearing? Which hat should I be wearing? 
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INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 
1. OVERVIEW 
Largely as a result of increasing litigation, expanding governmental regulation 
and publicity associated with scandals in the business world, internal corporate 
investigations have become, regrettably, an all too frequent component of corporate 
America. Businesses must be particularly aware of the pitfalls and traps that can be 
associated with internal investigations. Well in advance of commencing an internal 
investigation, in-house and outside counsel should carefully ponder how it will be 
conducted and, correspondingly, how it can be protected from disclosure in subsequent 
legal proceedings. Numerous treatises exist on this topic. These seminar materials will 
attempt only to outline key considerations which inside counsel should consider before 
commencing an internal investigation. 
2. IDENTIFY THE PURPOSE OF THE INTERNAL 
INVESTIGATION UNDER CONSIDERATION. 
Not all internal investigations are alike. The triggering event can be as 
varied as the situations that confront any business daily. For example, the decision to . 
investigate could flow from an employee's charge of wrongdoing, a competitor's threat of 
suit, a criminal investigation, a negative story in the press, a lawsuit, Grand Jury subpoenas, 
administrative agencies' document requests, etc. One constant exists, however: Before 
commencing an internal investigation, in response to any situation, counsel must carefully 
assess the potential benefit versus the potential harm that could result from subsequent 
disclosure in a legal proceeding. 
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3. THE KEY CONSIDERATIONS 
As a threshold matter, any business considering an internal investigation must 
assess the structure, scope and purpose of the internal investigation. An investigation not 
properly constituted with substantial lawyer participation will almost always become 
discoverable later. It is counsel's active involvement that implicates the attorney-client 
privilege and work-product doctrine. Counsel must therefore quarterback the investigation. 
An internal investigation can be costly, time-consuming and simply disruptive. 
Consequently, its scope· should be tailored to address the need. A criminal antitrust 
investigation would obviously warrant a broader-based investigation than would an 
employee's complaint regarding a single, isolated claim of wrongful discharge. 
Concomitant considerations are: What will the investigation accomplish? Will it advance 
the company's interests? Will it satisfactorily address the pending or impending problem? 
With these general concerns in mind, counsel, before authorizing or 
participating in an internal investigation, should ponder the following: 
1. What triggered the request or desire to investigate 
internally? That is, how serious is the causative agent? 
2. What is your corporate exposure, whether criminal or 
civil? 
3. Do extant documents -- once properly assembled and 
analyzed by counsel and others -- provide enough 
answers? 
4. Will an investigation, with the inherent risk of disclosure, 
ultimately benefit the corporation? 
5. How will the investigative team be structured so as to 
gather all necessary information and maintain 
confidentiality? 
6. Does counsel's role require the rendition of legal as 
opposed to business advice, thereby possibly implicating 
G - 36 
the attorney-client privilege and/or the work-product 
doctrine? 
7. If non-lawyers, ~, accountants, are required how 
should their activities be directed? 
8. In sensitive investigations, should more independence be 
sought by appointing outside lawyers to conduct the 
investigation? 
9. How can inadvertent disclosure be prevented both 
during and after the investigation? 
10. How should the results of the investigation be 
memorialized? Must they be in writing? 
11. Who needs to know? 
The general considerations naturally give way to the particulars of the 
situation confronting the corporation. Caution and confidentiality -- the underpinnings of 
each question above -- should pervade your deliberations, planning and investigative work. 
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I. Legislator Prohibited Practices 
1. Shall not use influence as member of General Assembly 
in any manner which involves substantial conflict 
between personal interests and duties in the public 
interest. (Pre-existing law) 
Example - vote for incentive package for company that 
will buy land from legislator's family. 
Penalty - Class A misdemeanor. 
2. Shall not use official position to obtain financial 
gain for legislator, family member, or business 
associate. (Pre-existing law) 
Example - Pressure Department of Transportation for 
road contract for relative. 
Penalty - Class D felony. 
3. Shall not use position to secure privileges, 
exemptions, advantages for legislator or others in 
derogation of public interest. (Pre-existing law) 
Example - Get refund back early; state police 
assistance. 
Penalty - Class A misdemeanor. 
4. Shall not use public funds, personnel for private gain. 
(New prohibition) 
Example - Use LRC secretaries to handle correspondence 
for private business. 
Penalty - Class A misdemeanor. 
5. Shall not use public funds, personnel for partisan 
political purposes. (New prohibition) 
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Example - LRC staff for campaign work; LRC xerox 
machines for campaign work. 
Penalty - Class A misdemeanor. 
6. Shall ,not use official stationery to solicit vote or 
contribution for a political campaign. (New 
prohibition, but consistent with last Ethics Commission 
ruling. ) 
Penalty - Ethical misconduct. 
Punishment: Issue cease and 'desist order 
Public reprimand 
Recommend censure or expulsion 
from the House in which he/she 
sits 
Civil penalty up to $2,000 
7. Shall not be drunk or under influence of controlled· 
substance to extent of being unable to discharge duties 
of office. (Pre-existing law) 
Penalty - Ethical misconduct. 
8. Shall not intentionally disclose confidential 
information acquired in the course of official duties 
to further own economic interest or that of another. 
(New, but covered in Penal Code - misuse of 
confidential information. KRS 522.040.) 
Example - Economic development project (Toyota) - go 
out and option up land. 
Penalty - Class D felony. 
9. Shall not be a party ,to a contract with the state 
involving more than $100 (up from $25) - whether 
directly or through others. (Pre-existing law) 
Exceptions: 
1. Contract between state and business he.and 
wife own 5' or·less. 
2. Contract entered into after public bidding. 
3. Contract available on similar terms as offered 
to other business or profession (e.g., state 
day care, medicaid, etc.). 
4. Contract entered into before he became a 
legislator. 
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Penalty - Class D felony and court may void the 
contract. 
10. Shall not sell or lease any real property to state. 
(Pre-existing law under general "contracts" 
limi tation. ) 
Exceptions: 
1. 5% rule applies. 
2. Pre-existing contracts. 
3. Nominal consideration contracts if the lease 
or sale pre-approved by Ethics Commission. 
4. Sales or leases in condemnation proceedings or 
under threat of condemnation. 
Issue: Extensions of existing leases - okay under this 
because a pre-existing contract - probably 
should go before the Commission first. 
11. Shall not use or attempt to use any means to influence 
a state agency in direct contravention of the public 
interest. (Pre-existing law) 
Example - Help a friend get a permit or strip mine; 
highway access. 
Problem in interpretation and application: What if you 
try to help new company get EPA permit (e.g., move a 
creek) and people in the district are split on whether 
this is in the public interest or not .. 
Penalty - Ethical misconduct. 
12. Shall not appear before a state agency--executive 
branch, not judicial--for compensation, as an expert 
witness. (Pre-existing law) 
Example - Legislator-engineer cannot appear before EPA 
(sewage treatment plant permit); Department of 
Transportation; legislator-doctor cannot testify before 
workers' compensation hearing officer. 
Penalty - Ethical misconduct. 
13. Shall not for compensation, represent a client before 
or in dealings with a state agency in matters relating 
to: 
1. Contracting for sale, lease, purchase, rental of 
goods or services; 
H - 3 
2. Any proceeding relating to rate-making; 
3. Adoption, amendment· or repeal of any 
administrative regulation; 
4. Obtaining grants of money or loans; 
5. Licensing or permitting (except matters relating 
to drivers licensing); 
6. Any proceeding before the PSC. 
Exceptions: 
1. Ministerial functions (not a defined term 
except "does not require discretion on the 
part of the agency") - examples given: filing 
corporate charters, reports, etc.; filing tax 
returns; filing reports required by a state 
agency; filing an application to particip.ate 
in a state-administered federal program if 
generally available to similar classes of 
people. May eat up much of the prohibition. 
2. Adversarial proceedings. 
3. Workers' Compensation and Special Fund 
proceedings. 
4. Unemployment Compensation proceedings. 
(Pre-existing law, but greatly modified.) 
Penalty - Ethical misconduct. 
14. Shall not represent a state agency. (New prohibition) 
Penalty - falls under general ethical misconduct 
provision. 
15. Shall not sue the state or state agency for money 
damages. (New prohibition) 
Exceptions: 
1. Appeal of state-initiated action vs. client. 
2. Workers' Compensation. 
3. Unemployment Compensation. 
4. Cases pending on effective date of new law. 
Penalty - falls under general ethical prohibition. 
16. Shall not receive compensation in any case that is 
contingent on action by a state agency - contingent 
fee. (Pre-existing law) 
Penalty - Ethical misconduct. 
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17. Shall not. accept honoraria for appearances, speeches or 
articles - doesn't apply to speeches, etc. related to 
legislator's private profession. (New prohibition) 
*May accept pre-paid or reimbursed food and lodging for 
out-of-state travel associated with official duties -
pre-approved by LRC. 
Penalty - Ethical misconduct. 
8. Shall not accept compensation, except as provided 
by law, for services as a legislator. 
(Pre-existing law) 
Example - Need to be at committee meeting- person 
wants you there for vote - agrees to fly you there in 
helicopter. 
Penalty - Class A misdemeanor. 
19. No legislator or spouse shall accept or solicit 
anything of value from a lobbyist (legislative agent) 
or employer of a legislative agent - e.g., gifts, golf, 
trips, tickets, food (except consumed on premises). 
(New prohibition) 
Definition of anything of value excludes: 
1. Campaign contributions. 
2. Compensation, etc. from private employer. 
3. Usual and customary commercial loan. 
4. Certificate plaque, commemorative token - less 
than $150 value. 
5. Informational/promotional items. 
6. Educational items. 
7. Food and beverages consumed on the premises. 
8. Tickets to events to which all legislators 
invited; all members of a jOint committee or task 
force are invited; to which a caucus is invited; 
events sponsored by local government or state 
institution of higher education; individual 
legislator if pre-approved by LRC. 
9. Gifts from relatives. 
10. Gifts if not used and returned or given to charity 
within thirty days. 
11. Cost of attendance·at national organization events 
- NCSL exception. 
12. Cost of attendance at ~vents sponsored by civic, 
charitable, governmental or community 
organizations. 
13. Gift from one legislator to another. 
14. Anything for which legislator pays or gives full 
value. 
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Penalty - Class B misdemeanor. 
20. Shall not advocate or cause the employment, promotion, 
transfer or advancement of family member to executive 
br~nch position; or participate in action relating to 
the disciplining of a family member; absolute 
prohibition on family member being employed in 
legislative branch (existing employees grand fathered 
in). (New prohibition) 
Penalty - Ethical misconduct. 
21. Shall not serve as a lobbyist (except for a public 
agency) for two years after leaving office (or be a 
lobbyist while in office). (New prohibition) 
Penalty - Ethical misconduct. 
22. Shall not participate in discussion/debate in Committee 
or on floor in any matter in which he has a conflict of 
interest (i.e., where the legislator or a family member 
has direct monetary loss or gain, or which relates 
directly to business in which the legislator 
owns/controls an interest of 5% or $10,000.00). 
(Largely pre-existing law) 
Exceptions: 
1. Matter that affects all members of a business 
or profession the same. 
2. Legislative salary, expenses, benefits. 
Penalty - Class D felony. 
23. Shall not accept appointment as officer or employee of 
state or state agency, or governing board of local or 
regional entity which has authority to levy taxes. 
(New prohibition added to pre-existing law.) 
Penalty - Ethical misconduct. 
24. Shall not accept a campaign contribution from a 
lobbyist. (Largely new prohibition - previous Attorney 
General opinion had limited the prohibition to times 
when the General Assembly was in session.) 
Saving provision: 14 day rule 
within 14 days of receipt. 
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turn in to Commission 
Penalty - Ethical misconduct. 
II. Legislator Reporting/Lobbyists Reporting (ALL NEW) 
1. Legislator reporting requirements - financial 
disclosure 
Report each February 15th on previous year. 
$lOO/day fine by Commission for non-compliance. 
Intentionally filing false or incomplete statement -
Class A misdemeanor. 
(1) Positions held by filer and spouse in any 
business, partnership, corporation, etc. 
(2) Information regarding all businesses, investments, 
securities - $10,000/5%. 
(3) Sources of gross income - filer and spouse. 
(4) Fiduciary positions held. 
(5) All real property having value of $10,000 or more 
- filer, spouse, minor child. 
(6) Gifts of $200 or more except from family member. 
(7) Creditors owed more than $10,000 except for debts 
. on consumer goods. . 
(8) Name of any lobbyist who is member of filer's 
immediate family, partner, officer or director of 
filer's employer, employer of filer or spouse, 
business associate of filer or filer's family. 
(9) Names of clients who are lobbyists or lobbyists' 
employers. 
(10) List of clients represented by partners and the 
state agencies they appeared before in areas where 
filer prohibited from acting. 
2. Lobbyist Registration/Reporting (See de!. p. 12 -
legislative agent) 
(1) Registration 
-File with Commission within 7 days of engagement. 
-10 employer and legislation action for which 
engaged. 
-Updated registration statement each month during 
regular sessions, 3 times in non-session years. 
-Registration lasts until December 31st of next 
odd-number year unless sooner terminated. 
-Separate filing for each employer. 
-Knowing failure to file - Class 0 felony. 
-Each employer pays 250 fee. 
(2) Reporting of Expendi~ures - at time of each 
registration update (see above) by lobbyist and 
employer) 
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-Amounts spent for food and beverages consumed on 
the premises; names; dates. 
-Total amount of lobbying expenditures in period. 
-Amounts spent on receptions. 
-Compensation paid to/received by lobbyists. 
-Details of any financial transaction with or for 
benefit of legislator. 
Note: If claim to have had financial transaction 
for benefit of legislators ~ spent money on 
legislators - send legislators a copy first so 
they have chance to dispute. (Commission resolves 
any dispute.) 
"Financial transaction" definition - doesn't 
include transactions entered into on same terms as 
other members of the general public. 
III. Lobbyist Prohibited Practices - Shall Not: 
1. Knowingly fail to register or intentionally file a 
false or incomplete statement of expenditures. 
Penalty - Class D felony. 
2. Fail to keep receipts/maintain records. 
Penalty - Ethical misconduct. 
3. Fail to file a required report. 
Penalty - Fine of $lOO/day up to maximum of $1,000. 
4. Give anything of value to legislator, spouse or child. 
Penalty - First offense - ethical misconduct. 
Second or subsequent offense - Class D 
felony. 
5. Serve as campaign treasurer or fundraiser for 
legislator or candidate for General Assembly. 
Penalty - First offense - ethical misconduct. 
Second or subsequent offense - Class D 
felony. 
- 6. Make a campaign contribution to a legislator or_ 
candidate for General Assembly. 
Penalty - First offense - ethical misconduct. 
Second or subsequent offense - Class D 
felony. 
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7. Spend more than $lOO/year on any legislator and 
immediate family for food and beverages consumed 4n the 
premises - collectively (if lobbyist has several 
employers or employer has several lobbyists). 
Penalty - First offense - ethical misconduct. 
Second or subsequent offense - Class D 
felony. . 
8. Hire a legislator as lobbyist or former legislator for 
two years after leaves office. 
Penalty - First offense - ethical misconduct. 
Second or subsequent offense - Class D 
felony. 
9. Lobby for contingent fee or hire lobbyist on contingent 
fee. 
Penalty - Class D felony. 
10. Go on floor of House or Senate while in session. 
Penalty - Class B misdemeanor. 
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I. Introduction. 
EXECUTIVE AGENCY LOBBYING 
Robert M. Watt, III 
Stoll, Keenon & Park 
201 East Main Street 
Suite 1000 
Lexington, Kentucky 40507 
A. The executive agency lobbying provision of S.B. 7 is an 
amendment to Chapter 11A of the Kentucky Revised 
Statutes, which was originally enacted in .1992 and is 
entitled "Executive Branch Code of Ethics." 
B. The statute, KRS 11A.201 through 11A.246, requires 
registration and reporting by both the lobbyists and 
their employers in connection with attempts to influence 
executive agency decisions. 
C. The Executive Branch Ethics Commission is the agency 
responsible for regulation of persons and conduct under 
this statute. 
D. A violation of these sections exposes the violator to 
both civil and criminal penalties. 
II. Who Is Regulated? (KRS l1A.201) 
A. "Employer" - any person who engages an executive agency 
lobbyist. KRS 11A.201(3). 
1. "Person" - an individual, proprietorship, firm, 
partnership, joint venture, joint stock company, 
syndicate, business, trust, estate, company, 
corporation, association, club, committee, 
organization, or group of persons acting in 
concert. KRS 11A.201(13). 
B. "Executive Agency Lobbyist" - any person engaged to 
influence executive agency decisions or to conduct 
executive agency lobbying activity as one of his main 
purposes on a regular and substantial basis. KRS 
11A. 20 I ( 8 ) (a) • 
1. Barring other unusual circumstances, only those who 
lobby concerning executive agency decisions 
involving state expenditures of more than $5,000 
per decision will be considered by the Executive 
I-I 
Branch Ethics Commission as acting on a "regular 
and substantial basis" and thus subject to 
regulation as executive agency lobbyists. Advisory 
Opinion 93-34. 
a. Those selling goods and services are not 
exempt from the provisions of S.B. 7 .. 
Advisory Opinion 93-34. 
b. A law firm partner must register as a lobbyist 
when pursuing a personal service contract if 
the activities of the partner or any lawyer 
exceed the levels in the foregoing guidelines. 
Advisory Opinion 93-34. 
2. "Executive Agency Lobbyist" does not include an 
elected or appointed officer or employee of a 
federal or state agency, ~tate college, state 
university, or political subdivision who attempts 
to influence or affect executive agency decisions 
in his fiduciary capacity as a representative of 
his agency, college, university or political 
subdivision. KRS IIA.201(8)(b). 
c. "Executive Agency" - the office of an elected executive 
official, a cabinet listed in KRS 12.250, or any other 
state agency, department, board, or commission controlled 
or directed by an elected executive official or otherwise 
subject to his authority. KRS lIA.201(6). 
1. "Executive agency" does not include any court or 
the General Assembly. 
2. The office of Property Valuation Administrator is 
an "executive agency." Advisory Opinion 93-41. 
D. "Executive Agency Official" - an officer or employee of 
an executive agency whose principal duties are to 
formulate policy or to participate directly or indirectly 
in the preparation, review, or award of contracts, 
grants, leases or other financial arrangements with an 
executive agency. KRS llA.201(10). 
E. "Elected Executive Official" Governor, Lieutenant 
Governor, Secretary of State, Auditor of Public Accounts, 
State Treasurer, Attorney General, Commissioner of 
Agriculture and Railroad Commissioners. KR.S llA.201(10). 
F. "Staff" - any employee in the office of the Governor, or 
a cabinet listed in KRS 12.250, whose official duties are 
to formulate policy and who exercises administrative or 
supervisory authority, or who authorizes the expenditure 
of state funds. KRS llA.201(14). 
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III. What Activity Is Regulated? (XRS lIA.201) 
A. "Executive Agency Lobbying Activity" - contacts made to 
promote, oppose, or otherwise influence the outcome of an 
executi ve agency decision by direct communication with an 
elected executive official, the secretary of any cabinet 
listed in KRS 12.250, or a member of the staff of anyone 
of the foregoing officials. KRS lIA.201(9)(a). 
1. "Executive agency lobbying activity" does not 
include: 
a. The action of any person having a direct 
interest in any executive agency decision 
which is protected by Section 1 of the 
Kentucky Constitution: lawful assembly or 
petition for redress of grievances; 
b. Contacts made for the sole purpose of 
gathering information contained in a public 
record; or 
c. Appearances before public meetings of 
executive agencies. KRS lIA.201(9)(b). 
B. "Executive Agency Decision" - a decision of an executive 
agency regarding the expenditure of funds of the state or 
of an executive agency with respect to the award of a 
contract, grant, lease or other financial arrangement 
under which those funds are distributed or allocated. 
KRS lIA.201(7). 
1. "Other financial arrangement" has been interpreted 
to mean any arrangement whereby funds of the state 
or an elected executive official or agency are 
distributed or allocated to the benefit of the 
person, company or organization seeking the 
distribution or allocation of such funds, e.g. the 
deposit of state funds into a particular commercial 
banking system, costs associated with the 
maintenance of any service agreement, and any type 
of retainer fees associated with management 
consulting services. Advisory Opinion 93-41. 
2. Decisions concerning licenses and permits, tax 
decisions, material specifications, bank charters, 
administrative regulations, enforcement actions and 
other non-expenditure decisions are not executive 
agency decisions. Advisory Opinion 93-41. 
C. "Expenditure" - any of the following that is made to, or 
for the benefit of an elected executive official, the 
secretary of a cabinet listed in KRS 12.250, an executive 
agency official, or a member of the staff of any of the 
foregoing officials KRS lIA.201(2)(a): 
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1. A payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, 
reimbursement, or gift of money, real estate, or 
anything of value, including, but not limited to, 
food and beverages, entertainment, lodging, 
transportation, or honoraria; 
2. A contract, promise, or agreement to make an 
expenditure; or 
3. The purchase, sale, or gift of services or any 
other thing of value. 
4. "Expenditure" does not include a gift to an 
organization exempt from taxation under Section 
50l(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code or the 
purchase, sale, or gift of services or any other 
thing of value that is available to the general 
public on the same terms as it is available to the 
foregoing persons. KRS lIA.201(2)(b). 
5. "Expenditure" has been interpreted to include 
refreshments, luncheon, meeting room, travel and 
consul ting fees paid by the lobbyist ,but 
"expenditure" has been interpreted not to include 
the cost of maintaining an office and support 
services for an executi ve agency lobbyist. 
Advisory Opinion 93-34. 
D. "Financial Transaction" - A transaction or activity that 
is conducted or undertaken for profit and arises from the 
joint ownership, or the ownership, or part ownership in 
common of any real or personal property or any commercial 
or business enterprise of whatever form or nature between 
the following KRS lIA.201(5)(a): 
1. An executive agency lobbyist, his employer, or a 
member of the immediate family of the executive 
agency lobbyist or his employer; and 
2. Any elected executive official, the secretary of a 
cabinet listed in KRS 12.250, an executive agency 
official, or any member of the staff of any of the 
foregoing officials. 
3. "Financial transaction" does not include any of the 
foregoing transactions if they are available to the 
general public on the same terms. KRS 
l1A. 201 ( 5 ) ( b) . 
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IV. Registration of Executive Agency Lobbyists and Employers. 
(KRS llA.206 and llA.2ll) 
A. An executive agency lobbyist or 
knowingly fail to ' 
employer shall 
register. 
not 
1. The lobbyist and the employer must file an initial 
registration statement within 10 days following the 
engagement of the lobbyist containing information 
about the lobbyist, the employer, the executive 
agency and the executive decision. 
2. In addition to the initial registration statement, 
the lobbyist and the employer must file updated 
registration statements on or before the last day 
of January, May and September of each year. 
a. Confirms the continuing existence of each 
engagement described in the ini tial 
registration statement; 
b. Lists the specific executive agency decisions 
the lobbyist sought to influence under the 
engagement during the period covered by the 
updated statement; and 
c. Attaches a statement of expenditures required 
by KRS llA.2l6 and any details of financial 
transactions required to be filed by KRS 
llA.221. 
3. If a lobbyist is retained by more than one 
employer, the lobbyist must file an initial and 
updated registration statement for each employer, 
but if an employer employs more than one lobbyist, 
it must file only on~ updated registration 
statement with information regarding all lobbyists. 
4. Any change in the information required to be filed 
in registration statements must be reflected in the 
next updated registration statement. The lobbyist 
must file notice of termination of an engagement 
within 30 days after termination of the engagement. 
5. No registration fee is charged for.the filing of 
the statements. 
6. Upon registration, each lobbyist receives a card 
issued by the Executive Branch Ethics Commission 
which is valid until January 31 of each year. 
7. The Commission must review each registration 
statement to determine if it is accurate and 
complete and notify the lobbyist or employer of 
deficiencies who will then have 15 days to file a 
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corrected statement. The Commission may also 
initiate an investigation of a failure to file. If 
the Commission initiates such an investigation, the 
executive official and secretary of the cabinet 
must also be notified. 
8. The Commission will publish statistical information 
about executive agency lobbying annually on or 
before March 15. 
9. I f an employer who engages a lobbyist is the 
recipient of a contract, grant, lease, or other 
financial arrangement pursuant to which funds are 
distributed or allocated, the executive agency or 
any aggrieved party may consider the failure of the 
employer or the lobbyist to comply with KRS 11A.211 
as a breach of a material condition of the 
contract, grant, lease or other financial 
arrangement. 
a. "Aggrieved party" means a party entitled to 
resort to a remedy. 
10. Executive agency officials may require 
certification of compliance with KRS 11A.211 from 
any person seeking the award of a contract, grant, 
lease or financial arrangement. 
v. Statement of Expenditures by Executive Agency Lobbyists and 
Employers. (KRS 11A.206 and 11A.216) 
A. Each lobbyist and each employer must file a statement of 
expenditures with the updated registration statement. 
The lobbyist must file a separate statement for each 
employer engaging him. 
B. The contents of the statement. 
1. The lobbyist must show the total expenditures made 
by the lobbyist during the reporting period. 
2. If the lobbyist or the employer made expenditures 
on behalf of a particular elected executive 
official, the secretary of a cabinet listed in KRS 
12.250, a particular executive agency official or a 
particular member of the staff of any of those 
officials, the lobbyist or the employer shall state 
the name of the official or employee on whose 
behalf the expenditure was made, the total amount 
of expenditures made, a brief description of 
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expenditures made and the approximate date of the 
expenditures made. 
3. In addition, the statement filed by the employer 
must show the total amount of expenditures made by 
the employer. 
4. An employer is not required to show any expenditure 
on his statement if it is shown on a statement 
filed by the employer's lobbyist. 
C. If it is impractical or impossible to determine exact 
dollar amounts or values of expenditures, reporting of 
good faith estimates, based on reasonable accounting 
procedures, constitutes compliance wi th this requirement. 
D. Lobbyists and employers are required to retain receipts 
or maintain records for all expenditures that are 
required to be reported .. These receipts or records must 
be maintained for a period ending on December 31 of the 
second calendar year after the year in which the 
expenditure was made. 
E. At least 10 days before the filing of the statement, each 
employer or lobbyist shall deliver a copy of the 
statement, or the portion thereof showing the 
expenditure, to the official or employee who is listed in 
the statement as having received the expenditure or on 
whose behalf it was made. 
F. The Executive Branch Ethics Commission has concluded that 
there is no exclusion for expenditures made on behalf of 
an official or employee which the employer or lobbyist 
may not be trying to influence. If the employer or 
lobbyist is registered, all expenditures made to or for 
the benefit of any state employee must be reported on the 
statement of expenditures. Advisory Opinion 93-41. 
VI. Statement of Financial Transactions. (KRS IIA.206 and 
IIA.221) 
A. Any lobbyist who has had a financial transaction with, or 
for the benefit of, an elected executive official, the 
secretary of a cabinet listed in KRS 12.250, an executive 
agency official, or any member of the staff of any of 
those officials must describe the details of the 
transaction, including the name of the official or 
employee, the purpose and nature of the transaction, and 
the date it was made and entered into, in a statement 
filed with the Commission with the updated registration 
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statement. Each statement shall describe each financial 
transaction during the four months preceding the filing 
of the updated registration statement. 
B. Any employer who has had a financial transaction with, or 
for the benefit of, the same officials or employees as 
listed above, must file a statement containing the same 
information with the Commission with the updated 
registration statement. 
C. At least 10 days before the date on which the statement 
is filed, each employer or lobbyist must deliver a copy 
of the statement to the official or employer with whom or 
for whose benefit the transaction was made. 
D. An employer is not required to file a statement of 
financial transactions or to deliver a copy of the 
statement to the official or employee with whom or for 
whose benefit the transaction was made if the financial 
transaction to which the statement pertains is reported 
by the lobbyist engaged by the employer. 
VII. Disputes Arising Out 
Financial Transactions. 
of Statements 
(KRS 11A.226) 
of Expenditures or 
A. Complaints arising out of statements of expenditures or 
financial transactions may be filed with the Executive 
Branch Ethics Commission. 
B. The complaint must be filed at least three days prior to 
the time the statement is required to be filed with the 
Commission. The filing of a complaint extends the time 
for filing the disputed, but not the undisputed, portions 
of the statement. If the Commission decides that the 
disputed expenditure or financial transaction should be 
reported, the employer or lobbyist must include the 
matter in an amended statement to be filed within 10 days 
after receiving notice of the decision of the Commission. 
C. An employer or lobbyist who files a false statement of 
expenditures or details of a financial transaction is 
liable in a civil action to any official or emplQyee who 
sustains damage as a result of the filing or publication 
of the statement. 
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VIII. Exceptions to the Filing Requirements. (KRS lIA.231) 
A. Registration ~tatements and· expenditure statements are 
not req\lired to be filed in connection with executive 
agency lobbying activity by any of the following: 
1. Appearances at public hearings of the committees or 
interim committees of the General Assembly, at 
court proceedings, at rule-making or adjudication 
proceedings, or at other public meetings; 
2. News, editorial and advertising statements in 
newspapers, journals or magazines or broadcast over 
radio or television; 
3. The gathering and furnishing of information and 
news by bona fide reporters, correspondents or news 
bureaus to news media; or 
4. Publications primarily designed for and distributed 
to members of associations or charitable or 
fraternal nonprofit corporations. 
B. Nothing in the executive agency lobbying portions of KRS 
llA requires the reporting of, or prohibits an elected 
official from soliciting or acceptirig, a contribution 
from or an expenditure by any person if the contribution 
or expenditure is reported .in accordance with KRS 
Chapters 121 or 121A. 
IX. Restrictions on the Form of Compensation for Executive Agency 
Lobbying. (KRS IIA.236) 
A. Contingent fee arrangements are prohibited. 
B. The foregoing prohibition does not prohibit any person 
from compensating his sales employees pursuant to an 
incentive compensation plan, such as commission sales, if 
the incentive compensation plan is the same plan used to 
compensate similarly situated sales employees who are not 
lobbyists. 
X. Miscellaneous Provisions Relating to the Executive Branch 
Ethics Commission. (KRS IIA.241) 
A. The Commission is required to keep on file all statements 
required to be filed by the Executive Agency Lobbying 
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sections of KRS llA and to computerize the files for 
ready accessibility by the general public. 
B. Twice a year, in February and October, the Commission 
must compile a list of registered lobbyists and their 
employers and distribute the list to each elected 
executive branch official and to each cabinet secretary 
listed in KRS 12.250. Copies of the list must be 
provided to the public at cost. 
C. The Commission must maintain a list of all executive 
agency lobbyists which must be provided to the public at 
cost. 
D. The Commission must prescribe and make available forms 
for filing registration, expenditure and financial 
transaction reports. 
1. The initial registration statement has been drafted 
by the Commission and is in the process of being 
finalized. 
E. Any rules promulgated by the Commission must be adopted 
as administration regulations in accordance with KRS 
Chapter 13A. 
F. The Commission must publish a handbook that explains in 
clear and concise language the executive agency lobbying 
provisions of KRS liA. 
XI. Attorney General Investigations and Penalties. (KRS l1A.266 
and lIA.990) 
A. The attorney general and any assistant or special counsel 
designated by him may investigate compliance with the 
executive agency lobbying provisions of KRS liA. 
B. The penalties for violation of KRS l1A.206, which 
requires the filing of the initial and update 
registration statements, the maintenance of receipts and 
records and the filing of expenditure and financial 
transaction reports, are as follows: 
1. For the first violation, the lobbyist or employer 
is guilty of ethical misconduct; and 
2. For the second and each subsequent violation, the 
lobbyist or employer shall be guilty of a Class D 
felony. 
, r. 
.LV 
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C. Any lobbyist or employer who fails to file an initial or 
updated registration statement, KRS 11A.211 and 11A.216, 
or who fails to remedy a deficiency in a filing in a 
timely manner, may be fined by the Commission an amount 
not to exceed $100 per day, up to a maximum total fine of 
$1,000. 
D. Any lobbyist or employer who intentionally fails to 
register, or who intentionally files an initial or 
updated registration statement, required by KRS 1lA.211 
and 11A.216, which he knows to contain false information 
or to omit required information shall be guilty of a 
Class 0 felony. 
E. Any lobbyist or employer who files a false statement of 
expenditures or details of a financial transaction under 
KRS 11A.221 and 11A.226, is liable in a civil action to 
any official or employee who sustains damage as a result 
of the filing or publication of the statement. 
F. Violation of KRS 11A.236, which prohibits contingent fee 
arrangements, is a Class 0 felony. 
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SECTION J 
PACs and Campaign 
Financing After Senate Bill 7 
presented by Herbert A. Miller, Jr. 
Stoll, Keenon & Park, Attorneys 
1. Introduction 
2. Effective Dates: November 3, 1993 vs. January 1, 1994 
3. New Provisions (all references are to changes in 
KRS Chapter 121): 
(a) All of the following will be required to identify all PAC 
contributors "of any amount" and all of contributors of 
more than $100 (was $300) by name, add~ess, description 
of the PAC's business, social or political interest, age 
(if under 18), employer, spouse (if applicable) and 
occupation ("Businessman" is not a sufficient 
description) : 
(1) Registry of Election Finance (.120) 
(2) Campaign Treasurer· (.160 (2) (b» - also must keep 
similar deposit records (.220(2». "Businessman" 
is ~ sufficient. 
(3) State and County executive committees (.180(2» 
(4) Fundraisers of more than $3,000 (.180(3» 
(5) ]?ACs, Inaugural committees and contributory 
organizations (.180(6)(a» 
(b) Prohibition against cash contributions to candidates, 
commi ttees and contributing organizations of over $50 
(was $100). (.150(4». 
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(c) No person may contribute to all PACs and contributing 
organizations more than $1,500 in anyone (1) year (was 
$4,000). (.150 ( 10) ) . 
(d) Effective January 1, 1994, "affiliated" PACs will be 
treated as if they were one PAC for contribution limits 
to candidates, campaign committees and political issues 
commi tte.es. The limit is $500 per election (except 
school board races which have their own limits. See, 
.150(7». 
(e) A candidate (except slates for Governor and Lt. Governor) 
may not accept more than 35% (or $5,000 whichever is 
greater) of all contributions in an election from PAC 
funds (calculated as of the regular election day which 
ends the cycle). Carryover funds are not counted in the 
next regular cycle. To avoid PAC limits, a candidate may 
contribute to his/her campaign account or refund excess 
PAC funds pro rata. (.150(25». Balances in campaign 
accounts on November 2, 1993 are not subject to this 
restriction. 
(f) Effecti ve January 1, 1994, no member of the General 
Assembly may organize, form or register a PAC. 
4. Other New Provisions: 
(a) A legislative agent may not lawfully give a campaign 
contribution to a member of the General Assembly, 
candidate for the General Assembly or hislher campaign 
committee (Section 26 of SB 7). 
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(b) A legislative agent shall not serve as a campaign 
treasurer or a fundraiser (Section 26 of SB 7), 
(c) Allowable Campaign Expenditures (Section 63 of SB 7): 
(1) Funds in a campaign account may only be used for 
expenditures (including reimbursements for actual 
expenses) made directly and primarily in support of 
or opposition to a candidate, constitutional 
amendment or public question which will appear on 
the ballot. 
(2) Allowable Campaign Expenditures Under Proposed 
Regulation 32 KAR 2:200: 
a) Advertising through charitable donations; 
b) Personal property with a value of $10 or less 
each (hats; shirts, calendars, cards, etc.) 
Tickets distributed generally to influence an 
election are not allowed under this section; 
c) Services directly related to the campaign; 
d) Transportation directly related to the 
campaign, including of voters to the polls; 
e) Tickets to events for candidate, spouse and 
staff if a direct benefit to the campaign; 
f) Flags to donate to schools, charities, etc.; 
g) Campaign event meals of $5 or less value each; 
h) Purchase or rental of phones, copiers, 
computers, fax machines, etc. directly relateq 
to the campaign. A presumption will exist in 
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favor of the candidate in the year of the 
election. In non-election years the campaign 
use must exceed 50%. 
(3) Unlawful Campaign Expenditures Under Proposed 32 
KAR 2:200: 
a) Dues to profession~l, civic or other 
organizations; 
b) Defraying costs of the individual's 
performance as an officeholder; 
c) Gifts, flowers, food, etc. for to benefit 
campaign staff or volunteers or "any other 
expenditure which bestows a private, pecuniary 
benefit to an individual." 
(4) Burden of proof placed on the .candidate or 
officeholder. 
5. "Contribution" Rules: 
(a) A "contribution" is any: 
(1) payment, distribution, loan, deposit or gift of 
money or other thing of value ("loan" includes a 
guaranty) (See Advisory. Opinion 92-008); 
(2) payment by any other person for personal services 
rendered to a candidate; 
(3) goods, advertising or services valued over $100 in 
any election furnished or utilized without charge, 
or less than the rate normally charged; and 
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(4) independent expenditures made .Qr furnished to 
influerice el~ction results. 
(b) A "contribution" is not: 
(1) volunteer services of an individual (See Advisory 
Opinion 93-025); or 
(2) loans from financial institutions made per banking 
regulations and in the ordinary course of business. 
(c) Continuing Contribution Limits (see generally KRS 
121.150): 
(1) $500 per election per candidate and PAC (except 
school boards and party executive committees); 
(2) No anonymous contributions over $50, or aggregate 
of $1,000 in anyone election; 
(3) No contributions over $100 from anyone not 18 by 
the gen~ral election; 
(4) Personal Loans from candidates to committees shall 
not exceed $50,000 per election for Governor/Lt. 
Governor slates; $25,000 for other statewide 
offices; and $10,000 for other offices sought by a 
candidate. 
(d) Other Continuing Contribution Restrictions: 
(1) Prohibition against corporate contributions, 
directly or indirectly (including in-kind) . 
Corporate PAC expenses must be reimbursed with 
detailed records kept. 
(2) Prohibition against candidates and PAC from 
soliciting from and contributing to charitable 
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causes or org?lnizations, except the candidates 
continuation of regular personal contributions (See 
Advisory Opinions 93-005 and 93-031). 
(3) Cannot solicit nor accept contributions after the 
date of a primary, regular election, or special 
election for these respective elections. Includes 
solicitations by others on behalf of the candidate. 
Excludes the candidate's own contributions (See 
Advisory Opinion 93-013). 
(4) No commingling of funds with candidate's own 
contributions. (121.180(9» 
(5) Cannot use campaign funds for other offices or 
issues (121.180(10», except for admission tickets 
not over $100 per event. 
6. Treasurers and Fundraisers: 
(a) Definitions. 
(b) Fundraisers to report as treasurers once threshold 
reached (121.180(3» on a Registry form (See Advisory 
Opinion 93-015). 
(c) Must establish a primary campaign depository. (121.220) 
(d) Expenditures over $25 to be made by check. (121.160) 
(e) Retain records for 6 years from date of last report 
filed. 
(f) Can serve as treasurer for more than one candidate or 
slate but cannot be both treasurer and chairman of a 
committee. 
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(g) Vacancies shall be filed wi thin 3 days of notice of 
vacancy. 
7. Special Rules of KRS 121.330 (See Advisory Opinion 93-002): 
(a) Entities whose officers or employees (including their 
spouses) knowingly contribute more than $5,000 in the 
aggregate (in anyone election) to an elected official's 
campaign, cannot knowingly receive, or be awarded by the 
elected official or his appointees, any non-bid contract 
with any governing authority on which the elected 
official serves during the term of office following the 
campaign in which the contributions were made. 
(b) Fundraisers (and their immediate families, employer or 
employee) raising over $30,000 in anyone election for 
the elected candidate cannot receive or be awarded non-
bid contracts, lease or appointment to any office or 
board with a governing authority on which the elected 
official serves. (121.330) 
8. Registration Rules: 
(a) Campaign Treasurer - KRS 121.160 
(b) Fundraisers - KRS 121.160 
(c) PACs ($200 to register, plus $200 annually) 
9. Reporting Rules - KRS 121.180 
10. Registry Advisory Opinions 
J-7 
J-8 
Summary of Advisory Opinions 
Registry of Election Finance 
92-001: Attorney's campaign must pay for use of property (phones, copiers, etc.) 
owned by the attorney's P.S.C. and used in the campaign. 
92-002: Affiliated PACs. Now moot. 
92-003: A PAC's 5% administrative fee must be remitted with each PAC report. 
Expenditures to federal candidates do not count in the calculation. Reports under 
KRS 121.180(6) are not applicable to federally-regulated out-of-state PACs. 
92-004: Campaign funds can buy tickets to another candidate's event not to exceed 
$100 per event. Cautions against giving them away in order to influence a vote (this 
could be a "bribe") . 
92-005: PAC contributions cannot be commingled with corporate funds. 
92-006: Local Democratic Party cannot sponsor a scholarship at a local college to aid 
incoming Democratic freshmen. 
92-007: Democratic National Committee can contribute to Kentucky Democratic Party 
to help elect candidates to federal office. The funds should be separately 
maintained. 
92-008: Donated office space constitutes an in-kind contribution. 
92-009: A candidate may use personal funds to buy UK basketball tickets and donate 
them to raise scholarship money provided that there is no linkage as to who the 
recipients are. ' 
92-010: A legislator cannot use his campaign funds to run for Speaker of the House. 
92-011: A PAC may fund a status report on the finances and services of Jefferson 
County as long as the report is not candidate specific. 
93-001: A PAC is limited by statute in how much it can contribute to other PACs 
($500/$1,500), state executive committees ($2,500) and the like. A PAC is included 
under the definition of "person". 
93-002: The prohibition against getting no-bid contracts in KRS 121.330 still applies 
even if the elected official (and his/her appointees) constitute minority membership 
on an independent board. 
93-003: PVA candidates may accept contributions from those whose property they 
assess. 
93-004: A candidate's corporation owned by the candidate and his wife cannot 
contribute to his campaign, and cannot provide reduced rate facilities and services 
to the campaign (or the campaigns of others) . 
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93-005: A candidate may continue to make personal contributions to charitable 
causes. 
93-006: The sole-owner of a personal service corporation (P. S. C.) can contribute 
to the sole-owner's campaign. Based on Gable v. Jones case on appeal to the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals. 
93-007: A dissolving PAC cannot distribute surplus funds to another PAC. 
93-008: A corporation may pay for advertising in the Democratic Party newspaper 
as long as the paper charges market rates and uses the money for administrative 
purposes, not for elections. 
93-009: Candidates may split the costs of campaign materials if each pays pro rata. 
Payment should be made by campaign fund checks if paid to the vendor or by 
individual checks if reimbursing another candidate. 
93-010: While a Kentucky corporation cannot contribute to candidates in other 
states, a Kentucky PAC can. 
93-011: PACs not regulated by KRS 121 do not fall within the contribution limits of 
the chapter. 
93-012: Not Yet Issued. 
93-013: Discusses generally the timely receipt of contributions mailed or delivered 
before election day but received after election day. "Several days creates an 
impermissible gap." 
93-014: Not Yet Issued. 
93-015: To qualify as a "fundraiser" a person must both solicit and receive 
contributions. 
93-016: A candidate may use bulk rate mailing services but is required to include 
the sponsorship identification on them. 
93-017: A person who has contributed the $500 limit to a candidate can still give the 
limit to an executive committee (but not earmarked for a specific candidate). 
93-018: A trust created by the Jefferson County Democratic Party to pay its 
operating expenses would be regulated by the Registry as a permanent committee or 
a political action committee and subject to the contribution limitations, etc. of those 
entities. 
93-019: The Citizens for Better Judges PAC may endorse judicial candidates through 
newspaper advertising not to exceed $500 per candidate, which must be reported as 
in-kind contributions to those candidates. 
93-020: Discusses the transfer of contribution money between the Republican Party 
of Kentucky and its affiliates and subdivisions, and the limitations thereon. 
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93-021: A tax-exempt neighborhood association may not lawfully contribute to a 
Kentucky judicial candidate. 
93-022: When a person endorses a check in blank to a PAC, the instrument is 
treated as cash and subject to the cash contribution limit of $50 in KRS 121.150(4). 
The Registry recommends such giving from a person's personal checking account. 
93-023: A Republican Party newsletter may sell advertising space to corporations 
provided it charges regular rates for comparable publications and puts the money 
in a separate, segregated administrative account dedicated for party administrative 
expenses. (See also Advisory Opinion 93-008). 
93-024: See Advisory Opinion 93-032. 
93-025: (1) A full partner of a law firm partnership may donate legal services to a 
candidate for elected office without it being considered an in-kind contribution. (2) 
However, such services by employees of the firm (such as non-equity partners, 
associates and clerks) which are paid by the partnership are considereq. in-kind 
contributions. To the extent the dollar value of these services exceeds $100 per full 
partner, each partner's pro rata share should be reported by the candidate as an in-
kind contribution. (3) Services provided to a candidate after the general election 
must either be volunteered services by the employees or fully compensated at their 
fair market value by the campaign. 
93-026: Volunteered legal services for a campaign are not contributions. See 
Advisory Opinion 93-025. 
93-027: A vendor (in this case, a corporation providing long-distance telephone 
discounts) to a state political party may enter into arm's length business agreements 
provided that revenue to the party be deposited into a separate, segregated bank 
account designated for administrative purposes only (see 93-008 and 93-023). 
93-028: In order to qualify as an "independent expenditure" under KRS 121.150(1), 
printed political speech (newspaper advertisement) need not contain literal language 
urging the defeat of a political candidate. Citing federal cases, the Registry 
concluded that the speech qualifies if it is "susceptible of no other reasonable 
interpretation but as an exhortation to vote. . against. . specific 
candidate(s). " 
93-029: A campaign may award a bonus to a campaign worker after an election only 
if: (1) the worker is a paid employee, (2) the worker has an advance agreement with 
the campaign regarding the bonus and (.3) the bonus is reasonable in light of all the 
facts and circumstances. 
93-030: Bumper stickers are exempt under 32 KAR 2:110 from the disclaimer 
language required by KRS 121.190(1). 
93-031: (1) A candidate for re-election may not make contributions to charities with 
surplus campaign funds from the previous election. KRS 121.180(10) governs the 
final disbursements of a fund. (2) The expense of a computer and computer operator 
or other equipment in the year of the election will be a permitted campaign expense 
if at east 50% of its use is in re-election campaign related activities. (3) A newsletter 
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by a candidate for re-election may be viewed as campaign material (as opposed to a 
report of an officeholder's activities), particularly as to its timing to an election. 
(4) If a potential candidate for re-election ultimately declines to run, the individual 
may have ,to reimburse the campaign for expenses not directly related to the 
campaign. (5) Expenses for the next election (re-election), even though incurred 
within 60 days of the most previous election, cannot be considered part of the 
previous campaign. [Note: the foregoing is premised upon adoption of proposed 
regulation 32 KAR 2: 200. ] 
93-032: The state Republican party may establish a building fund governed by 
federal election laws, provided that all contributions to the fund and expenditures 
by the fund are reported to the Registry. 
93-033: An unincorporated Democratic Women's Club is a "person" as used in KRS 
121 .150 (11) , and may contribute $1,000 in a calendar year to a local party executive 
committee. . 
* * * * * 
WARNING 
The above are just summaries of Advisory Opinions. Please obtain and read the 
whole Opinion in order to get the benefit of the full text. 
KRS 121.135 provides that an Advisory Opinion is binding on the Registry only to 
the person to whom it is addressed and only if the facts stated were complete and 
correct at the time the opinion was rendered, and the person acted in good faith 
reliance on the opinion. 
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Chairman 
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KENTUCKY REGISTRY OF ELECTION FINANCE 
140 WALNUT STREET 
F~ANKFORl KENTUCKY 40601 
(502) 564·2226 
FAX' 564·5622 
ADVISORY OPINION 93-025 
George Russell 
Executive DirBC~r 
Any advisory op1n10n rendered by the registry 
under subsections {1) or (2) of this section may 
be relied upon only by the person or committee 
involved in the specific transaction or activity 
with respect to which the advisory opinion is 
required. KRS 121.135(4). 
November 10, 1993 
Hon. Spencer D. Noe 
Stoll, Keenon & Park 
201 East Main Street 
Suite 1000 
Lexington, Kentucky 40507-1380 
Dear Mr. Noe: 
Thank you for contacting the Registry. Also, thank you for 
supplementing your facts in our phone conversation. Based on 
the information you have provided, the facts to your question 
can be stated as follows: 
Dennis Clark ("Clark") is the 1993 Republican 
Party candidate for County Judge Executive of 
Oldham County, Kentucky. To gain the office of 
Oldham County Judge Executive, Mr. Clark needed 
to raise funds for his campaign. Because Mr. 
Clark is an employee of a county merit system, 
the Oldham County Police Department, he or his 
advisors decided that he needed to obtain a 
declaratory judgment which clearly affirmed his 
right to run for political office and do 
everything necessary to gain office under KRS 
95.017, in spite of what appeared to be a 
prohibi tion against a merit system employee 
soliciting funds for any political activity under 
KRS 78.435(1). 
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Kentucky Republican Party officials, asked you, 
as a practicing attorney (and an equity partner 
in a Kentucky law firm), to volunteer legal 
services by filing the above-referenced 
declaratory judgment action in the Oldham County 
Circuit Court. 
After you obtained a favorable ruling for 
candidate Clark, the Oldham Circuit Court's 
ruling was appealed. A summer law clerk with 
your firm assisted you through the Circuit Court 
judgment stage of the lawsuit. Since you 
received notice of the appeal, a non-equity 
partner in your firm has assisted you with the 
case. Neither the non-equity partner nor the 
summer law clerk knew that you had volunteered 
your services for Mr. Clark's campaign effort. 
Clark has paid all out-of-pocket expenses 
required in the above action. Also, Clark will 
receive no bill for the services provided. 
Based on the above facts, your question can be stated as 
follows: 
Under KRS Chapter 121, may a practicing attorney 
volunteer legal services for a candidate for 
political office in Kentucky, or would this 
practice constitute an in-kind contribution to 
the candidate's campaign? 
The answer to your question is a qualified yes. In 
general, an attorney may volunteer servicef?· in support of a 
candidate for elective office in Kentucky. A basic tenant of 
Kentucky campaign finance law is that anyone may volunteer 
various services in support of a candidate for elective office. 
For instance, KRS 121.015(7) (a) excludes "services provided 
without compensation" from the definition of the term 
"contribution." Id. KRS 121.160(6) further develops this 
concept by stating that "The candidate or slate of candidates 
may pay a campaign treasurer a salary for his services which 
shall be considered a campaign expense and shall comply with the 
reporting provisions of KRS 121.180 and administrative 
regulations promulgated by the registry." Id. (Emphasis 
added). Many times treasurers for Kentucky-Candidates are 
attorneys or licensed certified public accountants who volunteer 
professional services as campaign treasurers. KRS 121.160(6) 
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does not require that a professional be paid by a candidate or 
campaign committee for services rendered in support of the 
candidacy. Clearly a treasurer I s duties are fundamental to a 
campaign effort. In your particular case, legal services are 
fundamental to Clark I s candidacy, since he is an employee of 
the Oldham County Police Department. 
Recently, the Registry considered a similar question in 
KREF v. Studio Arts, Inc., KREF 93-105. In that case, which 
considered whether or not the services in question constituted a 
corporate contribution, commercial artists had volunteered their 
services to design a logo for a political campaign in Kentucky. 
The commercial artists created the logo design on their own 
personal time. The Registry ruled that the services involved 
constituted volunteered professional services. 
You have indicated that you are not incorporated as a 
professional service corporation; therefore, the corporate 
contribution issue is not part of your question. However, your 
services as an attorney would easily exceed the $500 
contribution limit set forth in KRS 121.150(6) if such services 
counted as a contribution. As the treasurer may volunteer in 
KRS 121.160(6), and the professionals were allowed to volunteer 
in Studio Arts, Inc., you may volunteer your services to the 
Clark campaign. 
You did not ask the question of whether or not your 
non-equity partner and your summer law clerk may volunteer 
services to a campaign. Using the same reasoning as above I 
these employees would also be allowed to volunteer services to a 
campaign. However, you indicated that these employees performed 
legal services for Clark during regular work hours and knew 
nothing of the "volunteer'" billing, arrangement. Therefore, the 
amount spent by the equity partners as salary paid to. these 
employees for their work on the lawsuit. in question, constitutes 
an in-kind contribution. The amount of this in-kind 
contribution should be reported by Clark. Therefore, you may 
value the in-kind contribution by-determining the hours spent by 
your employees on the project and multiplying that figure by the 
hourly amounts the firm compensates these employees. This 
figure should be divided by the number of equity partners in 
your law firm and Clark should itemize and report (or record and 
report) these amounts depending on whether the amounts are less 
than $300 per equity partner. For example: The non-equity 
partner earns $50 per hour in salary and he or she works twenty 
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(20) hours on the project. If there are ten (10) equity 
partners in the firm, each partner has contributed $100 in-kind 
to Clark. Clark should report these as ten (10) unitemized 
in":'kind contributions. Note: I f the separate contributions 
exceeded $300 each, Clark would have to itemize these on his 
report. [See KRS 121.160(2)(b)]. After the 1993 general 
election, the threshold amount for itemized reporting will be 
$100. Finally, no contribution may be made or accepted after 
the general election. [See KRS 121.150(16)]. Therefore, in the 
event the litigation in question continues after the 1993 
general election, your employee (s) would have to volunteer any 
services provided after the general election date or the Clark 
campaign would have to pay fair market value for such services. 
This opinion is based upon the course of action outlined in 
your letter. If you should have any more questions, please give 
us a call. Thank you. 
TES/dt 
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DEPARTMENT Of STATE 
Registry of Election Finance 
32 KAR 2~180. Extension of credit to candidates, camp_gn 
committees, or politicallssu. committee. 
RELATES TO: KRS 121.180(7) . 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS 121.12O(1)(g) 
NECESSITY AND FUNCTION: KRS 121.180(7) provides that if 
the final statement of a candidate, campaign committee, or political 
issues committee shows an unexpended balance or outstanding debt, 
the entity shall continue to file supplemental reports until all debts 
have been settled and any outstanding balance depleted. Except for 
debts incurred in campaigns prior to January, 1989, only candidates· 
may contribute after an election to defray outstanding debts. As a 
result, obligations owed by a candidate are of necessity assumed by 
the candidate personally. Regardless of whether an outstanding debt 
is !he result of a pre·1989 campaign or subsequent election, the 
failure to settle a debt may result in a contribution, and often an illegal 
corporate contribution, or a contribution in excess of the contribution 
limit in effect at the time of the election. It is necessary to promulgate 
this administrative regulation to establish the criteria on which the 
registry shall determine if an outstanding debt has been converted to 
a contribution. 
Section 1. Scope. This administrative regulation shall apply only 
to debts incurred for elections held subsequent to November, 1993. 
Section 2. Extensions of credit to cancidates, campaign commit-
I8es, or political issues committees. 
(1) For purposes of this section, an 'unsatisfied extension of 
crecit" means an outstanding debt which has not been satisfied within 
a reasonable time after the date of an election and which has not 
been assumed by a candidate personally. 
(2) An unsatisfied extension of credit through deferred bUling or 
payment fOr goods and services rendered to a cancidate, campaign 
committee, or political issues committee shall be construed as a 
campaign contribution if: 
(a) The transaction was entered into with no reasonable expecta-
tion of repayment; 
(b) The nnsaction is baed upon tllnns WKI conditions not 
avaiable 110 other c:::ustomers sarvad by the creditor; 
(c) The transaction is not a transaction between two (2) unrelated 
plries bargaining at arms length; or 
(d) The transaction constitutes a significant deviation from the 
crecitor's regular commercial practices. 
(3) An extension of credit through deferred billing or payment for 
goods and services rendered to a candidate, campaign committee, or 
political issues committee, may be considered a campaign contribu-
tion if: 
(a) The creditor abandons efforts to enforce or collect the debt on 
grounds that are not commercially reasonable; 
(b) The creditor abandons, forgives, or cancels the debt under 
conditions not generally available to other customers of the creditor; 
(c) The creditor abandons, cancels or forgives the debt for no 
r&aSonable business purpose; or 
(d) In !he case of a creditor who is an individual or unincorporated 
entity, if any of the conditions in this subsection are determined to 
exist, and the amount of the debt forgiven, abandoned, or cancelled, 
when added to other monetary or in-kind contributions made by the 
creditor exceed the contribution limits in effect at the time of the 
extension of credit 
(4) An extension of credit through deferred billing or payment for 
goods and services rendered by a creditor to a candidate or cam-
paign committee or the cancellation, forgiveness, or abandonment of 
such a debt may be determined by the registry to be a campaign 
contribution if a totality of the evidence indicates that the transaction 
is not commercially reasonable. The mere passage of time shall not 
be determinatiVe, nor shall the finding that a transaction was merely 
unwise. In making the determination, the registry shall consider: 
(a) Whether owners or controllers of the creditor are contributors 
to or political supporters of the candidate; 
(b) Whether the amount of credit extended exceeds the amount 
of credit extended to nonpolitical customers of the creditor; and 
(c) Whether the terms under which the credit was extended are 
substantially different than the terms and conditions generally applied 
in transactions between the creditor and its nonpolitical customers. 
JOSEPH H. TERRY, Chair 
APPROVED BY AGENCY: November 12,1993 
FILED WITH LAC: November 15, 1993 at 11 a.m. 
PUBUC HEARING: A public hearing on this proposed administra-
tive regulation shall be held on December 21,1993, at 9 a.m. at 140 
Walnut Street, Frankfort, Kentucky. Individuals interested in attending 
this hearing shall notify this agency in writing by December 16, 1993, 
five days prior to the hearing, of their intent to attend. If no notification 
of intent to attend the hearing is received by that date, the hearing 
may be cancelled. This hearing is open to the public. Any person who 
attends will be given an opportunity to comment on the proposed 
administrative regulation. A transcript of the public hearing will not be 
made unless a written request for a transcript is made. If you do not 
wish to attend the public hearing, you may submit written comments 
on the proposed administrative regulation to: George Russell, 
Executive Director, Kentucky Registry of Election Finance, 140 
Walnut Street, Frankfort, Kentucky 40601, (502) 564-2226. 
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 
Contact Person: Anita Stanley 
(1) Type and number of entities affected: This administrative 
regulation affects all candidates, campaign colt:1 mittees , political 
issues committees, and also indirectly affects creditors of those 
entities. The administrative regulation shall apply. only to debts 
incurred for elections held subsequent to November, 1993. 
(a) Direct and incirect costs or savings to those affected: 
1. First year: No direct or indirect cost will result from the 
promulgation of this administrative regulation. 
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2. Con1inuing com « savings: No cIrect « i1dr9ct cost wiI f8SUtt 
fnMn !he promulgation of !tIis administrative regulation. 
3. Additional factors inc:t9asing « deaeasing costs (nota any 
eft8cts u-pon competition: None . 
(b) Reporting and paperwork ~iraments: The only adcitionaI 
paperwortt resulting from this administrative regulation wi. be that 
associated with ~s before the Registry in which !he determination 
wi. be made as to whether an unsatisfied debt has became a 
contribution . 
(2) Effects on !tie promulgating administrative boctj: 
(a) Direct and incirect costs « savings: 
1. First year: This administrative regulation will result in no 
additional direct or indirect cost to the agency. 
2. Continuing costs or savings: This administrative regulation will 
result in no additional direct or indirect cost to !tie agency. 
3. Additional factors increasing or decreasing costs: None 
(b) Reporting and paperwork requirements: The agency wiR 
experience some increase in paperwork associated wi!tl actions 
before the ~gistry in which !tie determination will be made as to 
whether an unsatisfied debt has become a contribution. 
(3) Assessment of anticipated effect on state and local revenues: 
This administrative regulation w~1 have no effect on state and local 
revenues. 
(4) Assessment of alternative methods; reasons why alternatives 
were rejected: The proviSions of this administrative regulation 
establish fair guidelines to be useclby the registry in determining 
whether an outstanding debt has become a contribution. 
(5) Identify any stallJte, administrative regulation or government 
policy which may be in conflict, overlapping, or duplication: None 
(a) Necessity of proposed regulation if in conflict: None 
(b) If in conflict, was effort made to harmonize the proposed 
administrative regulation with conflicting provisions: None 
(6) Any additional information or comments: None 
TIERING: Is tiering applied? Tiering is not applied because the 
provisions of this administrative regulation will apply uniformly to 
debts incurred subsequent to 1993. 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
Registry of Section Finance 
32 KAR 2:190. Committee affiliation. 
RELATES TO: KRS 121.150(7) 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS 121.120(1)(g), 121.150(7) 
NECESSITY AND FUNCTION: KRS 121.150(7) provides that 
permanent committees affiliated by bylaws, structure, or registration, 
as determined by the registry, shall be considered one (1) committee 
for purposes of the contribution limitations contained in KRS 121.150. 
It is necessary to promulgate this administrative regulation to 
establish guidelines to be followed by the registry in making the 
affiliation determination. 
Section 1. (1) For purposes of applying the contribution limits 
contained in KRS 121.150, permanent committees shall be consid-
ered affiliated committees if they are estab~shecl, financed, main-
tained, or controlled by or in common control wi1h: 
(a) A single corporation or its subsidiaries; 
(b) A single national or international union or its state and Ioc:aI 
unions or subordinate organizations; and 
(c) A membership organization, olher !han a political party 
committee, inclucing a trade or professional association or group. 
(2) The registry may examine the relationship between organiza-
tions that sponsor committees, between the committees themselves, 
or between one (1) sponsoring «ganization and a commitille 
established by another «ganization ID determine whether the 
committees are affiliated. In determining whether committees not 
otleI wi. ~ by fIis adrninisuM regUiaeon ani atftIiared b 
purposes of contribution limitations, the registry may consider !he 
circumstantial factors described in this subsection in the context of the 
overall relationship between the entities. Such faclDrs include, but 
shaJI not be rmil8cl to: 
(a) Whether a sponllOring organization of one (1) committee owns 
a c:ontroIing inI&rest in the voting steck or SeaJrities of !he sponsoring 
organization of another committee; 
(b) Whether a sponsoring organization or committee has the 
authority or ability to cirect or participate in the governance of another 
sponsoring organization or committee through proviSions of conslifu. 
tions, bylaws, contracts, or o!tler rules, or through formal or informal 
practices «procedJres; 
(c) Whether a sponsoring organization or committee has the 
authority « ability to hire, appoint, demote, or otherwise contralthe 
officers or other decisionmaking employees or members of another 
sponsoring organization « committee; . 
(d) Whether a sponsoring organization « committee has a 
common or overlapping membership or common contributors with 
another sponsoring organization « committee which indicates a 
formal or ongoing relationship between the sponsoring organizations 
or committees; 
(e) Whether a sponsoring «ganizalion « commit!ee has any 
- members, officers, or employees who were members, officers, or 
employees of another sponsoring organization or committee which 
indicates the creation of an aIfer ego of the original committee; and 
(f) Whether a sponsoring organization or committee provides 
funds or goods in a significant amount or on an ongoing basis to 
another sponsoring organization «committee, such as through direct 
or incirect payments for administrative, fundraising, or other costs. 
Section 2. No person, organization, or committee shall establish 
an entity which would qualify as a contributing organization as defined 
in KRS 121.035 for the purpose of circumventing the contribution 
limitatior:ts contained in KRS 121.150 and the affiliation guidelines 
established by this administrative regulation. 
JOSEPH H. TERRY, Chair 
APPROVED BY AGENCY: November 12,1993 
FILED WITH LAC: November 15, 1993 at 11 a.m. 
PUBLIC HEARING: A public hearing on this proposed administra-
tive regulation shall be held on December 21, 1993, at 9 a.m. at 140 
Walnut Street, Frankfort, Kentucky. Individuals interested in attending 
this hearing shaH notify this agency in writing by December 16, 1993, 
five days prior to the hearing, of their intent to attend. If no notification 
of intent tD attend the hearing is received by that date, the hearing 
may be cancelled. This hearing is open Ie the public. Any person who 
attends win be given an opportunity to comment on the proposed 
administrative regulation. A transcript of the public hearing w~1 not be 
made unless a written request for a transcript is made. If you do not 
wish to attend the public hearing, you may submit written comments 
on the proposed administrative regulation to: George Russell, 
ExeaJtive Director, Kentucky Registry of Election Finance, 140 
Walnut SIreat, Frankfort, Kentucky 40601, (502) 564-2226. 
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 
Contact Person: Anita Stanley 
(1) Type and number of entilles affeded: This administrative 
regulation applies to all permanent committees registered w~ the 
Kentucky Registry of Election Finance and their affiliates. 
. (a) Direct and incirect costs «savings to those atfecte« 
t. First year. No direct or indirect cost will result from the 
promutgaon of this administrative regulation. 
2. Continuing costs or saYings: No dinIct or indirect cost wi/lresult 
from the promulgdon of !tIiIr administrative regulation. 
3. Additional fac1Drs increasin§ « deaeasing costs (note any 
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IIIacta upon compeIiIion: None 
(b) Reporting and paperwork requirements: No adc:IlionaJ 
paperwork and raporting raquiraments will rasuIt from this administra-
.. ragu/ation. 
(2) Effacls on the promulgating administrative body: 
(_) Direct and incirect costs or savings: 
1. First year: This aaninistraliw regulation will result in no 
.a:fdional cirect or indirect cost to the agency. 
2. Continuing costs or savings: This administrative regulation wUI 
.. suit in no adcitionaJ diract or indirect cost to the agency. 
3. AdcitionaJ factors increasing or decreasing costs: None 
(b) Reporting and paperwork requirements: Some adcitional 
paperwork requirements may result through the submission of 
documentation by permanent committees related to the question of 
whether or not a particular committee is an independent committee 
or an affiliate of another committee. 
(3) Assessment of anticipated effect on state and local revenues: 
No significant effect on slate and local rewnues is expected. 
(4) Assessment of alternative methods; reasons why alternatives 
were rejected: .No a1temative were considered because the registry 
is charged w~ the responsibility for making the affiliation determina-
tion. 
(5) Identify any statute, administrative regulation or govemment 
policy which may be in conflict, overlapping, or duplication: None 
(a) Necessity of proposed regulation if in conflict: None 
(b) If in conflict, was effort made to harmonize the proposed. 
administrative regulation with conflicting ProVisions: None 
(6) Any additional information or comments: None 
TIERING: Is tiering applied? Tiering is not applied because the 
provisions of this administrative regulation will apply uniformly to all 
permanent committees. 
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32 KAR 2:200. Allowable campaign expenditures. 
RELATES TO: KRS 121.150 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS 121.12O(1)(g), 121.175 
NECESSITY AND FUNCTION: KRS 121.175, as amended by the 
General Assembly in extraordinary session in 1993, requires the 
Registry of Election Finance to promulgate administrative regulations 
to specifically define those expenditures that may lawfully be made 
from a candidate's campaign account. It is therefore necessary to 
promulgate this administrative regulation so that the agency may fulfill 
its statutory mandate. . 
Section 1. Allowable Expenditures. In addition to the general 
categories of allowable campaign expenditures provided.by law, the 
following expenditures shall be considered allowable: 
(1) Expenditures made or items donated to charitable and civic 
organizations such as clubs, neighborhood organizations, schools, 
and churches, provided that the expenditure furthers a candidacy 
through advertising; 
(2) Expenditures for items of personal property bearing the name 
or likeness of the candidate in a conspicuous manner for distribution 
by a candidate which have a value of ten (10) dollars or iess, and 
which are distributed for the purpose of advertising that individual's 
candidacy. These items include, but are not limited to, hats, shirts, 
calendars, magnets, holiday greeting cards, and similar items. The 
purchase of tickets for general distribution for the purpose of 
influencing and election, either directly or indirectly, shall not be 
aDowed under the subsection; 
(3) Reasonable expenditures for services such as distribution of 
campaign literature, staff services, and similar services which are 
primarily and ciraclly related to the individual'sc8nclidacy; 
(4) Expenditures for the purchase of transpot1ation services, 
inducing but not linitad to the transportation of voters to the polls, 
pro~d that the expancitures are reasonable. in light of the nuinbef 
of persons transporl8d, miieage driven, and time spenl All transporta-
tion expencitures shall- be primarily 8iId cirectly related. to the 
candidacY of the individual on whose behalf the expenditures are 
made; 
(5) Expenditures for tickets to political and other events to be 
attended by the candidate, his spouse, or a campaign staff represen-
tative, and from which the candidate derives a direct benefit to his 
candidacy. The burden shall be on the candidate to prove to the 
registry that representation at the event provided a direct benefit to 
his candidacy; 
(6) The purchase of American, state, or other flags which are 
donated to schools, civic, or charitable organizations; 
(7) Campaign events such as bean suppers, breakfasts, lun-
cheons, or ·similar events, regardless of whether admission is 
charged, provided that the value of the meal does not exceed five (5) 
dollars per person; and 
. (8) The purchase or rental of items such as cellular telephones, 
copiers, computers, automobiles, facsimile machines, and similar 
items. Such purchase or rental shall be presumed to be primarily and 
directly related to the individual's candidacy if the purchase or rental 
occurs during the year in which the individual will appear on the ballot 
or seeks election as a write-in candidate. The purchase of such items 
in a year in which the individual is not a candidate shall be allowed 
only if the item is purchased solely for use in an upcoming campaign. 
The continued rental of such items during a year in which an 
individual is not a candidate shall be allowed, provided that the 
prorated use thereof which is primarily campaign related exceeds fifty 
(SO) percent of the total use. Only that use attributable to the 
campaign may be paid for with campaign funds and the burden shall 
be on the candidate to prove that an expenditure is allowable under 
this . subsection. 
Section 2. Unlawful Campaign Expenditures. In addition to the 
expenditures specifically prohibited by law, the following categories of 
campaign expenditures shall not be considered allowable expendi. 
tures from a campaign account: 
(1) Payment of dues to professional, civic, or other organizations 
to which the incividual belongs or desires to join; 
(2) Expenditures made to defray the costs associated with an 
individual's performance of his official duties as an officeholder; and 
. (3) Costs associated with gifts, flowers, food, or similar items 
which are purchased for the benefit of campaign staff or volunteers, 
or any other expenditure which bestows a private, pecuniary benefit 
to an individual. . 
Section 3. Expenditures made by a candidate or an incumbent 
officeholder during a year in which he will not appear on the ballot as 
a candidate shall be subject to strict scrutiny. If the registry staff, in 
the course of reviewing a candidate's or incumbenrs campaign 
finance statements, determines that a questionable expenditure has 
been made, whether or not the expenditure was made during an 
eiection year; the burden shall be on the candidate or incumbent to 
prove that the expenditure was directly and primarily related to his 
candidacy. 
JOSEPH H. TERRY, Chairman 
APPROVED BY AGENCY: December 9, 1993-
FILED WITH LAC: December 15,1993 at 10 a.m. 
PUBUC HEARING:~ public hearing on this proposed administra-
tive regulation shan be held on January 24, 1994:at 9 a.m., at 140 
Walnut Street. Frankfort, Kentucky. Individuals interested in· being 
heard at this hearing shall notify this agency in writing by January 19, 
1994, five days prior to the hearing, of their intent to attend. If no 
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naIiIic:aIian of "tant kI a1tIInd the·nearing is raceMd by that data, !he : 
hearing. may be cancellaci. This hearing is open to the public. Ant . 
parson who wishes to be heard wiY be giYBn an opportUnity to-
comment on this proposed administrative regulation. A transcript of 
the public hearing will not be made unless a writ1Bn request fer a rra... 
script is made. If you do not wish to be heard at the pubic hearing, 
you may- submit Written comments on the proposed administrative· 
regulation. SeI1d written notification of intant to be heard at the pub6c 
hearing or written comments on the proposed administraJive regula-
tion to: George Russell, Executive Dir8ctor, Kentucky Registry of 
Election Finance, 140 Walnut S1rHt, Frankfort, Kentucky 40601, 
(502) 564-2226. 
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 
Agency Contact Person: Anita Stanley 
(1) Type and number of entities affected: This proposed adminis-
trativa regulation will affect all candidates for public office in the state. 
(a) Direct and indirect costs or savings to'those affected: 
1. First year: None 
2. Continuing costs or savings: None 
3. Additional factors increasing or decreasing .costs (Note any 
effects upon competition): None 
(b) Reporting and paperwork requirements: No additional 
paperwork will result except some recordkeeping on vote haulers. 
(2) Effects on the promulgateEl administrati'iQ body: 
(a) Direct and indirect costs or savings: 
1. First year: None .. 
2. Continuing costs or savings: None 
3. Additional factors increasing or decreasil)9 costs: None 
Cb) Reporting and paperwork requirements: No addtional 
paperwortt will result to the agency. 
(3) Assessment of anticipated effect on state and local revenues: 
This proposed administrativa regulation will have no effect on state 
and local revenues. 
(4) Assessment of alternative methods; reasons why alternatives 
were rejected: No altemative methods were considered because the 
agency was required by statute. to promulgate this administrativa 
regulation. . 
(5) Identify any statute, administrative regulation or govemmental 
policy which may be in conflict, overlapping, or duplication: None 
Ca) Necessity of proposed administrativa regulation if in conflid: 
Cb) If in conflict, was effort made to harmonize the proposed 
administrativa regulation with conflicting provisions: 
(6) Any additional information or comments: 
TIERING: Was tiering appHed? Tiering is not applied l?ecause 
these provisions regarding allowable campaign expenditures apply in 
a uniform manner to all candidates for pUblic office. 
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32 teAR 2:170.In-lcind conbibutiona. 
RELATES TO: KAS 121.015(6)(b), (e), (d), 121A.010(11)(a)(2), 
(3), (4) 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS 121.120(1)(g), 121A.020(7) 
NECESSITY AND FUNCTION: KRS 121.015(6)(b), (c), and (d) 
and 121A.010(11)(a)(2), (3), and (4) include the payment for or 
provision of certain goods and services to a candidate, slate of 
candidates, committee, or contributing organization within the 
definition of ·contribution". Such payments are known as 'in-kind" 
contributions. It is necessary to promulgate this administrative 
regulation to clearly identify the circumstances under which a 
contribution falls within the in-kind category. 
Section 1. (1) A candidate, slate of candidates, eommittee, or 
contributing organization shall not conspire with an individual or other 
entity to disguise an illegal contribution as an in-kind contribution. 
(2) It shall be considered an in-kind contribution when an 
individual or other entity provides direct goods or services to a 
candidate, slate of candidates, committee, or contributing organization 
or if an individual purchases goods or services from a third party for 
the benefit of a candidate, slate of candidates, committee, or 
contributing organization. 
(3) A business enterprise may make an in-kind contribution to a 
candidate, slate of candidates, committee, or contributing organization 
provided, however, that the business enterprise is not incorporated. 
The owner of a corporation may make personal in-kind contributions 
provided that no corporate funds or assets are involved, or, if 
corporate property such as copiers, telephones, or other office 
equipment are utilized, the actual costs are billed to the owner and 
reimbursed with personal funds, and the cost does not exceed the 
applicable individual contribution limit contained in KRS 121.150. A 
candidate· shall not accept the use of the assets of any corporation 
unless the fair marXet value is billed to the campaign and paid for 
with campaign funds. 
(4) If goods or services are provided at less than the rate 
normally charged, the amount of the in-kind contribution shall be the 
difference between the usual and normal charge for the goods and 
services at the time of the contribution and the amount actually 
charged. 
(5) The payment by any person of compensation for the personal 
services of another if those services are rendered without charge to 
a candidate, slate of candidates, committee, or contributing organiza-
tion shall. be an in-kind contribution. No compensation shall be 
considered paid to any employee under the following conditions: 
(a) If an employee is paid on an hourly or salaried basis and is 
expected to worX a particular number of hours per period, no 
contribution results if the employee engages in activity for the benefit 
of a candidate, slat~ of candidates, committee, or contributing 
organization during what would otherwise be a regular worX period, 
provided that the taken or released time is made up or completed by 
the employee within a reasonable time; 
(b) No contribution results where.-l employee engages in activity 
for the benefit of a candidate, slate of candidates, committee, or 
contributing organization during what would otherwise be normal 
working hours if the employee is paid on a commission or piecework 
basis, or is paid only for worX actually performed and the employee's 
time is considered his awn to use as he sees fit; or 
(c) No contribution results where the time used by the employee 
to engage in activity for the benefit of a cancidate, slate of candi-
dates, committee, or contributing organization is bona fide, although 
compensable, vacation or other earned leave time. 
Section 2. A contribution made under the following circumstances 
shall not be considered an in-kind contribution: 
(1) Payment for goods and services previously or simultaneously 
acquired by a cancidate, slate of cancidates, committee, or contribut-
ing organization; or 
(2) Payment of a debt with cash received by a candidate, slate of 
candidates, committee, or contributing organization without depositing 
the funds into the campaign aCcount and complying with all applicable 
reporting requirements. 
Section 3. (1) A candidate, slate of candidates, committee, Of 
contributing organization shall not attempt to circumvent the contribu-
tion limitations of KRS 121.150 or the contribution and expenditure 
limits of KRS Chapter 121A by conspiring with an individual, business 
enterprise, or other entity to engage in activity which would otherwise 
constitute an independent expenditure tor the benefit of the candidate, 
slate of candidates, committee, or contributing organization. 
(2) Cancidates, slates of candidates, committees, or contributing 
organizations shall have no duty to report expenditures made on their 
behalf which qualify as independent expenditures. They shall report 
receipt of in-kind contributions resulting from expenditures made on 
their behalf and with their direct or indirect cooperation, consent, 
request, suggestion, or consultation. 
JOSEPH H. TERRY, Chair 
APPROVED BY AGENCY: November 12,1993 
FILED WITH LAC: November 15, 1993 at 11 a.m. 
PUBUC HEARING: A public hearing on this proposed administra-
tive regulation shall be held on December 21, 1993, at 9 a.m. at 140 
Walnut Street, Frankfort, Kentucky. Individuals interested in attending 
this hearing shall notify this agency in writing by December 16,1993, 
five days prior to the hearing, of their intent to attend. If no notification 
of intent to attend the hearing is received by that date, the hearing 
may be cancelled. This hearing is open to the public. Any person who 
attends will be given an opportunity to comment on the proposed 
administrative regulation. A transcript of the public hearing will not be 
made unless a written request for a transcript is made. If you do not 
wish to attend the public hearing, you may submit written comments 
on the proposed administrative regulation to: George Russell, 
Executive Director, Kentucky Registry of Election Finance, 140 
Walnut Street, Frankfort, Kentucky 40601, (502) 564-2226. 
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 
Contact Person: Anita Stanley 
(1) Type and number of entities affected: This administrative 
regulation affects all candidates for public office in Kentucky as well 
as individuals who contribute to those candidates. 
(a) Direct and indirect costs or savings to those affected: 
1. First year: No direct or indirect cost will be associated with this 
administrative regulation. 
2. Continuing costs or savings: No direct or indirect cost will be 
associated with this administrative regulation. . 
3. Additional factors increasing or decreasing costs (note any 
'effects upon competition: None 
(b) Reporting and paperworX requirements: All in-kind contribu-
tions in excess of $100 per election must be repGrted to the Registry 
as provided in KRS 121.180. There wiD be no additional paperworil 
and reporting requirements as a result of this administrative regula-
tion. 
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RECENT DECISIONS AFFECTING KENTUCKY BANKS: 
Alticle 1 
Pitch Witch Trenching v. C & S Carpentry, Ky. App., 812 S.W.2d 171 (1991). 
The Kentucky Court of Appeals applied KRS 355.1-207, the UCC section on 
performance or acceptance under reservation of rights, to allow the payee of a "payment in full" 
check to accept the check under an explicit reservation of rights without the acceptance 
constituting an accord and satisfaction. Kentucky has accepted the position that the enactment 
of the Uniform Commercial Code modified the old common law rule. Although this is a 
minority position among the states, it is one in accord with most commentators on the Code and 
the law of several other states including Missouri, New York, and Ohio. 
Alticle 2 
J.P. Morgan Delaware v. Onyx Arabians n. Ltd., 825 F.Supp. 146 (W.D.Ky. 1993). 
- This case involves issues that fall across the full breadth of the Code from Article 2 to 
Article 9. Applying the exception to the parol evidence rule found at KRS 355.2-202(b), the 
Court recognized an oral agreement that was in addition to, but not contradictory to, a written 
contract. 
Keeneland Association. Inc. v. Earner, 830 F.Supp. 974 (E.D.Ky. 1993). 
This is one of the many cases that have come out of the liquidation of the assets of. 
Calumet Farm. The Keeneland Association sued the buyer of a Calumet filly for breach of 
contract. The buyer removed the action to federal court, sought recision of the contract, and 
brought his own claim against Calumet. Keeneland prevailed partially because of the warranty 
disclaimer language in its sales contract: "THERE IS NO WARRANTY IMPLIED BY 
AUCTIONEER OR CONSIGNOR (INCLUDING OWNER), EXCEPT AS SET FORTH 
HEREIN, AS TO THE MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE OF ANY ANIMAL OFFERED IN THIS SALE. ALL SALES ARE MADE ON AN 
AS IS BASIS, WITH ALL FAULTS." Relying on prior Kentucky law (Greg Coats Cars. Inc.' 
y. Kasey, Ky. App., 576 S.W.2d 251 (1978); Childers & Venters, Inc. y. Sowards, Ky. 460 
Copyright 1994, John T. McGarvey 
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Potts v. Draper, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 896 (1993); Rogers v. Wheeler, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 892 
(1993). 
In companion cases decided on September 30, 1993, the Kentucky Supreme Court found, 
that for liability insurance purposes, automobile dealers are the legal owners of a vehicle until 
such time as the A VIS System shows their customer as the owner. In. the Potts case, the Court 
referred to the 1983 Commentary (the unofficial Commentary found in the Bank's Baldwin 
edition of the statutes) to KRS 355.2-202 (parol evidence rule) in fmding that "actual 
performance of the parties must be considered the best indication of what they intended the 
writing to mean and that it is not proper to include testimony or other evidence of the parties' 
conduct as opposed to their words". The specific ruling was on the question of whether the 
transaction between the dealer and customer was a conditional sale as opposed to a transfer with 
a retention of a security interest. Although the dicta in regard to KRS 355.2-202 remains, the 
practical effect of both cases is being overruled by Senate Bill 106, passed by both houses and 
delivered to the Governor on February 28. 
Wyatt v. Mullins, 91-CA-002628 (September 3, 1993) (NOT FINAL). 
The Court of Appeals was called upon to settle a dispute between two innocent parties 
concerning the purchase of a 1984 Corvette that was stolen. The vehicle was recovered by the 
Kentucky State Police and returned to an Illinois insurer. The last owner of the vehicle, Wyatt, 
brought an action against his seller, Mullins, for breach of warranty of good title pursuant to 
KRS 355.2-312. (The Court notes that the actual warranty involved was the warranty of 
merchantability, KRS 355.2-314.) Mullins' defense was based on the notice requirements of 
KRS 355.2-607(3)(a). Mullins alleged that Wyatt was required to notify him of any breach prior 
to commencing a lawsuit or be barred from relief. Our Court of Appeals found that the 
summons and suit could serve as a notice under KRS 355.2-607 but remanded the case for the 
determination of whether Wyatt's notice was "reasonably timely." 
Article 3 
Davis v. Davis, Ky. App., 838 S.W.2d 415 (1992). 
This is another case where Kentucky courts have ruled that the enactment of the Uniform 
Commercial Code "superseded" the prior rule of law in the Commonwealth. In this case, KRS 
355.3-111 on bearer paper was applied to overturn the decision of Finley v. Rose, 189 Ky. 359, 
224 S.W. 1059 (1920). The case involved a note with a blank payee line. The holder argued 
that the note constituted bearer paper. However, the Court ruled that KRS 355.3-111 restricted 
bearer paper to instruments payable to a bearer, a specified person or bearer, or cash. The 
Court determined that the instrument in question was incomplete and could not be enforced until 
completed. 
K- 2 
Federal Land Bank v. Hardin-Mapes Coal, Ky., 817 S.W.2d 225 (1991). 
This decision is described by Leibson and Nowka as ". . . an opinion packed with 
incorrect and ambiguous analysis made in order to reach what the Court felt was a fair result. " 
(The Uniform Commercial Code of Kentucky 2 Ed., Section 4.6(A)(1}.} The opinion of the 
Court of Appeals, as affirmed by the Supreme Court, held that: (1) forged instruments are a 
nullity, and (2) that a bank as payee of a check, presented by one who is not a maker, and who 
directs the bank to credit the check to his personal account, cannot be a holder in due course and 
is on notice that it should inquire further as to the presenters authority. The Court places a 
burden on Kentucky banks far greater than that prescribed by the Uniform Commercial Code. 
The UCC allocates the primary risk of loss and forgeries to the drawee or payor bank, not the 
payee as does the decision in Hardin-Mapes. 
The decision may well have resulted due to application of the principles of equity and, 
several procedural twists in the underlying litigation. Hardin-Mapes never brought a claim 
against its bank that paid the forged check and the Federal Land Bank of Louisville did not raise 
on appeal Hardin-Mapes' failure to timely report the forgery. 
Hopefully, this aberration in Kentucky law can be corrected legislatively or through 
future litigation that brings a more attractive case, in a better procedural posture, before our 
courts. Bank counsel must be careful to distinguish Hardin-Mapes based on both its facts and 
the legal issues presented to our Supreme Court. (Thus far the case has not been cited as 
authority in any other decision from any jurisdiction. In nearly identical facts, the New York 
Supreme Court recently reached a different but correct result in Gino's of Caprie. Inc. v. 
Chemical Bank, 592 N. Y.S. 2d 682 (January 1993).} 
J.P. Morgan Delaware v. Onyx Arabians II. Ltd., 825 F.Supp. 146 (W.D.Ky. 1993). 
The holder of notes associated with the sale of Arabian horses claimed holder in due 
course status. That the original transferor of the notes did not endorse the notes. Applying KRS 
355.3-201, the Court found that subsequent transferees were entitled to have the endorsement 
of the original tra'1sferor; however, without t~e endorsement the subsequent mm.sferees could 
not attain holder in due course status (KRS 355.3-202). 
Article 4 
Ferguson Enterprises. Inc. v. Main Supply. Inc. and Bank of Danville, 92-CA-0884 
(1993) (Final, Motion For Discretionary Review denied 2-19-94). 
The Court applied KRS 355.4-303 to allocate priorities between a judgment creditor that 
levied a garnishment on a depositor's account and the bank's right of setoff. Picking up on the 
concept of the Code section, the Court said that a bank cannot charge a customer's account with 
a setoff after accepting a garnishment thereon, the garnishment being the type of legal process 
anticipated by the Code. Regardless of whether the debtor's loan account was in default, the 
K- 3 
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Court ruled that the setoff must be. effected prior to receipt of the garnishment in order for the 
setoff to take priority. To determine when a setoff takes effect, our Court of Appeals followed 
the Sixth Circuit in using the following criteria: (1) the decision to exercise the right, (2) some 
action which accomplishes the setoff, and (3) some record. which evidences that the right of 
setoff has been exercised. The burden of proof is allocated to the bank to demonstrate when the 
setoff actually occurred as evidenced by intent, affirmative acts, and records. 
In the event the Kentucky Supreme Court allows this decision to stand, the KBA is 
currently working on a legislative solution. 
James v. Webb, Ky. App., 827 S.W.2d 702 (1992). 
The Court determined that a safe deposit box is not an "account" or "other like 
arrangement" for the purposes of KRS 391.300(1) entitling the surviving party to the balance. 
The Court cited as authority KRS 355.4-104(1)(a) that defines "account" as any account with 
a bank including "a checking, time, interest or savings account; .... " 
Arncle 9 
Validity of Security Agree"!ent and Rights of Parnes Thereto 
In re Bush (Estate of Conn v. First National Bank of Pikeville), 159 BR 209 (Bkrtcy. 
E.D.Ky. 1993). 
The debtor, Marvin T. Bush, and his P.S.C., Marvin T. Bush, D.M.D., P.S.C., filed, 
respectively, a Chapter 7 petition and Chapter 11 petition on the same date. Conn was an 
unsecured creditor who challenged the security interest of First National Bank of Pikeville in the 
personal property associated with the dental practice. Although the debtor practiced as a P.S.C. 
in February 1989, the Bank took its security interest from the individual. The P.S.C. was 
administratively dissolved in December 1990. On the issue of attachment of the security 
interest, the Court found for the Bank on the basis that the security agreement clearly referred 
to the debtor's dental practice and that third parties could not fail to be put on notice that the 
Bank was claiming a security interest in the personal property related to the dental practice 
whether or not the debtor was identified as a P.S.C. Although ruling on the attachment of the 
security interest under Part 2 of Article 9, the Court apparently applied, without specifically 
statmg, the seriously misleading error test of KRS 355.9-402(7). 
J.P. Morgan Delaware v. Onyx Arabians II. Ltd., 825 F.Supp. 146 (W.D.Ky. 1993). 
The second aspect of the Morgan case concerns KRS 355.9-206(1). The holder of the 
note, having failed in its attempt to claim holder in due course status, attempted to assert its 
rights under KRS 355.9-206(1) as an assigneeibeneficiary of a waiver of defenses clause in a 
security agreement. Although the Court recognized the statutory defense, it found the defense 
inapplicable due to its location on the reverse of the contract without proper incorporation 
language above the signature on the face of the contract. 
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Priority of Liens 
Central Trust Co. v. Dan's Marina, Ky. App., 858 S.W.2d 211 (1993). 
This case presented the Court of Appeals with a classic confrontation between the claim 
of a mechanic for towing, repairs, storage, and service charges versus the claim of the secured 
creditor. The boat, on which a balance of over $28,000.00 was owed, was placed in the 
possession of Dan's Marina in May 1989. A total bill of $4,574.00 accumulated by February 
1992. The bill was composed of towing and storage charges, service charges, and actual repair 
costs. For a resolution of the priority claim, the Court looked at KRS 355.9-310: 
When a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes services or 
materials with respect to goods subject to a security interest, a lien upon goods 
in the possession of such person given by statute or rule of law for such material 
or services takes priority over a perfected security interest unless the lien is 
statutory and the statute expressly provides otherwise. 
The Court thus found that the repair costs and the towing and storage charges, properly 
came ahead of the bank's lien but denied priority to the claim for services charges. This was 
in keeping with the spirit and intent of the mechanic's lien statute. The Court reaffrrmed the 
law of this state as first enunciated in Corbin Deposit Bank v. King, Ky., 384 S.W.2d 302, 
(1964). The Court particularly noted that Dan's Marina retained possession of the boat 
continuously from May 1989. Possession is the key to the mechanic's retention of priority. 
Once possession is released, even if the vehicle or boat returns to the possession of the 
mechanic, the priority on the original claim is lost. 
A different result might have been reached had Central Trust Company taken a ship 
mortgage. The law of ship mortgages is more akin to the law of real estate. Except for certain 
claims to wages, and marine torts, the holder of a properly recorded ship mortgage primes all 
other liens. 
McGonigle v. Combs, 968 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1992). 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied Kentucky law in a dispute between a 
Louisville law fum and a Kentucky bank as to the priority of their respective claims to 
settlement funds from a securities claim. The bank argued that the settlement funds constituted 
proceeds from the disposition of stock in which it held a prior perfected security interest. The 
Court ruled in favor of the bank, based on Kentucky's Uniform Commercial Code, and the 
Code's definition of proceeds as "whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection or 
other disposition of collateral ... " Citing In re Stone, 52 BR 305 (Bankr. W.D.Ky. 1985), the 
Court ruled that it was the intent of the Kentucky Legislature to give the term "proceeds" the 
broadest possible defmition. After making the determination that the settlement funds constituted 
proceeds under the Code, the Ninth Circuit determined, outside the Code, that a perfected 
security interest that is prior in time is superior to a later lien. 
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Peifection of Security Interests 
Banque Worms v. Davis Const. Co .. Inc., Ky. App., 831 S.W.2d 921 (1992). 
Judge Gudgle, in a decision cited in the December 1992 uee Bulletin, applied the 
brightline rule of most jurisdictions on the period during which a continuation statement can be 
fIled. A fIled fmancing statement is effective for fIve years. KRS 355.9-403(2). To continue 
the perfection of a lien for another fIve years from the date of expiration of the original 
fInancing statement, a creditor must fue a continuation statement "within six mop,ths prior to the 
expiration of the fIve year period." KRS 355.9-403(3). Banque Worms' continuation statement 
was ffied six months and two days before the end of the five year perfection period. Thus, 
under the decision of our Court of Appeals, it was ineffective. Although the brightline standard 
has been criticized by some commentators, the position taken by Kentucky is in accord with that 
of other states. 
In re Bush (Estate of Conn v. First National Bank of Pikeville), 159 BR 209 (Bkrtcy. 
E.D.Ky. 1993). 
Having survived the· test for attachment of its security interest, the bank lost on a 
perfection issue. The perfection question borders on a law school exam. The individual debtor 
maintained residences in Floyd County and Fayette County. His dental practice was located in 
Pike County. The bank recorded in Floyd County. The Court applied KRS 355. 9-401 (5) (a) and 
found the proper place to record a lien against an individual is their principal place of business. 
With the dental practice located in Pike County, the Court found the bank not to have properly 
perfected its security interest. This gets back to the old Kentucky rule on where to record: 
EVERYWHERE. 
Default and Remedies 
Great American Insurance Company v. Stapleton and GMAC, 92-CA-OOI625 (1994) 
(NOT FINAL). 
GMAC repossessed a 1984 Cadillac from its customers. After GMAC had applied for 
and obtained a repossession title, the customers exercised their right under KRS 355.9-506 and 
redeemed the collateral. Here, the Code conflicts with the new Supreme Court decisions in 
Potts v. Draper and Rogers v. Wheeler. The debtor was entitled to redeem the collateral at any 
time prior to its disposition under KRS 355.9-504. GMAC properly surrendered its collateral 
upon payment and forwarded documents to reverse the repossession title to the Pike County 
Clerk. Unfortunately for GMAC, its debtors were involved in an accident prior to the time of 
transfer. 
Holt v. Peoples Bank of Mt.Washington, Ky., 814 S.W.2d 568 (1991) (copy attached). 
There were formerly two camps on the issue of whether a creditor could collect a 
defIciency if its sale of collateral failed to meet any of the several tests of commercial 
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reasonability. One line of cases held that a rebuttable presumption was created that the value 
of the collateral was equal to the debt but that a creditor could present evidence to show it 
remained entitled to a deficiency. Other jurisdictions, including Kentucky, held that any failure 
on the part of a creditor in the disposition of collateral negated its legal right to sue for a 
deficiency.· Bank Josephine v. Conn, Ky. App., 599 S.W.2d 773 (1980). 
The decision in Holt strikes a middle ground that has received favorable comment. A 
secured creditor who properly notifies the debtor of the sale will not forfeit a deficiency if it can 
prove that the commercial unreasonableness did not reduce the selling price, or that if the selling 
price was reduced, the amount of the reduction did not wipe out the deficiency. The critical 
difference between this and the former line of rebuttable presumption cases relates to the notice 
of sale. Writing for the Court, Justice Lambert emphasized the importance of a notice of sale 
as a fundamental right of due process and held that a creditor's failure to give notice borders on 
conversion and voids the right to a deficiency. 
J.P. Morgan Delaware v. Onyx Arabians II. Ltd., 825 F.Supp. 146 (W.D.Ky. 1993). 
Bank Josephine v. Conn, Ky. App., 599 S.W.2d 773 (1980) may have been partially 
reversed by Holt v. Peoples Bank of Mt. Washington; however, the federal court applied, 
properly, the rule that the burden of proof is on the secured party to show that it has acted with 
commercial reasonableness. 
Lee & Mason Intern. v. Daugherty, Ky. App., 828 S.W.2d 677 (1992). 
The fact situation addressed by the Court involved a bank with insurance coverage 
relating to deficiencies on certain of its installment sale contracts. When the bank repossessed 
its collateral, a car, it notified its debtor that the vehicle would be sold at public auction. At the 
auction, the highest bid, $7,400.00, was rejected by the bank on the advice of its insurance 
carrier. Subsequently, the bank was paid off by the insurance carrier and assigned to the 
insurance carrier all of its rights in the security agreement and collateral. The insurance carrier 
applied $7,400.00 to the debtor's account and sued for a deficiency. The Kentucky Court of 
Appeals held that the sale to the insurance ca...rrier did not constitute the public auction of which 
the bank's debtor was notified. The Court further ruled that the insurance carrier could have 
collected a deficiency as an assignee of the bank (KRS 355.9-504(5» if it had met the statutory 
requirements for a commercially reasonable sale. 
THE STATUS OF KENTUCKY'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
Kentucky was one of the first, if not the first, states to enact the Code in 1958. There 
were no substantial changes in Kentucky's Code until 1986 when the legislature adopted the 
1972 amendments to Article 9 and the 1977 amendments to Article 8. There were minor 
amendments in a "clean-up" bill in 1988 to iron out certain problems, particularly in relation to 
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motor vehicle and mobile home liens. The 1990 Legislature enacted the model version of 
Article 2A on leases. The 1992 Legislature, following the recommendations of the American 
Law Institute and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, repealed 
Article 6 on bulk transfers and enacted the model amendments to Article 2A. A small but 
significant amendment in the 1992 UCC bill added KRS 355.1-110. This section adopts the 
comments of the National Conference of Commissioner's on Uniform State Laws and the 
American Law Institute as interpretative of the Code. This can be very useful in a state where 
reported case law provides little guidance in interpretation of the Code. 
Kentucky's Code has recently stayed abreast of the remainder of the country with the 
possible exception of action on the amendments to Articles 3 and 4. As of December 1, 1993, 
40 states have adopted Article 2A on leases with 38 adopting the model amendments, 30 states 
have adopted the amendments to Articles 3 and 4, 47 states have enacted Article 4A, and 24 
states, including Kentucky, have repealed the Bulk Sales Act in its entirety (Louisiana never 
adopted Article 6) while 5 have enacted an amended and less burdensome version. 
Although we have less than two years of experience with the repeal of Article 6, the sky 
has not fallen in Kentucky. The ability of inventory creditors to obtain purchase money security 
interest, ahead of other filers, and use of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act have essentially 
alleviated the need for the Bulk Sales Act. The Bulk Sales Act has been a greater burden on 
commerce since the enactment of Article 9 than it has been a protector of vendors who sell 
inventory. 
AMENDED ARTICLE 2A 
The model amendments adopted by the 1992 Legislature are generally lender friendly. 
The new KRS 355.2A-303 (3) voids provisions in lease agreements that prohibit the assignment 
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or sale of leases by a lessor. Equipment leases are now freely available to lenders as collateral 
and can be treated much as accounts receivable and general intangibles under KRS 355.9-318(4). 
Taking the leased equipment as collateral remains risky. If goods are leased to "a lessee 
in the ordinary course of business," the lessee takes free of any security interest created by the 
lessor. KRS 355.2A-307(3). The equipment does not become available to the secured lender 
until expiration of the lease term for default by the lessee. This follows the pattern set by KRS 
355.9-307(1). 
If the leased equipment is unavailable to the secured party while in the possession of the 
lessee, the lease payments may be available as proceeds of the collateral. Case law has been 
to the contrary; however, Permanent Editorial Board Commentary No.9 (1992) treats equipment 
lease payments as proceeds except where the lease term is of avery short term such as daily car 
rental payments. 
A companion amendment to Article 1 sets a statutory distinction between a true lease and 
a disguised security transaction. The text, found at KRS 355.1-201(37) "Security Interest", 
focuses on economic reality. If the lease term covers the economic life of the collateral, or if 
a purchase option at the end of the lease term is for little or nominal consideration, the 
transaction will be deemed to be in the nature of a security interest. A protective filing should 
be made in borderline cases. KRS 355.9-408. If the lessor is confident under the new and more 
precise definition that the transaction is a pure lease, flling is not necessary. The new defInition 
should resolve a point that has created a significant amount of litigation under the Code. 
AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLES 3 AND 4: The Prospects For Change In Kentucky 
Article 3 
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Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, governing commercial paper and negotiable 
instruments, is essentially a spruced up version of the old Negotiable Instruments Law first 
promulgated in 1896. Shortcomings of the current Article 3 include the failure to address 
modern check processing where numbers of checks unanticipated by the drafters of Article 3 are 
processed using visual and electronic scanners and computers, and the failure to recognize the 
different functions of notes and the various forms of drafts. 
In 1990 the American Law Institute and National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws recommended revisions for Article 3, and corresponding revisions to Article 
4, to cure deficiencies identified both through the decisions of courts and operational experience. 
Highlights of the proposed revisions include: 
• Narrowing the scope to include only checks and bearer or order instruments. 
• The requirement that a negotiable instrument state a "sum certain" is eliminated 
in favor of a requirement for a "readily ascertainable amount of money, with or 
without interest or other charges described in the promise or order." Interest may 
be fixed or variable. (Kentucky adopted language authorizing a variable rate in 
1990. See KRS 355.3-106(2).) 
• A party who satisfies an instrument has a right of contribution from co-parties 
signing in the same capacity. When a co-party is insolvent, contribution is 
divided between the parties who remain solvent. 
• A new statute of limitations requires that any action under Article. 3 must be 
brought according to the ordinary statute of limitations existing in the state. 
• The effect of restrictive endorsements is limited. Endorsements conditioning the 
right to payment do "not effect the right of the endorsee to enforce the 
instrument." A person paying the instrument, or an intermediary party that takes 
for value, may disregard conditions imposed by endorsement. 
• The effect of certain restrictive endorsements such as "for deposit", "for 
collection", and "pay any bank", is retained. 
• Non-depository payor banks join intermediary banks as being exempt from 
wrongfully paying over a restrictive endorsement. 
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• Indicia of a regularly executed instrument is added to the requirements for 
attaining holder-in-due-course status. "Apparent evidence of forgery or 
alteration" prevents a holder from becoming a holder-in-due-course. 
• Modem check processing is addressed by relaxation of rules from the old 
mechanical system requiring "presentment as a condition of payment. " 
Corresponding Changes in Article 4 
Article 4 is not as fully revised as Article 3. The primary reason being uncertainty as 
to whether the Federal Reserve Board will exercise greater authority over bank deposits and 
collections. Only amendments necessary to take care of immediate problems and corresponding 
amendments required by changes in Article 3 have been suggested. 
Primary changes include: 
• Truncation agreements between banks and customers are permitted allowing 
presentment for payment by "transmission of an image of an item or information 
describing the item rather than delivery of the item itself. " 
• The statute of limitations requires that actions to enforce obligations, duties, and 
rights under Article 4 be brought within three years of the time the action 
accrues. 
• Warranties relating to encoding and retention are added. One who encodes 
information on an item warrants that the encoding is correct. Retention 
warranties relate to original instruments subject to truncation agreements. 
• Customers provided with a sufficiently detailed statement of items credited and 
debited, in lieu of the actual item, must notify the payor bank of an altered or 
forged item following receipt of the statement as opposed to the item. 
• Banks providing statements of items credited and debited must keep the item or 
legible copies for seven years and supply legible copies at the customer's request. 
Amendments to Articles 3 and 4 in Kentucky 
Until this Legislature, Kentucky's Special Study Commission on the Uniform Commercial 
Code, sponsored by the Legislative Research Commission, had met each biennium since 1984. 
At the request of legislative leadership, and due to the continuing specter of special sessions and 
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large legislative agendas, the Commission did not meet to consider legislation for the 1994 
session. As of December 1, 1993, 31 states have enacted the amendments for Articles 3 and 
4. This is significant in that 12 states enacted the amendments in the fIrst eleven months of 
1993. If Kentucky banks and their counsel are interested in enacting the amendments in 
Kentucky they should make their wishes known to the legislators. 
Article 4A Funds Transfer 
The transfer of money takes place through three primary systems: checks that are 
regulated by Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC, electronic funds transfers by consumers (primarily 
automated teller machines) regulated by the Federal Electronic Funds Transfer Act, and "funds 
transfers", sometimes referred to as wholesale transfers or wire transfers. Funds transfers are 
unregulated except for rules of the Fedwire (Reg. J), clearing houses and private contracts. 
Article4A is designed to provide certainty as to what the rights and obligations of the 
parties to funds transfers are. The Article addresses the interests of banks, commercial users 
and the public. The Article establishes who takes the risk of loss and who will be liable and 
what the damages will be. 
Article 4A has been enacted more quicldy than any other article of the Code. First 
recommended in 1989, as of December 1, 1993, Article 4A had been adopted in its uniform 
version by all states except New Jersey, South Carolina, and Vermont. 
It is easy to understand the quick acceptance of Article 4A. Funds transfers account for 
many times the amount of money transferred each day than the system of checks and consumer 
use of electronic funds transfers combined. On an average day, over a trillion dollars transfers 
through funds transfers. More than three trillion dollars have transferred on a single day. This 
is roughly equivalent to the country's annual gross national product. In the average funds 
transfer, five million dollars changes hands. 
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Important Definitions: 
A. "payment order" means an instruction of a sender to a receiving bank, transmitted 
orally, electronically, or in writing, to pay, or to cause another bank to pay, a 
fIXed or determinable amount of money to a beneficiary i: (i) the instruction does 
not state a condition to payment to the beneficiary other than time of payment, 
(ii) the receiving bank is to be reimbursed by debiting an account of, or otherwise 
receiving payment from, the sender, and (iii) the instruction transmitted by the 
sender directly to the receiving bank or to an agent, funds transfer system, or 
communication system for transmittal to the receiving bank . 
. B. "beneficiary" means the person to be paid by the beneficiary's bank. 
C. "beneficiary's bank" means the bank identified in a payment order in which an 
account of the beneficiary is to be credited pursuant to the order or which 
otherwise is to make payment to the beneficiary if the order does not provide for 
payment to an account. 
D. "receiving bank" means the bank to which the sender's instruction is addressed .. 
E. "sender" means the person giving the instruction to the receiving bank. 
F. "funds transfer" means the series of transactions, beginning with the originator's 
payment order, made for the purpose of making payment to the beneficiary of the 
order. The term includes any payment order issued by the originator's bank or 
an intermediary bank intended to carry out the originator's payment order. A 
funds transfer is completed by acceptance by the beneficiary's bank of a payment 
order. for the benefit of the beneficiary of the originator's payment order. 
G. "intermediary bank" means a receiving bank other than the originator's bank or 
the beneficiary's bank. 
H. ." originator" means the sender of the first payment order in a funds transfer. 
L "originator's bank" means (i) the receiving bank to which the payment order of 
the originator is issued if the originator is not a bank, or (ii) the originator if the 
originator is a bank. 
Article 4A divides the funds transfer process into three primary areas: issuance and 
acceptance of payment orders, execution of sender's payment orders by receiving banks, and 
payment. A fmal part of Article 4 governs such miscellaneous provisions as a variation of the 
statutory requirements by agreement, creditors actions against funds in the transfer process, rates 
of interest, and choice of law. 
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Consumer transactions are specifically outside the cope of Article 4A. The statute also 
provides that to the extent it is inconsistent with regulations and operating circulars of the 
Federal Reserve Board, those regulations take precedence. Transfer system rules will also 
prevail over the statutory provisions of Article 4A. 
Two major subjects covered by Article 4A are unauthorized payment orders and 
authorized but erroneous payment orders. If a bank is to avoid liability, it must provide a 
"commercially reasonable security procedure. "? The words "commercially reasonable" have 
been a source of substantial litigation under Article 9 and in all likelihood will follow in Article 
4A. However, as opposed to Article 9, the question of commercially reasonable under Article 
. 4A is a question of law that is to be decided by the courts. [4A-202(c)] The courts are directed 
to. consider the instructions of the customer, the circumstances surrounding the customer 
including their normal funds transfer activity, alternative security procedures issued to the 
customer, and security procedures used in similar transactions by similar parties. A bank that 
has complied with the security procedures, and relied on written instructions of its customer, will 
generally not bear a loss for an unauthorized transfer. However, if a bank's customer meets its 
burden of proof, and a crook has initiated the transfer, the loss does fallon the bank. 
A more frequent occurrence than a fraudulent payment order is an authorized but 
erroneous order. Here a bank is liable to its customer for direct expenses but is exempted from 
consequential damages unless there is a written contract to the contrary. Article 4A also 
imposes a one year statute of repose. 
Benefits for users of funds transfers include: 
• Finality of payment; funds transfers, although equivalent to cash, are made with 
a more certain degree of finality. 
• Customers have a "money back guarantee" if a transfer is not completed. 
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• There is a statutory discharge of underlying obligations upon acceptance by the 
beneficiary's bank. 
• In order to take advantage of loss allocation rules, banks will provide reasonable 
security procedures. 
• A receiving bank suffers the loss for an unauthorized transfer unless the bank can 
prove: . (i) its security procedure was commercially reasonable, (ii) the bank 
followed the procedure, (iii) the bank acted in good faith, and (iv) the bank 
complied with the .customer's written agreement or instructions restricting 
acceptance of payment orders. Regardless, the loss will fall on the bank, if a 
customer can prove it is without fault. 
• A customer may receive damages for dishonor if its bank has accepted an order 
and the bank fails to pay. Consequential damages are available to customers if 
the beneficiary gave notice of particular circumstances that would give rise to 
such damages and an indication of the magnitude of the damages. 
Benefits to Banks Under Article 4A: 
• Enactment of a body· of statutory law fills the large gaps that now exist in 
determination of the rights and remedies of parties to the payment system. 
• When banks are users of the system, they have all of the benefits of users noted 
above. 
• Bank liability is limited to loss of interest and principal and in certain instances 
incidental costs and attorneys fees. Consequential damages are available to a 
customer only in the event of intentional dishonor. The statute of limitations 
requires objections to payment be made within one year from the time the 
customer receives notice that the order was sent (4A-502) 
• There is statutory guidance for choice of law that will promote certainty as to 
legal rights (4A-507) 
• There is statutory recognition of the netting of obligations between banks. This 
is particularly important in the reduction of insolvency risks. (4A-402) 
• Banks are authorized to rely upon numbers used by customers to identify a 
beneficiary, even if there is a conflict with name. (4A-305) 
• Banks can rely upon a message that tests against a security procedure unless a 
customer proves that a payment order was unauthorized and any breach of 
confidential security procedures was not the fault of the customer. 
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FUTURE CHANGES IN OTHER ARTICLES OF THE CODE 
Article 1 (General Provisions) 
During 1993, the Permanent Editorial Board issued a draft commentary on the meaning 
of the term "good faith" as used in the Code. The commentary has not yet been adopted. 
The essence of the commentary is that the "good faith" requirement of the Code does not 
support an independent cause of action where no other basis for a cause of action exists. 
Once adopted, no legislative· action will be necessary. See KRS 355.1-110. 
Article 2 (Sale of Goods) 
A comprehensive redraft of Article 2 is being prepared following a study report and 
preliminary draft proposals. The primary changes will accommodate cases dealing with 
computer software and other intangible commercial property. 
Article 5 (Letters of Credit) 
A fifth discussion draft of amendments to the article on letters of credit is being 
circulated. The drafting committee has particularly worked to harmonize Article 5 with 
the Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits (500). 
Article 7 (Warehouse Receipts) . 
The Uniform Commercial Code Committee of the American Bar Association formed an 
Article 7 Task Force in 1992, to consider the need for revisions. 
Article 8 (Securities) 
A final reading of draft amendments was expected before the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws last summer. However, the time schedule has 
been pushed back. The primary changes. address the indirect holding system for 
securities. The term "securities entitlement" is coined to deal with the interest in 
securities held by most customers of brokerage houses. The rules for priority in regard 
to security interest in securities are returned to Article 9. However, a special section, 
8-502 would deal with purchase money interest in securities. A final draft is now 
expected this summer. 
Article 9 (Secured Transactions) 
A drafting committee has been appointed to consider a final report of the Article 9 Study 
Commission of the permanent Editorial Board on the Uniform Commercial Code. A 
massive Study Commission Report is available for those with incurable insomnia. There 
are no radical changes in the scope of Article 9. Some of the primary changes relate to 
remedies of both the secured party and the debtor. One proposed amendment does away 
with the absolute bar to a deficiency rule. Other amendments clear up the relation of 
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security interest in personal property to real property. Amendments are proposed to 
make the filing system more accurate and fundamental. 
REGUIATION B-UPDATE 
Section 223 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation improvement act of 1991 
amended the Equal Opportunity Act by adding a new section (e) to 15 USC 1691. The new 
section requires a creditor to furnish to an applicant, upon the applicant's request, a copy of any 
appraisal report used by the creditor in connection with its evaluation of a loan secured by 
residential real estate. At the creditor's option, it may require reimbursement of the cost of the 
appraisal from the applicant. The requirement applies to applicants whose applications are 
rejected as well as those whose applications are accepted. Section 223 ofF.D.I.C.I.A. became 
effective December 19, 1991; however, the correspondent amendments to Regulation B of the 
Federal Reserve Board were not published in the Federal Register until December 14, 1993. 
The new portions of the regulation were effective that date; however, compliance is optional 
until June 14, 1994. 
Transactions Affected: 
All loans (whether business or consumer) secured by a lien on a dwelling. Dwelling is 
defmed in the regulation as "a residential structure that contains one to four units whether or not 
that structure is attached to real property. The term includes, but is not limited to, an individual 
condominium or cooperative unit and a mobile or other manufactured home. 
What Must Be Provided: 
The documents relied upon by the creditor in evaluating the value of the dwelling, 
collectively defmed as an "appraisal report." 
Compliance: 
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A creditor may routinely provide a copy of the appraisal report to an appalicant (whether 
credit is granted or denied or the application is withdrawn)." Section 202.5a(a)(1). If a creditor 
does not routinely provide appraisal reports, it shall provide a copy upon an applicant's written 
request. If the creditor does not routinely provide appraisal reports, the applicant must be 
notified in writing of their right to receive an appraisal report. The notice may be given at any 
time during the application process but no later than when the creditor provides a notice of 
action. The notice must specify that the applicant's request must be in writing, give the 
creditor's mailing address, and state that the request must be received within 90 days after the 
creditor has provided notice of action taken on the application. The creditor must mail or 
deliver the copy of the appraisal report "promptly" after receiving the applicant's request. The 
regulation defines promptly as "generally within 30 days." Mailing or delivery may also be 
contingent upon receipt of the report or receipt of reimbursement from the applicant. 
Model Notice: 
You have the right to a copy of the appraisal report used in connection with your 
application for credit. If you wish a copy, please write to us at the mailing 
address we have provided. We must hear from you no later than 90 days after 
we notify you about the action taken on your credit application or you withdraw 
your application. 
Federal Reserve Form C-9. 
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Robert E. BOLT; Collllie Bolt; and 
Marion E. Bolt, Appellants, 
1'. 
The PEOPLES BANK OF MT. 
W ASBINGTON, Appellee. 
No. 9O-SC-M29-DG. 
Supreme Court of Kentucky. 
Aug. 29, 1991. 
In action to recover deficiency judg-
ment, the Circuit Court, Bullitt County, de-
t.ennined that secured party did not act in a 
reasonable commercial manner when, after 
repossession, it failed to timely dispose of 
truck which secured indebtedness. Dimi-
-nution in value of vehicle was fixed at 
$1,439 and debtors were allowed a credit 
for such sum against amount of deficiency 
judgment entered in favor of creditor. On 
review from Court of Appeals, the Su-
preme Court, Lambert,J., held that se-
cured party may present evidence as to 
amount of damage caused by its lack of 
commercial reasonableness in disposing of 
collateral and such sum will be deducted 
from deficiency. 
Affinned. 
1. Secured Transactiona C=240 
Secured party who fails to give notice 
to debtor that collateral is about to be 
disposed denies debtor an opportunity to 
assert defenses, contest the amount 
claimed or pay any indebtedness prior to 
sale of the collateral; when notice is omit-
ted, principle of estoppel prevents recovery 
of any deficiency judgment. KRS 355.9-
504(3), 355.9-507. 
2. Secured Transactiona -=-240 
It is presumed that collateral is worth 
at least the amount of debt it secures, and 
burden is cast upon secured party to prove 
~i9ita commercial 1UU'ea8Onable1)e8S in 
HOLT v. PEOPLES BANK OF MT. WASHINGTON Ky. 569 
ate ... J(y .. 114 S.W.2d 561 
disposing of collateral did not result in the amount of the deficiency judgment en-
diminished proceeds, or if it did, by what tered in favor of appellee. In this Court 
amount; upon failure of secured party to there is no viable contention that the find-
prove that his conduct did not diminish the ing of commercial unreasonableness and 
proceeds, presumption that collateral is of the amount of loss occasioned thereby is 
lufficient value to satisfy the debt controls clearly erroneous. CR 52.01. 
and claim for deficiency is forfeited; if, in 
8uch circumstances, secured party is un- Throughout this litigation, appellants 
willing to depend entirely upon contention, have argued that the finding of commercial 
that its conduct did not result in diminished unreasonableness barred recovery of any 
proceeds, it may present evidence as to 
amount of damage it caused and such sum 
will be deducted from the deficiency. KRS 
355.9-504 et seq., 355.9-507. 
deficiency judgment. The courts below re-
jected this contention, but failed to distin-
guish or adequately explain their failure to 
fol]pw what appears to be controlling au-
thority. See Bank Josephine v. Conn, su-
pra, Rering v. Doug Evam Auto Sales, 
John A. Schmidt, Shepherdsville, for ap- Inc., supra, and Bailey v. Nawror Finan-
pellants. cial Corp., supra. The Court of Appeals 
Joseph J. Wantland, Shephersdville, for simply said "[i]n light of the minimal de-
appellee. crease in value of the truck due to the 
LAMBERT, Justice. 
bank's action, it would not be fair to the 
bank to completely bar it from seeking a 
deficiency judgment." Instead, the Court 
of Appeals adopted the view found in Wil-
son Leasing Co. v. Seaway Pharmacal 
Corp., 220 N.W.2d 83 (Mich.App.1974), 
which allows an offset for the damage 
caused by the secured party. 
The issue presented is whether any fail-
ure of a secured party to dispose of the 
collateral in a commercially reasonable 
manner necessarily results in a forfeiture 
of its right to a deficiency judgment. Deci-
sions of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky 
in Bank Josephine v. Conn, Ky.App., 599 
S.W.2d 773(1980), Rering v. Doug Evam Prior to addressing the real issue, appel-
lee has contended that the loss was occa-Auto Sales, Inc., Ky.App., 703 S.W.2d 491 
(1986), and Bailey v. Nawror Financial 
Corp., Ky.App., 709 S.W.2d 841 (1986), 
broadly hold that a secured party found to 
be in violation of the requirements of KRS 
355.9-504 is estopped to claim entitlement 
to a deficiency judgment. Despite these 
decisions, in the instant case, the trial court 
and the Court of Appeals fashioned an 
equitable remedy which allowed the debt-
ors a credit against the amount of the 
deficiency for the damage which resulted 
from the commercially unreasonable dis~ 
sition of the collateral. 
In the trial court it was determined that 
sioned by appellants' own misconduct or 
that- the trial court's finding was clearly 
erroneous. This issue was settled against 
appellee in the Court of Appeals, "We can-
not say then that the trial court's finding 
that the bank did not act in a commercially 
reasonable manner is clearly erroneous," 
and appellee's failure to present the issue 
to this Court by means of a cross-motion 
for discretionary review precludes any fur-
ther review. CR 76.21 and Common-
wealth of Kentucky, Transportation Cab-
inet, Department of Highways v. Taub, 
Ky., 766 S.W.2d 49 (1989). 
the secured party, appellee herein, did not On the merits, appellee contends that if 
act in a commercially reasonable manner the debtor can prove damages occasioned 
when, after repossession, it failed to timely by the secured party's improper disposition 
dispose of the truck which secured the in- of the collateral with reasonable certainty, 
debtedness. Diminution in value of the such sum should be deducted from the 
vehicle, earlier appraised at $18,()()().-$19,- amount of the deficiency judgment allowed. 
000, was fixed at $1,439 and appellants If 8uch damages are not subject to reason-
were allowed a credit for this sum agains~ _~be calculation, appellee concedes that the 
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entire deficiency should be forfeited. 
While this view is not unappealing, in most 
cases it would provide little incentive to the 
secured party to strictly observe the re-
quirements of KRS 355.9-504. In one 
study of repossession and resale of auto-
mobiles, the author concluded that the code 
procedure which pennits recovery of defi-
ciency provided a disincentive to the se-
cured creditor to obtain the highest price 
and recommended elimination of all defi-
ciency judgments in this context Shuch-
man, "Profit on Default: An Archival 
Study of Automobile Repossession and Re-
sale," 22 Stan.L.Rev. 20 (1969). If the ap-
proach urged by appellee was followed, in 
many cases a secured party would be enti-
tled to ignore or circumvent the require-
ments of the law with no greater risk of 
loss than payment of that which his mis-
conduct brought about. We considered a 
similar question in the context of bad, faith 
refusal to pay insurance policy proceeds 
and held that an insurer should not be 
entitled to wrongfully withhold payment 
sults in the forfeiture, Rezing and Bailey 
rely exclusively on Bank J08ephine, which 
relies exclusively on the common law doe-
trine of estoppel rather than a provision of 
the Unifonn Commercial Code. In our 
view, estoppel was too broadly applied and 
should be limited as hereinafter explained. 
Whether or to what extent a secured 
party should be denied a deficiency judg-
ment upon a determination that it failed to 
act in a commercially reasonable manner is 
not clear in the Unifonn Commercial 'Code. 
See J. White and R. Summers, Uniform 
Commercial Code, § 26-15 (1972). KRS 
355.9-504 provides that the debtor is liable 
for any deficiency, but KRS 355.9-507 pro-
vides that the secured party is liable for 
any loss caused by its failure to comply 
with the requirements of KRS 355.9-504, et 
seq. In an effort to achieve a proper reme-
dy, we have examined the approach taken 
by numerous state courts and various text 
writers. See generally, Annot., Improper 
Sale of Collateral-Judgment Ba,r, 10 
A.L.R.4th 413, (1980), and J. White and R. 
Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, su-"with no greater possible detriment than payment of the amount justly owed plus 
interest." Curry v. Fireman's Fund Ins. pra. 
Co., Ky., 784 S.W.2d 176 (1989). The [1] At the outset, a distinction should 
analogy is appropriate. Duties arising un- be made between the failure to give pre-
der an insurance contract are consensual sale notice of the intended disposition of 
and the duties of a secured party are im- collateral and other acts of commercially 
posed by law. We decline to wholly adopt unreasonable behavior. Notice to the debt-
the approach urged by appellee. or that the collateral is about to be dis-
The parties and the courts below have posed of is so fundamental that no remedy 
relied heavily upon the decisions of Ule less severe than forfeiture of the deficiency 
Court of Appeals in Bank Josephine v. amount would be adequate and this remedy 
Conn, supra, Rexing v. Doug Evans Auto is by no means exclusive. In a proper case, 
Sales, Inc., supra, and Bailey v. Nawtar criminal and tort liability may be imposed 
Financial Corporation, supra, cases in and a debtor is entitled to the benefits of 
which the real controversy was whether KRS 355.9-507. See J. White and R. Sum-
the secured party breached its duty to act mers, Uniform Commercial Code, § 26-
in a commercially reasonable manner, a 12, et seq. The essence of the notice re-
question which is not before us now. It quirement was explained in Bailey v. Nav-
appears to have been conceded that upon istar Financial Corporation, supra, as 
such a detennination, the doctrine of estop- , follows: . 
pel prevented recovery of a deficiency judg- "The purpose of pre-sale notice is to give 
ment. Whether the doctrine of estoppel the debtor sufficient time to protect his 
arises to automatically forfeit a secured interest in the collateral by participating 
party's right to recover any deficiency in the sale, or by taking appropriate 
judgment does not appear to have been the steps to oppose the sale. See KRS 
main event. For the proposition that any 855.9-604, Kentucky Commentary to BUb-
violation of commercial reasonableness rex _ ~n (3). Here, Bailey alleged that be 
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would have participated in or opposed the will be dedueted from the deficiency. To 
ule and there is no evidence that his avoid application of the presumption that in~ts were protec:ted by any other the collateral is of sufficient value to satis-
person or that he was not damaged by fy the debt, a secared party whose conduct 
lack of notice." Bailq, ftprtJ, at 843. has been found to be commercially unrea-
"A secured party who falls to give the notice sonable must prove that its conduct did not 
required by KRS 855.9-004(3) denies the cause damage or if it did, by what amount. 
debtor· an opportunity to assert defenSes, In the case at bar, the trial court deter-
contest the amount claimed or pay the in- mined that appellee failed to dispose of the 
debtedness prior to sale of the collateral. collateral in a commercially reasonable 
The greatest protection available to debtors manner and that this reduced its value in 
from unscrupulous conduct by secured "par- the sum of $1439. Appellants were given a 
ties" who have repossessed collateral is no- c:redit for this sum in the trial court's defi-
tice of disposition of the collateral. When ciency judgment and this was affirmed by 
notice is omitted, the principle of estoppel the Court of Appeals. While our reasoning 
heretofore recognized by the courts of this may differ to some extent from that of the 
Commonwealth prevents recovery ~f any courts below, we are obliged to affirm if 
deficiency judgment. Skeels 11. UnIversal the result achieved was correct. Keesee v. 
CIT Credit Corpora.tion, 222 F.Supp. 696 Smith., 289 Ky. 609, 159 S.W.2d 56 (1941), 
(W.D.Pa.I963). and Ritchie v. Perry County, 276 Ky. 57, 
We now turn to the myriad of other 122 S.W.2d 988 (1938). While the burden 
cireumstances in which the finding of co~ of proof may not have been allocated pre-
mercial unreasonableness is based on some cisely as we have direeted, the result would 
defect other than a failure to give notice. have been the same and the error, if any, 
Three possible remedial fonnulas are de- was harmless. CR 61.01. 
scribed in D. Leibson and R. Nowka, The 
Uniform Commercial Code of Kentucky, 
§ 8.6(G)(2) (1983). Having heretofore re-
affirmed our reliance on the first of these 
when the defect is lack of notice but reject-
ed it in other circumstances, the first ap-
proach need not be discussed further. 
[2] . The second and third approaches de-
scribed by Professors Leibson and Nowa 
are substantially the same except as to the 
allocation of the burden of proof. In our 
view, the second approach is preferable. It 
begins with a presumption that the collat-
eral is worth at least the amount of debt is 
secures and the burden is cast upon the 
secured party to prove that its commercial 
unreasonableness did not result in dimin-
ished proceeds, or if it did, by what 
amount. Upon failure of the secured party 
to prove that its conduct did not diminish 
the proceeds, the presumption that the col-
lateral is of sufficient value to satisfy the 
debt would control and the claim for defi-
ciency would be forfeited. If, in such cir-
eumstanc:es, a secured party is unwilling to 
depend entirely upon" the view, if any, that 
One final issue merits brief discussion. 
It was contended in the courts below and at 
oral argument in this court that the dis-
charge provisions of KRS 855.3-606(1)(b) 
operate to absolve appellant, Marion E. 
Holt, of liability. Of course, this necessar-
ily depends on the view that said appellant 
was an accommodation party whether as 
maker or endorser. See Schmuckie 11. AI-
wy, Ky., 758 S.W.2d 81 (1988). Appellants 
construe the statute too broadly, however, 
when they seek complete discharge of the 
accommodation party. The Court of Ap-
peals correctly construed the statute when 
it granted relief "to the extent" the collat-
eral was unjustifiably impaired. Appellant, 
Marion E. Holt, along with the other appel-
lants, was benefited by the c:redit allowed 
for the diminished value resulting from the 
commercially unreasonable conduct of ap-
pellee. 
We affirm. 
All con~. 
its conduct did not result in diminished 
proceeds, it may present evidence as to the 
amount of damage it caused and such sum K _ 22 
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EMPLOYMENT LAW ISSUES W A TIME OF DOWNSIZING 
AND STAFF CONSOLIDATIONS 
Depressed economic conditions, recent technological developments, business 
restructuring, financial losses and a whole host of variables frequently cause employers to 
make reductions in force. In these instances, employers must be cognizant of the 
requirements of the Workers Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN), and 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which protects employees over the 
age of40. 
If the reduction disproportionately affects employees within the protected age 
group, groups of such employees and/or individual employees may believe the reduction in 
force was prompted to get rid of older workers to bring in younger workers in the future. 
Thus, any reduction in force raises the prospect of affected employees filing age 
discrimination claims. Theref6re, when an employer contemplates reductions in force, it 
must exercise caution to avoid ADEA violations and violation of the WARN Act. 
I. GENERAL SCOPE AND PROlllBITIONS OF ADEA 
A. Coverage 
(i) ADEA applies to all employers who are "engaged in an industry 
affecting commerce" and who have twenty or more employees. (29 USC §630); and 
(ii) ADEA protects anyone who has attained at least age 40. (29 USC 
§631) 
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B. Prohibitions 
Employers are prohibited from discriminating against any employee over 
the age of 40 in employment decisions including hiring, promotions, work assignments, 
compensation, and terms and conditions of employment. In addition employers shall not 
limit, segregate or classify employees in a way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities because of such individual's age. (29 USC §623 ) 
C. Proof 
(i) Prim~ Facie Case 
With respect to a reduction in force, to establish a prima facie ·case, 
the employee must establish (I) that he/she is a member of the protected age class; (2) that 
he/she is qualified for the available position;(3) that he/she was terminated; and (4) he/she 
must provide circumstantial or direct evidence that the employer intended to discriminate 
in reaching its reduction decisions. Mauter v~ Hardy Corp., 825 F2d 1554 (II th Cir., 
1987). 
Prima facie case of discriminatory impact may be established by 
showing that an employer's facially neutral practice has a disparate impact on members of 
plaintiffs class. Geller v. Markham 24 FEP Cases 920 (1980). 
(ii) Defenses 
(a) Legitimate non-discriminatory reasons 
(b) Job related policy 
L-2 
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( c) Statutory exemption or exception 
- BFOQ: Bona fide occupational qualification 
- Differentiations based on reasonable factors other than age 
[29 USC §623(t)(1)] 
- Observation of the terms of a bona fide seniority system 
that is not intended to evade the Act [29 USC 
§623 (t)(2)(A)] 
- Observation of the terms of a bona fide employee benefit 
plan [29 USC §623(t)(2)(B)] 
D. Remedies 
ADEA specifically authorizes the courts to grant prevailing plaintiffs "such 
legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of" the Act. 29 
USC §626(b). Courts have held that such relief includes back pay, reinstatement, 
promotions, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, costs, injunctive relief and criminal 
penalties. 
n. PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING A REDUCTION IN FORCE 
A. Consideration of Alternatives to Discharge or Layoff 
Before an employer makes a final decision to make a reduction in staff, 
other less burdensome alternatives should be explored. Exploring alternatives to reduction 
in force is most effective when the magnitude of the anticipated reduction is relatively 
small. Even when a relatively large layoff or reduction is planned, the use of several 
alternatives may be effective to reduce the size of employee displacement. 
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However, to the extent alternatives are helpful in addressing the employers 
needs, they should be utilized. In defending a civil action based on age discrimination, the 
fact that the employer considered and/or adopted alternatives to staff reductions lends 
credence to the employers argument that it sought to protect its employees to the extent 
possible. Before reducing its workforce, an employer might consider the feasibility and/or 
appropriateness of personnel alternatives including: 
--Hiring and Recruitment Freeze 
--Reduction of work force through attrition 
--Part time positions 
--Freeze on Pay Raises 
--Examination of unit and Department Budgets 
--Pay Reductions 
--Reassigning displaced workers to other jobs within the company 
* --Voluntary Early Retirement* 
*Note: Many believe that this option creates more problems than it solves. 
Employees within the protected age group represent the greatest concern in these 
endeavors. Many view "voluntary" early retirement options as dangerous because 
of the hidden ADEA pitfalls. The issue usually turns on whether or not the choice 
was actually "voluntary". And, in reduction in force situations, the issue is also 
whether or not the employer targeted older workers and forced them into 
retirement. 
If an employer does utilize voluntary early retirement to diminish or avoid 
reduction in force, the employer should offer the option to all eligible employees 
before particular job functions are targeted for reduction. 
Although waivers have been effective in protecting employers from 
liability under ADEA, waivers have been the source of much litigation under 
ADEA. To withstand judicial review, the waiver must: (I) be written in language 
easily understood; (2) not allow employee to waive or release future claims which 
may arise after the date of the agreement; (3) be given in exchange for 
consideration beyond other benefits to which the employee is already entitled; 
(4) make specific reference to rights and claims under ADEA; (5) give the 
employee a reasonable time period in which to consider and review the document 
(21 days); (6) advise the employee to seek the advice ofan attorney; and (7) allow 
the employee at least 7 days within which to revoke the agreement after it is 
signed. 
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Documentation of alternatives is essential to an employer in the event of a 
civil action based on age discrimination. And, remember, the larger the number of 
employees affected by a reduction in force, the higher the probability of a civil action being 
filed under ADEA since reductions virtually aiways include some persons age 40 or over. 
B. Establishing Business Justifications for Staff Reductions 
Courts generally defer to employer's business justifications in cases of 
reduction in force, so long as the actions are carried out in a non-discriminatory manner 
and the reasons are not pretext for age discrimination. The U.S. Court of Appeals at 
Richmond denied an age discrimination claim from older employees who were demoted in 
a reduction in force, finding that the employer "attempted to achieve its overall reduction 
in force objectives in a fair and legitimate way.and the employer's reasons were grounded 
on qualifications and geographical considerations". EEOC v. Western Electric Co., 32 
FEP Cases 708, 712 (1983). Legitimate business reasons for reductions in force are 
numerous, but typically include technological advances, financial problems, tum down in 
business and reorganization. Also, See Chappell v. GTE Prods. Corp., 803 F2d 261 (6th 
Cir. 1986); Bechold v. IGW Sys. Inc., 817 F2d 1282 (7th Cir. 1987) and Tice v. Lampert 
Yards. Inc., 761 F2d 1210 (7th Cir., 1985). 
The identification of a legitimate business justification is crucial evidence to 
show the relationship of the particular layoff to a valid business objective. The Court in 
Sahadi v. Reynolds Chern., held that " .. a prima facie case of age discrimination is not 
shown by mere termination of a competent employee where it is shown that an employer is 
making cutbacks due to economic necessity." 636 F2d 1116, 1118 (6th Cir., 1980). 
L - 5. 
While no action taken by an employer making personnel decisions that 
result in reduction in force will guarantee that no civil action will be filed, proper actions 
taken by such an employer will minimize the prospect of such actions and will increase the 
probability of a favorable outcome for the employer. 
C. Essential Tools For The Evaluation Process 
(i) Workforce Statistical Analysis 
An employer considering a reduction in force should make a 
determination of the race, sex and age distribution of all employees in the company. 
Next, a similar analysis should be made with respect to the facilities and/or departments to 
be affected by the reduction. This information is necessary for the employer to evaluate 
the impact of its reduction decisions. If patterns of disparate impact on older workers are 
detected, the employer can reexamine the process for bias and take corrective action when 
necessary. 
This statistical infmmation should not be shared with 
decision-makers in the reduction process, as this would afford a plaintiff an opportunity to 
allege that the decision-maker did in fact base the decision on race, sex or age. Before 
reduction decisions are final, top-management should use this statistical data to determine 
the effect of planned reduction decisions. 
(ii) Job-Function Evaluation 
The next step in implementing a selection and evaluation process to 
facilitate force reduction is the identification by management of the particular operations 
of the employer that will be curtailed or eliminated. Management should also determine 
which jobs within the identified operations would be subject to cutback. Finally, 
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management must decide which functions within jobs must be curtailed or eliminated. 
Further consideration should be given to whether new functions will be performed by the 
employer and whether these new functions can be absorbed by present employees who 
otherwise would face layoff or termination. 
A review of the job functions in the different departments will be 
necessary to determine the qualifications required to perform these jobs. Evidence that the 
employer made a determination of the qualifications required to perform the retained jobs 
will help prove that those employees laid off or terminated as a result of the reduction in 
force were less qualified to fill the positions than those employees retained. 
In some cases, plaintiffs can establish a prima facie case of discrimination 
by showing that a policy underlying a layoff disproportionately affected employees within 
the protected age group. Geller v. Markham, 24 FEP Cased 920 (1980). An employer's 
defense can be buttressed by this type of job function evaluation, which objectively 
determines necessary qualifications. 
(iii). Employee Appraisal Criteria 
Since the lack of qualifications by an employee to perform a 
particular job is a sound defense to a legal challenge, it is vital that the criteria used to 
evaluate employees be objective and job-related. Again, the aim or purpose of employee 
evaluations is to establish a basis to show that those employees laid off or terminated were 
less qualified for the available positions than those retained. 
Job-related criteria includes: knowledge of a particular job function 
(Matthews v. Allis-chalmers, 769 F2d 1215, (7th CiT;, 1985); quality of work supported by 
L-7 
records; past performance evaluations, ifbased on objective criteria (Mistretta v. Sandia 
Corp., 15 FEP Cases 1690, (1977); education; training if training was available to all 
employees equally; attendance, test scores, length of service with employer (Gill v. Union 
Carbide, 368 F. Supp. 364, (1973). 
(iv) Market Conditions 
Market conditions should be studied prior to any use of criteria 
based on salary. It is best to avoid salary as a criteria for evaluation in the reduction 
process. Some courts might find salary inextricably tied to the age of an employee. 
~oklitar v. CBS. Inc. 652 F. Supp. 1023 (SDNY 1987). Metz v. Transit Mix, 44 FEP 
Cases 1339, (1989). 
However, the U.S. Court of Appeals at New York in Bay v. Times 
Mirror Magazines, 56 FEP Cases 407 (1991) found that during cutbacks, ADEA does not 
" ... prohibit an employer from making employment decisions that relate to an employee's 
salary to contemporaneous market conditions ... so long as the employer's decisions view 
each employee individually ... do not impose a general role that has a disparate impact on 
older workers and are based solely on financial considerations ... " 56 FEP Cases 407, 
411. 
(v) Consultant Guidelines 
In reduction in force cases involving a significant number of 
employees, an outside consultant familiar with the industry might be hired to help develop 
job-related evaluation guidelines. The use of a consultant would further underscore the 
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job-relatedness of the evaluation criteria and help defeat a prima facie case of age 
discrimination based on the disproportionate impact of the criteria. 
D. The Evaluation Process 
Once management has determined which job functions are essential to the 
remaining operations of the employer and has determined the qualifications necessary for 
these jobs; and management has developed appropriate job-related criteria to evaluate 
employees, the next step involves the actual evaluation of employees. 
(i) Role of Department Heads and Supervisors 
Employee evaluations should be performed by department heads 
and first line supervisors who have been trained on how to properly apply the developed 
criteria and to maintain the necessary records. Ratings of employees should be done on a 
comparative basis so that department heads and supervisors are forced to actually rank all 
employees relative to each other. 
Supervisors and department heads should be cautioned against 
making any statements, comments or remarks relative to age. Although such comments or 
remarks alone are insufficient to prove an age discrimination case, courts will allow 
plaintiffs to introduce evidence of such comments to show that a policy underlying a staff 
reduction is based on discrimination. Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649 F2d 691 (9th Cir., 
1981). 
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(ii) Reduction in Force Committee 
If the reduction in force involves a significant number of employees, 
an additional review of employee appraisals is worthwhile. This can be accomplished by 
establishing a Reduction in Force (RIF) Committee. This is an internal committee 
comprised of management and non-management personnel, including representatives of all 
protected groups. The review conducted by this Committee should include a comparison 
between each employee's previous evaluation and the reduction evaluation. Discrepancies 
should be resolved and any significant changes should be based on legitimate grounds. 
More importantly, this Committee's review should determine the impact of the reduction 
on all employees and groups of employees over the age of 40. The review should not 
confine its impact analysis to the single group of employees over 40, but should look for 
patterns of impact on groups within the protected age group (i.e. age 50 or above; age 60 
or above, etc.). Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 15 FEP Cases 1690 (1977) and Lowe v. 
Commack Union School District, 50 FEP Ca.ses 1400, (1989) Also, See EEOC 
Interpretations of ADEA, 29 CFR §1625.2 
If an adverse impact is observed, the evaluation of each employee in 
that particular age group should be reexamined to ensure that the evaluations are based on 
job-related factors. The employer must be able to substantiate its decision on legitimate 
grounds. 
E. Notice to Employees 
The final step in the reduction in force process, is employee notification. 
To be more humane, notification should be given in a meeting with the employee. The 
employer should establish guidelines to be used by individuals conducting the notification 
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meetings. These guidelines should be written; should cover the issues common to all 
employees; and should provide inform~tion on how the selection process works. Further, 
the individual conducting the notification meeting should be able to inform the employees 
of how and why job functions were eliminated or curtailed. Employees should then be 
told how their individual evaluations were made and in what ways their performance was 
less than other employees who were retained. 
During this meeting management might solicit comments or input from 
employees affected by the reduction. ' 
The notification meetings should be limited to conveying the essential 
information to employees and should avoid gratuitous remarks referencing age (e.g .. 
:~IYoulve had a number of good years here"; or," you wiIl not suffer much because you 
are eligible for early retirement"). 
If the employer is subject to the WARN Act, there are precise notification 
requirements discussed later in this outline .. 
F. Appeal Process 
As a final check and balance of the reduction in force process, an employer 
might also consider providing affected employees with an appeal process. This process 
need not be complex to be effective. The scope of the appeal could be tailored to the 
number of affected employees, with a more thorough process used when significant 
numbers of the workforce are affected. The RIP Committee could function in an appeals 
capacity. Or, the employer might use membeis of higher management to review employee 
appeals. 
Giving employees advanced notice of the possibility of a reduction in force 
and establishing an approach that: considers reduction alternatives; determines necessary 
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job functions and qualifications, evaluates employees based on job-related criteria and 
provides for reexamination of employee reviews, has many advantages. First, it forces the 
employer to document and substantiate the reasons for termination or layoff And, it 
assures that uniform criteria are uniformly applied to all employees. This process will 
boost employee morale by demonstrating fairness and will create a strong psychological 
effect that will help deter lawsuits. 
III. WORKER ADmSTMENT AND RETRAINING NOTIFICATION ACT 
The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN), commonly 
referred to as the Plant Closing Act, was enacted by Congress in 1988 and took effect 
February 4,1989. (29 USC §2101 et seq.). Congress enacted this legislation in response 
to concerns arising out of unannounced plant closings and mass layoffs. 
Though commonly known as the Plant Closing Act, WARN in fact applies to 
situations other than plant closings. Any employer who is shutting down a unit or facility 
within a plant or site of employment, or who is laying off a significant number of 
employees at a single site of employment, must comply with the notice requirements 
mandated by the WARN Act. 
A. Requirements 
The basic requirement of the WARN Act is for all employers subject to the 
Act to give sixty days' advance written notice of shutdowns or mass layoffs. This notice 
must be given to: (1) the bargaining representative of the affected employees, or absent 
such representative, each individual employee; (2) the local community where the work 
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force reduction is to take place; and (3) to the state dislocated workers unit. 29 USC 
§2102 (a)(I) and (2) 
The Act contains exceptions to the sixty days advance notice requirement 
where the employer can show that at the time of plant closing the employer was actively 
seeking capital or business to avoid a plant closing; or the employer must show that the 
circumstances necessitating the closing or layoff were "not reasonably foreseeable" as of 
the time notice should have been given. 29 USC §2102(b)(I) and (2). 
B. Coverage 
The Act covers all employers with more than 100 employees at all sites 
combined. Part-time employees are excluded from this definition 29 USC §2101(a)(I)(A) 
and (B). "Part-time" employee is defined in the Act as "an employee who is employed for 
an average of fewer than 20 hours per week or who has been employed for fewer than 6 
of the 12 months preceding the date on which notice is required". 29 USC §2101(a)(8). 
The Act defines a "plant closing" as "the permanent or temporary 
shutdown of a single site of employment, or one or more facilities or operating units 
within a single site of employment, if the shutdown results in an employment loss at the 
single site of employment during any 30-day period for 50 or more employees excluding 
any part-time employees" 29 USC §2101(a)(2). 
The statute defines "mass layofP' as " a reduction in force which is not the 
result of a plant closing; and results in an employment loss at the single site of employment 
during any 30 day period for at least 33 percent of the employees and at least 50 
employees or at least 500 employees. 29 USC §2101(a)(3)(A)and (B). 
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The Act defines "employment loss" as (A) any employment termination, 
other than a discharge for cause, voluntary departure, or retirement, (B) a layoff 
exceeding 6 months, or (C) a reduction in hours of work of more than 50 percent during 
each month of any 6-month period. 29 USC §2101(1)(b). 
An employee has not suffered an employment loss if the employer has 
offered himlher a transfer to a different site of employment within a reasonable commuting 
distance with no more than a six-month break in employment or if the employer offers to 
transfer the employee anywhere with no more than a six-months break,. and the employee 
accepts within thirty days of the offer or of the closing or layoff, whichever is later. No 
employment loss has occurred in this instant, therefore notice is not required. 29 USC 
§2101(b)(2)(A) and (B). 
Thus, under the definition of "employment loss", a bargaining 
representative or in the absence thereof, an employee terminated or otherwise displaced as 
a result of reduction in force is entitled to the required advanced written notice, if all of 
the above mentioned jurisdictional requirements are met. . 
C. Exemptions 
The Act exempts from its coverage temporary facilities, and the completion 
of a particular project or undertaking. However, to escape the notice requirements under 
these circumstances, the employer· must show that the employee was hired with the 
understanding that the employment was limited to the duration of the facility or project. 
29 USC §2103(1) 
Strikes and lockouts will also negate an employer's responsibility to give 
notice under this act, if the closing or layoff is caused by the strike or lockout. 29 USC 
§2103 (2). 
D. Contents of Written Notice 
The regulations requires that notices of layoffs and plant closings be 
specific. 20 CPR §639.7. Notices to representatives of affected employees must contain 
the name and address of the employment site; the nature of the planned action and 
whether it is expected to be permanent or temporary; if the entire plant is to be closed, a 
statement to that effect; the expected date of the first separation and the schedule for 
making separations; the job titles of positions to be affected and the names of the people 
currently holding those jobs; and the name and telephone number of an employer official 
to contact for further information. 
Notices to individual employees, absent a collective bargaining agreement, 
must contain a statement as to whether the planned action is expected to be temporary or 
permanent and whether the entire plant is to be closed; the expected date when the plant 
closing or mass layoff will begin; the expected date when the individual employee will be 
separated; a statement on the existence of applicable bumping rights; and the name and 
telephone number of an employer official to contact for further information. 
The regulations also suggest that employers include in these notices other . 
useful information such as the availability of retraining assistance and other assistance for 
dislocated workers. 
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E. Enforcement 
The WARN Act may be enforced in court by individual employees, their 
representatives, or local units of government. A person seeking to enforce the WARN 
Act may sue for him or herself or on behalf of a class in any U.S. district court in which 
the violation is alleged to have occurred or in which the employer transacts business. 
29 USC §2104(a)(5). 
Thus, while the Act authorizes the Department of Labor to issue 
regulations interpreting the WARN Act, no federal government agency has enforcement 
power to process claims by aggrieved employees. 
F. Remedies 
An employer who violates the WARN Act is liable to each aggrieved 
employee for back pay for each day of violation and any benefits available under an 
employee benefit plan, up to· a maximum of sixty days but in no event for more than one 
half the number of days the employee was employed by the employer. The amount of 
back pay is reduced by any wages that were paid during the period of violation, any 
voluntary payment of the employer that is not required by any legal obligation, and any 
payment by the employer to a third party or trustee attributable to the employee, such as 
premiums for health benefits. 29 USC §2104(a). 
The Act specifically states that the remedies provided for in this Act shall 
be the exclusive remedies for any violation of the Act. Federal courts are specifically 
prohibited from enjoining a plant closing or mass layoff. 29 USC §21 04(b). 
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Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1961 
Following is the text of the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967, 
which prohibits employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of age for anyone aged 
40 or over. Codified as 29 U.S.C. §621 et 
seq., the statute reads as amended by the 
Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 
1990, P.L. 101-433, and by the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, P.L. 102-166, effective 
November 21, 1991. 
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Sec. 621. Statement of Findings and 
Purpose 
(a) The Congress hereby finds and de-
clares that-
(1) in the face of rising productivity 
and affluence, older workers find them-
selves disadvantaged in their efforts to 
retain employment, and especially to 
regain employment when displaced from 
jobs; 
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits 
regardless of potential for job perfor-
mance has become a common practice, 
and certain otherwise desirable practices 
may work to the disadvantage of older 
persons; 
(3) the incidence of unemployment, es-
pecially long-term unemployment with 
resultant deterioration of skill. morale, 
and employer acceptability is, relative to 
the younger ages, high among older 
workers; their numbers are great and 
growing; and their employment problems 
grave; 
(4) the existence in industries affecting 
commerce, of arbitrary discrimination in 
employment because of age, burdens 
commerce and the free flow of goods in 
commerce. 
(b) It is therefore the pUrpose of this 
chapter to promote employment of older 
persons based on their ability rather 
than age; to prohibit arbitrary age dis-
crimination in employment; to help em-
ployers and workers find ways of meet-
ing problems arising from the impact of 
age on employment. 
[Editor's note: The Older Workers 
Benefit Protection Act, P.L. 101-UJ3, ef-
fective October 16, 1990, prO'lJided as fol-
lows: 
Sec. 101. Finding 
The Cong7"ess finds that,as a result of 
the decision of the Supreme Court in 
Public Employees Retirement System of 
Ohio v. Betts, 109 S.Ct. 256 (1989), legisla-
tive action is. necessary to restore the 
original cong7"essional intent in passing 
and amending the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 621 et 
seq.), which was to prohibit discrimina-
tion against older workers in all employ-
ee benefits except when age-based reduc-
tions in employee benefit plans are justi-
fied by sign'ijicant cost considerations.] 
Sec. 622. Education and Research 
Program 
(a) The Secretary of Labor shall un-
dertake studies and provide information 
to labor unions, management, and the 
general public concerning the needs and 
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abilities of older workers, and their po-
tentials for continued employment and 
contribution to the economy. In order to 
achieve the purposes of this chapter, the 
Secretary of Labor shall carryon a con-
tinuing program of education and infor-
mation. under which he may, among oth-
er measures-
(1) undertake research, and promote 
research, with a view to reducing barri-
ers to the employment of older persons, 
and the promotion of measures for utiliz-
ing their skills; 
(2) publish and otherwise make avail-
able to employers, professional societies, 
the various media of communication, 
and other interested persons the findings 
of studies and other materials for the 
promotion of employment; 
(3) foster through the public employ-
ment service system and through cooper-
ative effort the development of facilities 
of public and private agencies for ex-
panding the opportunities and potentials 
of older persons; 
(4) sponsor and assist State and com-
munity informational and educational 
programs. 
(b) Not later than six months after the 
effective date of this chapter, the Secre-
tary shall recommend to the Congress 
any measures he may deem desirable to 
change the lower or upper age limits set 
forth in section 631 of this title. 
Sec. 623. Prohibition of Age 
Discrimination 
(a) Employer practices 
It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to dis-
charge any individual or otherwise dis-
criminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, be-
cause of such individual's age; 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his 
employees in any way which would de-
prive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affect his status as an employ-
ee, because of such individual's age; or 
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any em-
ployee in order to comply with this chap-
ter. 
(b) Employment agency practices 
It shall be unlawful for an employ-
ment agency to fail or refuse to refer for 
employment, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against, any individual because of 
such individual's age, or to classify or 
refer for employment any individual on 
the basis of such individual's age. 
(c) Labor organization practices 
It shall be unlawful for a labor organi-
zation-
(1) to exclude or to expel from its mem-
bership, or otherwise to discriminate 
against, any individual because of his 
age; 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its 
membership, or to classify or fail or re-
fuse to refer for employment any individ-
ual, in any way which would deprive or 
tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities, or would limit such 
employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affect his status as an employ-
ee or as an applicant for employment, 
because of such individual's age; 
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an em-
ployer to discriminate against an indi-
vidual in violation of this section. 
(d) Opposition to unlawful practices; 
participation in investigations, proceed-
ings, or litigation 
It shall be unlawful .for any employer 
to discriminate against any of his em-
ployees or applicants for employment, 
for an employment agency to discrimi-
nate against any individual, or for a la-
bor organization to discriminate against 
any member thereof or applicant for 
membership, because such individual, 
member, or applicant for membership, 
has opposed any practice made unlawful 
by this section, or because such individu-
al, mell)ber, or applicant for membership 
has made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
participated in any manner in an investi-
gation, proceeding, or litigation under 
this chapter. 
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(e) Printing or publication of notice or 
advertisement indicating preference, 
limitation, etc. 
It shall be unlawful for an employer, 
labor organization, or employment agen-
cy to print or publish, or cause to be 
printed or published, any notice or ad-
vertisement relating to employment by 
such an employer or membership in or 
any classification or referral for employ-
ment by such a labor organization, or 
relating to any classification or referral 
for employment by such an employment 
agency, indicating any preference, limi-
tation, specification, or discrimination, 
based on age. 
(j) Lawful practices; age an occupa-
tional qualification; other reasonable fac-
tors; laws of foreign workplace; seniority 
. system; employee benefit plans; discharge 
. or discipline for good cause 
It shall not be unlawful for an employ-
er,employment agency, or labor organi-
zation-
(1) to take any action otherwise pro-
hibited under subsection (a), (b), (c), or 
(e) of this section where age is a bona fide 
occupational qualification reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation of the 
particular business, or where the differ-
entiation is based on reasonable factors 
other than age or where such practices 
involve an employee in a workplace in a 
foreign country, and compliance with 
such subsections would cause such em-
ployer, or a corporation controlled by 
such employer, to violate the laws of the 
country in which such workplace is lo-
cated; 
(2) to take any action otherwise pro-
hibited under subsection (a), (b), (c), or 
(e) of this section-
(A) to observe the terms of a bona fide 
seniority system that is not intended to 
evade the purposes of this chapter, ex-
cept that no such seniority system shall 
require or permit the involuntary retire-
ment of any individual specified by sec-
tion 631(a) of this title because of the age 
of such individual; or 
(B) to observe the terms of a bona fide 
employee benefit plan-
(i) where, for each benefit or benefit 
package, the actual amount of payment 
made or cost incurred on behalf of an 
older worker is no less than that made or 
incurred on behalf of a younger worker, 
as permissible under section 1625.10, title 
29, Code of Federal Regulations (as in 
effect on June 22, 1989); or 
(ii) that is a voluntary early retire-
ment incentive plan consistent with the 
relevant purpose or purposes of this 
chapter. 
Notwithstanding clause (i) or (ii) of 
subparagraph (B), no such employee ben-
efit plan or voluntary early retirement 
incentive plan shall excuse the failure to 
hire any individual, and no such employ-
ee benefit plan shall require or permit 
the involuntary retirement of any indi-
vidual specified by section 631(a) of this 
title, because of the age of such individu-
al. An employer, employment agency, or 
labor organization acting under sub-
paragraph (A), or under clause (i) or (ii) 
of subparagraph (B), shall have the bur-
den of proving that such actions are law-
ful in any civil enforcement proceeding 
brought under this chapter; or (As 
amended by the Older Workers Benefit 
Protection Act, eff. Oct. 16, 1990) 
(3) to discharge or otherwise discipline 
an individual for good cause. 
[Editor'S note: Paragraph (g), Entitle-
ment to coverage under group health 
plan, was repealed by P.L. 101-239, effec-
tive December, 19, 1989.] 
(h) Practices of foreign corporations 
controlled by American employers; for-
eign persons not controlled by American 
employers; factors determining control 
. (1) If an employer controls a corpora-
tion whose place of incorporation is in a 
foreign country, any practice by such 
corporation prohibited under this section 
shall be presumed to be such practice by 
such employer. 
(2) The prohibitions of this section 
shall not apply where the employer is a 
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foreign person not controlled by an 
American employer. 
(3) For the purpose of this subsection 
the determination of whether an employ-
er controls a corporation shall be based 
upon the-
(A) interrelation of operations, 
(B) common management, 
(C) centralized control of labor rela-
tions, and 
(D) common ownership or financial 
control, of the employer and the corpora-
tion. (As added by P.L. 98-459, eif. Oct. 9, 
1984) 
(i) Employee pension beMfit plans; ces-
sation or reduction of benefit accrual or 
of allocation to employee account; distri-
bution of benefits after attainment of 
normal retirement age; compliance; 
highly compensated employees (As 
amended by the Older Workers Benefit 
Protection Act, eif. Oct. 16, 1990) 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in 
this subsection, it shall be unlawful for 
an employer, an employment agency, a 
labor organization, or any combination 
thereof to establish or maintain an em-
ployee pension benefit plan which re-
quires or permits-
(A) in the case of a defined benefit 
plan, the cessation of an employee's ben-
efit accrual, or the reduction of the rate 
of an employee's benefit accrual, because 
of age, or 
(B) in the case of a defined contribu-
tion plan, the cessation of allocations to 
an employee's account, or the reduction 
of the rate at which amounts are allocat-
ed to an employee's account, because of 
age. 
(2) Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to prohibit an employer, em-
ployment agency, or labor organization 
from observing any provision of an em-
ployee pension benefit plan to the extent 
that such provision impose.., (without re-
gard to age) a limitation on the amount 
of benefits that the plan provides or a 
limitation on the number of years of ser-
vice or years of participation which are 
taken into account for purposes of deter-
mining benefit accrual under the plan. 
(3) In the case of any employee who, as 
of the end of any plan year under a de-
fined benefit plan, has attained normal 
retirement age under such plan-
(A) if distribution of benefits under 
such plan with respect to such employee 
has commenced as of the end of such 
plan year, then any requirement of this 
subsection for continued accrual of bene-
fits under such plan with respect to such 
employee during such plan year shall be 
treated as satisfied to the extent of the 
actuarial equivalent of in-service distri-
bution of benefits, and 
(B) if distribution of benefits under 
such plan with respect to such employee 
has not commenced as of the end of such 
year in accordance with section 
1056(a)(3) of this title [Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974] and 
section 401(a)(14)(C) of title 26 [Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986], and the payment 
of benefits under such plan with respect 
to such employee is not suspended during 
such plan year pursuant to section 
1053(a)(3)(B) of this title [Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974] or 
section 411(a)(3)(B) of title 26 [Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986], then any require-
ment of this subsection for continued ac-
crual of benefits under such plan with 
respect to such employee during such 
plan year shall be treated as satisfied to 
the extent of any adjustment in the bene-
fit payable under the plan during such 
plan year attributable to the delay in the 
distribution of benefits after the attain-
ment of normal retirement age. 
The provisions of this paragraph shall 
apply in accordance with regulations of 
the Secretary of the Treasury. Such regu-
lations shall provide for the application 
of the preceding provisions of. this para-
graph to all employee pension benefit 
plans subject to this subsection and may 
provide for the application of such provi-
sions, in the case of any such employee, 
with respect to any period of time within 
a plan year. 
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(4) Compliance with the requirements 
of this subsection with respect to an em-
ployee pension benefit plan shall consti-
tute compliance with the requirements of 
this section relating to benefit accrual 
under such plan. 
(5) Paragraph (1) shall not apply with 
respect to any employee who is a highly 
compensated employee (within the mean-
ing of section 414(q) of title 26 [Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986]) to the extent pro-
vided in regulations prescribed by the 
Secretary of the Treasury for purposes of 
precluding discrimination in favor of 
highly compensated employees within 
the meaning of subchapter D of chapter 
1 of title 26. 
(6) A plan shall not be treated as fail-
ing to meet the requirements of para-
graph (1) solely because the subsidized 
portion of any early retirement benefit is 
disregarded in determining benefit ac-
cruals. 
(7) Any regulations prescribed by the 
Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to 
clause (v) of section 411(b)(I)(H) of title 
26 and subparagraphs (C) and (0) of sec-
tion 411(b)(2) of such title 26 shall apply 
with respect to the requirements of this' 
subsection in the same manner and to 
the same extent as such regulations ap-
ply with respect to the requirements of 
such sections 411(b)(I)(H) and 411(b)(2). 
(8) A plan shall not be treated as fail-
ing to meet the requirements of this sec-
tion solely because such plan provides a 
normal retirement age described in sec-
tion loo2(24)(B) of this title [Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974] 
and section 411(a)(8)(B) of title 26. [In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1986] 
(9) For purposes of this subsection-
(A) The terms "employee pension ben-
efit plan", "defined benefit plan", "defined 
contribution plan", and "normal retire-
ment age'" have the meanings provided 
such terms in section 1002 of this title. 
[Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974] 
. (B) The term "compensation" has the 
meaning provided by section 414(s) of ti-
tle 26. [Internal Revenue Code of 1986] 
(Added by P.L. 99-509, effective with re-
spect to plan years starting on or after 
Jan. '1, 1988. For collectively bargained 
plans, it is effective on the earlier of (1) 
Jan. 1,1990 or (2) the later of Jan. 1, 1988 
or the expiration date of the last con-
tract.) 
(j) Employment as firefighter or law 
enforcement officer 
(i) It shall not be unlawful for an em-
ployer which is a State, a political subdi.." 
vision of a State, an agency or instru-
mentality of a State or a political subdi-
vision of a State, or an interstate agency 
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge 
any individual because of such individu-
al's age if such action is taken-
(1) with respect to.the employment of 
an individual as a firefighter or as a law 
enforcement officer and the individual 
has attained the age of hiring or retire-
ment in effect under applicable State or 
local law on March 3, 1983, and 
(2) pursuant to a bona fide hiring or 
retirement plan that is not a subterfuge 
to evade the purposes of this chapter. 
(Added by P.L. 99-592, eff. Jan. I, 1987, 
through Dec. 31, 1993) 
[Editor's note: The above section does 
not apply to any causes of action arising 
under ADEA before Jan. 1, 1987. Section 
5 of P.L. 99-592 directed EEOC and the 
Lahor Department to conduct a study 
and make recommendations on the use of 
physical and mental fi·tness tests to mea-
sure the ability and competence of police 
officers and firefighters. In addition. by 
Nov. 1991, EEOC must propose guide-
lines for the administration and use of 
such tests.] 
(k) &niority system or employee bene-
fit plan; compliance 
A seniority system or employee benefit 
plan shall comply with this chapter re-
gardless of the date of adoption of such 
system or plan. (As added by the Older 
Workers Benefit Protection Act, eff. Oct. 
16, 1990) 
(l) Lawful practices; minimum age as 
condition of eligibility for retirement 
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benefits; deductions from severance pay; 
reduction of long-term disability benefits 
Notwithstanding clause (i) or (ii) of 
subsection (f)(2)(B) of this section-
(1) It shall not be a violation of subsec-
tion (a), (b), (c), or (e) of this section 
solely because-
(A) an employee pension benefit plan 
(as defined in section 1002(2) of this title 
[Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974] provides for the attainment 
of a minimum age as a condition of eligi-
bility for normal or early retirement 
benefits; or 
(B) a defined benefit plan (as defined in 
section 1002(35) of this title) provides 
for-
(i) payments that constitute the subsi-
dized portion of an early retirement ben-
efit; or 
(ii) social security supplements for 
. plan participants that commence before 
the age and terminate at the age (speci-
fied by the plan) when participants are 
eligible to receive reduced or unreduced 
old-age insurance benefits under title II 
of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 401 
et seq.), and that do not exceed such old-
age insurance benefits. 
(2)(A) It shall not be a violation of 
subsection (a), (b), (c), or (e) of this sec-
tion solely because following a contin-
gent event unrelated to age-
(i)the value of any retiree health bene-
fits received by an individual eligible for 
an immediate pension; 
(ii) the value of any additional pension 
benefits that are made available solely as 
a result of the contingent event unrelated 
to age and following which the individu-
al is eligible for not less than an immedi-
ate and unreduced pension; or 
(iii) the values described in both 
clauses (i) and (ii); 
are deducted from severance pay made 
available as a result of the contingent 
event unrelated to age. 
(B) For an individual who receives im-
mediate pension benefits that are actua-
rially reduced under subparagraph 
(A)(i), the amount of the deduction avail-
able pursuant to subparagraph (A)(i) 
shall be reduced by the same percentage 
as the reduction in the pension benefits. 
(C) For purposes of this paragraph, 
severance pay shall include that portion 
of supplemental unemployment compen-
sation benefits (as described in section 
501(c)(17) of title 26 [Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986]) that-
(i) constitutes additional benefits of up . 
to 52 weeks; 
(ii) has the primary purpose and effect 
of continuing benefits until an individual 
becomes eligible for an immediate and 
unreduced pension; and 
(iii) is discontinued once the individual 
becomes eligible for an immediate and 
unreduced pension. 
(D) For purposes of this paragraph 
and solely in order to make the deduction 
authorized under this paragraph, the 
term "retiree health benefits"means ben-
efits provided pursuant to a group health 
plan covering retirees, for which (deter-
mined as of the contingent event unrelat-
ed to age)- . 
(i) the package of benefits provided by 
the employer for the retirees who are be-
low age 65 is at least comparable to bene-
fits provided under title XVIII of the So-
cial Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395 et seq.); 
(ii) the package of benefits provided by 
the employer for the retirees who are age 
65 and above is at least comparable to 
that offered under a plan that provides a 
benefit package with one-fourth the val-
ue of benefits provided under title XVIII· 
of such Act; or 
(iii) the package of benefits provided 
by the employer is as described in clauses 
(i) and (ii). (As amended by P.L. 101-521, 
eff. Nov. 5, 1990) 
(E)(i) If the obligation of the employer 
to provide retiree health benefits is of 
limited duration, the value for each indi-
vidual shall be calculated at a rate of 
$3,000 per year for benefit years before 
age 65, and $750 per year for benefit 
years beginning at age 65 and above. 
(ii) If the obligation of the employer to 
provide retiree health benefits is of un-
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limited duration, the value for each indi-
vidual shall be calculated at a rate of 
$48,000 for individuals below age 65, and 
$24,000 for individuals age 65 and above. 
(iii) The values described in clauses (i) 
and (ii) shall be calculated based on the 
age of the individual as of the date of 
the contingent event unrelated to age. 
The values are effective on October 16, 
1990, and shall be adjusted on an annual 
basis, with respect to a contingent event 
that occurs subsequent to the first year 
after October 16, 1990, based on the med-
ical component of the Consumer Price 
Index for all-urban consumers published 
by the Department of Labor. 
(iv) If an individual is required to pay 
a premium for retiree health benefits, the 
value calculated pursuant to this sub-
paragraph shall be reduced by whatever 
. percentage of the overall premium the 
~individual is required to pay. 
(F) If an employer that has imple-
mented a deduction pursuant to subpara-
graph (A) fails to fulfill the obligation 
described in subparagraph (E), any ag-
grieved individual may bring an action 
for specific performance of the obligation 
described in subparagraph (E). The relief 
shall be in addition to any other reme-
dies provided under Federal or State law. 
(3) It shall not be a violation of subsec-
tion (a), (b), (c), or (e) of this section 
solely because an employer provides a 
bona fide employee benefit plan or plans 
under which long-term disability bene-
fits received by an individual are reduced 
by any pension benefits (other than those 
attributable to employee contribu-
tions)-
(A) paid to the individual that the in-
dividual voluntarily elects to receive; or 
(B) for which an individual who has 
attained the later of age 62 or normal 
retirement age is eligible. (Added by the 
Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, 
eff. Oct. 16, 1990) 
[Editor's note: The Older Workers 
Benefit Protection Act, P.L. 101-433, ef-
fective October 16,· 1990, provided as fol-
lows: 
Sec. 104. Rules and Regulations 
Notwithstanding section 9 of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967 (29 U.s.C. 628), the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission may issue 
such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may consider necessary or ap-
propriate for carrying out this title, and 
the amendments made by this title, only 
after consultation with the Secretary of 
the Treasury and the Secretary of Labor. 
Sec. 105. Effective Date 
(a) In General-Except as otherwise 
provided in this section, this title and the 
amendments made by this title shall ap-
ply only to-
(1) any employee benefit established or 
modified on or after the date of enact-
ment of this Act; and 
(2) other conduct occurring more than 
180 days after the date of enactment of 
this Act. 
(b) Collectively Bargained Agree-
ments. - With respect to any employee 
benefits provided in accordance with a 
collective bargaining agreement-
(1) that is in effect as of the date of 
enactment of this Act; or that is a result 
of pattern collective bargaining in an in-
dustry where the agreement setting the 
pattern was ratified after September 20, 
1990, but prior to the date of the enact-
ment, and the final agreement in the in-
dustry adhering to the pattern was rati-
fied after the date of enactment, but not 
later than November 20, 1990; 
(2) that terminates after such date of 
enactment; 
(3) any provision of which was entered 
into by a labor organization (as defined 
by section 6(d)(J,) of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 206(d)(J,))); 
and 
(4) that contains any provision that 
would be superseded (in whole or part) 
by this title and the amendments made 
by this title, but for the operation of this 
section, this title and the amendments 
made by this title shall not apply until 
the termination of such collective bar-
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gaining agreement or June 1, 1992, 
whichever occurs first. 
(c) States and Political Subdivi-
sions.-
(1) In generaL- With respect to any 
employee benefits provided by an em-
ployer-
(A) that is a State or political subdivi-
sion of a State or any agency or instru-
mentality of a State or political subdivi-
sion of a State; and 
(B) that maintained an employee bene-
fit plan at any time between June 23, 
1989, and the date of enactment of this 
Act that would be superseded (in whole 
or part) by this title and the amendments 
made by this title butfor the operation of 
this subsection, and which plan may be 
modified only through a change in appli-
cable State or local law, 
this title and the amendments made by 
this title shall not apply until the date 
that is 2 years after the date of enact-
ment of this Act. 
(2) Election of disability C01Jerage for 
employees hir;ed prior to effective 
date.-
(A) In general.-An employer that 
maintains a plan described in paragraph 
(1)(B) may, with regard to disability ben-
efits pr01Jided pursuant to such a plan-
(i) following reasonable notice to aU 
employees, implement new disability 
benefits that satisfy the requirements of 
the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967 (as amended by this title); 
and 
(ii) then offer to each employee c01Jered 
by a plan described in paragraph (1)(B) 
the option to elect such new disability 
benefits in lieu of the existing disability 
benefits, if-
(l) the offer is made and reasonable 
notice provided no later than the date 
that is 2 years alter the date of enact-
ment of this Act; and 
(II) the employee is given up to 180 
days after the offer in which to make the 
election. 
(B) Previous disability benefits.-Ifthe 
employee does not elect to be c01Jered by 
the new disability benefits, the employer 
may continue to C01Jer the employee un-
der the previous disability benefits even 
though such pre'pious benefits do not oth-
erwise satiify the requirements of the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
of 1967 (as amended by this title). 
(C) Abrogation of right to receive bene-
fits.-An election of coverage under the 
new disability benefits shall abrogate any 
right the electing employee may have 
had to receive existing disability benefits. 
The employee shall maintain any years 
of service accumulated for purposes of 
determining eligibility for the new bene-
fits. 
(3) State assistance.-The Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission, the 
Secretary of Labor, a nd the Secretary of 
the Treasury shall, on request, pr01Jide to 
States assistance in identifying and se-
curing independent technical advice to 
assist in complying u'ith this subsection. 
(4) Definitions.-For purposes of this 
subsection.' 
(A) Employer and state.-The terms 
"employer "and "State" shall have the re-
spective meanings provided such terms 
under subsections (b) a nd (i) of section 11 
of the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 630). 
(B) Disability benefits. - The term "dis-
ability benefits" means any program for 
employees of a State or political subdivi-
sion of a State that provides long-term 
disability benefits. whether on an insured 
basis in a separate employee benefit plan 
or as part of an employee pension benefit 
plan. 
(C) Reasonable notice.-The term 
"reasonable notice" means, with respect 
to notice of new disability benefits de-
scribed in paragraph (2j{A) that is gil'en 
to each employee, notice that-
(i) is suJficiently accurate and compre-
hensive to appraise the employee of the 
terms and conditions of the disability 
benefits, including whether the employee 
is immediately eligible for such benefits; 
and 
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(ii) is written in a manner calculated 
to be understood by the average employee 
eligible to participate. 
(d) Discrimination in Employee Pen-
sion Benefit Plans.-Nothing in this title, 
or the amendments made by this title, 
shall be construed as limiting the 
prohibitions against discrimination that 
are set forth in section 4(j) of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967 (as redesignated by section 103(2) of 
this Act). 
(e) Continued Benefit Payments.-
Notwithstanding any other provision of 
this section, on and after the effective 
date of this title and the amendments 
made by this title (as determined in ac-
cordance with subsections (a), (b), and 
(c)), this title and the amendments made 
by this title shall not apply to a series of 
benefit payments made to an individual 
or the individual's representative that 
began prior to the effective date and that 
continue after the effective date pursuant 
to an arrangement that was in effect on 
the effective date, except that no substan-
tial modification to such arrangement 
may be made after the date of enactment 
. of this Act if the intent of the modifica-
tion is to evade the purposes of this Act.] 
Sec. 624. Study by Secretary of 
Labor 
(1) The Equal Employment Opportuni-
ty Commission shall, not later than 12 
months after the date of enactment of 
this Act (Oct. 31, 1986), enter into an 
agreement with the National Academy of 
Sciences for the conduct of a study to 
analyze the potential consequences of the 
elimination of mandatory retirement on 
institutions of higher education. 
(2) The study required by paragraph 
(1) of this subsection shall be conducted 
under the general supervision of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences by a study 
panel composed of 9 members. The study 
panel shall consist of-
(A) 4 members who shall be adminis-
trators at institutions of higher educa-
tion selected by the National Academy of 
Sciences after consultation with the 
American Council of Education, the As-
sociation of American Universities, and 
the National Association of State Uni-
versities and Land Grant Colleges; 
(B) 4 members who shall be teachers 
or retired teachers at institutions of 
higher education (who do not serve in an 
administrative capacity at such institu-
tions), selected by the National Academy 
of Sciences after consultation with the 
American Federation of Teachers, the 
National Education Association, the 
American Association of University 
Professors, and the American Associa-
tion of Retired Persons; and 
(C) one member selected by the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences. 
(3) The results of the study shall be 
reported, with recommendations, to the 
President and to the Congress not later 
than 5 years after the date of enactment 
of this Act (Oct. 31, 1986). 
(4) The expenses of the study required 
by this subsection shall be paid from 
funds available to the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission. (As 
amended by P.L. 99-592, eff. Oct. 31,1986) 
Sec. 625. Administration 
The Secretary shall have the power -
(a) Delegation of functions; appoint-' 
ments of personne~' technical assistance 
to make delegations, to appoint such 
agents and employees,. and to pay for 
technical assistance on a fee-for-service 
basis, as he deems necessary to assist 
him in the performance of his functions 
under this chapter: 
(b) Cooperation with other agencies, 
employers, labor organizations, and em-
ployment agencies 
to cooperate with regional, State, local, 
and other agencies, and to cooperate with 
and furnish technical assistance to em-
ployers, labor organizations, and em-
ployment agencies to aid in effectuating 
the purposes of this chapter. 
Sec. 626. Recordkeeping, 
Investigation, and Enforcement 
[Editor's note: The Age Discrimina-
tion Claims Assistance Act of 1988, which 
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extended the statute of limitations for 
employees whose ADEA claims were 
jeopardized by EEOC'sfailure to process 
their cases in a timely manner, effective 
April 7, 1988, was added to the end of this 
section. See 401:685 for the text of that 
Act.] 
(aj Attendance of witnesses; investiga-
tions, inspections, records, and home-
work regulations 
The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission shall have the power to 
make investigations and require the 
keeping of records necessary or appropri-
ate for the administration of this chap-
ter in accordance with the powers and 
procedures provided in sections 209 and 
211 of this title. [Fair Labor Standards 
Act of 1938] 
(bj Eriforcement; prohibition of age 
discrimination under fair labor stan-
dards; unpaid minimum wages and un-
paid overtime compensation; liquidated 
damages; judicial relief; conciUiation, 
coriference, and persuasion 
The provisions of this chapter shall be 
enforced in accordance with the powers, 
remedies, and procedures provided in 
sections 211(b), 216 (except for subsec-
tion (a) thereof), and 217 of this title 
[Fair Labor Standards Act of 19381 and 
subsection (c) of this section. Any act 
prohibited under section 623 of this title 
shall be deemed to be a prohibited act 
under section 215 of this title. Amounts 
owing to an individual as a result of a 
vioiation of this chapter shall be deemed 
to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid 
overtime compensation for purposes of 
sections 216 and 217 of this title: Provid-
ed, that liquidated damages shall be pay-
able only in cases of willful violations of 
this chapter. In any action brought to 
enforce this chapter the court shall have 
jurisdiction to grant such legal or equi-
table relief as may be appropriate to ef-
fectuate the purposes of this chapter, in-
cluding without limitation judgments 
compelling employment, reinstatement 
or promotion, or enforcing the liability 
for amounts deemed to be unpaid mini-
mum wages or unpaid overtime compen-
sation under this section. Before institut-
ing any action under this section, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission shall attempt to eliminate the 
discriminatory practice or practices al-
leged, and to effect voluntary compliance 
with the requirements of this chapter 
through informal methods of concilia-
tion, conference, and persuasion. 
(c) Civil actions; persons aggrieved; ju-
risdiction; judicial relief; termination of 
individual action upon commencement 
of action by Commission; jury trial 
(1) Any person aggrieved may bring a 
civil action in any court of competent ju-
risdiction for such legal or equitable re-
lief as will effectuate the purposes of this 
chapter: Provided, that the right of any 
person to bring such action shall termi-
nate upon the commencement of an ac-
tion by the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission to enforce the right of 
such person under this chapter. 
(2) In an action brought under para-
graph (1), a person shall be entitled to a 
trial by jury of any issue of fact in any 
such action for recovery of amounts ow-
ing as a result of a violation of this chap-
ter, regardless of whether equitable re-
lief is sought by any party in such action. 
(d) Filing of charge with Commission; 
timeliness; conciliation, conference, and 
persuasion 
No civil action may be commenced by 
an individual under this section until 60 
days after a charge alleging unlawful 
discrimination has been filed with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission. Such a.charge shall be filed-
(1) within 180 days after the alleged 
unlav.-1'ul practice occurred; or 
(2) in a case to which section 633(b) 
applies, within 300 days after the alleged 
unlawful practice occurred, or within 30 
days after receipt by the individual of 
notice of termination of proceedings un-
der State law, whichever is earlier. 
Upon receiving such a charge, the 
Commission shall promptly notify all 
persons named in such charge as pro-
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spective defendants in the action and 
shall promptly seek to eliminate any al-
leged unlawful practice by informal 
methods of conciliation, conference, and 
persuasion. 
(e) Reliance on administrative rulings; 
notice 0/ dismissal or termination; civil 
action after receipt 0/ notice 
Section 259 of this title [Portal-to-Por-
tal Act of 1947] shall apply to actions 
under this chapter. If a charge filed with 
the Commission under this chapter is 
dismissed or the proceedings of the Com-
mission are otherwise terminated by the 
Commission, the Commission shall noti-
fy the person aggrieved. A civil action 
may be brought under this section by a 
person defined in section 630(a) of this 
title ,against the respondent named in the 
charge within 90 days after the date of 
the receipt of such notice. (As amended 
by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, eff. Nov. 
'021, 1991) 
[Editor's note: See J,.Ol:15/or'the perti-
nent portions 0/ the Portal-ta-Portal 
Act.] 
(f) Waiver 
(1) An individual may not waive any 
right or claim under this chapter unless 
the waiver is knowing and voluntary. 
Except as provided in paragraph (2), a 
waiver may not be considered knowing 
and voluntary unless at a minimum-
(A) the waiver is part of an agreement 
between the individual and the employer 
that is written in a manner calculated to 
be understood by such individual, or by 
the average individual eligible to partici-
pate; , 
(B) the waiver specifically refers to 
rights or claims arising under this chap-
ter; 
(C) the individual does not waive 
rights or claims that may arise after the 
date the waiver is executed; 
(D) the individual waives rights or 
claims only in exchange for consideI:-
ation in addition to anything of value to 
which the individual already is entitled; 
(E) the individual is advised in writing 
to consult with an attorney prior to exe-
cuting the agreement; 
(F)(i) the individual is given a period 
of at least 21 days within which to con-
sider the agreement; or 
(ii) if a waiver is requested in connec-
tion with an exit incentive or other em-
ployment termination program offered 
to a group or class of employees, the indi-
vidual is given a period of at least 45 
days within which to consider the agree-
ment; 
(G) the agreement provides that for a 
period of at least 7 days following the 
execution of such agreement, the individ-
ual may revoke the agreement, and the 
agreement shall not become effective or . 
enforceable until the revocation period 
has expired; 
(H) if a waiver is requested in connec-
tion with an exit incentive or other em-
ployment termination program offered 
to a group or class of employees, the em-
ployer (at the commencement of the peri-
od specified in subparagraph (F» in-
forms the individual in writing in a man-
,ner calculated to be understood by the 
average individual eligible to participate, 
as to-
(i) any class, unit, or group of individ-
uals covered by such program, any eligi-
bility factors for such program, and any 
time limits applicable to such program; 
and 
(ii) the job titles and ages of all indi-
viduals eligible or selected for the pro- ' 
gram, and the ages of all individuals in 
the same job classification or organiza-
tional unit who are not eligible or select-
ed for the program'. 
(2) A waiver in settlement of a charge 
filed with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission, or an action filed in 
court by the individual or the individu-
al's representative, alleging age discrimi-
nation of a kind prohibited under section 
623 or 633a of this title may not be con-
sidered knowing and voluntary unless at 
a minimum-
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(A) subparagraphs CA) through (E) of 
paragraph (1) have been met; and 
(B) the individual is given a reasonable 
period of time within which to consider 
the settlement agreement. 
(3) In any dispute that may arise over 
whether any of the requirements, condi-
tions, and circumstances set forth in 
subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), 
(G), or (H) of paragraph (1), or subpara-
graph (A) or (B) of paragraph (2), have 
been met, the party asserting the validity 
of a waiver shall have the burden of 
proving in a court of competent jurisdic-
tion that a waiver was knowing and vol-. 
untary pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2). 
(4) No waiver agreement may affect 
the Commission's rights and responsibil-
ities to enforce this chapter. No waiver 
may be used to justify interfering with 
the protected right of an employee to file 
a charge or participate in an investiga-
tion or proceeding conducted by the 
Commission. (Added by the Older Work-
ers Benefit Protection Act, eff. Oct. 16, 
1990) 
[Editor's note: The Older Workers 
Benefit Protection Act, P.L. 101-1,.33, ef-
fective October 16, 1990, provided as fol-
lows: 
Sec. 202. Effective Date 
(a) In General.-The amendment 
made by section 201 [626 f] shall not ap-
ply with. respect to waivers that occur 
before the date of enactment of this Act. 
(b) Rule on Waivers.-Effective on the 
date of enactment of this Act, the rule on 
waivers issued by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Com mission and con-
tained in section 1627.16(c) of title 29, 
Code of Federal Regulations, shall ha.ve 
no force and effect.] 
Sec. 627. Notices To Be Posted 
Every employer, employment agency, 
and labor organization shall post and 
keep posted in conspicuous places upon 
its premises a notice to be prepared or 
approved by the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission setting forth in-
formation as the Commission deems ap-
propriate to effectuate the purposes of 
this chapter. 
[Editor's note: 29 CFR 1627, at 
403:1473, gives posting requirements.] 
Sec. 628. Rules and Regulations 
In accordance with the provisions of 
subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5. 
United States Code, the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission may is-
sue such rules and regulations as it may 
consider necessary or appropriate for 
carrying out this chapter, and may es-
tablish such reasonable exemptions to 
and from any or all provisions of this 
chapter as it may find necessary and 
proper in the public interest. 
Sec. 629. Criminal Penalties 
Whoever shall forcibly resist, oppose, 
impede, intimidate, or interfere with a 
duly authorized representative of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission while it is engaged in the perfor-
mance of duties under thi~ chapter shall 
be punished by a fine of not more than 
$500 or by imprisonment for not more 
than one year, or by both: Provided; 
however, That no person shall be impris-
oned under this section except when 
there has been a prior conviction her-
eunder. 
Sec. 630. Definitions 
For the purposes of this chapter-
(a) The term "person" means one or 
more individuals, partnerships, associa-
tions, labor organizations, corporations, 
business trusts, legal representatives, or 
any organized groups of persons. 
(b) The term "employer" means a per-
son engaged in an industry affecting 
commerce who has twenty or more em-
ployees for each working day in each of 
twenty or more calendar weeks in the 
current or preceding calendar year: Pro-
vided, that prior to June 30, 1968, em-
ployers having fewer than fifty employ-
ees shall not be considered employers. 
The term also means (1) any agent of 
such a person, and (2) a State or political 
subdivision of a State and any agency or 
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instrumentality of a State or a political 
subdivision of a State, and any interstate 
agency but such term does not include 
the United States, or a corporation whol-
ly owned by the Government of the Unit-
ed States. (As amended, eff. May 1, 1974) 
(c) The term "employment agency" 
means any person regularly undertaking 
with or without compensation to procure 
employees for an employer and includes 
an agent of such a person; but shall not 
include an agency of the United States. 
(As amended, eff. May 1, 1974, 
(d) The term "labor organization" 
means a labor organization engaged in 
an industry affecting commerce, and any 
agent of such an organization, and in-
cludes any organization of any kind, any 
agency, or employee representation com-
mittee, group, association, or plan so en-
gaged in which employees participate 
and which exists for the purpose, in 
whole or in part, of dealing with employ-
ers concerning grievances, labor dis-
putes, wages, rates of pay, hours, or oth-
er terms or conditions of employment, 
and any conference, general committee, 
joint or system board, or joint council so 
engaged which is subordinate to a na-
tional or international labor organiza-
tion. 
(e) A labor organization shall be 
deemed to be engaged in an industry af-
fecting commerce if (1) it maintains or 
operates a hiring hall or hiring office 
which procures employees for an employ-
er or procures for employees opportuni-
ties to work for an employer, or (2) the 
number of its members (or, where it is a 
labor organization composed of other la-
bor organizations or their representa-
tives, if the aggregate number of the 
members of such other labor organiza-
tion) is fifty or more prior to July 1, 1968, 
or twenty-five or more on or after July 1, 
1968, and such labor organization -
(1) is the certified representative of 
employees under the provisions of the 
National Labor Relations Act, as amend-
ed, or the Railway Labor Act, as amend-
ed; or 
(2) although not certified, is a national 
or international labor organization or a 
local labor organization recognized or 
acting as the representative of employees 
of an employer or employers engaged in 
an industry affecting commerce; or 
(3) has chartered a local labor organi-
zation or subsidiary body which is repre-
senting or actively seeking to represent 
employees of employers within the mean-
ing of paragraph (1) or (2); or 
(4) has been chartered by a labor orga-
nization representing or actively seeking 
to represent employees within the mean-
ing of paragraph (1) or (2) as to local or 
subordinate body through which such 
employees may enjoy membership or be-
come affiliated with such labor organiza-
tion; or 
(5) is a conference, general committee, 
joint or system board or joint council 
subordinate to a national or internation-
al labor organization, which includes a 
labor organization engaged in an indus-
try affecting commerce within the mean-
ing of any of the preceding paragraphs of 
this subsection. 
(f) The term "employee" means any in-
dividual employed by an employer except 
that the term "employee" shall not in-_ 
elude any person elected to public office 
in any State or political subdivision of 
any State by the qualified voters thereof, 
or any person chosen by such officer to be 
on such officer's personal staff, or an ap-
pointee on the policy-making level or an 
immediate adviser with respect to the ex--
ercise of the constitutional or legal pow-
ers of the office. The exemption set forth 
in the preceding sentence shall not in-
clude employees subject to the civil ser-
vice laws of a State government, govern-
mental agency, or political subdivision. 
The term "employee" includes any indi-
vidual who is a citizen of the United 
States employed by an employer in a 
workplace _in a foreign country. (As 
amended by P.L. 98-459, eff. Oct. 9, 1984) 
(g) The term "commerce" means trade, 
traffic, commerce, transportation, trans-
mission, or communication among the 
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several States, or between a State and 
any place outside thereof; or within the 
District of Columbia, or a possession of 
the United States, or between points in 
the same State but through a point out-
side thereof. 
(h) The term "industry affecting com-
merce" means any activity, business, or 
industry in commerce or in which a labor 
dispute would hinder or obstruct com-
merce or the free ftow of commerce and 
includes any activity or industry "affect-
ing commerce" within the meaning of 
the Labor-Management Reporting and 
Disclosure Act of 1959. 
(i) The term "State" includes a State of 
the United States, the District of Colum-
bia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, 
American Samoa, Guam, Wake Island, 
the Canal Zone, and Outer Continental 
Shelf Lands defined in the Outer Conti-
nental Shelf Lands Act. 
(j) The term "firefighter" means an 
employee, the duties of whose position 
are primarily to perform work directly 
connected with the control and extin-
guishment of fires or the maintenance 
and use of firefighting apparatus and 
equipment, including an employee en-
gaged in this activity who is transferred 
to a supervisory or administrative posi-
tion. 
(k) The term "law enforcement officer" 
means an employee, the duties of whose 
position are primarily the investigation, 
apprehension, or detention of individuals 
suspected or convicted of offenses against 
the criminal laws of a State, including an 
employee engaged in this activity who is 
transferred to a supervisory or adminis-
tration position. For the purpose of this 
subsection, "detention" includes the du-
ties of employees assigned to individuals 
incarcerated in any penal institution. 
(Sections l1(j) and (k) were added by 
P.L. 99-592, eff. Jan. 1, 1987, but do not 
apply to any causes of action arising un-
der ADEA as in effect before Jan. 1, 
1987.) 
(1) The term "compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment" 
encompasses all employee benefits, in-
cluding such benefits provided pursuant 
to a bona fide employee benefit plan. 
(Added by the Older Workers Benefit 
Protection Act, eff. Oct. 16, 1990) 
Sec. 631. Age Limits 
(a) Individu.als a.t least 40 years of age 
The prohibitions in this chapter shall 
be limited to individuals who are at least 
40 years of age. (As amended by P.L. 101-
239, eff. Dec. 19, 1989) 
(b) Employees or applicants for em-
ployment in Federal Government 
In the case of any personnel action aC-
fecting employees or applicants for em-
ployment which is subject to the provi-
sions of section 633a of this title, the 
prohibitions established in section 633a 
of this title shall be limited to individu-
als who are at least 40 years of age. 
(c) Bonafide executives or high policy-
ma~s ' 
(1) Nothing in this chapter shall be 
construed to prohibit compulsory retire-
ment of any employee who has attained 
65 years of age, and who, for the two-
year period immediately before retire-
ment, is employed in a bona fide execu-
tive or a high policymaking position, if 
such employee is entitled to an immedi-
ate nonforfeitable annual retirement 
benefit from a pension, profit-sharing, 
savings, or deferred compensation plan, 
or any combination of such plans, of the 
employer of such employee, which 
equals, in aggregate, at least $44,000 (As· 
amended by P.L. 99-592, eff. Jan. 1, 1987) -
(2) In applying the retirement benefit 
test of paragraph (1) of this subsection, 
if any such retirement benefit is in a 
form other than a straight life annuity 
(with no ancillary benefits), or if employ-
ees contribute to any such plan or make 
rollover contributions, such benefit shall 
be adjusted in accordance with regula-
tions prescribed by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, after 
consultation with the Secretary of the 
treasury, so that the benefit is the equiv-
alent of a straight life annuity (with no 
ancillary benefits) under a plan to which 
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employees do not contribute and under 
which no rollover contributions are 
made. 
(d) Tenured employee at institution of 
higher learning 
Nothing in this chapter shall be con-
strued to prohibit compulsory retirement 
of any employee who has attained 70 
years of age, and who is serving under a 
contract of unlimited tenure (or similar 
arrangement providing for unlimited 
tenure) at an institution of higher educa-
tion (as defined by section 1141(a) of title 
20 [Higher Education Act of 1965].) 
(Added by P.L. 99-592, eff. Jan. 1, 1987 
through Dec. 31, 1993. For section 6 of 
P.L. 99-592, see Sec. 624) 
[Editor's note on history of amend-
ments: This section was amended in 1978 
to raise the age of coverage of the Act 
from 65 to 70 in 1978. In 1987, the section 
was amended by P.L. 99-592, eff. Jan. 1, 
1987, which removed the age-70 upper 
limit. &ction 12(d) was added, establish-
ing a seven-year exemption from the ban 
on mandatory retirement for tenured 
college professors aged 70 and older. An 
exception to the Jan. 1, 1987, effective 
date was made for coUective bargaining 
agreements which were in effect on June 
30, 1986, and which terminate after Jan. 
1, 1987. The 1987 amendments do not ap-
ply to those agreements until they termi-
nate or Jan. 1, 1990, whichever occurs 
first.] 
Sec. 632. Annual Report to Congress 
The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission shall submit annually in 
January a report to the Congress cover-
ing its activities for the preceding year 
and including such information, data, 
and recommendations for further legis-
lation in connection with the matters 
covered by this chapter as it may find 
advisable. Such report shall contain an 
evaluation and appraisal by the Commis-
sion of the effect of the minimum and 
maximum ages established by this 
chpater, together with its recommenda-
tion to the Congress. In making such 
evaluation and appraisal, the Com mis-
sion shall take into consideration any 
changes which may have occurred in the 
general age level of the population, the 
effect of the chapter upon workers no1 
covered by its provisions, and such other 
factors as it may deem pertinent. 
Sec. 633. Federal-State Relationship 
(a) Federal action superseding State 
action 
Nothing in this chapter shall affect the 
jurisdiction of any agency of any State 
performing like functions with regard to 
discriminatory employment practices on 
account of age except that upon com-
mencement of an action under this chap-
ter such action shall supersede any State 
action. . 
(b) Limitation of Federal action upon 
commencement of State proceedings 
In the case of an alleged unlawful 
practice occurring in a State which has a 
law prohibiting discrimination in em-
ployment because of age and establishing 
or authorizinga State authority to grant 
or seek relief from such discriminatory 
practice, no suit may be brought under 
section 626 of this title before the expira-
tion of sixty days after proceedings have 
been commenced under the State law, un-
less such proceedings have been earlier 
terminated: Provided, That such sixty-
day period shall be extended to one hun-
dred any twenty days during the first 
year after the effective date of such State 
law. If any requirement for the com-
mencement of such proceedings is im-
posed by a State authority other than a 
requirement of the filing of a written and 
signed statement of the facts upon which 
the proceeding is based, the proceeding 
shall be deemed to have been commenced 
for the purposes of this subsection at the 
time such statement is sent by registered 
mail to the appropriate State authority. 
Sec. 633a. Nondiscrimination 
on Account of Age in Federal 
Government Employment 
(aJ Federal agencies aJfected 
All personnel actions affecting employ-
ees or applicants for employment who 
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are at least 40 years of age (except per-
sonnel actions with regard to aliens em-
ployed outside the limits of the United 
States) in military departments as de-
fined in section 102 of title 5, in executive 
agencies as defined in section 105 of title 
5, (including employees and applicants 
for employment who are paid from non-
appropriated funds), in the United States 
Postal Service and the Postal Rate Com-
mission, in those units in the govern-
ment of the District of Columbia having 
positions in the competitive service, and 
in those units of the legislative and judi-
cial branches of the Federal Government 
having positions in the competitive ser-
vice, and in the Library of Congress shall 
be made free from any discrimination 
based on age. 
(b) Enforcement by Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission and by 
Librarian of Congress in Library of Con-
gress; remedies; rules, regulations, or-
ders, and instructions of Commission: 
compliance by Federal agencies; powers 
and duties of Commission; notijication of 
final action On complaint of discrimina-
tion; exemptions: bona fide occupational 
qualijication 
Except as otherwise provided in this 
subsection, the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission is authorized to 
enforce the provisions of subsection (a) 
of this section through appropriate rem-
edies, including reinstatement or hiring 
of employees with or without backpay, as 
will effectuate the policies of this section. 
The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission shall issue such rules, regu-, 
lations, orders, and instructions as it 
deems necessary and appropriate to car-
ry out its responsibilities under this sec-
tion. The Equal Employment Opportuni-
ty Commission shall-
(1) be responsible for the review and 
evaluation of the operation of all agency 
programs designed to carry out the poli-
cy of this sectio~, periodically obtaining 
and publishing (on at least a semiannual 
basis) progress reports from each de-
partment, agency, or unit referred to in 
subsection (a) of this section; 
(2) consult with and solicit the recom-
mendations of interested individuals, 
groups, and organizations relating to 
nondiscrimination in employment on ac-
count of age; and 
(3) provide for the acceptance and pro-
cessing of complaints of discrimination 
in Federal employment on account of 
age. 
The head of each such department, 
agency, or unit shall comply with such 
rules, regulations, orders, and instruc-
tions of the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission which shall include a 
provision that an employee or applicant 
for employment shall be notified of any 
final action taken on any complaint or 
discrimination filed by him thereunder. 
Reasonable exemptions to the provisions 
of this section may be established by the 
Commission but only when the Commis-
sion has established a maximum age re-
quirement on the basis of a determina-
tion that age is a bona fide occupational 
qualification necessary to the perfor-
mance of the duties of the position. With 
respect to employment in the Library of 
Congress, authorities granted in this 
subsection to the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission shall be exercised 
by the Librarian of Congress. 
(c) Civil actions; jurisdiction; relief 
Any person aggrieved may bring a civ-
il action in any Federal district court of 
competent jurisdiction for such legal -or 
equitable relief as will effectuate the pur-
poses of this chapter. 
(d) Notice to Commission; time of no-
tice; Commission notification of prospec-
tive defendants; Commission elimination 
of unlawful practices 
When the individual has not filed a 
complaint concerning age discrimination 
with the Commission, no civil action may 
be commenced by any individual under 
this section until the individual has giv-
en the Commission not less than thirty 
days notice of an intent to file such ac-
tion. Such notice shall be filed within one 
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hundred and eighty days after the al-
leged unlawful practice occurred. Upon 
receiving a notice of intent to sue, the 
Commission shall promptly notify all 
persons named therein as prospective de-
fendants in the action and take any ap-
propriate action to assure the elimina-
tion of any unlawful practice. 
(e) Dut1l of Government O{}enc1l or offi-
cial . 
Nothing contained in this section shall 
relieve any Government agency or official 
of the responsibility to assure non-dis-
crimination on account of age in employ-
ment as required under any provision of 
Federal law. 
(j) Applicabilit1l of statutory provisions 
to perscmnel acticm of Federal depart-
ments, etc. 
Any personnel action of any depart-
ment, agency, or other entity referred to 
in subsection (a) of this section shall not· 
be subject to, or affected by, any provi-
sion of this chapter, other than the pro-
visions of section 631(b) of this title and 
the provisions of this section. 
(g) Stud1land repo-rt to President and 
Congress by Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commissicm; scope 
(1) The Equal Employment Opportuni-
ty Commission shall undertake a study 
relating to the effects of the amendments 
made to this section by the Age Discrim-
ination in Employment Act Amend-
ments of 1978, and the effects of section 
631(b) of this of this title. 
(2) The Equal Employment Opportuni-
ty Commission shall transmit a report to 
the President and to the Congress con-
. taining the findings of the Commission 
resulting from the study of the Commis-
sion under paragraph (1) of this subsec-
tion. Such report shall be transmitted no 
later than January 1, 1980. 
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APPENDIX 2 
No. 641 403:1369 
EEOC: Interpretations of the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act 
FoUowing is the text of EEOC's Inter-
pretations of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, codified as ~9 CFR 
Part 1625, which reads as amended at 53 
FR 5972, Feb. 29, 1988, and corrected at 
53 FR 15673, May 3, 1988. Effective June 
25, 1987, the Department of Labor's In-
terpretative Bulletin on Employee Bene-
fit Plans, formerly designated as ~9 CFR 
860.120, was redesignated by EEOC as 
Section 1625.10 of these ADEA interpre-
tations. Part (f)(l)(ivj(B) of Section 
16~5.10, which allowed employers to dis-
continue pension accruals for employees 
who work beyond normal retirement age, 
was rescinded by the commission, pursu-
ant to court order, at 52 FR 8448, March 
18, 1987. 
Section. 
1625.1 
1625.2 
1625.3 
1625.4 
1625.5 
1625.6 
1625.7 
1625.8 
1625.9 
1625.10 
1625.11 
1625.12 
1625.13 
PART 1625-AGE 
DISCRIMINATION IN 
EMPLOYMENT ACT 
Table of Contents 
Subpart A-lnterpretatiolUl 
Definitions. 
Discrimination Between Individuals Pro-
tected by the Art. 
Employment Agency. 
Help Wanted Notices or Advertisements. 
Employment Applications. 
Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications. 
Differentiations Based on Reasonable Fac-
tors Other Than Age. 
Bona Fide Seniority Systems. 
Prohibition of Involuntary Retirement. 
Costs and Benefits Under Employee Bene-
fit Plans. 
Exemption for Employees Serving Under 
a Contract of Unlimited Tenure. 
Exemption for Bona Fide Executive or 
High Policymaking Employees. 
Apprenticeship Programs. 
Subpart A-Interpretations 
Sec. 1625.1. Definitions 
The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission is hereinafter referred to as 
the "Commission". The terms "person", 
"employer", "employment agency", "la-
bor organization", and "employee" shall 
have the meanings set forth in Section 11 
of the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 
621, et seq., hereinafter referred to as the 
"Act", References to "employers" in this 
part state principles that are applicable 
not only to employers but also to labor 
organizations and to employment agen-
cies. 
Sec. 1625.2. Discrimination Between 
Individuals Protected by the Act 
(a) It is unlawful in situations where 
this Act applies, for an employer to dis-
criminate in hiring or in any other way 
by giving preference because of age be-
tween individuals 40 and over. Thus, if 
two people apply for the same position, 
and one is 42 and the other 52, the em-
ployer may not lawfully turn down ei-
ther one on the basis of age, but must 
make such decision on the basis of some 
other factor. 
(b) The extension of additional bene-
fits, such as increased severance pay, to 
older employees within the protected 
group may be lawful if an employer has a 
reasonable basis to conclude that those 
benefits will counteract problems related 
to age discrimination. The extension of· 
those additional benefits may not be used 
as a means to accomplish practices oth-
erwise prohibited by the Act. (As amend-
ed by 53 FR 5972, eff. Jan. 1, 1987) 
Sec. 1625.3. Employment Agency 
(a) As long as an employment agency 
regularly procures employees for at least 
one covered employer, it qualifies under 
section l1(c) of the Act as an employ-
ment agency with respect to all of its 
activities whether or not such activities 
are for employers covered by the act. 
(b) The prohibitions of section 4(b) of 
the Act apply not only to the referral 
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activities of a covered employment agen-
cy, but also to the agency's own employ-
ment practices, regardless of the number 
of employees the agency may have. 
Sec. 1625.4. Help Wanted Notices or 
Advertisements 
(a) When help wanted notices or ad-
vertisements contain terms and phrases 
such as "age 25 to 35," "young," "college 
student," "recent college graduate," 
"boy," "girl," or others of a similar na-
ture, such a term or phrase deters the 
employment of older persons and is a vi-
olation of the Act, unless one of the ex-
ceptions applies. Such phrases as "age 40 
to 50," "age over 65," "retired person," or 
"supplement your pension" discriminate 
against others within the protected 
group and, therefore, are prohibited un-
less one of the exceptions applies. 
(b) The use of the phrase "state age" in 
help wanted notices or advertisements is 
not, in itself, a violation of the Act. But 
because the reques~ that an applicant 
state his age may tend to deter older ap-
plicants or otherwise indicate discrimi-
nation based on age, employment notices 
or advertisements which include the 
phrase "state age," or any similar term, 
will be closely scrutinized to assure that 
the request is for a lawful purpose. 
Sec. 1625.5. Employment Applications 
A request on the part of an employer 
for information such as "Date of Birth" 
or "State Age" on an employment appli-
cation form is not, in itself, a violation of 
the Act. But because the request that an 
applicant state his age may tend to deter 
older applicants or otherwise indicate 
discrimination based on age, employ-
ment application forms which request 
such information will be closely scruti-
nized to assure that the request is for a 
permissible purpose and not for purposes 
proscribed by the Act. That the purpose 
is not one proscribed by the statute 
should be made known to the applicant, 
either by a reference on the application 
form to the statutory prohibition in lan-
guage to the following effect: 
"The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967 prohibits discrimination on the basis of age 
with respect to individuals who are at least 40 years 
of age," or by other means. The term "Employment 
applications" refers to aU written inquiries about 
employment or applications for employment or pro-
motion including, but not limited to, resumes or oth-
er summaries of the applicant's background. It re-
lates not only to written preemployment inquiries, 
but to inquiries by employees concerning terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment as specified in 
section 4 of the AcL (As amended by 53 FR 5972, eff. 
Jan. I, 1987) 
Sec. 1625.6. Bona Fide Occupational 
Qualifications 
(a) Whether occupational qualifica-
tions will be deemed to be "bona fide" to 
a specific job and "reasonably necessary 
to the normal operation of the particular 
business," will be determined on the ba-
sis of all the pertinent facts surrounding 
each particular situation. It is antici-
pated that this concept of a bona fide 
occupational qualification will have lim-
ited scope and application. Further, as 
this is an exception to the Act it must be 
narrowly construed. 
(b) An employer asserting a BFOQ de-
fense has the burden of proving that (1) 
the age limit is reasonably necessary to 
the essence of the business, and either (2) 
that all or substantially all individuals 
excluded from the job involved are in 
fact disqualified, or (3) that some of the 
individuals so excluded possess a dis-
qualifying trait that cannot be ascer-
tained except by reference to age. If the 
emplOyer's objective in asserting a BFOQ 
is the goal of public safety, the employer -
must prove that the challenged practice 
does indeed effectuate that goal and that 
there is no acceptable alternative which 
would better advance it or equally ad-
vance it with less discriminatory impact. 
(c) Many State and local governments 
have enacted laws or administrative reg-
ulations which limit employment oppor-
tunities based on age. Unless these laws 
meet the standards for the establishment 
of a valid bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation under section 4(f)(1) of the Act, 
they will be considered in conflict with 
and effectively superseded by the ADEA. 
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Sec. 1625.7. Differentiations Based on 
Reasonable Factors Other Than 
Age 
(a) Section 4(f)(1) of the Act provides_ 
that 
- - -it shall not be unlawful for an employer, em-
ployment agency, or labor organization • • • to take 
any action otherwise prohibited under paragraphs 
(a), (b), (c), or (e) o( this section • • • where the 
differentiation is based on reasonable (actors other 
than age • - -
(b) No precise and unequivocal deter-
mination can be made as to the scope of 
the phrase "differentiation based on rea-
sonable factors other than age." Wheth-
er such differentiations exist must be de-
cided on the basis of all the particular 
facts and circumstances surrounding 
each individual situation. 
(c) When an employment practice uses 
__ age as a limiting criterion, the defense 
that the practice is justified by a reason-
able factor other than age is unavailable. 
(d) When an employment practice, in-
cluding a test, is claimed as a basis for 
different treatment of employees or ap-
plicants for employment on the grounds 
that it is a "factor other than" age, and 
such a practice has an adverse impact on 
individuals within the protected age 
group, it can only be justified as a busi-
ness necessity. Tests which are asserted 
as "reasonable factors other than age" 
will be scrutinized in accordance with 
the standards set forth at Part 1607 of 
this title. 
(e) When the exception of "a reaso~­
able factor other than age" is raised 
against an individual claim of discrimi-
natory treatment, the employer bears the 
burden of showing that the "reasonable 
factor other than age" exists factually. 
(f) A differentiation based on the aver-
age cost of employing older employees as 
a group is unlawful except with respect 
to employee benefit plans which qualify 
for the section 4(f)(2) exception to the 
Act. 
Sec. 1625.8. Bona Fide Seniority 
Systems 
Section 4(f)(2) of the Act provides that 
• • • It shall not be unlawful for an em-
ployer, employment agency, or labor or-
ganization • • • to observe the terms of a 
bona fide seniority system • • • which is 
not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of 
this Act except that no such seniority 
system • • • shall require or permit the 
involuntary retirement of any individual 
specified by section 12(a) of this Act be-
cause of the age of such individual. • • • 
(As corrected at 53 FR 15673, May 3, 
1988) 
(a) Though a seniority system may be 
qualified by such factors as merit, capac- _ 
ity, or ability, any bona fide seniority 
system must be based on length of ser-
vice as the primary criterion for the eq-
uitable allocation of available employ-
ment opportunities and prerogatives 
among younger and older workers. 
(b) Adoption of a purported seniority 
system which gives those with longer 
_ service lesser rights, and results in dis-
charge or less favored tr~atment to those 
within the protection of the Act, may, 
depending upon the circumstances, be a 
"subterfuge to evade the purposes" of the 
Act. 
(c) Unless the essential terms and con-
ditions of an alleged seniority system 
have been communicated to the affected 
employees and can be shown to be ap-
plied uniformly to all of those affected, 
regardless of age, it will not be consid--
ered a bona fide seniority system within 
the meaning of the Act. 
(d) It should be noted that seniority 
systems which segregate, classify, or 
otherwise discriminate against individu-
als on the basis of race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin, are prohibited 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, where that Act otherwise applies. 
The "bona fides" of such a system will be 
closely scrutinized to ensure that such a 
system is, in fact, bona fide under the 
ADEA. -
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Sec. 1625.9. Prohibition of 
Involuntary Retirement 
(a)(I) As originally enacted in 1967, 
section 4(f)(2) of the Act provided: "It 
shall not be unlawful • • • to observe the 
terms of a bona fide seniority system or 
any bona fide employee benefit plan such 
as a retirement, pension, or insurance 
plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade 
the purposes of this Act, except that no 
such employee benefit plan shall excuse 
the failure to hire any individual • • •. " 
The Department of Labor interpreted the 
provisions as "Authoriz[ing] involuntary 
retirement irrespective of age: Provided, 
That such retirement is pursuant to the 
terms of a retirement or pension plan 
meeting the requirements of section 
4(f)(2)." &e 34 FR 9709 (June 21, 1969). 
The Department took the position that in 
order to meet the requirements of section 
4(f)(2), the involuntary retirement provi-
sion had to be (i) contained in a bona fide 
pension or retirement plan, (ii) required 
by the terms of the plan and not option-
al, and (iii) essential to the plan's eco-
nomic survival or to some other legiti-
mate business purpose-i.e .• the provi-
sion was not in the plan as the result of 
arbitrary discrimination on the basis of 
age. 
(2) As revised by the 1978 amend-
ments, section 4(f)(2) was amended by 
adding the following clause at the end: 
"and no such seniority system or em-
ployee benefit plan shall require or per-
mit the involuntary retirement of any in-
dividual specified by section 12(a) of this 
Act because of the age of such individual 
• • •. " The Conference Committee Report 
expressly states that this amendment is 
intended "to make absolutely clear one of 
the original purposes of this provision, 
namely, that the exception does not au-
thorize an employer to require or permit 
involuntary retirement of an employee 
within the protected age group on ac-
count of age" (H.R. Rept. No. 95-950, p. 8) 
(b)(I) The amendment applies to all 
new and existing seniority systems and 
employee benefit plans. Accordingly, any 
system or plan provision requiring or 
permitting involuntary retirement is un-
lawful, regardless of whether the provi-
sion antedates the 1967 Act or the 1978 
amendments. 
(2) Where lawsuits pending on the date 
of enactment (April 6, 1978) or filed 
thereafter challenge involuntary retire-
ments which occurred either before or 
after that date, the amendment applies. 
(c)(I) The amendment protects all in-
dividuals covered by section 12(a) of the 
Act. Section 12(a) was amended in Octo-
ber of 1986 by the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. 
L. 99-592, 100 Stat. 3342 (1986), which 
removed the age 70 limit. Section 12(a) 
provides that the Act's prohibitions shall 
be limited to individuals who are at least 
forty years of age. Accordingly, unless a 
specific exemption applies, an employer 
can no longer force retirement or other= 
wise discriminate on the basis of age 
against an individual because (s)he is 70 
or older. 
(2) The amendment to section 12(a) of 
the Act became effective on January I, 
1987, except with respect to any employee 
subject to a collective bargaining agree-
ment containing a provision that would 
be superseded by such amendment that 
was in effect on June 30, 1986, and which 
terminates after January I, 1987. In that 
case, the amendment is effective on the 
termination of the agreement or January 
1, 1990, whichever comes first. 
(d) Neither section 4(0(2) nor any oth-
er provision of the Act makes it unlawful 
for a plan to permit individuals to elect 
early retirement at a specified age at 
their own option. Nor is it unlawful for a 
plan to require early retirement for rea-
sons other than age. (As amended by 53 
FR 5973, eff. Jan. 1, 1987) 
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Sec. 1625.10. Costs and Benefits 
UnderEmployee Benefit Plans 
[Editor's note: The foUowing section, 
/ormerlydesignated as £9 CF R 860.120, 
was redesignated by EEOC as £9 CFR 
1625.10, effective June £5, 1987 (52 FR 
£3812). However, Part (f)(1)(iv)(B) 0/ the 
section, which allowed employers to 
cease pension accruals for employees 
who continue working beyond normal re-
tirement age, was rescinded by EEOC on 
March 18, 1987, pursuant to court order 
(See 52 FR 8448). Part (f)(1)(iv)(B) is, 
there/ore, rendered obsolete, and has 
been removed/rom the CFR.J 
(a)(I) General. Section 4(f)(2) of the 
Act provides that it is not unlawful for 
an employer, employment agency, or la-
bor organization "to observe the terms of 
... any bona fide employee benefit plan· 
such as retirement, pension, or insurance 
plan, which is not subterfuge to evade 
the purposes of this Act, except that no 
such employee benefit plan shall excuse 
the failure to hire any individual, and no 
such ••• employee benefit plan shall re-
quire or permit the involuntary retire-
ment of any individual specified by sec-
tion 12(a) of this Act because of the age 
of such individuals." The legislative his-
tory of this provision indicates that its 
purpose is to permit age-based reduc-
tions in employee benefit plans where 
such reductions are justified by signifi-
cant cost considerations. Accordingly, 
section 4(f)(2) does not apply, for exam-
ple, to paid vacations and uninsured paid 
sick leave, since reductions in these bene-
fits would not be justified by significant 
cost considerations. Where employee 
benefit plans do meet the criteria in sec-
tion 4(f)(2), benefit levels for older work-
ers may be reduced to the extent neces-
sary to achieve approximate equivalency 
in cost for older and younger workers .. A 
benefit plan will be considered in compli-
ance with the statute where the actual 
amount of payment made, or cost in-
curred, in behalf of an older worker is 
equal to that made or incurred in behalf 
of a younger worker, even though the 
older worker may thereby receive a lesser 
amount of benefits or insurance cover-
age. Since section 4(f)(2) is an exception 
from the general non-discrimination 
provisions of the Act, the burden is on 
the one seeking to invoke the exception to 
show that every element has been clearly 
and unmistakably met. The exception 
must be narrowly construed. The follow-
ing sections explain three key elements 
of the exception: (i) What a "bona fide 
employee benefit plan" is; (ii) what it 
means to "observe the terms" of such a 
plan; and (iii) what kind of plan, or plan 
provision; would be considered "a subter-
fuge to evade the purposes of [the] Act." 
There is also a discussion of the applica-
tion of the general rules governing all 
plans with respect to specific kinds of 
employee benefit plans . 
(2) Relation 0/ section 4(f)(£) to sec-
tions .Ua), Mb), and Mc). Sections 4(a), 
4(b), and 4(c) prohibit specified acts of 
discrimination on the basis of age. Sec-
tion 4(a) in particular makes it unlawful 
for an employer to "discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such in-
dividual's age···." Section 4(f)(2) is an 
exception to this general prohibition. 
Where an employer under an employee 
benefit plan provides the saine level of 
benefits to older workers as to younger 
workers, there is no violation of section 
4(a), and accordingly the practice does 
not have to be justified under section 
4(f)(2). 
(b) "Bona fide employee benefit plan. " 
Section 4(f)(2) applies only to bona fide 
employee benefit plans. A plan is condis-
ered "bona fide" if its terms (including 
cessation of contributions or accruals in 
the case of retirement income plans) 
have been accurately described in writ-
ing to all employees and if it actually 
provides the benefits in accordance with 
the terms of the plan. Notifying employ-
ees promptly of the provisions and 
changes in an employee benefit plan is 
essential if they are to know how the 
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plan affects them. For these purposes, it 
would be sufficient under the ADEA for 
employers to follow the disclosure re-
quirements of ERISA and the regula-
tions thereunder. The plan must actually 
provide the benefits its provisions de-
scribe, since otherwise the notification of 
the provisions to employees is misleading 
and inaccurate. An "employee benefit 
plan" is a plan, such as a retirement, 
pension, or insurance plan, which pro-
vides employes with what are frequently 
referred to as "fringe benefits." The term 
does not refer to wages or salary in cash; 
neither section4(f)(2) nor any other sec-
tion of the Act excuses the payment of 
lower wages or salary to older employees 
on account of age. Whether or not any 
particular employee benefit plan may 
lawfully provide lower benefits to older 
employees on account of age depends on 
whether all of the elements of the excep-
tion have been met. An "employee-pay-
aU" employee benefit plan is one of the 
"terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment" with respect to which dis-
crimination on the basis of age is forbid-
den under section 4(a)(1). In such a plan, 
benefits for older workers may be re-
duced only to the extent and according to 
the same principles as apply to other 
plans under section 4(f)(2). 
(c) "To observe the terms" ola plan. In 
order for a bona fide employee benefit 
plan which provides lower benefits to 
older employees on account of age to be 
, within the section 4(0(2) exception, the 
lower benefits must be provided in "ob-
serv[ance of] the terms of" the plan. As 
this statutory text makes clear, the sec-
tion 4({)(2) exception is limited to other-
wise discriminatory actions which are 
actually prescribed by the terms of a 
. bona fide employee benefit plan. Where 
the employer, employment agency, or la-
bor organization is not required by the 
express provisions of the plan to provide 
lesser benefits to older workers, section 
4(f)(2) does not apply. Important pur-
poses are served by this requirement. 
Where a discriminatory policy is an ex-
press term of a benefit plan, employees 
presumably have some opportunity to 
know of the policy and to plan (or pro-
test) accordingly. Moreover, the require-
ment that the discrimination actually be 
prescribed by a plan assures that the 
particular plan provision will be equally 
applied to all employees of the same age. 
Where a discriminatory provision is an 
optional term of the plan, it permits in-
dividual, discretionary acts of discrimi-
nation, which do not fall within the sec-
tion 4(f)(2) exception. 
(d) "Subterfuge." In order for a bona 
fide employee benefit plan which 
prescribes lower benefits for older em-
ployees on account of age to be within 
the section 4(f)(2) exception, it must not 
be "a subterfuge to evade the purposes of 
[the ]Act." In general, a plan or plan pro-
vision which prescribes lower benefits for 
older employees on account of age is not 
a "subterfuge" within the meaning of 
section 4({)(2), provided that the lower 
level of benefits is justified by age-related 
cost considerations. (The only exception 
to this general rule is with respect to cer-
tain retirement plans. See paragraph 
(f)(4) of this section.) There are certain 
other requirements that must be met in 
order for a plan not to be a subterfuge. 
These requirements are set forth below. 
(1) Cost data-general. Cost data used 
in justification of a benefit plan which 
provides lower benefits to older employo 
ees on accounto( age must be valid and 
reasonable. This standard is met where 
an employer has cost data which show 
the actual cost to it of providing the par-
ticular benefit (or benefits) in question 
over a representative period of years. An 
employer may rely in cost data for its 
own employees over such a period, or on 
cost data for a larger group of similarly 
situated employees. Sometimes, as a re-
sult of experience rating or other causes, 
an employer incurs costs that differ sige 
nificantly from costs for a group of simie 
larly situated employees. Such an em-
ployer may not rely on cost data for the 
similarly situated employees where such 
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reliance would result in significantly 
lower benefits for its own older employ-
ees. Where reliable cost information is 
not available, reasonable projections 
made from existing cost data meeting 
the standards set forth above will be con-
sidered acceptable. 
(2) Cost data - Individual benefit ba-
sis and "benefit package" basis. Cost 
comparisons and adjustments under sec-
tion 4(f)(2) must be made on a benefit-
by-benefit basis or on a "benefit package" 
basis, as described below. 
(i) Benefit-by-benefit basis. Adjust-
ments made on a beilefit-by-benefit basis 
must be made in the amount or level of a 
specific form of benefi t for a specific 
event or contingency. For example, high-
er group term life insurance costs for 
older workers would justify a corre-
sponding reduction in the amount of 
group term life insurance coverage for 
older workers, on the basis of age. How-
ever, a benefit-by-benefit approach would 
not justify the- substitution of one form 
of benefit for another, even though both 
forms of benefit are designed for the 
same contingency, such as death. See 
paragraph (f)(I) of this section. -
(ii) "Benefit package" basis. As an al-
ternative to the benefit-by-benefit basis, 
cost comparisons and adjustments under 
section 4(f)(2) may be made on a limited 
"benefit package" basis. Under this ap-
proach, subject to the limitations de-
scribed below, cost comparisons and ad-
justments can be made with respect to 
section 4(f)(2) plans in the aggregate. 
This alternative basis provides greater 
flexibility than a benefit-by-benefit basis 
in order to carry out the declared statu-
tory purpose "to help employers and 
workers find ways of meeting problems 
arising from the impact of age on em-
ployment." A Ubenefit package" ap-
proach is an alternative approach consis-
tent with this purpose and with the gen-
eral purpose of section 4(f)(2) only if it is 
not used to reduce the cost to the employ-
er or the favorability to the employees of 
overall employee benefits for older em-
ployees. A "benefit package" approach 
used for either of these purposes would 
be a subterfuge to evade the purposes of 
the Act. In order to assure that such a 
cCbenefit package" approach is not abused 
and is consistent with the legislative in-
tent, it is subject to the limitations de-
scribed in paragraph (f), which also in-
cludes a general example. 
(3) Cost data- five year maximum ba-
sis. Cost comparisons and adjustments 
under section 4(f)(2) may be made on the 
basis of age brackets of up to 5 years. 
Thus a particular benefit may be reduced 
for employees of any age within the pro-
tected age group by an amount no 
greater than that which could be justi-
fied by the additional cost to provide 
them with the same level of the benefit as 
younger employees within a specified 
five-year age group immediately preced-
ing theirs. For example, where an em-
ployer chooses to provide unreduced 
group term life insurance benefits until 
age 60, benefits for employees who are 
between 60 and 65 years of age may be 
reduced only to the extent necessary to 
achieve approximate equivalency in costs 
with employees who are 55 to 60 years 
old. Similarly, any reductions in benefit 
levels for 65 to 70 year old employees 
cannot exceed an amount which is pro-
portional to the additional costs for their 
coverage over 60 to 65 year old employ-
ees. 
(4) Employee contributions in support 
of employee benefit plans- (iJ As a con-' 
dition of employment. An older employee 
within the protected age group may not 
be required as a condition of employment 
to make greater contributions than a 
younger employee in support of an em-
ployee benefit plan. Such a requirement 
would be in effect a mandatory reduction 
in take-home pay, which is never autho-
rized by section 4(f)(2), and would im-
pose an impediment to employment in vi-
olation of the specific restrictions in sec-
tion 4(f)(2). 
(ii) As a conditUm of participation in a 
'Voluntary employee benefit plan. An old-
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er employee within the protected age 
group may be required as a condition of 
participation in a voluntary employee 
benefit plan to make a greater contribu-
tion than a younger employee only if the 
older employee is not thereby required to 
bear a greater proportion of the total 
premium cost (employer-paid and em-
ployee-paid) than the younger employee. 
Otherwise the requirement would dis-
criminate against the older employee by 
making compensation in the form of an 
employer contribution available on less 
favorable terms than for the younger 
employee and denying that compensation 
altogether to an older employee unwill-
ing or unable to meet the less favorable 
terms. Such discrimination is not autho-
rized by section 4(f)(2). This principle ap-
plies to three different contribution ar-
rangements as follows: 
(A) Employee-pay-all plans. Older em-
ployees, like younger employees, may be 
required to contribute as a condition of 
participation up to the full premium cost 
for their age. 
(B) Non-contrilndory ("employer-pay-
all 'J plans. Where younger employees are 
not required to contribute any portion of 
the total premium cost, older employees 
may not be required to contribute any 
portion. 
(C) Contributo-ry plans. In these plans 
employers and participating "employees 
share the premium cost. The required 
contributions of participants may in-
crease wi th age so long as the proportion 
of the total premium required to be paid 
by the participants does not increase 
with age. 
(iii) As an option in order to receive an 
unreduced benefit. An older employee 
may be given the option, as an individu-
al, to make the additional contribution 
necessary to receive the same level of 
benefits as a younger employee (provided 
that the contemplated reduction in bene-
fits is otherwise justified by section 
4(f)(2». 
(5) Forfeiture clauses. Clauses in em-:-
ployee benefit plans which state that liti-
gation or participation in any manner in 
a formal proceeding by an employee will 
result in the forfeiture of his rights are 
unlawful insofar as they may be applied 
to those who seek redress under the Act. 
This is by reason of section 4( d) which 
provides that it is unlawful for an em-
ployer, employment agency, or labor or-
ganization to discriminate against any 
individual because such individual "has 
made a charge, testified, assisted, or par-
ticipated in any manner in an investiga-
tion, proceeding, or litigation under this 
Act." 
(6) Refusal to hire clauses. Any provi-
sion of an employee benefit plan which 
requires or permits the refusal to hire an 
individual specified in section 12(a) of the 
Act on the basis of age is a subterfuge to 
evade the purposes of the Act and cannot 
be excused under section 4(f)(2). 
(7) Involuntary retirement clauses. 
Any provision of an employee benefit 
plan which requires or permits the invol-
untary retirement of any individual 
specified in section 12(a) of the Act on 
the basis of age is a subterfuge to evade 
the purpose of the Act and cannot be ex-
cused under section 4(f)(2). 
(e) Benefits provided by the Govern-
ment. An employer does not violate the 
Act by permitting certain benefits to be 
provided by the Government, even 
though the availability of such benefits 
may be based on age. For example, it is 
not nec.essary for an employer to provide 
health benefits which are otherwise pro-. 
vided to certain employees by Medicare. 
However, the availability of benefits 
from the Government will not justify a 
reduction in employer-provided benefits 
if the result is that, taking the employer-
provided and Government-provided ben-
efits together, an older employee is enti-
tled to a lesser benefit of any type (in-
cluding coverage for family andlor de-
pendents) than a similarly situated 
younger employee. For example, the 
availability of certain benefits to an older 
employee under Medicare will not justify 
denying an older employee a benefit 
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which is provided to younger employees 
and is not provided to the older employee 
by Medicare. 
(f) Application of section J,(j)(2) to var-
ious employee benefit plans-(1J Benefit-
by-benefit approach. This portion of the 
interpretation discusses how a benefit-
by-benefit approach would apply to four 
of the most common types of employee 
benefit plans. 
(i) Life insurance. It is not uncommon 
for life insurance coverage to remain 
constant until a specified age, frequently 
65, and then be reduced. This practice 
will not violate the Act (even if reduc-
tions start before age 65), provided that 
the reduction for an employee of a par-
ticular age is no greater than is justified 
by the increased cost of coverage for that 
employee's specific age bracket encom-
passing no more than five years. It 
should be noted that a total denial of life 
insurance, on the basis of age, would not 
be justified under a benefit-by-benefit 
analysis. However, it is not unlawful for 
life insurance coverage to cease upon sep-
aration from service. 
(ii) Long-term disability. Under a ben-
efit-by-benefit approach, where employ-
ees who are disabled at younger ages are 
entitled to long-term disability benefits, 
there is no cost-based justification for 
denying such benefits altogether, on the 
basis of age, to employees who are dis-
abled at older ages. It is not unlawful to 
cut off long-term disability benefits and 
coverage on the basis of some non-age 
factor, such as recovery from disability. 
Reductions on the basis of age in the lev-
el or duration of benefits available for 
disability are justifiable only on the basis 
of age-related cost considerations as set 
forth elsewhere in this section. An em-
ployer which provides long-term disabil-
ity coverage to all employees may avoid 
any increases in the cost to it that such 
coverage for older employees would en-
tail by reducing the level of benefits 
available to older employees. An employ-
er may also avoid such cost increases by 
reducing the duration of benefits avail-
able to employees who become disabled 
. at older ages, without reducing the level 
of benefits. In this connection, the De-
partment would not assert a violation 
where the level of benefits is not reduced 
and the duration of benefits is reduced in 
the following manner: 
(A) With respect to disabilities which 
occur at age 60 or less, benefits cease at 
age 65. 
(B) With respect to disabilities which 
occur after age 60, benefits cease 5 years 
after disablement. Cost data may be pro-
duced to support other patterns of reduc-
tion as well. 
(iii) Retirement plans - (A) Partici-
pation. No employee hired prior to nor-
mal retirement age may be excluded 
from a defined contribution plan. With 
respect to defined benefit plans not sub-
ject to the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA), Pub. L. 93-406, 
29 U.S.C. 1001, l003(a) and (b), an em-
ployee hired at an age more than 5 years 
prior to normal retirement age may not 
be excluded from such a plan unless the 
exclusion is justifiable on the basis of 
cost considerations as set forth else-
where in this section. With respect to de-
fined benefit plans subject to ERISA, 
such an exclusion would be unlawful in 
any case. An employee hired less than 5 
years prior to normal retirement age 
may be excluded from a defined benefit 
plan, regardless of whether or not the 
plan is covered by ERISA. Similarly, any 
employee hired after normal retiremerit 
age may be excluded from a defined bene-
fit plan. (As amended by 53 FR 5973, eff. 
Jan. 1, 1987) 
(2) "Benefit package" approach. A 
"benefit package" approach to compli-
ance under section 4(f)(2) offers greater 
flexibility than a benefit-by-benefit ap-
proach by permitting deviations from a 
benefit-by-benefit approach so long as 
the overall result is no lesser cost to the 
employer and no less favorable benefits 
for employees. As previously noted, in 
order to assure that such an approach is 
used for the benefit of older workers and 
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not to their detriment, and is otherwise 
consistent with the legislative intent, it 
is subject to limitations as set forth be-
low: 
(i) A benefit package approach shall 
apply only to employee benefit plans 
which fall within section 4(fJ(2). 
(ii) A benefit package approach shall 
not apply to a retirement or pension 
plan. The 1978 legislative history sets 
forth specific and comprehensive rules 
governing such plans, which have been 
adopted above. These rules are not tied to 
actuarially significant cost considera-
tions but are intended to deal with the 
special funding arrangements of retire-
ment or pension plans. Variations from 
these special rules are therefore not jus-
tified by variations from the cost-based 
benefit-by-benefit approach in other ben-
efit plans, nor may variations from the 
special rules governing pension and re-
tirement plans justify variations from 
the benefit-by-benefit approach in other 
benefit plans. .. 
(iii) A benefit package approach shall 
not be used to justify reductions in health 
benefits greater than would be justified 
under a benefit-by-benefit approach. 
Such benefits appear to be of particular 
importance to older workers in meeting 
"problems arising from the impact of 
age" and were of particular concern to 
Congress. Therefore, the "benefit pack-
age" approach may not be used to reduce 
health insurance benefits by more than is 
warranted by the increase in the costs to 
the employer of those benefits alone. Any 
greater reduction would be a subterfuge 
to evade the purpose of the Act. 
(iv) A benefit reduction greater than 
would be justified under a bene./it-by-ben-
efit approach must be offset by another 
benefit available to the same employees. 
No employees may be deprived because of 
age of one benefit without an offsetting 
benefit being made available to them. 
(v) Employers who wish tojusti/y ben-
efit reductions under a benefit package 
approach must be prepared to produce 
data to show that those reductions are 
fully justified. Thus employers must be 
able to show that deviations from a bene-
fit-by-benefit approach do not result in 
lesser cost to them or less favorable ben-
efits to their employees. A general exam-
ple consistent with these limitations may 
be given. Assume two employee benefit 
plans, providing Benefit "A" and Benefit 
uB." Both plans fall within section 
4(f)(2), and neither is a retirement or 
pension plan subject to special rules. 
Both benefits are available to all employ-
ees. Age-based cost increases would jus-
tify a 10% decrease in both benefits on a 
benefit-by-benefit basis. The affected em-
ployees would, however, find it more fa-
vorable - that is, more consistent with 
meeting their needs - for no reduction 
to be made in Benefit "A" and a greater 
reduction to be made in Benefit "B". This 
"trade-oW' would not result in a reduc-
tion in health benefits. The "trade-off" 
may therefore be made. The details of the 
"trade-oW' depend on data on the rela-
tive cost to the employer of the two bene-
fits. If the data show that Benefit "A" 
and Benefit "B" cost the same, Benefit 
"B" may be reduced up to 20%, if Benefit 
"A" is unreduced. If the data show that 
Benefit "A" costs only half as much as 
Benefit "B", however, Benefit "B" may be 
reduced up to only 15% if Benefit "A" is -
unreduced, since a greater reduction in 
Benefit "B" would result in an impermis-
sible reduction in total benefit costs. 
(g) Relation 0/ ADEA to State laws. 
The ADEA does not preempt State age 
discrimination in employment laws. 
However, the failure of the ADEA to 
preempt such laws does not affect the is-
sue of whether section 514 of the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) preempts State laws which re-
lated to employee benefit plans. 
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Sec. 1625.11. Exemption for Employ-
ees Serving Under a Contract of 
Unlimited Tenure 
(a)(I) Section 12(d) of the Act, added 
by the 1986 amendments, provides: 
"Nothing in this Act shan be construed to prohibit 
compulsory retirement of any employee who has at· 
tained 70 years of age, and who is serving under a 
contract of unlimited tenure (or similar arrange-
ment providing for unlimited tenure) at an insti.tu-
tion of higher education <as defined by section 
1201(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965)." 
(2) This exemption from the Act's pro-
tection of covered individuals took effect 
on January 1, 1987, and is repealed on 
December 31, 1993 (see section 6 of the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, 
100 Stat. 3342). The Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission. is require~ to 
enter into an agreement with the Nabon-
al Academy of Sciences, for the conduct 
of a study to analyze the potential conse-
quences of the elimination of mandatory 
retirement on institutions of higher edu-
cation. (As amended by 53 FR 5973, eft'. 
Jan. 1, 1987) 
(b) Since section 12(d) is an exemption 
from the nondiscrimination require-
ments of the Act, the burden is on the 
one seeking to invoke the exemption to 
show that every element has been clearly 
and unmistakably met. Moreover, as 
with other exemptions from the ADEA, 
this exemption must be narrowly con-
strued. 
(c) Section 1201(a) of the Higher Edu-
cation Act of 1965, as amended, and set 
forth in 20 U.S.C. 1141(a), provides in 
pertinent part: 
The term "institution of higher education" means 
an educational institution in any State which <I) 
admits as regular students only persons having a 
certificate of graduation from a school providing sec-
ondary education, or the recognized eq.uivale~t ?f 
such a certificate (2) is legally authorized Within 
such State to provide a program of education beyond 
secondary education, (3) provides an educational 
program for which it awards a bachelor's d~ ~r 
provides not less than a two-year program whIch IS 
&cceptable for full credit toward such a degree, (4) is 
a public or other nonprofit institu.tion. and (?). is 
accredited by a nationally recogmzed accredltlDg 
agency or association or, if not 80 ~ceredited, (A). is 
an institution with respect to which the Commls-
sioner has determined that there is satisfactory as-
surance considering the resources available to the 
institution, the period of time, if any, during which it 
has operated, the effort it is making to meet accredi-
tation standards, and the purpose for which this de-
termination is being made, that the institution will 
meet the accreditation standards of such an agency 
or association within a reasonable time, or (B) is an 
institution whose credits are accepted, on transfer, 
by not less than three institutions which are 80 ac-
credited, for credit on the same basis as if trans-
ferred from an institution so accredited .••• 
The definition encompasses almost all 
public and private universities and two-
and four-year colleges. The omitted por-
tion of the text of section 1201(a) refers 
largely to one-year technical schools, 
which generally do not grant tenure to 
employees, but which, if they do, are also 
eligible to claim the exemption. 
(d)(l) Use of the term "any employee" 
indicates that application of the exemp-
tion is not limited to teachers, who are 
traditional recipients of tenure. The ex-
emption may also be available with re 
spect to other groups, such as academic 
deans, scientific researchers, professional 
librarians and counseling staft', who fre-
quently have tenured status. 
(2) The Conference Committee Report 
on the 1978 amendments expressly states 
that the exemption does not apply to 
Federal employees covered by section 15 
of the Act (H.R. Rept. No. 95-950, p. 10). 
(e)(I) The phrase "unlimited tenure" is 
not defined in the Act. However, the al-
most universally accepted definition of 
academic "tenure" is an arrangement 
under which certain appointments in an 
institution of higher education are con-
tinued until retirement for age or physi-
cal disability, subject to dismissal for 
adequate cause or under extraordinary 
circumstances on account of financial ex-
igency or change of institutional pro-
gram. Adopting that definition, it is evi-
dent that the word "unlimited" refers to 
the duration of tenure. Therefore, a con-
tract (or other similar arrangement) 
which is limited to a specific term (for 
example, one year or 10 years) will not 
meet the requirements of the exemption. 
(2) The legislative history shows that 
Congress intended the exemption to ap-
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ply only where the minimum rights and 
privileges traditionally associated with 
tenure are guaranteed to an employee by 
contract or similar arrangement. While 
tenure policies and practices vary greatly 
from one institution to another, the min-
imum standards set forth in the 1940 
Statement of Principles on Academic 
Freedom and Tenure, jointly developed 
by the Association of American Colleges 
and the American Association of Univer-
sity Professors, have enjoyed widespread 
adoption or endorsement. The 1940 
Statement of Principles on academic ten-
ure provides as follows: 
(a) After the expiration of a probationary period, 
teachers or investigators should have permanent or 
continuous tenure, and their service should be termi-
nated only for adequate cause, exoept in the case of 
retirement for age, or under extraordinary circum-
stances because of financial exigencies. 
In the interpretation of this principle it is under-
stood that the following represents acoeptable aca-
demic practioe: 
(1) The precise terms and conditions of every ap-
pointment should be stated in writing and be in the 
possession of both institution and teacher before the 
appointment is consummated. 
(2) Beginning with appointment to the rank of 
full-time instructor or a higher rank, the probation-
ary period should not exoeed seven years, including 
within this period full-time servioe in all institutions 
of higher education; but subject to the proviso that 
when, after a term of probationary servioe or more 
than three years in one or more institutions, a teach-
er is called to another isntitution it may be agreed in 
writing that his new appointment is for a probation-
ary period of not more than four years, even though 
thereby the person's total probationary period in the 
academic profession is extended beyond the normal 
maximum of seven years. Notioe should be given at 
least one year prior to the expiration of the proba-
tionary period if the teacher is not to be continued in 
servioe after the expiration of that period. 
(3) During the probationary period a teacher 
should have the academic freedom that all other 
members of the faculty have. 
(4) Termination for cause of a continuous appoint-
ment, or the dismissal (or cause of a teacher previous 
to the expiration of a term appointment, should, if 
possible, be considered by both a faculty committee 
and the governing board of the institution. In all 
cases where the facts are in dispute, the accused 
teacher should be informed before the hearing in 
writing of the charges against him and should have 
the opportunity to be heard in his own defense by all 
bodies that pass judgment upon his case. He should 
be permitted to have with him an advisor of his own 
choosing who may act as Counsel. There should be • 
full stenographic record of the hearing available to 
the parties conoerned. In the hearing of charges of 
incompetence, the testimony should include that of 
teachers and other scholars, either (rom his own or 
from other institutions. Teachers on continuous ap-
pointment who are dismissed for reasons not involv-
ing moral turpituide should receive their salaries for 
at least a year from the date of notification of dis-
missal whether or not they are continued in their 
duties at the institution. 
(5) Termination of • continuous appointment be-
cause of financial exigency should be demonstrably 
bona fide. 
(3) A contract or similar arrangement 
which meets the standards in the 1940 
Statement of Principles will satisfy the 
tenure requirements of the exemption. 
However, a tenure arrangement will not 
be deemed inadequate solely because it 
fails to meet these standards in every re-
spect. For example, a tenure plan will not 
be deemed inadequate solely because it 
includes a probationary period some-
what longer than seven years. Of course, 
the greater the deviation from the stan~ 
dards in the 1940 Statement of Princi-
ples, the less likely it is that the employ-
ee in question will be deemed subject to 
"unlimited tenure" within the meaning 
of the exemption. Whether or not a ten-
ure arrangement is adequate to satisfy 
the requirements of the exemption must 
be determined on the basis of the facts of 
each case. 
(f) Employees who are not assured of a 
continuing appointment either by con-
tract of unlimited tenure or other similar 
arrangement (such as a state statute) 
would not, of course, be exempted from 
the prohibitions against compulsory re-
tirement, even if they perform functions. 
identical to those performed by employ-
ees with appropriate tenure. 
(g) An employee within the exemption 
can lawfully be forced to retire on ac-
count of age at age 70 (see (a)(l) above). 
In addition, the employer is free to retain 
such employees, either in the same posi-
tion or status or in a different position or 
status: Provided, That the employee vol-
untarily accepts this new position or sta-
tus. For example, an employee who falls 
within the exemption may be offered a 
nontenured position or part-time em-
ployment. An employee who accepts a 
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nontenured position or part-time em-
ployment, however, may not be treated 
any less favorably, on account of age, 
th~n any similarly situated younger em-
ployee (unless such less favorable treat-
ment is excused by an exception to the 
Act). (As amended by 53 FR 5973, eff. 
Jan. 1, 1987) 
Sec. 1625.12. Exemption for Bona 
Fide Executive or High 
Policymaking Employees 
(a) Section 12(c)(I) of the Act, added 
by the 1978 amendments and as amended 
in 1984 and 1986, provides: UNothing in 
this Act shall be construed to prohibit 
compulsory retirement of any employee 
who has attained 65 years of age, and 
who, for the 2-year period immediately 
before retirement, is employed in a bona 
fide executive or higher policymaking po-
sition, if such employee is entitled to an 
immediate nonforfeitable annual retire-
ment benefit from a pension, profit-shar-
ing, savings, or deferred compensation 
plan, or any combination of such plans, 
of the employer of such employee which 
equals, in" the aggregate, at least 
$44,000." (As amended by 53 FR 5973, eff. 
Jan. 1, 1987) 
(b) Since this provision is an exemp-
tion "from the non-discrimination re-
quirements of the Act, the burden is on 
the one seeking to invoke the exemption 
to show that every element has been 
clearly and unmistakably met. Moreover, 
as with other exemptions from the Act, 
this exemption must be narrowly con-
strued. 
(c) An employee within the exemption 
can lawfully be forced to retire on ac-
count of age at age 65 or above. In addi-
tion, the employer is free to retain such 
employees, either in the same position or 
status or in a different position or status. 
For example, an employee who falls 
within the exemption may be offered a 
position of lesser status or a part-time 
position. An employee who accepts such 
a new status or position, however, may 
not be treated any less favorably, on ac-
count of age, than any similarly situated 
younger employee. 
" (d)(I) In order for an employee to qual-
ify as a "bona fide executive," the em-
ployer must initially show that the em-
ployee satisfies the definition of a bona 
fide executive set forth in §541.1 of this 
chapter. Each of the requirements in" 
paragraphs (a) through (e) of §541.1 
must be satisfied, regardless of the level 
of the eqtployee's salary or compensa-
tion. 
[Editor's note: Section 5.41.1 appears 
at 29 CFR Part 5.1,1, the Labor Depart-
ment's Wage and Hour regulations. The 
section reads as follows: 
Sec. 541.1. Executive. 
The term "employee employed in a 
bona fide executive ... capacity" in sec-
tion 19(a)(1) of the act shaU mean any 
employee: 
(a) Whose primary duty consists of the 
management of the enterprise in which 
he is employed or of a customarily recog-
nized department of subdivision thereof; 
and 
(b) Who customarily and regularly di-
rects the work of two or more other em-
ployees therein; and 
(c) Who has the authority to hire or 
fire other employees or whose suggestions 
and recommendations as to the hiring or 
firing and as to the advancement and 
promotion or any other change of status 
of other employees will be given particu-
lar weight; and 
(d) Who customarily and regularly ex-. 
ercises discretionary powers; and 
(e) Who does not devote more than 20 
percent, or, in the case of an employee of 
a retail or service establishment who 
does not devote as much as 40 percent, of 
his hours of work in the workweek to 
activities which are not directly and 
closely related to the performance of the 
U'ork described in paragraphs (a) 
through (d) of this section: Provided, 
That this paragraph shall not apply in 
the case of an employee who is in sole 
charge of an independent establishment 
or a physically separated branch estab-
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lishment, or who owns at least a 20-per-
cent interest in the enterprise in which 
he is employed; and 
(j) Who is compensatedfor his sert'ices 
on a salary basis at a_rate of not less than 
$155 per week (or $130 per week, if em-
ployed by other than the Federal Govern-
ment in Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, 
or American Samoa), exclusive of board, 
lodging, or other faCilities; Provided, 
That an employee who is compensated on 
a salary basis at a rate of not less than 
$250 per week (or $200 per week, if em-
ployed by other than the Federal Govern-
ment in Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands 
or American Samoa), exclusive of board, 
lodging, or other facilities, and whose 
primary duty consists of the manage-
ment of the enterprise in which the em-
ployee is employed or of a customarily 
recognized department or subdivision 
thereof, and includes the customary and 
regular direction of the work of two or 
more other employees therein, shall be 
deemed to meet all the requirements of 
this section. (33 FR 11390, May 7, 1973, 
as amended at ~O FR 7092, Feb. 19, 
1975) ] 
(2) Even if an employee qualifies as an 
executive under the definition in §541.1 of 
this chapter, the exemption from the 
ADEA may not be claimed unless the 
employee also meets the further criteria 
specified in the Conference Committee 
Report in the form of examples (see H.R. 
Rept. No. 95-950, p.9). The examples are 
intended to make clear that the exemp-
tion does not apply to middle-manage-
ment employees, no matter how great 
their retirement income, but only to a 
very few top level employees who exercise 
substantial executive authority over a 
significant number of employees and a 
large volume of business. As stated in 
the Conference Report (H.R. Rept. No. 
95-950, p. 9): 
Typically the head of a significant and substJntial 
local or regional operation of a corporation [or other 
business organizationl such as a major production 
facility or retail establishment, but not the head of a 
minor branch, warehouse or retail store. would be 
covered by the term "bona fide executive." Individu-
als at higher levels in the corporate organizational 
structure who possess comparable or greater levela 
of responsibility and authority as measured by es-
tablished and recognized criteria would al80 be cov-
ered. 
The heads of major departments or divisions of 
corporations [or other business organizations] are 
usually located at corporate or regional headquar-
ters. With respect to employees whose duties are as 
80ciated with corporate headquarters operations, 
such as finance. marketing. legal. production and 
manufacturing (or in a corporation organized on a 
product line basis. the management of product lines). 
the definition would cover employees who head those 
divisions. 
In a large organization. the immediate subordi-
nates of the heads of these divisions sometimes al80 
exercise executive authority, within the meaning of 
this exemption. The conferees intend the definition to 
cover such employees if they possess responsibility 
which is comparable to or greater than that p0s-
sessed by the head of a significant and substantial 
local operation who meets the definition. 
(e) The phrase "high policymaking po-
sition," according to the Conference Re-
port (H.R. Rept. No. 95-950, p. 10), is lim-
ited to "***certain top level employees 
who are not 'bona fide executives'···." 
Specifically, these are: 
"·individuals who have little or no line authority 
but whose position and responsibility are such that 
they play a significant role in the development of 
corporate policy and effectively recommend the im-
plementation thereof. 
For example. the chief economist or the chief re-
search scientist of a coporation typically has little 
line authority. His duties would be primarily intel-
lectual as opposed to executive or managerial. His 
responsibility would be to evaluate significant ec0-
nomic or scientific trends and issues. to develop and 
recommend policy direction to the top executive of-
ficers of the corporation. and he would have a signifi-
cant impact on the ultimate decision on such policies 
by virtue of his expertise and diiect access to the 
decisionmakers. Such an employee would meet the 
definition of a "high policymaking" employee. 
On the other hand, as this description 
makes clear, the support personnel of a 
"high policymaking" employee would not 
be subject to the exemption even if they 
supervise the development, and draft the 
recommendation, of various policies sub-
mitted by their supervisors. 
(f) In order for the exemption to apply 
to a particular employee, the employee 
must have been in a "bona fide executive 
or high policymaking position," as those 
terms are defined in this section, for the 
two-year period immediately before re-
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tirement. Thus, an employee who holds 
two or more different positions during 
the two-year period is subject to the ex-
emption only if each such job is an execu-
tive or high policymaking position. 
(g) The Conference Committee Report 
expressly states that the exemption is 
not applicable to Federal employees cov-
ered by section 15 of the Act (H.R. Rept. 
No. 95-950, p. 10). ' 
(h) The "annual retirement benefit," to 
which covered employees must be enti-
tled, is the sum of amounts payable dur-
ing each one-year period from the date 
on which such benefits first become re-
ceivable by the retiree. Once established, 
the annual period upon which calcula-
tions are based may not be changed from 
year to year. 
(i) The annual retirement benefit must 
be immediately available to the employee 
to be retired pursuant to the exemption. 
For purposes of determining complaince, 
"immediate" means that the payment of 
plan benefits (in a lump sum or the first 
of a series -of periodic payments) must 
occur not later than 60 days after the 
effective date of the retirement in ques-
tion. The fact that an employee will re-
ceive benefits only after expiration of the 
GO-day period will not preclude his re-
tirement pursuant to the exemption, if 
the employee could 'have elected to re-
ceive benefits within that period. 
(j)(1) The annual retirement benefit 
must equal, in the aggregate, at least 
$44,000. The manner of determining 
whether this requirement has been satis-
fied is set forth in §1627.17( c). 
(2) In determining whether the aggre-
gate annual retirement benefit equals at 
least $44,000, the only benefits which 
may be counted are those authorized by 
and provided under the terms of a pen-
sion, profit-sharing, savings, or deferred 
compensation plan. (Regulations issued 
pursuant to section 12(c)(2) of the Act, 
regarding the manner of calculating the 
amount of qualified retirement benefits 
for purposes of the exemption, are set 
forth in §1627.17 of this chapter.) 
(k)(I) The annual retirement benefit 
must be "nonforfeitable." Accordingly, 
the exemption may not be applied to any 
employee subject to plan provisions 
which could cause the cessation of pay-
ments to a retiree or result in the reduc-
tion of benefits to less than $44,000 in 
anyone year. For example, where a plan 
contains a provision under which bene-
fits would be suspended if a retiree en-
gages in litigation against the former 
employer, or obtains employment with a 
competitor of the former employer, the 
retirement benefit will be deemed to be 
forfeitable. However, retirement benefits 
. will not be deemed forfeitable solely be-
cause the benefits are discontinued or 
suspended for reasons permitted under 
section 411(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue 
Code. 
(2) An annual retirement benefit will 
not be deemed forfeitable merely because 
the minimum statutory benefit level is 
not guaranteed against the possibility of 
plan bankruptcy or is subject to benefit 
restrictions in the event of early termi-
nation of the plan in accordance with 
Treasury Regulation 1.401-4(c). How-
ever, as of the effective date of the retire-
ment in question, there must be at l~ast a 
reasonable expectation that the plan will 
meet its obligations. 
Sec. 1625.13. Apprenticeship 
Programs 
Age limitations for entry into bona 
fide apprenticeship programs were not, 
intended to be affected by the Act. Entry 
into most apprenticeship programs has 
traditionally been limited to youths un-
der specified ages. This is in recognition 
of the fact that apprenticeship is an ex-
tension of the educational process to pre-
pare young men and' women for skilled 
employment. Accordingly, the prohibi-
tions contained in the Act will not be 
applied to bona fide apprenticeship pro-
grams which meet the standards speci-
fied in §§521.2 and 521.3 of this chapter. 
[Editor's. note: Sections 521.2 and 
521.3 appear at 29 CFR Part 521, the La-
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bor Department's Wage and Hour re{}U-
lations. The sections read as foUows: 
Sec. 521.: Definitions. 
As used in th is part: 
(a) "Apprentice" means a worker at 
least sixteen years of age, except where a 
higher minimum age standard is other-
wise fixed by law, who is employed to 
learn a skiUed trade as defined in §521.4, 
and in conformity with or substantial 
c01l/ormity with the standards of appren-
ticeship as set forth in §521.3. 
(b) "Apprenticeship agreement" means 
a written agreement between an appren-
tice and either his employer or a joint 
apprenticeship committee, which con-
tains the terms and conditions of the em-
ployment and training of the apprentice, 
and which conforms or substantially con-
forms with the standards of apprentice-
ship set forth in §521.3. 
(c) "Apprenticeship program" means a 
complete plan of terms and conditions 
for the employment and training of ap-
prentices which conforms or substantial-
ly conforms with the standards of ap-
prenticeship, as set forth in §521.3. 
(d) "Joint apprenticeship committee" 
means a local committee, equally repre-
sentative of employers and employees, 
which has been established by a group of 
employers and a bona fide bargaining 
agent or agents, to direct the training of 
apprentices with whom it has made 
agreements. This term does not include a 
joint apprenticeship committee estab-
lished for an individual plant. 
(e) "Recognized apprenticeship agen-
cy" means either (1) a state apprentice-
ship agency recognized by the Bureau of 
Apprenticeship, United States Depart-
ment of Labor, or (2) if no such appren-
ticeship agency exists in the state, the 
Bureau of Apprenticeship, United States 
Department of Labor. 
(j) "Registration" means the approval 
by a recognized apprenticeship agency 0/ 
an apprenticeship program or agreement 
as meeting the basic standards adopted 
by the Bureau of Apprenticeship, United 
States Department of Labor, upon the 
recommendation of the Federal Commit-
tee on Apprenticeship. 
(g) "State" means any state of the Unit-
ed States or the District of Columbia or 
any territory or possession of the United 
States. 
Sec. 521.3. Standards of 
Apprenticeship 
An apprenticeship program must con-
form with or substantially conform with 
the following standards of apprentice-
ship before the Administrator or his au-
thorized representative will issue a spe-
cial certificate authorizing employment 
o/an apprentice under such program at 
wages lower than the minimum wages 
applicable under section 6 of the act: 
(a) Employment and training of the 
apprentice .in a skiUed trade. A skilled 
trade is an apprenticeable occupation 
which satUifi,es the criteria set forth in 
§521.4-
(b) One year or more (2,000 or more 
hours) of work experience. 
(c) A progressively increasing schedule 
of wages to be paid the apprentice which 
averages at least 50 percent of the jour-
neyman's rate over the period of appren-
ticeship. 
(d) A schedule of work processes or 0p-
erations in which experience is to be giv-
en the apprentice on the job. 
(e) Submission of the apprenticeship 
program and the apprenticeship agree-
ment to the recognized apprenticeship 
agency for registration as provided in 
§521.5. 
(j) Joint agreement to the apprentice-
ship program by the employer and the 
bona.fide bargaining agent, where a bar-
gaining agent exists. 
(g) An indication that the number of 
apprentices to be employed conforms to 
the needs and practices in the communi-
ty. 
(h) Adequate facilities for training and 
supervi.sion of the apprentice and the 
keeping of appropriate records concern-
ing his progress. 
(iJ Related instruction, if available, 
(144 hours a year is normally considered 
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necessary. Related instruction means an 
organized and BYstematic form of in-
struction which is designed to provide 
the apprentice with knowledge of the the-
oretical and technical subjects related to 
his trade. Such instruction may be given 
in a classroom, through correspondence 
courses, or other forms of self-study.} ] 
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Worker Adjustment And Retraining Notification Act 
Following is the text of The Worker 
Adjustment and Retraining Notifica-
tion Act, which, with some exceptions, 
requires employers to provide 60 days' 
advance notice of plant closings and 
layoffs. The law (P L 100-979, 102 Stat 
890, 29 USC §§2101-2109) automatical-
ly became law on Aug. 4, 1988, without 
the president's signature, and took ef-
fect, except where noted, on Feb. 4, 
1989. 
29 U.S.C. 8 2101 
TITLE 29-LABOR 
CHAPTER 23- WORKER AD= 
JUSTMENT AND RETRAINING 
NOTIFICATION 
, 
Sec. 2101. Definitions; exclusions 
from definition of loss of employ-
ment 
(a) Definitions. As used in this chap-
ter-
(1) the term "employer" means any 
business enterprise that employs~ 
(A) 100 or more employees, exclud-
ing part-time employees; or 
(B) 100 or more employees who in 
the aggregate work at least 4,000 hours 
per week (exclusive of hours of over-
time); 
(2) the term "plant closing" means 
the permanent or temporary shutdown 
of a single site of employment, or one 
or more facilities or operating units 
within a single site of employment, if 
the shutdown results in an employ-
ment loss at the single site of employ-
ment during any 30-day period for 50 
or more employees excluding any part-
time employees; . 
(3) the term "mass layoff" means a 
reduction in force which-
(A) is not the result of a plant clos-
ing; and 
(B) results in an employment loss at 
the single site of employment during 
any 30-day period for-
(i)(I) at least 33 percent of the em-
ployees (excluding any part-time em-
ployees); and 
(II) at least 50 employees (excluding 
any part-time employees); or 
(ii) at least 500 employees (excluding 
any part-time employees); 
(4) the term "representative" means 
an exclusive representative of employ-
ees within the meaning of section 
159(a) or 158(f) of this title or section 
152 of Title 45; 
(5) the term "affected employees" 
means employees who may reasonably 
be expected to experience an employ-
ment loss as a consequence of a pro-
posed plant closing or mass layoff by 
their employer; . 
(6) subject to subsection (b) of this 
section, the term "employment loss"o 
means (A) an employment termina-
tion, other than a discharge for cause, 
voluntary departure, or retirement, (B) 
a layoff exceeding 6 months, or (C) a 
reduction in hours of work of more 
than 50 percent during each month of 
any 6-month period; 
(7) the term "unit of local govern-
ment" means any general purpose po-
litical subdivision of a State which has 
the power to levy taxes and spend 
funds, as well as general corporate and 
police powers; and 
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(8) the term "part-time employee" 
means an employee who is employed 
for an average of fewer than 20 hours 
per week or who has been employed for 
fewer than 6 of the 12 months preced-
ing the date on which notice is re-
quired. 
(b) Exclusions from definition of 
employment loss. (1) In the case of a 
sale of part or all of an employer's 
business, the seller shall be responsible 
for providing notice for any plant clos-
ing or mass layoff in accordance with 
section 2102 of this title, up to and 
including the effective date of the sale. 
After the effective date of the sale of 
part or all of an employer's business, 
. the purchaser shall be responsible for 
providing notice for any plant closing 
or mass layoff in accordance with sec-
tion 2102 of this title. Notwithstanding 
any other provision of this chapter, 
any person who is an employee of the 
seller (other than a part-time employ-
ee) as of the effective date of the sale 
shall be considered an employee of the 
purchaser immediately after the effec-
tive date of the sale. 
(2) Notwithstanding subsection 
(a)(6) of this section, an employee may 
not be considered to have experienced 
an employment loss if the closing or 
layoff is the result of the relocation or 
consolidation of part or all of the em-
ployer's business and, prior to the clos-
ing or layoff-
(A) the employer offers to transfer 
the employee to a different site of 
employment within a reasonable com-
muting distance with no more than a 
6-month break in employment; or 
(B) the employer offers to transfer 
the employee to any other site of em-
ployment regardless of distance with 
no more than a 6-month break in em-
ployment, and the employee accepts 
within 30 days of the offer or of the 
closing or layoff, whichever is later. 
Sec. 2102. Notice required before 
plant closings and mass layoffs 
(a) Notice to employees, state dislo-
cated worker units, and local govern-
ments. An employer shall not order a 
plant closing or mass layoff until the 
end of a 60-day period after the em-
ployer serves written notice of such an 
order-
(1) to each representative of the af-
fected employees as of the time of the 
notice or, if there is no such represen-
tative at that time, to each affected 
employee; and 
(2) to the State dislocated worker 
unit (designated or created under title 
III of the Job Training Partnership 
Act [29 V.S.C.A. s 1651 et seq.]) and the 
chief elected official of the unit of local 
government within which such closing 
or layoff is to occur. 
If there is more than one such unit, 
the unit of local government which the 
employer shall notify is the unit of 
local government to which the employ-
er pays the highest taxes for the year 
preceding the year for which the deter-
mination is made. 
(b) Reduction of notification period. . 
(1) An employer may order the shut-
down ofa single site of employment 
before the conclusion of the 60-day 
period if as of the time that notice 
would have been required the employer 
. was actively seeking capital or busi-, 
ness which, if obtained, would have 
enabled the employer to avoid or post-
pone the shutdown and the employer 
reasonably and in good faith believed 
that giving the notice required would 
have precluded the employer from ob-
taining the needed capital or business .. 
(2)(A) An employer may order a 
plant closing or mass layoff before the 
conclusion of the 60-day period if the 
closing or mass layoff is caused by 
business circumstances that were not 
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reasonably foreseeable as of the time 
that notice would have been required. 
(B) No notice under this chapter 
shall be required if the plant closing or 
mass layoff is due to any form of 
natural disaster, such as a flood, 
earthquake, or the drought currently 
ravaging the farmlands of the United 
States. 
(3) An employer relying on this sub-
section shall give as much notice as is 
practicable and at that time shall give 
a brief statement of the basis for re-
ducing the notification period. 
(c) Extension of layoff period. A 
layoff of more than 6 months which, at 
its outset, was announced to be a lay-
off of 6 months or less, shall be treated 
as an employment loss under this 
. chapter unless-
": (1) the extension beyond 6 months is 
"caused by business circumstances (in-
cluding unforeseeable changes in price 
or cost) not reasonably foreseeable at 
the time of ~he initial layoff; and 
(2) notice is given at the time it 
becomes reasonably foreseeable that 
the extension beyond 6 months will be 
required. 
(d) Determinations with respect to 
employment loss. For purposes of this 
section, in determining whether a 
plant closing or mass layoff has oc-
curred or will occur, employment 
losses for 2 or more groups at a single 
site of employment, each of which is 
less than the minimum number of em-
ployees specified in section 2101(a)(2) 
or (3) of this title but which in the 
aggregate exceed that minimum num-
ber, and which occur within any 90-
day period shall be considered to be a 
plant closing or mass layoff unless the 
employer demonstrates that the em-
ployment losses are the result of sepa-
rate and distinct actions and causes 
and are not an attempt by the employ-
er to evade the requirements of this 
chapter. 
Sec. 2103. Exemptions. 
This chapter shall not apply to a 
plant closing or mass layoff if-
(1) the closing is of a temporary 
facility or the closing or layoff is the 
result of the completion of a particular 
project or undertaking, and the affect-
ed employees were hired with the un-
derstanding that their employment 
was limited to the duration of the 
facility or the project or undertaking; 
or 
(2) the closing or layoff constitutes a 
strike or constitutes a lockout not in-
tended to evade the requirements of 
this chapter. Nothing in this chapter 
shall require an employer to serve 
written notice pursuant to section 2102 
(a) of this title when permanently re-
placing a person who is deemed to be 
an economic striker under the Nation-
al Labor Relations Act: [29 U.S.C.A. s 
151 et seq.~ Provided, That nothing in 
this chapter shall be deemed to vali-
date or invalidate any judicial or ad-
ministrative ruling relating to the hir:" 
ing of permanent replacements for 
economic strikers under the National 
Labor Relations Act. 
Sec. 2104. Administration and en-
forcement of requirements. 
(a) Civil actions against employers. 
(1) Any employer who orders a plant 
closing or mass layoff in violation of 
section 2102 of this title shall be liable 
to each aggrieved employee who suf": 
fers an employment loss as a result of 
such closing or layoff for-
(A) back pay for each day of viola-
tion at a rate of compensation not less. 
than the higher of - . 
(i) the average regular rate received 
by such employee during the last 3 
years of the employee's employment; 
or 
(ii) the final regular rate received by 
such employee; "and 
(B) benefits under an employee bene-
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fit plan described in section 1002 (3) of 
this title, including the cost of medical 
expenses incurred during the employ-
ment loss which would have been cov-
ered under an employee benefit plan if 
the employment loss had not occurred. 
Such liability shall be calculated for 
the period of the violation, up to a 
maximum of 60 days, but in no event 
for more than one-half the number of 
days the employee was employed by 
the employer. 
(2) The amount for which an em-
ployer is liable under paragraph (1) 
shall be reduced by-
(A) any wages paid by the employer 
to the employee for the period of the 
violation; 
(B) any voluntary and unconditional 
payment by the employer to the em.;. 
ployee that is not required by any legal 
obligation; and 
(C) any payment by the employer to 
a third party or trustee (such as pre-
miums for health benefits or payments 
to a defined contribution pension plan) 
on behalf of and attributable to the 
employee for the period of the viola-
tion. 
In addition, any liability incurred 
under paragraph (1) with respect to a 
defined benefit pension plan may be 
reduced by crediting the employee with 
service for all purposes under such a 
plan for the period of the violation. 
(3) Any employer who violates the 
provisions of section 2102 of this title 
with respect to a unit of local govern-
ment shall be subject to a civil penalty 
of not more than $500 for each day of 
such violation, except that such penal-
ty shall not apply if the employer pays 
to each aggrieved employee the amount 
for which the employer is liable to that 
employee within 3 weeks from the date 
the employer orders the shutdown or 
layoff. 
(4) If an employer which has violat-
ed this chapter proves to the satisfac-
tion of the court that the act or omis-
sion that violated this chapter was in 
good faith and that the employer had 
reasonable grounds for believing that 
the act or omission was not a violation 
of this chapter the court may, in its 
discretion, reduce the amount of the 
liability or penalty provided for in this 
section. 
(5) A person seeking to enforce such 
liability, including a representative of 
employees or a unit of local govern-
ment aggrieved under paragraph (1) or 
(3), may sue either for such person or 
for other persons similarly situated, or 
both, in any district court of the Unit-
ed States for any district in which the 
violation is alleged to have occurred, or 
in which the employer transacts busi-
ness. 
(6) In any such suit, the court, in its 
discretion, may allow the prevailing 
party a reasonable attorney's fee as 
part of the costs. 
(7) For purposes of this subsection, 
the term, "aggrieved employee" means 
an employee who has worked for the 
employer ordering the plant closing or 
mass layoff and who, as a result of the 
failure by the employer to comply with 
section 2102 of this title did not receive 
timely notice ei ther directly or 
through his or her representative as 
required by section 2102 of this title. 
(b) Exclusivity of remedies. 
The remedies provided for in this . 
section shall be the exclusive remedies. 
for any violation of this chapter. Un-
der this chapter, a Federal court shall 
not have authority to enjoin a plant 
closing or mass layoff. 
Sec. 2105. Procedures in addition 
to other rights of employees. 
The rights and remedies provided to 
employees by this chapter are in addi-
tion to, and not in lieu of, any other 
contractual or statutory rights and 
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remedies of the employees, and are not 
intended to alter or affect such rights 
and remedies, except that the period of 
notification required by this chapter 
shall run concurrently with any period 
of notification required by contract or 
by any other statute. 
Sec. 2106. Procedures encouraged 
where not required. 
It is the sense of Congress that an 
employer who is not required to com-
ply with the notice requirements of 
section 2102 of this title should, to the 
extent possible, provide notice to its 
employees about a proposal to close a 
plant or permanently reduce its work-
force. 
Sec. 2107. Authority to prescribe 
regulations. 
(a) The Secretary of Labor shall 
prescribe such regulations as may be 
necessary to carry out this chapter. 
Such regulations shall, at a minimum, 
include interpretative regulations de-
scribing the methods by which em-
ployers may provide for appropriate 
service of notice as required by this 
chapter. 
(b) The mailing of notice to an em-
ployee's last known address or inclu-
sion of notice in the employee's pay-
check will be considered acceptable 
methods for fulfillment of the employ-
er's obligation to give notice to each 
affected employee under this chapter. 
Sec. 2108. Effect on other laws. 
The giving of notice pursuant to this 
chapter, if done in good faith compli-
ance with this chapter, shall not con-
stitute a violation of the National 
Labor Relations Act [29 U.S.C.A. s 151 
et seq.] or the Railway Labor Act. 
Sec. 2109. Report on employment 
and international competitiveness. 
Two years after Aug. 4, 1988, the 
Comptroller General shall submit to 
the Committee on Small Business of 
both the House and Senate, the Com-
mittee on Labor and Human Re-
sources, and the Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor a report containing a 
detailed and objective analysis of the 
effect of this chapter on employers 
(especially small-and medium-sized 
businesses), the economy (internation-
al competitiveness), and employees (in 
terms of levels and conditions of em-
ployment). The Comptroller General 
shall assess both costs and benefits 
including the effect on productivity: 
competitiveness, unemployment rates 
and compensation, and worker retrain-
ing and readjustment. (Effective Feb-
ruary 4, 1989, expect that the authority 
of the Secretary of Labor under Sec. 
2107 took effect August 4, 1988.) 
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Final Rule 
Accordingly, Chapter V of Title 20, Code of Feder-
al Regulations. is amended by Revising Part 639, to 
read as follows: 
PART 639 - WORKER ADJUST-
MENT AND RETRAINING NOTI· 
FICATION 
Sec.. 
639.1 Purpose and &cope. 
639.2 What does WARN require? 
639.3 Definitions. 
639.4 Who must give notice? 
639.5 When must notice be given! 
8-t2, 
639.6 Who must receive notice! 
639.7 What must the notice contain! 
639.8 How iJ the notice eerved? 
639.9 When may notice be given leal than 60 day. 
in advance! 
639.10 When may notice be extended! 
§639.1 Purpose and scope. 
(a) Purpose of WARN. 
The Worker Adjustment and Re-
training Notification Act (WARN or 
the Act) provides protection to work-
ers, their families and communities by 
requiring employers to provide notifi-
cation 60 calendar days in advance of 
plant closings and mass layoffs. Ad-
vance notice provides workers and 
their families some transition time to 
adjust to the prospective loss of em-
ployment, to seek and obtain alterna-
tive jobs and., if necessary, to enter 
skill training or retraining that will 
allow these workers to successfully 
compete in the job market. WARN also 
provides for notice to State dislocated 
worker units so that dislocated worker· 
assistance can be promptly provided. 
(b) Scope of these regulations. 
These regulations establish basic 
definitions and rules for giving notice, 
implementing the provisions of 
WARN. The Department's objective is 
to establish clear principles and broad 
guidelines which can be applied in spe-
cific circumstances. However, the De-
partment recognizes that Federal rule-
making cannot address the multitude 
of industry and company-specific situ-
ations in which advance notice will be 
given. 
(c) Notice encouraged where not re-
quired. 
Section 7 of the Act states: 
It is the sense of Congress that an 
employer who is not required to com-
ply with, the notice requirements of 
section 3 should, to the extent possible, 
provide notice to its employees about a 
proposal to close a plant or perma-
nently reduce its workforce. 
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(d) WARN enforcement. 
Enforcement of WARN will be 
through the courts, as provided in §5 
of the statute. Employees, their repre-
sentatives and units of local govern-
ment may initiate civil actions against 
employers believed to be in violation of 
§3 of the Act. The Department of 
Labor has no legal standing in any 
enforcement action and, therefore, will 
not be in a position to issue advisory 
opinions on specific cases. The Depart-
ment will provide assistance in under-
standing these regulations and may 
revise them from time to time as may 
be necessary. 
(e) Notice in ambiguous situations. 
It is civically desirable and it would 
appear to be good business practice for 
an employer to provide advance notice 
to its workers or unions, local govern-
ment and the State when terminating 
a significant number of employees. In 
practical terms, there are some ques-
tions and ambiguities of interpretation 
inherent in the application of WARN 
to business l practices in the market 
economy that cannot be addressed in 
these regulations. It is therefore pru-
dent for employers to weigh the desir-
ability of advance notice against the 
possibility of expensive and time-con-
suming litigation to resolve disputes 
where notice has not been given. The 
Department encourages employers to 
give notice in all circumstances. 
(f) Coordination with job placement 
and retraining progra'ITUJ. 
The Department, through these reg-
ulations and through the Trade Ad-
justment Assistance Program (TAA) 
and Economic Dislocation and Worker 
Adjustment Assistance Act (EDW AA) 
regulations, encourages maximum co-
ordination of the actions and activities 
of these programs to assure that the 
negative impact of dislocation on 
workers is lessened to the extent possi-
ble. By providing for notice to the 
State dislocated worker unit, WARN 
notice begins the process of assisting 
workers who will be dislocated. 
(g) WARN not to supersede other 
laws and contracts. 
The provisions of WARN do not su-
persede any laws or collective bargain-
ing agreements that provide for addi-
tional notice or additional rights and 
remedies. If such law or agreement 
provides for a longer notice period, 
WARN notice shall run concurrently 
with that additional notice period. Col-
lective bargaining agreements may be 
used to clarify or amplify the terms 
and conditions of WARN, but may not 
reduce WARN rights. 
§639.2 What does WARN require? 
WARN requires employers who are 
planning a plant closing or a mass 
layoff to give affected employees at 
least 60 days' notice of such an em-
ployment action. While the 6O-day pe-
riod is the minimum for advance no-
tice, this provision is not intended to 
discourage employers from voluntarily 
providing longer periods of advance 
notice. Not all plant closings and lay-
offs are subject to the Act, and certain 
-employment thresholds must be 
reached before the Act applies. WARN 
sets -out specific exemptions, and pro-
vides for a reduction in the notifica-
tion period in particular circum-
stances. Damages and civil penalties 
can be assessed against employers who 
violate the Act. 
§639.3 Definitions. 
(a) Empicyer. (1) The term "employ-
er" means any business enterprise that 
employs -
(i) 100 or more employees, exclud-
ing part-time employees; or 
(ii) 100 or more employees, includ-
ing part-time employees, who in the 
aggregate work at least 4,000 hours 
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per week, exclusive of hours of over-
time. 
Workers on temporary layoff or on 
leave who have a reasonable expecta-
tion of recall are counted as employees. 
An employee has a "reasonable expec-
tation of recall" when he/she under-
stands, through notification or 
through industry practice, that 
his/her employment with the employer 
has been temporarily interrupted and 
that he/she will be recalled to the 
same or to a similar job. The term 
"employer" includes non-profit organi-
zations of the requisite size. Regular 
Federal, State, local and federally rec-
ognized Indian tribal governments are 
not covered. However, the term "em-
ployer" includes public and quasi-pub-
lic entities which engage in business 
(Le., take part in a commercial or in-
dustrial enterprise, supply a service or 
good on a mercantile basis, or provide 
independent management of public as-
sets, raising revenue and making de-
sired investments), and which are sep-
ara tely organized from the regular 
government, which have their own 
governing bodies and which have inde-
pendent authority to manage their 
personnel and assets. 
(2) Under existing legal rules, inde-
pendent contractors and subsidiaries 
which are wholly or partially owned by 
a parent company are treated as sepa-
rate employers or as a part of the 
parent or contracting company de-
pending upon the degree of. their inde-
pendence from the parent. Some of the 
factors to be considered in making this 
determination are (i) common owner-
ship, (ii) common directors and/or of-
ficers, (iii) de facto exercise of control, 
(iv) unity of personnel policies emanat-
ing from a common source, and (v) the 
dependency of operations. 
(3) Workers, other than part-time 
workers, who are exempt from notice 
under §4 of WARN are nonetheless 
counted as employees for purposes of 
determining coverage as an employer. 
(4) An employer may have one or 
more sites of employment under com-
mon ownership or control. An example 
would be a major auto maker which 
has dozens of automobile plants 
throughout the country. Each plant 
would be considered a site of employ-
ment, but there is only one "employ-
er," the auto maker. 
(b) Plant closing. The term "plant 
closing" means the permanent or tem-
porary shutdown of a "single site of 
employment," or one or more "facili-
ties or operating units" within a single 
site of employment, if the shutdown 
results in an "employment loss" dur-
ing any 30-day period at the single site 
of employment for 50 or more employ-
ees, excluding any part-time employ-
ees. An employment action that re-
sults in the effective cessation of 
production or the work performed by a 
unit, even ira few employees remain, is 
a shutdown. A '·temporary shutdown" 
triggers the notice requirement only if 
there are a sufficient number of termi-
nations, layoffs exceeding 6 months, or 
reductions in hours of work as speci-
fied under the definition of "employ-
ment loss." 
(c) Mass layoff. (1) The term "mass 
layoff" means a reduction in force 
which first, is not the result of a plant 
closing, and second, results in an em-
ployment loss at the single site of em-
ployment during any 30-day period 
for: 
(i) at least 33 percent of the active 
employees, excluding part-time em-
ployees, and 
(ii) at least 50 employees, excluding 
part-time employees. 
Where 500 or more employees (exclud-
ing part-time employees) are affected, 
the 33% requirement does not apply, 
and notice is required if the other cri-
teria are met. Plan!.. ~lo.!Jin~s involve 
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employment loss which results from 
the shutdown of one or more distinct 
units within a single site or the entire 
site. A mass layoff involves employ-
ment loss, regardless of whether one or 
more units are shut down at the site. 
(2) Workers, other than part-time 
workers, who are exempt from notice 
under §4 of WARN are nonetheless 
counted as employees for purposes of 
determining coverage as a plant clos-
ing or mass layoff. For example, if an 
employer closes a temporary project 
on which 10 permanent and 40 tempo-
rary workers are employed, a covered 
plant closing has occurred although 
only 10 workers are entitled to notice .. 
(d) Representative. The term "repre-
sentative" means an exclusive repre-
sentative of employees within the 
meaning of §9(a) or S(f) of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Act or §2 of the 
Railway Labor Act. 
(e) A.ffected employees. The term 
"affected employees" means employees 
who may reasonably be expected to 
experience an employment loss as a 
consequence of a proposed plant clos-
ing or mass layoff by their employer. 
This includes individually identifiable 
employees who will likely lose their 
jobs because of bumping rights or oth-
er factors, to the . extent that such 
individual workers reasonably can be 
identified at the time notice is required 
to be given. The term "affected em-
ployees" includes managerial and su-
pervisory employees, but does not in-
clude business partners. Consultant or 
contract employees who have a sepa-
rate employment relationship with an-
other employer and are paid by that 
other employer, or who are self-em-
ployed, are not "affected employees" of 
the business to which they are as-
signed. In addition, for purposes of 
determining whether coverage thresh-
olds are met, either incumbent workers 
in jobs being eliminated or, if known 
60 days in advance, the actual employ-
ees who suffer an employment loss 
may be counted. 
(f) Employment loss. (1) The term 
"employment loss" means (i) an em-
ployment termination, other than a 
discharge for cause, voluntary depar-
ture, or retirement, (ii) a layoff exceed-
ing 6 months, or (iii) a reduction in 
hours of work of individual employees 
of more than 50% during each month 
of any 6-month period. 
(2) Where a termination or a layoff 
(see paragraphs (f)(l)(i) and (ii) of this 
section) is involved, an employment 
loss does not occur when an employee 
is reassigned or transferred to employ-
er-sponsored programs, such as re-
training or job search activities, as 
long as the reassignment does not con-
stitute a constructive discharge or oth-
er involuntary termination. 
(3) An employee is not considered to 
have experienced an .employment loss 
if the closing or layoff is the result of 
the relocation or consolidation of part 
or all of the employer's business and, 
prior to the closing or layoff -
(i) the employer offers to transfer 
the employee to a different site of 
employment within a reasonable 
commuting distance with no more 
than a 6-month break in employ-
ment, or 
(ii) the employer offers to transfer 
the employee to any other site of . 
employment regardless of distance 
with no more than a 6-month break 
in employment, and the employee 
accepts within 30 days of the offer or 
of the closing or layoff, whichever is 
later. 
(4) A "relocation or consolidation" 
of part or all of an employer's busi-
ness, for purposes of paragraph 
§639.3(h)(4), means that some defin-
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able business, whether customer or-
ders, product lines, or operations, is 
transferred to a different site of em-
ployment and that transfer results in a 
plant closing or mass layoff. 
(g) Unit of local govern:ment. The 
term "unit of local government" means 
any general purpose political subdivi-
sion of a State, which has the power to 
levy taxes and spend funds and which 
also has general corporate and police 
powers. When a covered employment 
site is located in more than one unit of 
local government, the employer must 
give notice to the unit to which it 
determines it directly paid the highest 
taxes for the year preceding the year 
for which the determination is made. 
All local taxes direCtly paid to the local 
government should be aggregated for 
this purpose. 
(h) Part-time employee. The term 
"part-time" employee means an em-
ployee who is employed for an average 
of fewer than 2O'hours per week or who 
has been employed for fewer than 6 of 
the 12 months preceding the date on 
which notice is required, including 
workers who work full-time. This term 
may include workers who would tradi-
tionally be understood as "seasonal" 
employees. The period to be used for 
calculating whether a worker ha.s 
worked "an average of fewer than 20 
hours per week" is the shorter of the 
actual time the worker has been em-
ployed or the most recent 90 days. 
(i) Single site of employment. (1) A 
single site of employment can refer to 
either a single location or a group of 
contiguous locations. Groups of struc-
tures which form a campus or' indus-
trial park, or separate facilities across 
the street from one another, may be 
considered a single site of employment. 
(2) There may be several single sites 
of employment within a single build-
ing, such as an office building, if sepa-
rate employers conduct activities with-
in such a building. For example, an 
office building housing 50 different 
businesses will contain 50 single sites 
of employment. The offices of each 
employer will be its single site of em-
ployment. 
(3) Separate buildings or areas 
which are not directly connected or in 
immediate proximity may be consid-
ered a single site of employment if they 
are in reasonable geographic proxim-
ity, used for the same purpose, and 
share the same staff and equipment. 
An example is an employer who man-
ages a number of warehouses in an 
area but who regularly shifts or ro-
tates the same employees from one 
building to another. 
(4) Non-contiguous sites in the same 
geographic area which do not share 
the same staff or operational purpose 
should not be considered a single site. 
For example, assembly plants which 
are located on opposite sides of a town 
and which are managed by a single 
employer are separate sites if they 
employ different workers. 
(5) Contiguous buildings owned by 
the same employer which have sepa-
rate management, produce different 
products, and have separate work-
forces are considered separate single 
sites of employment. 
(6) For workers whose primary du-
ties require travel from point to point, 
who are outstationed, or whose prima-
ry duties involve work outside any of 
the employer's regular employment 
sites (e.g., railroad workers, bus driv-
ers, salespersons), the single site of 
employment to which they are as-
signed as their home base, from which 
their work is assigned, or to which 
they report will be the single site in 
which they are covered for WARN 
purposes. 
(7) Foreign sites of employment are 
not covered under WARN. U.S. work-
ers at such sites are counted to deter-
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mine whether an employer is covered 
as an employer under §639.3(a). 
(8) The term "single site of employ-
ment" may also apply to truly unusual 
organizational situations where the 
above criteria do not reasonably apply. 
The application of this definition with 
the intent to evade the purpose of the 
Act to provide notice is not acceptable. 
(j) Facility (}1" operating unit. The 
term "facility" refers to a building or 
buildings. The term "operating unit" 
refers to an organizationally or oper-
ationally distinct product, operation, 
or specific work function within or 
across facilities at the single site. 
(k) State dislocated W(}1"/rer unit. The 
term "State dislocated worker unit" 
means a unit designated or created in 
each State by the Governor under Title 
III of the Job Training Partnership 
Act, as amended by EDW AA. 
(1) State. For the purpose of WARN, 
the term "State" includes the 50 
States, the District of Columbia, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and 
the U.S. Viriin Islands. 
§639.4 Who must give notice? 
Section 3(a) of WARN states that 
"an employer shall not order a plant 
closing or mass layoff until the end of 
a 6O-day period after the employer 
serves written notice of such an or-
der· • • ." Therefore, an employer who 
is anticipating carrying out a plant 
closing or mass layoff is required to 
give notice to affected employees or 
their representative(s), the State dislo-
cated worker unit and the chief elected 
official of a unit of local government. 
(See definitions in §639.3 of this part.) 
(a) It is the responsibility of the 
employer to decide the most appropri-
ate person within the employer's or-
ganization to prepare and deliver the 
notice to affected employees or their 
representative(s), the State dislocated 
worker unit and the chief elected offi-
cial of a unit of local government. In 
most instances, this may be the local 
site plant manager, the local personnel 
director or a labor relations officer. 
(b) An employer who has previously 
announced and carried out a short-
term layoff (6 months or less) which is 
being extended beyond 6 months due to 
business circumstances (including un-
foreseeable changes in price or cost) 
not reasonably foreseeable at the time 
of the initial layoff is required to give 
notice when it becomes reasonably 
foreseeable that the extension is re-
quired. A layoff extending beyond 6 
months from the date the layoff com-
menced for any other reason shall be 
treated as an employment loss from 
the date of its commencement. 
(c) In the ease of the sale of part or 
all of a business, §2(b)(1) of WARN 
defines who the "employer" is. The 
seller is responsible for providing no-
tice of any plant closing or mass layoff 
which takes place up to and including 
the effective date (time) of the sale, 
and the buyer is responsible for pro-
viding notice of any plant closing or 
mass layoff that takes place there-
after. Affected employees are always 
entitled to notice; at all times the em-
ployer is responsible for providing no-
tice. 
(1) If the seller is made aware of any 
definite plans on the part of the buyer 
to carry out a plant closing or mass 
layoff within 60 days of purchase, the. 
seller may give notice to affected em-
ployees as an agent of the buyer, if so 
empowered. If the seller does not give 
notice, the buyer is, nevertheless, re-
sponsible to give notice. If the seller 
gives notice as the buyer's agent, the 
responsibility for notice still r~mains 
with the buyer. 
(2) It may be prudent for the buyer 
and seller to determine the impacts of 
the sale on workers, and to arrange 
between them for advance notice to be 
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given to affected employees or their 
representative(s), if a mass layoff or 
plant closing is planned. 
§639.5 When must notice be given? 
(a) General rule. (1) With certain 
exceptions discussed· in paragraphs 
(b), (c) and (d) of this section and in 
§639.9 of this part, notice must be 
given at least 60 calendar days prior to 
any planned plant closing or mass lay-
off, as defined in these regulations. 
When all employees are not terminat-
ed on the same date, the date of the 
first individual termination within the 
statutory 30-day or 90-day period trig-
gers the 6O-day notice requirement. A 
worker's last day of employment. is 
considered the date of that worker's 
layoff. The first and each subsequent 
group of terminees are entitled to a 
full 60 days' notice. In order for an 
employer to decide whether issuing no-
tice is required, the employer should-
(i) Look ahead 30 days and behind 
30 days to determine whether em-
ployment actions both taken and 
planned will, in the aggregate for 
any 30-day period, reach the mini-
mum numbers for a plant closing or 
a mass layoff and thus trigger the 
notice requirement; and 
(ii) Look ahead 90 days and behind 
90 days to determine whether em-
ployment actions both taken and 
planned each of which separately is 
not of sufficient size to trigger 
WARN coverage will, in the aggre-
gate for any 9O-day period, reach the 
minimum numbers for a plant clos-
ing or a mass layoff and thus trigger 
the notice requirement. An employer 
is not, however, required under §3(d) 
to give notice if the employer demon-
strates that the separate employ-
ment losses are the result of sepa-
rate and distinct actions and causes, 
and are not an attempt to evade the 
requirements of WARN. 
(2) The point in time at which the 
. number of employees is to be measured 
for the purpose of determining cover-
age is the date the first notice is re-
quired to be given. If this "snapshot" 
of the number of employees employed 
on that date is clearly unrepresenta-
tive of the ordinary or average employ-
ment level, then a more representative 
number can be used to determine cov-
erage. Examples of unrepresentative 
employment levels include cases when 
the level is near the peak or trough of 
. an employment cycle or when large 
upward pr downward shifts in the 
number of employees occur around the 
time notice is to be given. A more 
representative number may be an 
average number of employees over a 
recent period of time or the number of 
employees on an alternative date 
which is more representative of nor-
mal employment levels. Alternative 
methods cannot be used to evade the 
purpose of WARN, and should only be 
used in unusual circumstances. 
(b) Transfers. (1) Notice is not re-
quired in certain cases involving 
transfers, as described under the defi-
nition of "employment loss" at 
§639.3(f) of this part. 
(2) An offer of reassignment -to a 
different site of employment should 
not be deemed to be a "transfer" if the 
new job constitutes a constructive dis- . 
charge. 
(3) The meaning of the term "rea-
sonable commuting distance" will vary 
with local and industry conditions. In 
determining what is a "reasonable 
commuting distance", consideration 
should be given to the following fac-
tors: geographic accessibility of the 
place of work, the quality of the roads, 
customarily available transportation, 
and the usual travel time. 
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(4) In cases where the transfer is 
beyond reasonable commuting dis-
tance, the employer may become liable 
for failure to give notice if an offer to 
transfer is not accepted within 30 days 
of the offer or of the closing or layoff 
(whichever is later). Depending upon 
when the offer of transfer was made 
by the employer, the normal 6O-day 
notice period may have expired and the 
plant closing or mass layoff may have 
occurred. An employer is, therefore, 
well adviSed to provide 6O-day advance 
notice as part of the transfer offer. 
(c) Temporary employment. (1) No 
notice is required if the closing is of a 
temporary facility, or if the closing or 
layoff is the result of the cOmpletion of 
a particular project or undertaking, 
and the affected employees were hired 
with the understanding that their em-
ployment was limited to the duration 
of the facility or the project or under-
taking. 
(2) Employees must clearly under-
stand at tHe time of hire that their 
employment is temporary. When such 
underStandings exist will be determined 
by reference to employment contracts, 
collective bargaining agreements, or em-
ployment practices of an industry or a 
locality, but the burden of proof will lie 
with the employer to show that the 
temporary nature of the project or facil-
ity was clearly communicatai should 
questions arise regarding the temporary 
employment understandings. 
(3) Employers in agriculture and 
construction frequently hire workers 
for harvesting, processing, or for work 
on a particular building or project. 
Such work may be seasonal but recur-
ring. Such work falls under this ex-
emption if the workers understood at 
the time they were hired that their 
work was temporary. In uncertain sit-
uations, it may be prudent for employ-
ers to clarify temporary work under-
standings in writing when workers are 
hired. The same employers may also 
have permanent employees who work 
on a variety of jobs and tasks continu-
ously through most of the calendar 
year. Such employees are not included 
under this exemption. Giving written 
notice that a project is temporary will 
not convert permanent employment 
into . temporary work, making jobs 
exempt from WARN. 
(4) Certain jobs may be related to a 
specific contract or order. Whether 
such jobs are temporary depends on 
whether the contract or order is part 
of a long-term· relationship. For exam-
ple, an aircraft manufacturer hires 
workers to produce a standard air-
plane for the U.S. fleet under a con-
tract with the U.S. Air Force with the 
expectation that its contract ~ll con-
tinue to be renewed during the foresee-
able future. The employees of this 
manufacturer would not be considered 
temporary. 
(d) Strikes ~ lockouts. The statute 
provides an exemption for strikes and 
lockouts which are not intended to 
evade the requirements of the Act. A 
lockout occurs when, for tactical or 
defensive reasons durhig" the course of 
collective bargaining or during a labor 
dispute, an employer lawfully refuses 
to utilize some or all of its employees 
for the performance of available work. 
A lockout not related to collective bar-
gaining which is intended as a subter-
fuge to evade the Act does not qualify 
for this exemption. A plant closing or 
mass layoff at a site of employment 
where a strike or lockout is taking 
place, which occurs for reasons un-
related to a strike or lockout, is not 
covered by this exemption. An employ-
er need not give notice when perma-
nently replacing a person who is 
deemed to be an economic striker un-
der the National Labor Relations Act. 
Non-striking employees at the same 
single site of employment who exper-
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ience a covered employment loss as a 
result of a strike are entitled to notice; 
however, situations in which a strike 
or lockout affects non-striking em-
ployees at the same plant may consti-
tute an unforeseeable business circum-
stance, as discussed in §639.9, and 
reduced notice may apply. Similarly, 
the "faltering company" exception, 
also discussed in §639.9 may apply in 
strike situations. Where a union which 
is on strike represents more than one 
bargaining unit at the single site, non-
strikers includes the non-striking bar-
gaining unit(s). Notice also is due to 
those workers who are not a part of 
the bargaining unit(s) which is in-
volved in the labor negotiations that 
led to the lockout. Employees at other 
plants which have not been struck, but 
at which covered plant closings or 
mass layoffs occur as a direct or indi-
rect result of a strike or lockout are 
not covered by the strike/lockout ex-
emption. The unforeseeable business 
circumstances exception to 60 days' 
notice also may apply to these closings 
or"layoffs at other plants. 
§639.6 Who must receive notice? 
Section 3(a) of WARN provides for 
notice to each representative of the 
affected employees as of the time no-
tice is required to be given or, if there 
is no such representative at that time, 
to each affected employee. Notice also 
must be served on the State dislocated 
worker unit and the chief elected offi-
cial of the unit of local government 
within which a closing or layoff is to 
occur. Section 2(b)(1) of the Act states 
that ""any person who is an employee 
of the seller (other than a part-time 
employee) as of the effective date 
[time] of the sale shall be considered an 
employee of the purchaser immediate-
ly after the effective date [time] of the 
sale." This provision preserves the no-
tice rights of the employees of a busi-
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ness that has been sold, but creates no 
other employment rights. Although a 
technical termination of the seller's 
employees may be deemed to have oc-
curred when a sale becomes effective, 
WARN notice is only required where 
the employees, in fact, experience a 
covered employment loss. 
(a) Representative(s) 0/ affected em-
ployees. Written notice is to be Served 
upon the chief elected officer of the 
exclusive representative(s) or bargain-
ing agent(s) of affected employees at 
the time of the notice. If this person is 
not the same as the officer of the local 
union(s) representing affected employ-
ees, it is recommended that a copy also 
be given to the local union official(s). 
(b) Affected employees. Notice is re-
quired to be given to employees who 
may reasonably be expected to exper-
ience an employment loss. This in-
cludes employees who will likely lose 
their jobs because of bumping rights 
or" other factors, to the extent that 
such workers can be identified at the 
time notice is required to be given. If, 
at the time notice is required to be 
given, the employer cannot identify the 
employee who may reasonably be ex-
pected ~ experience an employment 
loss due to the elimination of a par-
ticular position, the employer must 
provide notice to the incumbent in that 
position. While part-time employees 
are not counted in determining wheth-
er plant closing or mass layoff thresh;. 
olds are reached, such workers are due 
notice. 
(c) State dislocated worker unit. No-
tice is to be served upon the State 
dislocated worker unit. Since the 
States are restructuring to implement 
training under EDW AA, service of no-
tice upon the State Governor consti-
tutes service upon the State dislocated 
worker unit until such time as the 
Governor makes public State proce-
dures for serving notice to this unit. 
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(d) Chief elected ojficial of the unit 
of local government. The identity of 
the chief elected official will . vary ac-
cording to the local government struc-
ture. In the case of elected boards, the 
notice is to be served upon the board's 
chairperson. 
§639.7 What must the notice con-
tain? 
(a) Notice must be specific. (1) All 
notice must be specific. 
(2) Where voluntary notice has been 
given more than 60 days in advance, 
but does not contain all of the required 
elements set out in this section, the 
employer must ensure that all of the 
information required by this section is 
provided in writing to the parties list-
ed in §639.6 at least 60 days in advance 
of a covered employment action. 
(3) Notice may be given conditional 
upon the occurrence or nonoccurrence 
of.an event, such as the renewal of a 
major contract, only when the event is 
definite and the consequences of its 
occurrence or nonoccurrence will nec-
essarily. in the normal course of busi-
ness, lead to a covered plant ·closing or 
mass layoff less than 60 days after the 
event. For example, if the non-renewal 
of a major contract will lead to the 
closing of the plant that produces the 
articles supplied under the contract 30 
days after the contract expires,· the 
employer may give notice at least 60 
days in advance of the projected clos-
ing date which states that if the con-
tract is not renewed, the plant closing 
will occur on the projected date. The 
notice must contain each of the ele-
ments set out in this section. 
(4) The information provided in the 
notice shall be based on the best infor-
mation available to the employer at 
the time the notice is served. It is not 
the intent of the regulations, that er-
rors in the information provided in a 
notice that occur because events subse-
quently change or that are minor, in-: 
advertent errors are to be the basis for 
finding a violation of WARN. 
(b) As used in this section, the term 
"date" refers to a specific date or to a 
14-day period during which a separa-
tion or separations are expected to 
occur. If separations are planned ac-
cording to a schedule, the schedule 
should indicate the specific dates on 
which or the beginning date of each 14-
day period during which any separa-
tions are expected to occur. Where a 
14-dayperiod is used, notice must be 
given at least 60 days in advance of the 
first day of the period. 
(c) Notice to each representative of 
affected employees is to contain: 
(1) The name and address of the 
employment site where the plant clos-
ing or mass layoff win occur, and the 
name and telephone number of a com-
pany official to contact for further 
information; 
(2) A statement as to whether the 
planned action is expected to be per-
manent or temporary and,. if the entire 
plant is to be closed, a statement to 
that effect; 
(3) The expected date of the first 
separation and the anticipated sched-
ule for making separations; 
(4) The job titles of positions to be 
affected and the names of the workers 
currently holding affected jobs. 
The notice may include additional in-
formation useful to the employees such 
as information on available dislocated 
worker assistance, and, if the planned 
action is expected to be temporary, the 
estimated duration, if known. 
(d) Notice to each affected employee 
who does not have a representative is 
to be written in language understand-
able to the employees and is to contain: 
(1) A statement as to whether the 
planned action is expected to be per-
manent or temporary and, if the entire 
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plant is to be closed, a statement to 
that effect; 
(2) The expected date when the plant 
closing or mass layoff will commence 
and the expected date when the indi-
vidual employee will be separated; 
(3) An indication whether or not 
bumping rights exist; 
(4) The name and telephone number 
of a company official to contact for 
further information. 
The notice may include additional in-
formation useful to the employees such 
as information on available dislocated 
worker assistance, and, if the planned 
action is expected to be temporary, the 
estimated duration, if known. 
(e) The notices separately provided 
to the State dislocated worker unit and 
to the chief elected official of the unit 
of local government are to contain: 
(1) The name and address of the 
employment site where the plant clos-
ing or mass layoff will occur, and the 
name and telephone number of a com-
pany official to contact for further 
information; I 
(2) A statement as to whether the 
planned action is expected to be per-
manent or temporary and, if the entire 
plant is to be closed, a statement to 
that effect; 
(3) The expected date of the first 
separation, and the anticipated sched-
ule for making separations; 
(4) The job titles of positions to be 
affected, and the number of affected 
employees in each job classification; 
(5) An indication as to whether or 
not bumping rights exist; 
(6) The name of each union repre-
senting affected employees, and the 
name and address of the chief elected 
officer of each union. 
The notice may include additional in-
formation useful to the employees such 
as a statement of whether the planned 
action is expected to be temporary and 
if so, its expected duration. 
(f) As an alternative to the notices 
outlined in paragraph (e) above, an 
employer may give notice to the State 
dislocated worker unit and to the unit 
of local government by providing them 
with a written notice stating the name 
and address of the employment site 
where the plant closing or mass layoff 
will occur; the name and telephone 
number of a company official to con-
tact for further information; the ex-
pected date of the first separation; and 
the number of affected employees. The 
employer is required to maintain the 
other information listed in §639.7(e) on 
site and readily accessible to the State 
dislocated worker unit and to the unit 
of general local government. Should 
this information not be available when 
requested, it will be deemed a failure to 
give required notice. . 
§639.8 How 1. the notice served? 
Any reasonable method of delivery 
to the parties listed under §639.6 of 
this part which is designed to ensure 
receipt of notice at least 60 days before 
separation is acceptable (e.g., first 
class mail, personal delivery with op-
tional signed receipt). ~n the case of 
notification directly to affected em-
ployees, insertion of notice in to pay 
envelopes is another viable option. A 
ticketed notice, i.e., preprinted notice 
regularly included in each employee's 
pay check or pay envelope, does not 
meet the requirement!; of WARN. 
§639.9 When may notice be given 
less then 60 days in advance? 
Section 3(b) of WARN sets forth 
three conditions under which the noti-
fication period may be reduced to less 
than 60 days. The employer bears the 
burden of proof that conditions for the 
exceptions have been met. If one of the 
exceptions is applicable, the employer 
must give as much notice as is practi-
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cable to the union, non-represented 
employees, the State dislocated worker 
unit, and the unit of local government 
and this may, in some circumstances, 
be notice after the fact. The employer 
must, at the time notice actually is 
given, provide a brief statement of the 
reason for reducing the notice period, 
in addition to the other elements set 
out in 1639.7. 
(a) The exception under §3(b)(1) of 
WARN, termed "faltering company", 
applies to plant closings but not to 
mass layoffs and should be narrowly 
construed. To qualify for reduced no-
tice under this exception: 
(1) An employer must have been 
actively seeking capital or business at 
the time that 6O-day notice would have 
been required. That is, the employer 
must .have been seeking financing or 
refinancing through the arrangement 
of loans, the issuance of stocks, bonds, 
or other methods of internally gener-· 
ated financing; or the employer must 
have been seeking additional money, 
credit, or· business through any other 
commercially reasonable method. The 
employer must be able to identify spe-
cific actions taken to obtain capital or 
business. 
(2) There must have been a realistic 
opportunity to obtain the financing or 
business sought. 
(3) The financing or business sought 
must have been sufficient, if obtained, 
to have enabled the employer to avoid 
or postpone the shutdown. The em-
ployer must be able to objectively dem-
onstrate that the amount of capital or 
the volume of new business sought 
would have enabled the employer to 
keep the facility, operating unit, or site 
open for a reasonable period of time. 
(4) The employer reasonably and in 
good faith must have believed that giv-
ing the required notice would have pre-
cluded the employer from obtaining the 
needed capital or business. The employ-
er must be able to objectively demon-
strate that it reasonably thought that a 
potential customer or source of financ-
ing would have been unwilling to pro-
vide the new business or capital if no-
tice were given, that is, if the 
employees, customers or the public 
were aware that the facility, operating 
unit, or site. might have to close. This 
condition may be satisfied if the em-
ployer can show that the financing or 
business source would not choose to do 
business with a troubled company or 
with a company whose workforce would 
be looking for other jobs. The actions of 
an employer relying on the "faltering 
company" exception will be viewed in a 
company-wide context. Thus, a com-
pany with access to capital markets or 
with cash reserves may not avail itself 
of this exception by looking solely at 
the financial condition of the facility, 
operating unit, or site to be closed. 
(b) The "unforeseeable business cir-
cumstances" exception under 
§3(b)(2)(A) of WARN applies to plant 
closings and mass layoffs caused by 
business circumstances that were not 
reasonably foreseeable at the time that 
GO-day notice would have been required. 
(1) An important indicator of a busi-
ness circumstance that is not reason-
ably foreseeable is that the circum-
stance is caused by some sudden, 
dramatic, and unexpected action or 
condition outside the employer's con-
trol. A principal client's sudden and 
unexpected termination of a major 
contract with the employer, a strike at 
a major supplier of the employer, and 
an unanticipated and dramatic major 
economic downturn might each be con-
sidered a business circumstance that is 
not reasonably foreseeable. A govern-
ment ordered closing of an employ-
ment site that occurs without prior 
notice also may be an unforeseeable 
business circumstance. 
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(2) The test for determining when 
business circumstances are not reason-
ably foreseeable focuses on an employ-
er's business judgment. The employer 
must exercise such commercially rea-
sonable business judgment as would a 
similarly situated employer in predict-
ing the demands of its particular mar-
ket. The employer is not required, how-
ever, to accurately predict general 
economic conditions that also may af-
fect demand for its products or services. 
(c) The "natural disaster" exception 
in §3(b)(2)(B) of WARN applies to 
plant closings and mass layoffs due to 
any form of a natural disaster. 
(1) Floods, earthquakes, droughts, 
storms, tidal waves or tsunamis and 
similar effects of nature are natural 
disasters under this provision. 
(2) To qualify for this exception, an 
employer must be able to demonstrate 
that its plant closing or mass layoff is 
a direct result of a natural disaster. 
(3) While a disaster may preclude 
full or any advance notice, such notice 
as is practicable, containing as much 
of the information required in §639.7 
as is available in the circumstances of 
the disaster still must be given, wheth-
er in advance or after the fact of an 
employment loss caused by a natural 
disaster. 
(4) Where a plant closing or mass 
layoff occurs as an indirect result of a 
natural disaster, this exception does not 
apply but the "unforeseeable business 
circumstance" exception described in 
paragraph (b) of this section may be 
applicable. 
§639.10 When may notice be ex-
tended? 
Additional notice is required when 
the date or schedule of dates of a 
planned plant closing or mass layoff is 
extended beyond the date or the ending 
date of any 14-day period announced in 
the original notice as follows: 
(a) If the postponement is for less 
than 60 days, the additional notice 
should be given as soon as possible to 
the parties identified in§639.6 and 
should include reference to the earlier 
notice, the date (or 14-day period) to 
which the planned action is postponed, 
and the reasons for the postponement. 
The notice should be given in a manner 
which will provide the information to 
all affected employees. 
(b) If the postponement is for 60 
days or more, the additional notice 
should be treated as new notice subject 
to the provisions of §§639.5, 639.6, and 
639.7 of this part. Rolling notice, in the 
sense of routine periodic notice, given 
whether or not a plant closing or mass 
layoff is impending, and with the in-
tent to evade the purpose of the Act 
rather than give specific notice as re-
quired by WARN, is not acceptable. 
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